Opinion

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2

3

4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6

7 SHERRIE R. HENDERSON, Case No. 25-cv-10496-JST

8 Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

9 v. REMAND

10 GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, Re: ECF No. 6

Defendant.

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13 Before the Court is Plaintiff Sherrie R. Henderson’s motion to remand. ECF No. 6. The

14 Court will grant the motion.

15 I. BACKGROUND

16 Henderson purchased a 2018 GM Acadia in May 2018. ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 1. She alleges that

17 the vehicle was defective and that Defendant General Motors (“GM”) failed to fulfill its warranty

18 obligations. Id. ¶¶ 12–14.

19 Henderson filed a complaint again GM in Contra Costa County Superior Court on

20 September 15, 2025, alleging claims under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”) and

21 the California Uniform Commercial Code. ECF No. 1-1. The complaint does not demand a

22 specific amount. GM removed the case on December 8, 2025, asserting that this Court has federal

23 question jurisdiction over the MMWA claim and supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs

24 remaining claims. ECF No. 1 at 2–3.

25 Henderson filed this motion to remand on December 30, 2025. ECF No. 6. GM opposed

26 on January 13, 2026. ECF No. 14. Henderson replied on January 21, 2026.

27 II. LEGAL STANDARD

1 if the federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case. The Ninth Circuit “strictly

2 construe[s] the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,” and “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be

3 rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc.,

4 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.1992); Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP, 533 F.3d

5 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008); see 28 U.S.C. § 1441. “The ‘strong presumption’ against removal

6 jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is

7 proper.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (citing Nishimoto v. Federman–Bachrach & Assocs., 903 F.2d

8 709, 712 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990); Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988)).

9 The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”) provides a federal cause of action for

10 express and implied warranty claims under state law. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1). “The Magnuson-

11 Moss Act has its own jurisdictional amount-in-controversy requirement, that is, the amount must

12 exceed $50,000 for federal jurisdiction to be exercised.” Cini v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No.

13 24-CV-00288-RS, 2024 WL 1138035, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2024). The amount-in-

14 controversy is “exclusive of interests and costs.” 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(10).

15 “As with suits in diversity, for MMWA claims, we look no farther than the pleadings to

16 determine the amount in controversy unless from the face of the pleadings, it is apparent, to a legal

17 certainty, that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount claimed.” Shoner v. Carrier Corp., 30 F.4th

18 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2022) (quotations omitted). If the initial pleading seeks nonmonetary relief

19 or “a money judgment, but the State practice either does not permit demand for a specific sum or

20 permits recovery of damages in excess of the amount demanded,” then “the notice of removal may

21 assert the amount in controversy,” but only “if the district court finds, by the preponderance of the

22 evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds the amount specified in section 1332(a).” 28

23 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2); see also Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 88

24 (2014). “In such a case, both sides submit proof and the court decides, by a preponderance of the

25 evidence, whether the amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Id. Under this

26 standard, the defendant bears the burden of providing evidence establishing that it is more likely

27 than not that the amount in controversy exceeds the threshold amount. Sanchez v. Monumental

1 F.3d 696, 701 (2007).

2 “The amount in controversy is simply an estimate of the total amount in dispute, not a

3 prospective assessment of defendant’s liability.” Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott, 936 F.3d

4 920, 927 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Lewis v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 400 (9th Cir.

5 2010)); see also Jauregui v. Roadrunner Transportation Servs., Inc., 28 F.4th 989, 994 (9th Cir.

6 2022) (defining the amount in controversy “as simply ‘the amount at stake in the underlying

7 litigation’” (quoting Theis Rsch., Inc. v. Brown & Bain, 400 F.3d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 2005)));

8 Jauregui, 28 F.4th at 994 (“Importantly, that ‘“[a]mount at stake” does not mean likely or

9 probable liability; rather, it refers to possible liability.’” (quoting Greene v. Harley-Davidson,

10 Inc., 965 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 2020) (emphasis original))). “In that sense, the amount in

11 controversy reflects the maximum recovery the plaintiff could reasonably recover.” Arias, 936

12 F.3d at 927 (emphasis in original); see also Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 417

13 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that the that the amount in controversy includes all amounts “‘at stake’ in

14 the litigation, whatever the likelihood that [the plaintiff] will actually recover them”).

15 III. DISCUSSION

16 The Court finds that GM has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the

17 actual damages exceed $50,000. ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 15, 31.1

18 Henderson seeks actual damages, restitution, a civil penalty in the amount of two times her

19 actual damages pursuant to Civil Code section 1794(c), consequential and incidental damages,

20 remedies authorized by California Commercial Code sections 2711, 2712, and/or 2713, and

21 attorney’s fees. ECF No. 1. While Henderson herself does not provide an estimate for her

22 damages, in its opposition, GM utilizes the formula given in California Commercial Code Section

23 2713 to estimate the damages that Henderson could recover. ECF No. 14 at 12.

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1 GM criticizes Henderson’s counsel for challenging the timeliness of removal, as they apparently

have in other cases. ECF No. 14 at 8–9. Henderson’s counsel does not actually make that

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argument in this case, however. But GM is not the only party to have used a secondhand brief. In

her motion for remand, Henderson asks that the case be remanded to the Los Angeles County

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Superior Court, which is neither within this district nor the court in which the case was originally

1 Henderson purchased a 2018 GMC Acadia on May 2, 2018 for $66,934. ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 6;

2 ECF No. 14-1 ¶ 2. GM estimates that with typical financing terms, the estimated “nonspeculative

3 total purchase price” was $80,321.20. ECF No. 14-1 ¶ 3. However, the $66,934 purchase price

4 listed on the retail installment purchase contract submitted by GM shows that the $66,934 amount

5 already includes financing charges of $10,167.30. ECF No. 14-2 at 2. Thus, $66,934, not

6 $80,321.20, is the total purchase price. Id. GM next estimates that when the vehicle was first

7 presented for repair at 12,448 miles it had an estimated fair market value of $24,480. ECF No. 14-

8 1 ¶ 5. GM concludes, on the basis of that valuation, that Henderson would not be entitled to any

9 additional benefit of the bargain damages as the value at repair does not exceed the consequential

10 damages. ECF No. 14 at 13. GM also estimates that Henderson is entitled to incidental and

11 consequential damages under section 2713, which in GM’s counsel experience typically amounts

12 to at least $5,000. ECF No. 14-1 at 6. GM also argues that attorney’s fees are available under the

13 MMWA. ECF No. 14 at 13. While GM does not provide a total estimate of damages, it estimates

14 that an aggregate total of the total value of the vehicle for the MMWA claim along with incidental

15 and consequential damages and attorney’s fees amounts to substantially more than the $50,000

16 threshold for jurisdiction under the MMWA. Id.

17 Henderson disagrees with GM’s damages estimate (although she provides no estimate of

18 her own). She argues that GM fails to establish “market price at the time” Plaintiff learned of the

19 breach pursuant to Section 2713; that GM’s $5,000 “incidental and consequential damages” figure

20 is unsupported speculation; that GM’s Kelly Blue Book printout is not an accurate measure of the

21 value of her car at 12,448 miles; and that GM cannot rely on the prospect of attorney’s fees to

22 reach the jurisdictional minimum. ECF No. 16.

23 Even accepting GM’s figures, the Court agrees that GM does not establish by a

24 preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000. “California

25 Commercial Code Section 2713 [] provides for ‘diminished value’ damages measured as the

26 ‘difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and the

27 contract price together with any incidental and consequential damages.’” Rodriguez v. Gen.

] (citing Cal. Comm. Code § 2713(1)). Utilizing the formula provided by Section 2713, the Court

2 || estimates the amount in controversy as follows: $66,934 (total purchase price with financing) -

3 $24,480 (market value when Henderson discovered breach) + $ 5,000 (incidental and

4 || consequential damages) = $47,454. That is the amount in controversy.

5 The Court has not included attorney’s fees in its calculations because such fees are not

6 automatically available under the MMWA.” Rather , ECF No. 14 at 13, the Ninth Circuit has held

7 || that “attorneys’ fees are not ‘costs’ within the meaning of the MMWA and therefore may be

8 included in the amount in controversy [only] if they are available to prevailing plaintiffs pursuant

9 || to state fee-shifting statutes.” Shoner v. Carrier Corp., 30 F Ath 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2022). The

10 || only other cause of action in this case is for the violation of California Uniform Commercial Code,

11 which is not a state fee-shifting statute. See Cal. Civ. P. § 1021 (“Except as attorney’s fees are

12 || specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and

13 counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties; but parties to actions

14 || or proceedings are entitled to their costs, as hereinafter provided.”). Accordingly, fees are not

15 || available under the MMWA.

a 16 In short, the amount in controversy of $47,574 does not exceed the necessary threshold to

17 || establish jurisdiction under the MMWA.

18 CONCLUSION

19 For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff Henderson’s motion to remand. This

20 || action is hereby remanded to the County of Contra Costa Superior Court.

21 IT IS SO ORDERED.

22 || Dated: August 17, 2026 .

23 JON S. TIG

United States District Judge

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7 2 GM’s counsel declares that “[b]ased on his firm’s prior experience defending claims brought

under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act,” Plaintiff's counsel typically seeks both past

28 and future attorneys’ fees.” ECF No. 14-1 97. Plaintiff does not bring a claim in this case under

the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. ECF No. 1-1.