The opinion
1
2
3
4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7 R.P.,1 Case No. 25-cv-09833-TSH
8 Plaintiff,
ORDER RE: CROSS-MOTIONS FOR
9 v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
10 SSA COMMISSIONER, Re: Dkt. Nos. 17, 20
11 Defendant.
12
13 I. INTRODUCTION
14 Plaintiff R.P. moves for summary judgment to reverse the Social Security Administration’s
15 denial of her claim for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.
16 ECF No. 17. Defendant cross-moves to affirm. ECF No. 20. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 16-5,
17 the matter is submitted without oral argument. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS
18 Plaintiff’s motion and DENIES Defendant’s cross-motion.2
19 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
20 On February 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed an application for Social Security disability insurance
21 benefits, stating a disability onset date of April 28, 2022. Administrative Record (AR) 224-32.
22 Following denial at the initial and reconsideration levels, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an
23 Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). AR 95-99, 101-04, 108-09. An ALJ held a hearing on October
24 8, 2024 and issued an unfavorable decision on November 22, 2024. AR 15-31, 32-61. The
25
26
1 Partially redacted in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the
recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial
27
Conference of the United States.
1 Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on September 16, 2025. AR 1-6. Plaintiff
2 now seeks review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
3 III. ISSUES FOR REVIEW
4 Plaintiff raises two issues on appeal: (1) the ALJ failed to properly assess her residual
5 functional capacity; and (2) the ALJ failed to properly assess her subjective symptom testimony.
6 IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
7 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) provides this Court’s authority to review the Commissioner’s decision
8 to deny disability benefits, but “a federal court’s review of Social Security determinations is quite
9 limited.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015). The Commissioner’s
10 decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on the
11 application of improper legal standards. Id. Substantial means “more than a mere scintilla,” but
12 only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
13 conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (cleaned up). Under this standard,
14 which is “not high,” the Court looks to the existing administrative record and asks “whether it
15 contains ‘sufficient evidence’ to support the agency’s factual determinations.” Id. at 102 (cleaned
16 up).
17 The Court “must consider the entire record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that
18 supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion, and may not affirm
19 simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d
20 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility,
21 resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.” Id. at 1010 (citation
22 omitted). If “the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing a decision,” the
23 Court must defer to the ALJ’s decision. Id. (citation omitted).
24 Even if the ALJ commits legal error, the ALJ’s decision must be upheld if the error is
25 harmless, meaning “it is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination, or that,
26 despite the legal error, the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned, even if the agency explains
27 its decision with less than ideal clarity.” Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492 (cleaned up). But “[a]
1 conclude that the ALJ’s error was harmless” and is instead “constrained to review the reasons the
2 ALJ asserts.” Id. (cleaned up).
3 V. DISCUSSION
4 A. Framework for Determining Whether a Claimant Is Disabled
5 A claimant is “disabled” under the Social Security Act (1) “if he is unable to engage in any
6 substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
7 impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last
8 for a continuous period of not less than twelve months” and (2) the impairment is “of such severity
9 that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and
10 work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
11 economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A)-(B); Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012).
12 To determine whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ is required to employ a five-step sequential
13 analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1) (disability insurance benefits); id. § 416.920(a)(4) (same
14 standard for supplemental security income). The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one
15 through four. Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
16 At step one, the ALJ must determine if the claimant is presently engaged in a “substantial
17 gainful activity,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i), defined as “work done for pay or profit that
18 involves significant mental or physical activities.” Ford, 950 F.3d at 1148 (cleaned up). Here, the
19 ALJ determined Plaintiff had not performed substantial gainful activity from her onset date of
20 April 28, 2022 through her date last insured of December 31, 2023. AR 20.
21 At step two, the ALJ decides whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of
22 impairments is “severe,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), “meaning that it significantly limits the
23 claimant’s ‘physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.’” Ford, 950 F.3d at 1148
24 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(a)). If no severe impairment is found, the claimant is not disabled.
25 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Here, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe
26 impairments: degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine; poorly controlled
27 diabetes mellitus and hypertension; IBS; obesity; agoraphobia; panic disorder; anxiety disorder;
1 At step three, the ALJ evaluates whether the claimant has an impairment or combination of
2 impairments that meets or equals an impairment in the “Listing of Impairments” (referred to as the
3 “listings”). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii); 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404 Subpt. P, App. 1. The listings
4 describe impairments that are considered “to be severe enough to prevent an individual from doing
5 any gainful activity.” Id. § 404.1525(a). Each impairment is described in terms of “the objective
6 medical and other findings needed to satisfy the criteria of that listing.” Id. § 404.1525(c)(3).
7 “For a claimant to show that his impairment matches a listing, it must meet all of the specified
8 medical criteria. An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how
9 severely, does not qualify.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990) (footnote omitted). If a
10 claimant’s impairment either meets the listed criteria for the diagnosis or is medically equivalent
11 to the criteria of the diagnosis, he is conclusively presumed to be disabled, without considering
12 age, education and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). Here, the ALJ determined Plaintiff
13 did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets the listings. AR 21.
14 If the claimant does not meet or equal a listing, the ALJ proceeds to step four and assesses
15 the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC), defined as the most the claimant can still do
16 despite their imitations (20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1)), and determines whether they are able to
17 perform past relevant work, defined as “work that [the claimant has] done within the past five
18 years that was substantial gainful activity and that lasted long enough for [the claimant] to learn to
19 do it.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(1). If the ALJ determines, based on the RFC, that the claimant
20 can perform past relevant work, the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(f). Here, the ALJ
21 determined Plaintiff has the RFC to
22 to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b). In addition,
she could perform simple routine tasks in a low stress environment,
23 involving only simple instructions and tasks that do not involved
production rate pace (such as on an assembly line) and no hourly
24 quota, with only occasional changes in routine work setting and
occasional interaction with supervisors, co-workers and the public.
25
26 AR 22. Based on this RFC, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could not perform past relevant work.
27 AR 25.
1 significant number of other jobs in the national economy.’” Ford, 950 F.3d at 1149 (quoting
2 Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 955 (9th Cir. 2002)). To meet this burden, the ALJ may rely
3 on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (commonly known as “the grids”), 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404 Subpt.
4 P, App. 2,3 or on the testimony of a vocational expert. Ford, 950 F.3d at 1149 (citation omitted).
5 “[A] vocational expert or specialist may offer expert opinion testimony in response to a
6 hypothetical question about whether a person with the physical and mental limitations imposed by
7 the claimant’s medical impairment(s) can meet the demands of the claimant’s previous work,
8 either as the claimant actually performed it or as generally performed in the national economy.”
9 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(2). An ALJ may also use other resources such as the Dictionary of
10 Occupational Titles (DOT).4 Id. Here, the ALJ determined there were jobs that existed in
11 significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could perform. AR 26. As such,
12 the ALJ determined Plaintiff was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at
13 any time from April 28, 2022, the alleged onset date, through December 31, 2023, the date last
14 insured. AR 27.
15 B. Residual Functional Capacity
16 State agency reviewing consultant A. Cepeda, M.D., found Plaintiff could lift 20 pounds
17 occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; could stand, walk, and sit about 6 hours each in an 8-hour
18 day; could occasionally climb ramps/stairs, ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; could occasionally
19 balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl; and must avoid concentrated exposure to hazards. AR 74-76.
20 On reconsideration, T.S. Bawa, M.D., limited Plaintiff to the full range of light work, finding
21
3 The grids “present, in table form, a short-hand method for determining the availability and
22
numbers of suitable jobs for a claimant.” Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1114-15 (9th
Cir. 2006) (citing Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999)). They consist of three
23
tables, for sedentary work, light work, and medium work, and a claimant’s place on the applicable
table depends on a matrix of four factors: a claimant’s age, education, previous work experience,
24
and physical ability. Id. “For each combination of these factors, [the grids] direct a finding of
either ‘disabled’ or ‘not disabled’ based on the number of jobs in the national economy in that
25
category of physical-exertional requirements.” Id.
4 The DOT classifies jobs by their exertional and skill requirements. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d)(1);
26
Wischmann v. Kijakazi, 68 F.4th 498, 502 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Although criticized as having many
outdated job descriptions, the DOT is typically the starting point for VEs to identify the
27
occupations relevant for each claimant’s residual functional capacities.”) (cleaned up); Pinto v.
1 Plaintiff could lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, stand and walk about 6 hours
2 in an 8-hour workday, and sit for about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. AR 86-87. The ALJ found
3 Dr. Bawa’s opinion persuasive “because it is generally consistent with the preponderance of the
4 longitudinal medical evidence of record as a whole” and it “is the most recent to date.” AR 24.
5 The ALJ found Dr. Cepeda’s opinion unpersuasive, stating Dr. Cepeda limited Plaintiff to “a
6 range of medium work,” which was “not sufficiently restrictive.” AR 25.
7 Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred because “Dr. Cepeda’s opinion comports with the lifting
8 requirements of light work, as Dr. Cepeda determined that [Plaintiff] could occasionally lift
9 twenty pounds and frequently lift ten pounds.” Pl.’s Mot. at 4-5 (citing AR 74). She argues the
10 ALJ’s opinion does not show she properly considered the supportability and consistency factors in
11 weighing Dr. Cepeda’s opinion, as she mischaracterizes the lifting requirements and failed to
12 discuss relevant postural limitations. Id. at 5.
13 1. Legal Standard
14 A claimant’s RFC is an assessment of “the extent to which an individual’s medically
15 determinable impairment(s), including any related symptoms, such as pain, may cause physical or
16 mental limitations or restrictions that may affect his or her capacity to do work-related physical
17 and mental activities.” Laborin v. Berryhill, 867 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Soc. Sec.
18 Ruling 96-8p). It “is the most [a claimant] can still do despite [his or her] limitations.” Id. (citing
19 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1)). The “scope of the RFC plays a crucial role in the ALJ’s determination
20 of whether an individual is disabled and entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act.” Id.
21 “The ALJ is required to consider all of the limitations imposed by the claimant’s impairments,
22 even those that are not severe. Even though a non-severe impairment standing alone may not
23 significantly limit an individual’s ability to do basic work activities it may — when considered
24 with limitations or restrictions due to other impairments — be critical to the outcome of a claim.”
25 Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up) (citing Social
26 Security Ruling 96-8p).
27 2. Analysis
1 an individual who can perform a range of medium work. Dr. Cepeda’s lifting restrictions (20
2 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently) are consistent with the RFC limiting Plaintiff to
3 light work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) (“Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at
4 a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds.”); 20 C.F.R. §
5 404.1567(c) (“Medium work involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time with frequent
6 lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds.”). However, this error is harmless
7 because the ALJ ultimately determined a finding of medium work is “not sufficiently restrictive”
8 and therefore limited Plaintiff to light work. See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492.
9 Beyond this error, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in failing to evaluate Dr. Cepeda’s
10 opinion as it relates to postural and environmental limitations. Pl.’s Mot. at 4. Specifically, Dr.
11 Cepeda found Plaintiff could occasionally climb ramps and stairs, occasionally climb ladders,
12 ropes, and scaffolds, occasionally balance, occasionally stoop, occasionally kneel, occasionally
13 crouch, and occasionally crawl. AR 74-75. Additionally, Dr. Cepeda assessed environmental
14 limitations and found Plaintiff must avoid concentrated exposure to hazards. AR 75.
15 Defendant acknowledges the ALJ’s RFC finding contains no postural or environmental
16 limitations but contends the omission is harmless because the jobs identified by the vocational
17 expert5 would not be precluded by such limitations. Def.’s Mot. at 1-2. In doing so, however,
18 Defendant effectively asks the Court to supply limitations (and corresponding findings) that the
19 ALJ herself did not include in the RFC or analyze in the decision. That approach is
20 impermissible. The Court’s review is limited to the reasoning provided by the ALJ, and it may not
21 affirm on a theory that requires augmenting the RFC with limitations the ALJ never found. See
22 Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009) (courts must review the
23 ALJ’s decision based on the reasoning offered, not post hoc rationalizations). By arguing that the
24 identified occupations would accommodate unspecified postural or environmental restrictions,
25 Defendant invites the Court to make new RFC findings in the first instance, something it cannot
26
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5 The ALJ found Plaintiff could perform the following jobs: Cleaner, Housekeeping (DOT
1 do.
2 Although an ALJ’s error may be deemed harmless where it is inconsequential to the
3 ultimate nondisability determination, the harmless error inquiry must be confined to the ALJ’s
4 stated reasoning and findings. See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492. A reviewing court “may not
5 make independent findings based on the evidence before the ALJ to conclude that the ALJ’s error
6 was harmless,” but instead is “constrained to review the reasons the ALJ asserts.” Id. (cleaned
7 up). Here, because Defendant admits the ALJ does not address Plaintiff’s postural and
8 environmental limitations, the Court finds it cannot deem the omission harmless by hypothesizing
9 how such limitations would interact with the identified jobs.
10 C. Symptom Testimony
11 At the hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff testified to a range of physical and mental
12 symptoms. She stated she stopped working on April 28, 2022 due to back and neck pain. AR 46.
13 She also reported hearing problems requiring a left-ear hearing aid. AR 48. Plaintiff testified she
14 was awaiting right-hand carpal tunnel surgery but could not proceed due to high blood sugar, and
15 that she had experienced numbness in her hands and thumb since the year prior to the hearing.
16 Plaintiff is waiting to undergo carpal tunnel surgery on the right hand and cannot undergo surgery
17 yet because of high blood sugar. Id. She testified to numbness in her hands and thumb since the
18 year prior to the hearing. Id. She described back pain limiting her ability to stand, as well as
19 dizziness and vertigo affecting her balance. AR 48-50. Plaintiff testified she has irritable bowel
20 syndrome that is aggravated by stress. AR 55.
21 Plaintiff also described functional limitations in daily activities. She stated her husband
22 does the cooking because she cannot chop due to carpal tunnel syndrome and because she forgets
23 tasks and burns food. AR 40-41. Although she has a driver’s license, she testified she cannot
24 drive due to medication side effects, including brain fog that interferes with multitasking. AR 41.
25 Her husband drives her to appointments. Id. She reported that during the day she watches
26 television and mostly waits for her husband to return home. AR 53. She can heat simple meals in
27 a microwave, but her husband otherwise does the cooking. Id. She can sweep a small room, but
1 Plaintiff also testified to mental health symptoms. She reported depression and anxiety
2 affecting her interest in activities, having no friends, and rarely speaking with others. AR 52-53.
3 The ALJ found Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be
4 expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms,” but her “statements concerning the intensity,
5 persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical
6 evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision.” AR 23.
7 Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred because she used boilerplate statements to discount her
8 allegations of disabling symptoms and failed to state with specificity the evidence upon which she
9 relied. Pl.’s Mot. at 7.
10 1. Legal Standard
11 The Ninth Circuit has established a two-step analysis to determine the extent to which a
12 claimant’s symptom testimony must be credited:
13 First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented
objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which could
14 reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms
alleged. In this analysis, the claimant is not required to show that her
15 impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the
symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could reasonably
16 have caused some degree of the symptom. Nor must a claimant
produce objective medical evidence of the pain or fatigue itself, or the
17 severity thereof.
18 If the claimant satisfies the first step of this analysis, and there is no
evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony
19 about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear
and convincing reasons for doing so. This is not an easy requirement
20 to meet: The clear and convincing standard is the most demanding
required in Social Security cases.
21
22 Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014–15 (emphasis in original) (cleaned up). Under this standard, “the ALJ
23 must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s
24 complaints.” Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). “In other words,
25 to reject the specific portions of the claimant’s testimony that the ALJ has found not to be
26 credible, we require that the ALJ provide clear and convincing reasons relevant to that portion.”
27 Smith v. Kijakazi, 14 F.4th 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2021); see also Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266,
1 explain the evidence undermining it.”).
2 2. Analysis
3 The ALJ did not make any findings that Plaintiff was malingering. Thus, to find Plaintiff’s
4 testimony not credible, the ALJ was required to make specific findings as to credibility and state
5 clear and convincing reasons for each.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014–15. The Court finds the ALJ
6 did so here.
7 Plaintiff testified she was unable to work due to neck and back pain. AR 48. She testified
8 to problems sitting, standing, and maintaining balance. AR 50. She also testified to depression
9 and anxiety. AR 52. The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s testimony and determined it was not entirely
10 consistent with the objective medical evidence, her conservative treatment, and her improvement
11 with treatment. AR 23-24. The ALJ cited imaging studies that were either normal or showed mild
12 to moderate findings and no evidence of stenosis, AR 23, 24-25 (citing AR 451, 471-73 (normal
13 aging changes which were “not expected to cause such extensive pain.”)); physical and mental
14 exams that contained normal findings, AR 23-24 (citing AR 441, 449-50, 453-54, 502, 1065-66);
15 conservative treatment consisting of medication management and physical therapy, id. (citing AR
16 533, 1061, 1084-85, 1318); and improvement of symptoms with treatment and medication, AR 24
17 (citing AR 362, 398, 486, 520).
18 While Plaintiff argues the ALJ merely provided a “boilerplate” reason to discount her
19 testimony, the record shows the ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s testimony about her alleged
20 limitations and then cited inconsistencies in the record that contradicted her claims. AR 23-25.
21 The ALJ’s explanation for her assessment of Plaintiff’s testimony was thus more than “a single
22 general statement that the claimant’s statements . . . are not credible.” Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at
23 493-94. As such, the ALJ provided valid reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony.
24 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2),(3); Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 498 (9th Cir. 2022)
25 (inconsistency between a claimant’s allegations and relevant medical evidence is a legally
26 sufficient reason to reject a claimant’s subjective testimony); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)
27 (effectiveness of treatment is a relevant factor in determining the severity of a claimant’s
1 treatment” is sufficient to discount a claimant’s testimony regarding severity of an impairment).
2 Plaintiff also asserts the ALJ erred by relying on objective findings, claiming that an ALJ
3 cannot “discredit a claimant’s testimony about symptom severity on the basis that it was not
4 supported by objective evidence.” Pl.’s Mot. at 12. However, ALJs are required to “evaluate
5 whether the [symptom] statements are consistent with objective medical evidence and the other
6 evidence.” Soc. Sec. Ruling 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *6. Thus, it was reasonable for the ALJ
7 to consider the objective medical evidence along with other factors to discount Plaintiff’s
8 complaints. Further, the ALJ did not solely rely on objective evidence; as discussed above, the
9 ALJ also cited other factors such as conservative treatment and reports of improvement.
10 Plaintiff next argues there is evidence in the record that supports her testimony, including
11 that her medications were adjusted multiple times and that the record contains a Global
12 Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score of between 31-40.6 Pl.’s Mot. at 12-14. Plaintiff may
13 have drawn different conclusions about the record had she been the fact finder, but this argument
14 does not show error and ignores the deferential “substantial evidence” standard of review. 42
15 U.S.C. § 405(g). The “key question is not whether there is substantial evidence that could support
16 a finding of disability, but whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s
17 actual finding that claimant is not disabled.” Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir.
18 1997). And “whatever the meaning of ‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such
19 evidentiary sufficiency [in Social Security disability cases] is not high.” Biestek, 587 U.S. at 102.
20 While Plaintiff may disagree with the ALJ’s interpretation of the evidence, the “‘possibility of
21 drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative
22 agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.’” Fletcher-Silvas v. Saul, 791 F.
23 App’x 647, 649 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620
24 (1966)); Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If the record would
25 support more than one rational interpretation, we defer to the ALJ’s decision.”). Thus, if an ALJ
26
6 The Court notes the ALJ did consider the GAF score, finding that, despite the score, mental
27
status examinations were generally normal aside from depressed mood, and longitudinal records
1 “show[s her] work” and the rationale for discounting a claimant’s symptom statements “is clear
2 enough that it has the power to convince,” the ALJ’s decision should be affirmed, even if the
3 reviewing court would have decided the issue differently. Smartt, 53 F.4th at 499; Thomas, 278
4 F.3d at 959 (When substantial evidence supports the ALJ's assessment of a claimant’s subjective
5 complaints, the reviewing court “may not engage in second-guessing.”).
6 Here, a review of the ALJ's opinion reveals she properly considered the substance of
7 Plaintiff’s complaints, but she ultimately determined they could not be fully credited in light of
8 other evidence in the record. The Court cannot conclude that the ALJ erred by failing to say more
9 or interpret the evidence differently. As such, the ALJ’s finding on this ground must be affirmed.
10 D. Remedy
11 As the ALJ failed to address Plaintiff’s postural and environmental limitations in the
12 context of her RFC and how they may impact her ability to perform the identified jobs, the
13 remaining question is whether to remand for further administrative proceedings or for the
14 immediate payment of benefits. The Social Security Act permits courts to enter a judgment
15 “affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or
16 without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Garrison, 759 F.3d at
17 1019. “[W]here the record has been developed fully and further administrative proceedings would
18 serve no useful purpose, the district court should remand for an immediate award of benefits.”
19 Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th Cir. 2004). However, “[r]emand for further
20 proceedings is appropriate where there are outstanding issues that must be resolved before a
21 disability determination can be made, and it is not clear from the record that the ALJ would be
22 required to find the claimant disabled if all the evidence were properly evaluated.” Luther v.
23 Berryhill, 891 F.3d 872, 877–78 (9th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). It is only “rare circumstances
24 that result in a direct award of benefits” and “only when the record clearly contradicted an ALJ’s
25 conclusory findings and no substantial evidence within the record supported the reasons provided
26 by the ALJ for denial of benefits.” Leon v. Berryhill, 880 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 2017).
27 While the ALJ failed to fully and fairly develop the record when evaluating Plaintiff’s
] Accordingly, remand for further proceedings is appropriate.
2 VI. CONCLUSION
3 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’'s motion and DENIES
4 || Defendant’s cross-motion. This matter is REMANDED for further administrative proceedings
5 consistent with this order. The Court shall enter a separate judgment, after which the Clerk of
6 Court shall terminate the case.
7 IT IS SO ORDERED.
8
9 || Dated: August 17, 2026
10 AZ \.. I.
THOMAS S. HIXSON
1] United States Magistrate Judge
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