Vang

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8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 JUAN A. CARRILLO, No. 2:26-cv-0683-DMC-P

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER

14 D. VANG,

15 Defendant.

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17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to

18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s original complaint, ECF No. 1.

19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

21 § 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was

22 initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel.

23 Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or

24 portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can

25 be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See

26 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).

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1 Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a

2 “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

3 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See

4 McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)).

5 These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim

6 and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996).

7 Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific

8 defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this

9 standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law

10 when the allegations are vague and conclusory.

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12 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

13 Plaintiff names D. Vang as the only defendant. See ECF No. 1, pg. 1. Plaintiff

14 alleges that he was defamed by a non-party correctional officer who retaliated against him and

15 endangered his safety by stating that Plaintiff was a member of the Mexican mafia. See id. at 2.

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17 II. DISCUSSION

18 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint is defective for multiple reasons, each

19 discussed in more detail below. First, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for

20 retaliation. Second, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim based on disregard

21 for his safety. Third, Plaintiff has not alleged facts to establish a causal connection between

22 named defendant Vang and the denial of a constitutional right.

23 A. Retaliation

24 In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for retaliation, the plaintiff must

25 establish that he was retaliated against for exercising a constitutional right, and that the retaliatory

26 action was not related to a legitimate penological purpose, such as preserving institutional

27 security. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). In meeting

28 this standard, the prisoner must demonstrate a specific link between the alleged retaliation and the

1 exercise of a constitutional right. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995);

2 Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 1989). The prisoner must also

3 show that the exercise of First Amendment rights was chilled, though not necessarily silenced, by

4 the alleged retaliatory conduct. See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000), see also

5 Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 569 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, the prisoner plaintiff must

6 establish the following in order to state a claim for retaliation: (1) prison officials took adverse

7 action against the inmate; (2) the adverse action was taken because the inmate engaged in

8 protected conduct; (3) the adverse action chilled the inmate’s First Amendment rights; and (4) the

9 adverse action did not serve a legitimate penological purpose. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568.

10 Here, Plaintiff has not alleged facts to show that either named defendant Vang or

11 the non-party correctional officer defamed Plaintiff because of Plaintiff’s protected activity.

12 More to the point, Plaintiff does not allege that he engaged in any protected activity whatsoever.

13 Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend to allege additional facts to support a

14 retaliation claim. To the extent Plaintiff believes the non-party correctional officer named in the

15 complaint is responsible, the amended complaint should list this individual as a defendant.

16 B. Safety

17 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the

18 prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel

19 and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan,

20 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts

21 of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102

22 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v.

23 Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with

24 “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy,

25 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when

26 two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such

27 that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)

28 subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of

1 inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison

2 official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.

3 Under these principles, prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to

4 protect inmates from safety risks. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9th Cir. 1982);

5 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. Liability exists only when two requirements are met: (1) objectively,

6 the prisoner was incarcerated under conditions presenting a substantial risk of serious harm; and

7 (2) subjectively, prison officials knew of and disregarded the risk. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

8 The very obviousness of the risk may suffice to establish the knowledge element. See Wallis v.

9 Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1995). Prison officials are not liable, however, if evidence

10 is presented that they lacked knowledge of a safety risk. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. The

11 knowledge element does not require that the plaintiff prove that prison officials know for a

12 certainty that the inmate’s safety is in danger, but it requires proof of more than a mere suspicion

13 of danger. See Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). Finally, the plaintiff must

14 show that prison officials disregarded a risk. Thus, where prison officials actually knew of a

15 substantial risk, they are not liable if they took reasonable steps to respond to the risk, even if

16 harm ultimately was not averted. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.

17 Here, Plaintiff claims that a non-party correctional officer falsely accused him of

18 being a member of the Mexican mafia. Plaintiff has not, however, alleged that this information

19 was made known to the prison population such that, objectively, it can be said that Plaintiff was

20 in any danger. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend. As with Plaintiff’s retaliation

21 claim, to the extent Plaintiff believes the non-party correctional officer named in the complaint is

22 responsible, the amended complaint should list this individual as a defendant.

23 C. Causal Link

24 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual

25 connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See

26 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A

27 person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of

28 § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform

1 an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.”

2 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations

3 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See

4 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth

5 specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional

6 deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).

7 Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts relating to the only named defendant, D.

8 Vang. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend to allege facts which show how

9 Defendant Vang is responsible for either the alleged retaliation or disregard for Plaintiff’s safety.

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11 III. CONCLUSION

12 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by

13 amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire

14 action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is

15 informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See

16 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to

17 amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended

18 complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if

19 Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make

20 Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be

21 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.

22 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the

23 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

24 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

25 each named defendant is involved and must set forth some affirmative link or connection between

26 each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167

27 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

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] Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the

2 || time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at

3 || 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply

4 | with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b).

5 || See Neviyel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).

6 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

7 1. Plaintiffs original complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and

8 2. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of

9 || service of this order.

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11 | Dated: July 23, 2026 Ss..c0_,

12 DENNIS M. COTA

13 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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