Shiheed

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT. .

DISTRICT OF MARYLAND | |

YAHYISHIHEED, □ yo

Plaintiff,

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER

TINA HUGHES, .

WARDEN KEITH ARNOLD, ~ .

TRISTAN McCROBIE, .

Correctional Officer IL, Civil Action No. 23-1862-TDC □

LEON GOODRICH, _ .

Correctional Officer Sergeant,

DAVID SPENCE, Correctional Officer II,

WESLEY APPEL, Correctional Officer IT, □□

- RANDALL OATES, Correctional Officer II, | -

JEREMY SNYDER, Correctional Officer II, .

Defendants. □

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Yahyi Shiheed, an inmate currently confined at the Western Correctional □

Institution (“WCTI”). in Cumberland, Maryland, has filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42

US.C. § 1983 against Correctional Officers Tina Hughes, Tristan McCrobie, Leon Goodrich,

David Spence, Wesley Appel, Randall Oates, and Jeremy Snyder, as well as Warden Keith Amold,

_ in which he alleges that they failed to protect him from harm, in violation of his rights under the

United States Constitution, while he was incarcerated at the North Branch Correctional Institution

(“NBCTI’”) in Cumberland, Maryland. Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the □

. Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. Despite being advised of his right to respond to the

Motion, Shihéed has failed to do so. Having reviewed the pleadings and submitted materials, the

Court finds that no hearing is necessary. See D. Md. Local R. 105.6. For the reasons set forth □

below, the Motions will be GRANTED.

BACKGROUND.

On March 28, 2025, the Court issued an.order which, among other things, defined the

operative Complaint as both the original Complaint, ECF No. 1, and the Amended Complaint,

ECF No. 27. Defendants previously filed Motions to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motions for

_ Summary: Judgment which the Court denied without prejudice after Shiheed filed the Amended □

Complaint. Those dispositive motions were accompanied by exhibits, which Defendants reference

and rely on in support of their now pending dispositive Motion. ©

In his pleadings, Shiheed alleges that on April 10, 2022 at approximately 9:05 p.m., □

Correctional Officer Tina Hughes saw him get stabbed multiple times by two other inmates in the

outside recreation yard cages. Hughes did not “call the 10-10 code,” which Shiheed asserts would

have prevented his injuries. Compl. at 3, ECF No. 1. Shiheed further asserts that Correctional

Officers McCrobie, Goodrich, Spence, Appel, Oates, and Snyder were present as escorts when he

was stabbed, but none of them called “a code” to prevent the stabbing. Am. Compl. at 4~5, ECF

~ No. 21. Shiheed states that believes that these correctional officers knew the stabbing would

take place and were deliberately indifferent to its occurrence. According to Shiheed, after the

stabbing, a nurse refused to treat him, and he had to see another nurse the following morning in

order to receive care. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

The parties do not dispute that Shiheed was stabbed by two inmates during the recreation

period. On the date of the incident, Shiheed was housed in MAX-II security in the D Wing of

NBCI’s Housing Unit 2 (“HU2”). On the evening of the incident, Ramadan services were held

from 7:00 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. The services were held in two separate locations: one group had

services oti the south side of the NBCI compound, where general population is located, and another

group held services on the north side, where the segregation and MAX II units are located. Hughes,

=. Appel, McCrobie, Oates, and Snyder were assigned as Escort Relief Officers on thig shift.

Recreation time ran later than normal that evening due to the Ramadan services and

because of a slowly operating door in another housing unit. Shiheed was in the last outdoor:

recreation group of the evening and was in Yard 7 at the time of the altercation.

At approximately 8:46 p.m., Shiheed was stabbed by inmates Darryl Powell and Malik

Shakur. Surveillance video footage does not show any of the named defendants in the vicinity of

the recreation yard when the attack occurred. The video shows two inmates in a recreation cage

who appear to attack another inmate, later identified as Shiheed. The attack appears to continue

for approximately 90 seconds, after which Shiheed stood up and the other inmates walked away.

Shiheed then walked around the recreation area, adjusting his clothing and sitting alone in the cage.

According to Spence, he was not assigned to monitor recreation at the time of the incident

but instead was assigned as a Medical Rover. In that role, as seen in the video footage, he passed

by the recreation yard shortly before the altercation. He asserts that he saw other officers

“monitoring recreation but did not see any disturbance. Spence has further stated that, prior to the

. attack, he had no advanced knowledge that Shiheed had any fear for his safety: or was in any danger

that day. .

At Shiheed’s administrative hearing on February 22, 2023, Hughes testified that “a total of

four officers [were] watching the yards,” and she “was the escort officer assigned to help the yard

officer watch the yard for the night on the north side.” 2/22/23 Hrg. Tr. at 19, Mot. Dismiss Ex.

E, ECF No. 21-9. The yard officers took turns taking 15-minute walks up and down the yards. If

an officer witnesses an altercation, the procedure is to call a 10-10 code and to make sure that the

is secure before officers enter the area. Hughes testified that she did not witness the fight,

and had she seen a fight, she would have called for assistance. During this time, no one, including

Shiheed, attempted to alert:the officers about an attack.

At approximately 9:10 p.m., Shiheed was escorted inside from the recreation yard. At that

time, Hughes observed his injuries and alerted other officers to check Shiheed’s recreation group.

Hughes reviewed the video of the yard and saw Shakur, Powell, and’ Shiheed involved in an

altercation. Later a weapon was found in the holding cell in which Shakur had been secured after

the incident. .

Powell and Shakur were detained on suspicion of their involvement in the altercation. -

Shiheed was searched for weapons or contraband and escorted to the HU2 medical room, where’.

he was photographed in the presence of a nurse who attempted to evaluate him. ‘According to the

Serious Incident Report and Information Reports prepared after the incident, McCrobie, Goodrich,

Spence, Appel, Oates, and Snyder responded after the assault to escort Shiheed and his suspected □

assailants to strip cages, holding cells, and medical evaluation rooms. Snyder assisted in securing

Shiheed’s handeufts after he came in from recreation. . oO

According to medical records, Shiheed refused treatment, declined to sign a Release of

Responsibility form, and left the medical room. The nurse and Goodrich signed the Release of

Responsibility form noting Shiheed’s refusal of treatment and his refusal to sign the form. The

following morning, a registered nurse who was conducting daily rounds on the segregation tier

noticed that Shiheed had dried blood on his face and neck. ‘Shiheed agreed to be escorted to the

medical room: where the nurse cleaned and dressed his wounds. At that time, Shiheed was not

actively bleeding, but the nurse observed “[s}mall cuts and puncture wounds” in his upper □□□□

and back, a swollen jaw, an open cut under his bruised right eye which she closed with steri-strips,

abrasions on the knuckles of his left hand and his knees. Med. Records at 1, Opp’n First Mot.

Dismiss Ex. B,. ECF No. 14-3, At that time, Shiheed did not have trouble speaking or opening or

closing his mouth. .

All three inmates involved in the altercation were charged with rule infractions and were

moved to administrative segregation, pending adjustment. Ultimately, the disciplinary charges

filed against Shiheed were dismissed:

Shiheed filed a timely Administrative Remedy Procedure grievance (“ARP”) on April □□□□

2022 in which he claimed that Hughes had witnessed the altercation but failed to protect him. In

response to the ARP, Hughes submitted an Information Report on May 12, 2022, in which she

stated that she did not witness the altercation and saw Shiheed’s injuries only after the fact. On

May 16, 2022, Defendant Warden Keith Arnold dismissed the ARP as without merit because

Hughes did not actually witness the assault, Shiheed filed an appeal of this decision to the

Commissioner of Correction, who affirmed the Warden’s decision. Shiheed appealed that decision □

to the Inmate Grievance Office, which referred the matter to the Maryland Office of Administrative

Hearings. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge denied relief, in part based on the finding

that there was no evidence that Hughes or any other correctional officers had advanced knowledge

that the two inmates intended to attack Shiheed on the date of the incident. Prior to this incident,

Shiheed had not reported either of his attackers, Powell or Shakur, as enemies.

DISCUSSION

In their Motion, Defendants seek dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

or summary judgment under Rule 56. In support of their Motion, Defendants argue that: (1) they

are immune from suit in their official capacities under the Eleventh Amendment to the

Constitution; (2) Shiheed has alleged no facts demonstrating personal involvement by Warden

Arnold: (3) Shiheed’s claims are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel:

Defendants are entitled to dismissal or summary judgment on the constitutional claims because

Shiheed has failed to present sufficient allegations or evidence to support those claims; and (6)

- Defendants ar entitled to qualified immunity. .

i . Legal Standards

To defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must allege enough facts

to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is

‘plausible. when the facts pleaded allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Legal conclusions or conclusory statements □

do not suffice. Jd. A court must examine the complaint as a whole, consider the factual allegations .

in the complaint as true, and construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Davidson

Cnty, 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005). A self-represented party’s complaint must be construed □

liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 US. 89, 94 (2007). However, “liberal construction does not □

mean overlooking the pleading requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Bing □□

Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 Fd 605, 618 (4th Cir, 2020). . □

Defendants filed their Motion asa Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for

Summary Judgment and attached exhibits for consideration, Typically, when deciding a motion

to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court considers only the complaint and any attached

documents: Sec’y of State for Defence v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir.

2007). Rule 12(d) requires courts to treat such a motion as a motion for summary judgment where

matters outside the pleadings are considered and not excluded: “Fed: R. Civ. P. 12(d). Before .

converting a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment, courts must give the nonmoving

Po

party “a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Id

“Reasonable opportunity” has two requirements: (1) the nonmoving party must have some notice

that the court is treating the Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a motion for summary judgment, and (2) the

nonmoving party “must be afforded a reasonable opportunity for discovery” to obtain information

essential to oppose the motion. Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 177 (4th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted).

- Here, the notice requirement has been satisfied by the title of Defendants’ Motion. To

show that a reasonable opportunity for discovery has not been afforded, the nonmoving party must

file an affidavit or declaration under Rule 56(d) or another filing, explaining why, “for specified

reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.”. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). See □

Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244-45 (4th Cir. 2002). Shiheed has

not opposed the Motion or asserted that he needs additional discovery in order to address the

Motion. The Court therefore will construe the Motion as a Motion for Summary Judgment as to

the arguments requiring consideration of the exhibits. -

_ Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), the Court grants summary judgment if the

moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue.as to any material fact, and that the’ □

moving party is entitled to judgment asa matter of law. Fed. R Civ, P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 US. 317, 322 (1986). In assessing the Motion, the Court views the facts in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party, with all justifiable inferences drawn in its favor. Anderson

vy. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 US. 242, 255 (1986). The Court may rely only on facts supported in

the revord, not simply assertions in the pleadings. Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., □

F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit

under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 US. at 248. A dispute of material fact is “genuine”

only if sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party exists for the trier of fact to return a

verdict for that party. Id, at 248-49.

IL Warden Arnold a

As to Warden Arnold, Defendants argue that the claims against him must‘be dismissed

because Shiheed makes no direct allegations against him. To the extent that Shiheed seeks to hold

Warden Amold responsible for the actions of his subordinates, the doctrine of respondeat superior,

‘or vicarious liability, is not applicable to § 1983 claims. See Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766,

782 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983). Thus,a_

supervisor may be held liable under § 1983 for the actions of subordinates only upon a showing

that: (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that a subordinate was engaged in

conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to individuals like

the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor’s response to the knowledge was -SO inadequate as to show

deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization ’of the alleged offensive practices -and (3) there was ,

an affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury

suffered by the plaintiff. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994). “A single act or

isolated incidents are normally insufficient to establish supervisory inaction upon which to

predicate § 1983 liability.” Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932, 936 (4th Cir. 1983) (footnote and

citations omitted). .

Here, Shiheed has failed to plead or demonstrate sufficient facts showing that Warden □

Amold is subject to supervisory liability. In particular, there is no allegation or evidence that .

Warden Amold had any involvement in or knowledge of the alleged failure by the other defendants

to protect Shiheed from an attack by fellow inmates or the alleged delay in securing medical care.

Accordingly, all claims against Warden Amold must be dismissed.

. TIE Failure to Protect Claim

Where Shiheed was a convicted prisoner at the time of this incident, his claim based on a

failure to protect him from the assault by other inmates is governed by the Eighth Amendment to

the Constitution, ‘which protects prison inmates from “cruel and unusual punishments.” US.

Const. amend, VIII. Though an Eighth Amendment claim could arise from a failure to protect an

inmate from an assault by another inmate, “not every injury suffered by a prisoner at the hands of

another translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim’s

safety.” Makdessi v. Fields,-789 F 3d 126, 133 (4th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). A two-part

inquiry that includes both an objective and a subjective component must be satisfied before

liability is established, See Raynor v. Pugh, 817 F.3d 123, 127-28 (4th Cir. 2016).. Objectively,

_ the prisoner “must establish a serious deprivation of his rights in the form of a serious or significant

physical or etnotional injury” or a substantial risk of such an injury. Id. (quoting Danser v.

Stansberry, m F.3d 340, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2014)). Subjectively, the prisoner must establish that

_ the prison officials exhibited deliberate or callous indifference toa specific known risk of harm.

_ See Pressly v. Hutto, 816 F.2d 977, 979 (4th Cir. 1987). Such deliberate indifference exists if there

‘was a substantial risk of serious harm that was “longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or

expressly noted by prison officials in the past,” and the prison official in question had been exposed

to that information but did not reasonably respond to it. Cox v. Quinn, 828 F .3d 227, 236 (4th Cir.

2016). Deliberate indifference also exists when prison officials were “aware that the plaintiff

. inmate face[d] a serious danger to his safety and they could avert the danger easily, yet they failfed]

to do so.” Id ‘Where prison officials respond reasonably to the risk, they are not liable even if the

was not ultimately averted. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844. (1994).

Here, although Shiheed suffered an objectively serious, injury, the record does not support

the conclusion that Defendants acted with deliberate or callous indifference to a specific known □

risk of harm. The record establishes that Shiheed was spontaneously attacked by two other inmates

during the recreation period. ‘Although he has alleged Defendants knew that the attack was about .

to take place, there is no evidentiary support for this claim. There is no evidence that anyone at

or any of the specific named Defendants, was aware in advance that Powell and Shakur

presented any risk of harm to Shiheed. Defendants have provided uncontested evidence that

neither assailant was listed among Shiheed’s known enemies, and unlike in many successful

failure-to-protect cases, there are no specific allegations, and no evidence, that Shiheed told any

of the defendants that he feared for his safety in general or in specific relation to Powell and Shakur.

See, eg, Cox, 828 F.3d at 236-37 (affirming the denial of summary judgment on a failure-to-

‘protect claim where the plaintiff had repeatedly informed prison officials that he was being

threatened and requested that he or the potentially dangerous inmates be transferred).

Moreover, the evidence does not support the conclusion that any of Defendants were

present at the time of the assault. Not only has Hughes denied that she witnessed the assault and

stated that she became aware of the attack only when she observed the blood on Shiheed upon his

removal from the recreation yard, but the surveillance video generally corroborates that account,

‘because it provides no evidence that Hughes or any other defendant was present at the scene at the

time of the assault. The only correctional officer seen in the video is Spence, who walked by the.

area prior to the initiation of the assault and was not present at the time of the attack. As to the

other defendants, McCrobie, Goodrich, Appel, Oates, and Snyder, there is no evidence establishing

that they saw the incident, only that they arrived on the scene to escort Shiheed and his assailants

from the area to holding cells and the medical unit, Thus, the record does not support the □□

conclusion that Defendants were aware of a known risk of harm prior to the assault. □

Under these circumstances, the Court finds that the record does not support the conclusion _

_ that Defendarits were aware that Shiheed faced A “substantial tisk of serious harm” from his

attackers that they did not seek to address. Cox, 828 F.3d at 236 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at

837). Accordingly, the Court finds that Shiheed cannot succeed on his Bighth Amendment failure-

to-protect claim and will grant the Motion as to that claim.

IV. Medical Care Claim .

_ As to Shiheed’s claim that Defendants failed to provide him with adequate medical care,

an Fighth Amendment claim relating to inadequate medical care requires that a plaintiff □

demonstrate that the actions of the defendants, or-their failure to act, amounted to deliberate : :

indifference to a serious tnedical need. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 US. 97, 106 (1976). Such

deliberate indifference requires proof that, objectively, the prisoner plaintiff was suffering froma .

serious medical need and that, subjectively, the prison staff was aware of the need for medical

attention but failed either. to provide it or to ensure that the needed care was available. See Iko v.

Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008). Objectively, the medical condition at issue must be

‘ serious. Hudson v. MeMillian, 503 U.S. 1,9 (1992). A medical condition is serious when it is “so

obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Tko,

535 F.3d at 241 (citation omitted).

As for the subjective component, “fa)n official is deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s

serious medical needs only when he or she subj ectively knows of and disregards an excessive □□□□

inmate health or safety.” Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting

, Farmer, 511 U.S, at 837). “[I]t is not enough that an official should have known of a risk; he or

she must have had actual subjective knowledge of both the inmate’s serious medical condition and

the excessive risk posed by the official’s action ot inaction.” Id. “[M]any acts or omissions that

would constitute medical malpractice. will not rise to the level of deliberate indifference.” Id.

Thus, “[d]eliberate indifference is more than mere negligence, but less than acts or omissions done □

for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Scinto v. □

Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 205 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Farmer, 511 US. at 835). Under this

standard, a mere disagreement between an inmate and a physician over the appropriate level of

_ care does not establish an Eighth Amendment violation absent exceptional circumstances. Id.

Moreover, even if the requisite subjeétive knowledge is established, an official may avoid liability

if the official “responded reasonably to the tisk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.”

"Farmer, 51 US. at 844.0

Here, the uncontroverted records demonstrate that Shiheed was taken to the medical unit

immediately after the attack. . According to Defendants, he refused medical treatment from the

nurse, as documented on a Release of Responsibility form signed by Goodrich and the nurse on

_ duty. The following morning, he was seen by a nurse during rounds who observed Shiheed’s

injuries and treated them by cleansing the wounds and applying steri-strips. Where Defendants,

who are correctional officers, arranged to have Shiheed taken to the medical unit promptly, and he

‘was seen by a nurse, the record does not support a claim of deliberate indifference to his medical

needs by Defendants. See Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 854-55 (4th Cir, 1990) (noting that, in

relation to a claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a warden was entitled to

rely upon the health care providers’ expertise); Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004)

(stating that “lil a prisoner is under the care of medical experts vee a non-medical prison official

will generally be Justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands”); Shelton v. Angelone,

F, Supp. 2d 670, 679 (W.D. Va. 2001) (dismissing an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need against security - officers ‘because the “nonmedical

defendants were entitled to rely on” the judgment of a medical staff member as to whether the

plaintiff's “injuries required treatment”). , □

Byen if there remains a factual dispute on whether Shiheed refused treatment or an

argument that the nurse should have provided more treatment than was actually provided, Shiheed: □

has neither alleged nor provided sufficient facts demonstrating that his condition was such that,

following the nurse’s assessment of his condition, the correctional officers who brought him to the

medical unit would have been subjectively aware of a serious risk that required that they take

additional action in relation to his medical care. The lack of evidence of such a known risk is

illustrated by the fact that, upon examination by a nurse the next morning, only limited treatment

was required. Where Shiheed has not provided sufficient evidence to establish that Defendants .

engaged in deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, the Motion will be granted as to this

claim. In so ruling, the Court.does not address whether Shiheed has any viable claims against the

«medical staff, which is the‘subj ect of a separate case. See Shiheed v. Massalla, No. SAG-22-1950

(D. Md.).

_ CONCLUSION

_ For the. foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion

for Summary Judgment, will be GRANTED. A separate Order shall be issued. on,

Date: August 27, 2026

THEODORE D. CHYANS

. . United States Distri Judge