The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-30283
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
AMELIE BROWN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the
Western District of Louisiana
(95-CR-20042-01)
February 24, 1997
Before JOHNSON, EMILIO M. GARZA, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Amelie Brown appeals his convictions for interstate
transportation of a stolen vehicle and making false claims and
statements to an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312 and § 1001 respectively. Brown
contends that (1) the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress statements made to the FBI agents allegedly in violation
of his Miranda rights, and (2) the district court erred in denying
his motion for judgment of acquittal.
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
“In reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress based on live testimony at a suppression hearing, the
district court’s findings of historical fact must be accepted
unless clearly erroneous or influenced by an incorrect view of the
law.” United States v. Foy, 28 F.3d 464, 474 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 610 (1994). After thoroughly review of the
record in this case, we conclude that the district court’s finding
that Brown was properly advised of his constitutional rights prior
to making statements to the FBI agents was not clearly erroneous.
Thus, the district court’s denial of Brown’s motion to suppress
statements made to FBI agents was proper.
In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal
conviction this Court must determine whether, viewing the evidence
in a light most favorable to the government, a rational trier of
fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). We find that
a reasonable juror could have determined that Brown intentionally
deprived the vehicle’s owner of the benefit of its ownership and
that Brown was properly convicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2312.
See United States v. Martinez, 694 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1982).
A violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 requires five elements: “(1)
a statement that is (2) false, (3) material, (4) made with the
requisite specific intent, and (5) within the purview of government
agency jurisdiction.” United States v. Shah, 44 F.3d 285, 289 (5th
Cir. 1995). In challenging his conviction under § 1001, Brown
claims that his statement was not material. He asserts that
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because the FBI agents were aware of the falsity of the statement
before he made the statement, it could not have been material.
A material statement is defined as statement that has “a
natural tendency to influence, or [one that is] capable of
affecting or influencing, a government function.” United States v.
Swaim, 757 F.2d 1530, 1534 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 825
(1985). Importantly, “actual influence or reliance by a government
agency is not required.” United States v. Puente, 982 F.2d 156,
159 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 962 (1993). Thus, a
statement may still be material irrespective of whether the
government had prior knowledge of the falsity of the statement. As
such, we find that a reasonable juror could have concluded that
Brown made a material misrepresentation of fact with the intent to
mislead agents of the FBI into believing that he was in lawful
possession of the vehicle.
Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Brown’s
motion to suppress or Brown’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
AFFIRMED.
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