The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA – EASTERN DIVISION
10
11 SANTOS SERRANO, Case No. ED CV 26-3341-FMO
(AS)
12 Petitioner,
13 v. ORDER GRANTING PETITION
14 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, et al.,
15
Respondents.
16
17
18 INTRODUCTION
19
20 On June 15, 2026, Santos Serrano (A# 246-057-185)
21 (“Petitioner”), an immigration detainee who is proceeding pro se
22 and is in the custody of United States Immigration and Customs
23 Enforcement (“ICE”) at the Adelanto ICE Processing Center in
24 Adelanto, California, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
25 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”), challenging the legality of
26 his December 2025 arrest and ongoing detention. (Dkt. No. 1).
27 Petitioner also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order
28 (“TRO”), which was subsequently denied. (Dkt. Nos. 2, 11).
1 On June 23, 2026, Respondents filed an Answer to the Petition.
2 (Dkt. No. 9). Respondents state that they “oppose Petitioner’s
3 immediate release from immigration detention because Petitioner
4 has a final order of removal and he has agreed to voluntarily
5 depart the United States by July 8, 2026.” (Id. at 2). According
6 to Respondents, if Petitioner is entitled to any relief here, “it
7 is not the extraordinary relief of immediate release but instead a
8 bond hearing.” (Id.).
9
10 On July 2, 2026, Petitioner filed a Motion - construed as a
11 Second TRO Motion - seeking “emergency relief,” including release
12 from detention. (Dkt. No. 13). Petitioner contends that he never
13 agreed to depart the United States voluntarily, and he asserts that
14 he has filed an appeal of the immigration judge’s removal order
15 with the Board of Immigration Appeals (or “BIA”). (Id. at 2-6).
16
17 For the reasons stated below, the Petition is granted, and
18 Respondents are ordered to immediately release Petitioner from
19 immigration detention and further ordered from re-detaining
20 Petitioner without providing him with notice and a pre-detention
21 hearing before a neutral decisionmaker at which the government
22 bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that
23 Petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community.
24
25 BACKGROUND
26
27 Petitioner, a Mexican citizen, arrived in the United States
28 without inspection on or about December 2003. (See Answer Ex. A;
1 Answer Ex. B at 3; Petition at 9, 48). He has resided in the United
2 States continuously since then. He and his partner now have two
3 daughters who are about nineteen and fourteen years old,
4 respectively, and a son who is about eleven. (See Petition at 10-
5 11, 58). His younger daughter was born deaf and requires “more
6 special care and special professional help.” (Id.). Petitioner’s
7 family depends on him for care and support, and he has worked for
8 many years in construction to support them. (Id.).
9
10 In 2022, apparently arising from a domestic dispute with
11 Petitioner’s partner, Petitioner was arrested on charges of
12 exhibiting a deadly weapon (other than a firearm) and threatening
13 a crime with intent to terrorize. (See Answer Ex. B at 6; Petition
14 at 58-59). He spent four days in jail but was then released under
15 a diversion program, pursuant to which he completed anger
16 management and other classes, and he also voluntarily attended
17 Alcoholics Anonymous meetings. (Petition at 58-59; Answer Ex. B at
18 6).
19
20 On or about December 14, 2025, Petitioner was arrested by ICE
21 agents who had abruptly approached his car when he was near a park
22 in Los Angeles, California, and asked him whether he had legal
23 status.1 (Petition at 12; Answer Ex. B at 3, 6). He was taken to
24
25
1 According to a deportation officer’s report of the arrest,
26 Petitioner voluntarily stepped out of his vehicle when asked to do
so but was then deceptive and evasive when responding to the
27 officers’ questions – initially stating, for example, that his
country of citizenship was the United States before eventually
28
1 an ICE office in downtown Los Angeles for processing and served
2 with a Notice to Appear charging him as removable under section
3 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8
4 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). (Answer Ex. A; Answer Ex. B at 3-4;
5 Petition at 12).
6
7 Petitioner subsequently filed an application for cancellation
8 of removal under INA section 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1),
9 but an immigration judge denied it on June 8, 2026, and found
10 Petitioner inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). (See
11 Answer Ex. C; Petition at 4, 13-15).
12
13 According to the immigration judge’s order, Petitioner filed
14 an application to voluntarily depart under INA section 240B(b), 8
15 U.S.C. 1229c(b), though Petitioner now disputes this. (See Answer
16 Ex. C at 2; Second TRO Motion at 2-6). The immigration judge’s
17 order reflects that the purported voluntary departure application
18 was granted, and Petitioner was thus ordered to depart from the
19 United States by July 8, 2026. (Answer Ex. C at 2). Petitioner
20 alleges that he has filed an appeal with the BIA (see Second TRO
21 Motion at 2-3, 6), and the Automated Case Information website for
22 the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) reflects that
23 a case appeal was filed on July 2, 2026, and is currently pending.
24 See https://acis.eoir.justice.gov.
25
26
27 where he was born, that it was in fact Mexico. (Answer Ex. B at
6).
28
1 Although Petitioner has now been detained for more than six
2 months, he has not received a bond hearing. (See Petition at 13).
3
4 DISCUSSION
5
6 Petitioner seeks release on the grounds that his detention at
7 Adelanto ICE Processing Center since December 14, 2025, without a
8 bond hearing violates his rights under the Due Process Clause,
9 among other grounds. (See Petition). Respondents, as noted above,
10 do not oppose an order requiring Petitioner to be provided a bond
11 hearing, but they oppose Petitioner’s immediate release from
12 immigration detention because Petitioner has a final order of
13 removal and “he has agreed to voluntarily depart the United States
14 by July 8, 2026.” (Response at 2). As explained below, Petitioner
15 merits immediate release because his detention violates due
16 process.
17
18 The Due Process Clause prohibits deprivations of life,
19 liberty, and property without due process of law. U.S. Const.
20 amend. V. The Supreme Court has firmly established that “the Due
21 Process Clause applies to all persons within the United States,
22 including [noncitizens], whether their presence is lawful,
23 unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
24 678, 679 (2001); see also Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025)
25 (“It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles
26 [noncitizens] to due process of law in the context of removal
27 proceedings.” (citation omitted)). “Freedom from imprisonment –
28 from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
1 restraint – lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process]
2 Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. That liberty interest
3 persists even for those who have been previously detained, and who
4 remain subject to “significant constraints on their liberty or over
5 whose liberty the government wields significant discretion.” Pinchi
6 v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025); see also
7 Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“The
8 fact that a decision-making process involves discretion does not
9 prevent an individual from having a protectable liberty
10 interest.”). Accordingly, Petitioner has a protected due process
11 liberty interest in his continued freedom. “The constitution
12 typically ‘requires some kind of a hearing before the State
13 deprives a person of liberty or property,’” particularly because
14 the loss of liberty “cannot be fully compensated after the fact.”
15 Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 2637503, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
16 12, 2025) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990)).
17 To determine what process she is due, the Court considers the
18 following three factors from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
19 (1976):
20
21 First, the private interest that will be affected by the
22 official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
23 deprivation of such interest through the procedures
24 used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
25 substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
26 Government’s interest, including the function involved
27 and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
28
1 additional or substitute procedural requirement would
2 entail.
3
4 424 U.S. at 335.
5
6 As to the first factor, Petitioner has a significant private
7 interest in remaining out of custody, given that he has resided in
8 the United States for over twenty-five years, has three children
9 including a daughter who was born deaf and requires special care,
10 and works in construction to support his family. Based on these
11 undisputed facts, the Court concludes that Petitioner developed a
12 substantial liberty interest in remaining out of custody based on
13 the life he has built and his strong ties to the Los Angeles area
14 community. See, e.g., Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1033 (petitioner
15 had substantial private interest “in remaining in her home,
16 continuing her employment, providing for her family, obtaining
17 necessary medical care, maintaining her relationships in the
18 community, and continuing to attend her church”); Ortega, 415 F.
19 Supp. 3d at 970 (petitioner had substantial private interest in
20 remaining on bond, as he was “living with his wife, spending time
21 with his mother and other family members, working as a bicycle
22 mechanic, and developing friendships in his community”); see also
23 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482 (a parolee’s liberty is “valuable” since
24 it “enables him to do a wide range of things open to persons who
25 have never been convicted of any crime,” such as being employed,
26 spending time with family and friends, and “form[ing] the other
27 enduring attachments of normal life”).
28
1 As to the second factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation of
2 liberty is high if Petitioner is deprived of any custody
3 redetermination hearing or is provided a hearing only after he has
4 been detained. Particularly as Petitioner does not have any
5 criminal convictions, an arrest without a prompt hearing or other
6 procedural safeguard poses a significant risk of error, with
7 substantial harm. See also Rivera Larios v. Albarran, 2025 WL
8 3043391, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2025) (“The risk of erroneous
9 deprivation of a noncitizen’s liberty interest is particularly high
10 where, after being previously found to not be a flight risk or
11 danger to the community, the government seeks to re-detain them
12 without a hearing or other procedural safeguard.” (citing Garcia
13 v. Andrews, 2025 WL 1927596, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025);
14 Arzate v. Andrews, 2025 WL 2230521, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4,
15 2025))); Padilla v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 704 F. Supp. 3d
16 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (“Due process protects against
17 immigration detention that is not reasonably related to the
18 legitimate purpose of effectuating removal or protecting against
19 danger and flight risk.” (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690-91)).
20
21 Furthermore, “there is no countervailing government interest
22 – the third and final Mathews factor – that supports conducting a
23 bond hearing only after [Petitioner] has been detained, rather than
24 in advance thereof.” Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1036. Indeed,
25 “[t]he efficiency burden entailed by a bond hearing would be
26 minimal. As other courts have observed, bond hearings require
27 little expenditure of resources.” Duong, 800 F. Supp. 3d at 1040.
28 Although “[t]he government may have ‘a strong interest’ in
1 detaining noncitizens during the pendency of removal proceedings
2 as needed to ‘protect[] the public from dangerous criminal
3 [noncitizens],’ or to prevent flight and thereby ‘increase the
4 chance that . . . the [noncitizens] will be successfully removed,’”
5 Pablo Sequen v. Kaiser, 800 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2025)
6 (quoting Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1208 (9th Cir.
7 2022)), Respondents have not argued that any delay attributable to
8 a pre-deprivation hearing would have risked flight or harm to
9 others. As such, there is no significant government interest in
10 forgoing a pre-detention hearing.
11
12 On balance, the Mathews factors show that Petitioner was
13 entitled to notice and a hearing prior to being detained. See also
14 Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 127 (“Applying [the Mathews] test, the Court
15 usually has held that the Constitution requires some kind of a
16 hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty.” (emphasis
17 in original)); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,
18 542 (1985) (“We have described ‘the root requirement’ of the Due
19 Process Clause as being ‘that an individual be given an opportunity
20 for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant protected
21 interest.’” (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379
22 (1971)) (emphasis in original)). Given Petitioner’s significant
23 liberty interest at stake, moreover, the government at such a
24 hearing must have the burden to prove by clear and convincing
25 evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the
26 community. See Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203-04 (9th Cir.
27 2011) (where substantial liberty interests are at stake, government
28 must prove by clear and convincing evidence that noncitizen is a
1 flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial of
2 bond), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583
3 U.S. 281 (2018); Duong, 800 F. Supp. 3d at 1042 (“[T]he Ninth
4 Circuit has repeatedly held that due process requires the
5 government to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a
6 noncitizen facing detention is a flight risk or danger to the
7 community.” (citing Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1199
8 (9th Cir. 2022))); Petrosyan v. Bondi, 2026 WL 790752, at *1 (C.D.
9 Cal. Mar. 20, 2026); Padilla v. Bowen, 2025 WL 3251368, at *8 &
10 n.3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2025).
11
12 Having been deprived of that right, Petitioner is entitled to
13 release from detention. See, e.g., Sompal v. Semaia, 2026 WL
14 311587, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2026) (“[O]rdering a bond hearing
15 without immediate release would not address the harm being done to
16 Petitioner, who would continue to be held in detention without due
17 process until the bond hearing takes place.”); Esmail v. Noem, 2025
18 WL 3030590 at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025) (“The fact that
19 [Petitioner] was not given an interview renders his detention
20 unlawful in the first place, necessitating his release.”).
21
22 Additionally, to the extent Petitioner wishes to challenge
23 the immigration judge’s order regarding Petitioner’s
24 inadmissibility to the United States, or to otherwise dispute the
25 government’s intention to remove him from the United States, this
26 Court lacks jurisdiction to review such matters. See 8 U.S.C. §
27 1252(a)(5) (“[A] petition for review filed with an appropriate
28 court of appeals . . . shall be the sole and exclusive means for
1 judicial review of an order of removal.”); id. § 1252(b)(9)
2 (“Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including
3 interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory
4 provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to
5 remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall
6 be available only in judicial review of a final order under this
7 section. Except as otherwise provided in this section, no court
8 shall have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under section 2241 of
9 Title 28 or any other habeas corpus provision, by section 1361 or
10 1651 of such title, or by any other provision of law (statutory or
11 nonstatutory), to review such an order or such questions of law or
12 fact.”); id. § 1252(g) (“Except as provided in this section and
13 notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or
14 nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other
15 habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title,
16 no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or
17 on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the
18 Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or
19 execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.”). To
20 raise such challenges at this time, Petitioner must instead seek
21 review before the BIA.2
22
23
24
25
26 2 As noted above, Petitioner has filed an appeal of the
immigration judge’s order with the BIA (see Second TRO Motion at
27 2-3, 6), and this appeal is reflected on the EOIR’s Automated Case
Information website, see https://acis.eoir.justice.gov.
28
1 ORDER
2
3 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Petition (Dkt. No. 1);
4 DENIES as moot the Second TRO application and Request for Counsel
5 (Dkt. Nos. 13 & 16); ORDERS Respondents to immediately release
6 Petitioner Santos Serrano (A# 246-057-185) from immigration
7 detention, and ENJOINS and RESTRAINS Respondents from re-detaining
8 Petitioner without providing him with notice and a pre-deprivation
9 hearing before a neutral decisonmaker at which the government bears
10 the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that
11 Petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community. If
12 Petitioner is again placed into detention in this District
13 following proceedings in this case, Respondents shall not transfer
14 or remove Petitioner from this District unless executing a final
15 order of removal issued against Petitioner. Should Respondents
16 take steps to remove Petitioner to a third country, Respondents
17 shall not remove Petitioner to any third country without providing
18 Petitioner written notice and affording Petitioner a meaningful
19 opportunity to seek any available fear-based protections or relief.
20 Respondents are further ordered to file a “notice of compliance”
21 within three days of the date of this Order and entry of Judgment.
22
23 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
24
DATED: July 31, 2026
25
26 ____________/s/_______________
FERNANDO M. OLGUIN
27 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
28