Ahmed

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

NESAR AHMED,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 6:25-cv-742-LHP

WOOD GROUP USA, INC.,

Defendant

ORDER1

This case is before the Court on Defendant Wood Group USA, Inc.’s Renewed

Motion to Dismiss. Doc. No. 61. Pro se Plaintiff Dr. Nesar Ahmed has responded

in opposition (Doc. No. 66),2 and Defendant has filed an authorized reply. Doc.

No. 65; see also Doc. No. 64. For the reasons discussed herein, the motion (Doc. No.

61) will be granted, and Plaintiff will be afforded one opportunity to file an

amended pleading.

1 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge

and the Inexpensive Determination, Efficient, and Abbreviated Litigation (IDEAL)

Program. Doc. Nos. 53, 55.

2 This is Plaintiff’s second response. See Doc. No. 62. Plaintiff has requested that

the Court only consider the second response, which was timely filed (see Local Rule 3.01(d);

Doc. No. 60), and Defendant has not filed anything challenging this request. Thus, the

Court will only consider the second response.

I. BACKGROUND.

On April 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Relief and Request for Jury Trial

in state court, which Defendant removed to this Court on April 29, 2025. Doc. Nos.

1, 1-2. See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, 1441, 1446. Defendant moved to dismiss

based on improper service of process and failure to exhaust administrative

remedies, and Plaintiff opposed. Doc. Nos. 23, 26. Before the motion could be

ruled upon, however, the case was dismissed on July 7, 2025 by then-Presiding

Distrct Judge Julie S. Sneed due to Plaintiff’s failure to file a Notice of Pendency of

Other Actions and a Disclosure Statement. Doc. No. 34. After Plaintiff rectified

these deficiencies, Judge Sneed reopened the case on December 3, 2025. Doc. No.

52. See also Doc. Nos. 36-37, 39, 41-44, 49-51. The case was thereafter reassigned

to the undersigned on January 6, 2026 based on the parties’ consent to my

jurisdiction. Doc. Nos. 53, 55-56.

On January 23, 2026, the Court held a preliminary pretrial conference with

the parties, at which the Court provided a schedule for Defendant to file a renewed

motion to dismiss, and for Plaintiff to file a response. Doc. Nos. 58, 60. The Court

also reminded Plaintiff that any arguments Defendant raises in its renewed motion

that Plaintiff does not address in response will be treated as unopposed. Doc. No.

60, at 1-2.3 Defendant and Plaintiff timely-filed their motion papers (Doc. Nos. 61,

65, 66), and the motion is now ripe for consideration.

II. ALLEGATIONS OF THE PETITION.4

Plaintiff is a law-abiding resident of Florida, who has never knowingly

consumed illegal drugs in his lifetime, and has passed all required drug tests. Doc.

No. 1-2 ¶¶ 1-2. On February 28, 2025, Defendant offered Plaintiff the position of

Senior Structural Design Engineer, with a start date of March 17, 2025. Id. ¶ 3. As

part of the pre-employment process, Plaintiff submitted to a drug test, and on

March 11, 2025, he was informed that traces of marijuana were found in his test

sample. Id. ¶ 4. Plaintiff provided the test administrator a list of his medications

and supplements, which included CBD gummies Plaintiff took to manage his

diabetes. Id. ¶ 5. According to Plaintiff, CBD gummies are neither banned by the

United States government nor the State of Florida, and the test taker confirmed the

CBD gummies likely caused the test results. Id.

Based on Plaintiff’s drug test results, Defendant revoked Plaintiff’s job offer

on or around March 13, 2025. Id. ¶ 7. As set forth in email correspondence

3 The Court also stayed all further proceedings pending resolution of the renewed

motion. Doc. No. 60, at 2.

4 While styled as a “Petition for Relief,” it is clear that Plaintiff’s filing is a complaint,

which the Court treats as such. Further, at the motion to dismiss stage, courts must

assume “that all the [factual] allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in

fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted).

attached to the complaint, that same day, Plaintiff emailed Defendant asking for

reconsideration of the revocation. Id. at 9-11.5 Plaintiff also asked Defendant for

two (2) alternative accommodations: (1) either postpone Plaintiff’s start date by

approximately one month so that he could cease using CBD gummies and they

would be out of his system; or (2) revise Defendant’s drug policy to allow for legal

marijuana and hemp-derived CBD. Id. Defendant denied Plaintiff’s requests,

explaining that Defendant has a zero-tolerance drug procedure, and that Florida

law does not require employers to accommodate an individual’s use of marijuana

or CBD products, either at work or off-site, does not limit employers from enforcing

a drug-free workplace policy, and does not create a cause of action against an

employer for wrongful discharge or discrimination based on such drug use. Id. at

11-12. Defendant further explained that if an applicant or employee requires an

accommodation, it must be requested prior to the drug test and be supported by

medical documentation, which Plaintiff did not do. Id.

Plaintiff again sought reconsideration on March 26, 2025, which Defendant

again denied. Id. at 12-14. And on April 3, 2025, Plaintiff reapplied for the same

5 Exhibits attached to the complaint are “part of the pleading for all purposes.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); see also Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1270 (11th Cir. 2014)

(“[D]ocuments attached to a complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference can

generally be considered by a federal court in ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6).”).

position, but it is unclear from the complaint whether Defendant considered his

application. Id. at 14-16.

Under a section entitled “Legal Argument,” Plaintiff alleges that he is “a

victim of an unforeseen consequence – namely, that CBD gummies, a legal product,

resulted in the loss of a job opportunity.” Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiff further alleges

marijuana is legally approved for medical use in Florida, and that the sale of CBD

products is legal under both federal and Florida law. Id. ¶ 9. Thus, Plaintiff

contends that Defendant “may have violated state law and infringed upon [his] civil

rights as a Florida resident” by penalizing Plaintiff for using a legal substance. Id.

¶ 10. Other than citing to Florida law legalizing medical marijuana, Plaintiff does

not, however, identify any legal basis for any claim against Defendant, nor does

Plaintiff set forth any specific claims for relief. He requests reinstatement of his job

offer, with a condition that Defendant not be able to terminate Plaintiff for five (5)

years, and no less than $250,000.00 in compensatory damages and exemplary

penalties. Id. at 5.

III. LEGAL STANDARD.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that a pleading contain the

following:

(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s

jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim

needs no new jurisdictional support;

(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief; and

(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in

the alternative or different types of relief.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The allegations must be simple, concise, and direct. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(d)(1). These requirements exist so as to “give the defendant fair notice of

what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). In addition, “[r]ule 10 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that each claim be separated into separate

counts and supported by distinct factual allegations.” Bagley v. City of Tampa, No.

8:07-cv-218-T-27EAJ, 2007 WL 9723949, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2007) (citing Fed.

R. Civ. P. 10(b)).

“The district court has the inherent authority sua sponte to require the plaintiff

to file a more definite statement” when a complaint fails to comply with Rule 8.

Holbrook v. Castle Key Ins. Co., 405 F. App'x 459, 460 (11th Cir. 2010)6 (citing Fikes v.

City of Daphne, 79 F.3d 1079, 1083 n.6 (11th Cir. 1996)). See also Weiland v. Palm Beach

Cty. Sheriff's Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015) (noting that the court may sua

sponte dismiss an action “for failure to comply with Rule 8(a)(2) and Rule 10(b)”

under its inherent authority). “Where the allegations of a complaint are ‘vague

6 Unpublished opinions of the Eleventh Circuit are cited as persuasive authority.

See 11th Cir. R. 36–2.

and ambiguous—leaving the reader to guess at precisely what the plaintiff [is]

claiming,’ the court should order a repleader.” Holbrook, 405 F. App'x at 460

(alterations in original) (quoting Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1128–31 (11th Cir.

2001), abrogated on other grounds by Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1357

n.10 (11th Cir. 2018)).

Courts give a “liberal construction” to pro se pleadings. Holsomback v. White,

133 F.3d 1382, 1386 (11th Cir. 1998). But this leeway is not limitless, as courts

cannot serve as “de facto counsel for a party, or . . . rewrite an otherwise deficient

pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165,

1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). See also Gilmore v. Hodges, 738 F.3d 266,

281 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[L]iberal construction is not the same thing as wholesale

redrafting.”). Pro se parties must comply with the minimum pleading standards

set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules. Nawab v.

LVNV Funding LLC, Case No. 5:12-cv-129-Oc-10PRL, 2012 WL 12918283, at *1 (M.D.

Fla. Nov. 19, 2012).

IV. ANALYSIS.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s complaint “can only be interpreted as [a]

claim alleging discrimination based on his disability,” for which Plaintiff failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies. Doc. No. 61. Plaintiff argues in his response

that any failure to exhaust is subject to equitable tolling, and in any event, his

complaint also alleges a variety of other claims, including a state law claim for

promissory estoppel. Doc. No. 66. The Court cannot resolve these arguments at

this time, however, for, as detailed above, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with

the pleading requirements of Rules 8 and 10, and therefore must be dismissed on

that basis alone, with leave to replead.

In short, Plaintiff’s complaint does not state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. The complaint wholly fails to comply with the procedural rules and

states no basis in fact that would give rise to a substantive claim. See Doc. No. 1-2.

Indeed, besides a conclusory reference to Florida’s medical marijuana laws and

Plaintiff’s “civil rights as a Florida resident,” the complaint does not include a short

and plain statement of the claim(s). See id. As best the Court can tell, Plaintiff is

complaining about Defendants’ drug-testing policy – both as a whole and as it was

applied to him – but does not allege how this policy and/or its application to

Plaintiff violated any laws. And the email attachments do not shed much light, as

while the word “accommodation” is referenced, there is again no mention of any

specific state or federal laws. Doc. No. 1-2, at 9-16. Rather, the Court is left to

guess at what claims are potentially being asserted.7 Accordingly, the complaint

7 This lack of clarity is further demonstrated by the parties’ motion papers.

Defendant assumes Plaintiff is pursuing a disability discrimination claim, possibly under

federal law, state law, or both, and while Plaintiff appears to agree in his response, he also

contends that he has sufficiently alleged claims for promissory estoppel and various state

law claims. Doc. Nos. 61, 66. Further confusing matters is Defendant’s reply, which

is due to be dismissed. See, Wabe v. Regions Bank, No. 8:22-cv-988-KKM-JSS, 2022

WL 2121493, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 3, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022

WL 1617741 (M.D. Fla. May 23, 2022) (dismissing complaint where “Plaintiff’s

Complaint [did] not include a short and plain statement of the claim showing an

entitlement to relief,” and “the Complaint [was] devoid of any specific factual

allegations to explain the harm caused”). See also Brinson v. Welsh, 709 F. App'x

582, 585 (11th Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal of complaint sua sponte because it failed

to plead relevant facts supporting its cause of action).

Ordinarily, a pro se party should be given one opportunity to file an amended

complaint. See Sifford v. Ford, 701 F. App’x 794, 796 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Generally, a

district court must sua sponte provide a pro se plaintiff at least one opportunity to

amend his complaint, even where the plaintiff did not request leave to amend.”

(citing Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991), overruled in part by Wagner v.

Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002))). Because it is at

notes the vague nature of Plaintiff’s complaint, but then addresses the merits of a

promissory estoppel claim (while also inserting facts that are not anywhere found in the

complaint – such as “at-will employment”), while ignoring Plaintiff’s other state law

references. Doc. No. 65. However, a party cannot amend his pleading via argument in

response to a motion to dismiss. See Burgess v. Religious Tech. Ctr., Inc., 600 F. App'x 657,

665 (11th Cir. 2015) (“We repeatedly have held that plaintiffs cannot amend their complaint

through a response to a motion to dismiss.” (citing Rosenberg v. Gould, 554 F.3d 962, 967

(11th Cir. 2009))). And the complaint in its current format simply fails to put both

Defendant and the Court on notice as to what theories of relief Plaintiff actually seeks to

pursue in this case.

least possible that Plaintiff may file an amended complaint stating a claim, the Court

will allow Plaintiff to file an amended complaint. See S & B/Bibb Hines PB 3 Joint

Venture v. Progress Energy Fla., Inc., No. 8:08-cv-439-JDW-MAP, 2008 WL 2275534,

at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 2, 2008) (finding amended complaint subject to dismissal sua

sponte due to pleading deficiencies, despite a pending motion to dismiss on the

merits, and ordering repleader); Bagley, 2007 WL 9723949, at *1 (sua sponte striking

complaint and ordering repleader where, even though not argued in motions to

dismiss, Title VII complaint did not comply with Rules 8(a) and 10(b), did not

contain any distinct counts, and contained a “disjointed recitation of various

incidents” of harassment and retaliation).

That said, Plaintiff is cautioned that in an amended complaint, he must

include factual allegations stating a plausible claim for relief, which requires him to

“plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation

omitted). Therefore, in an amended complaint, Plaintiff must clearly allege the

legal basis of each cause of action, whether a constitutional provision, treaty, statute,

or common law. Plaintiff must name as Defendants only those persons who are

responsible for the alleged violations. Plaintiff must allege in the body of the

complaint, under a section entitled “Statement of Facts,” how each named

Defendant participated in the activity that allegedly violated his rights. Plaintiff

must also allege some causal connection between each Defendant named and the

injury he allegedly sustained. One generally cannot be held liable for the actions

and/or omissions of others, but can only be held responsible if he or she

participated in the deprivation of a person’s rights or directed such action and/or

omission that resulted in such deprivation. Finally, Plaintiff must allege

specifically harm or injury by the actions and/or omissions of the Defendant(s).

In addition, the Court finds Defendant’s argument regarding exhaustion of

administrative remedies may have merit. Insofar as Plaintiff seeks to allege a claim

of employment discrimination under either the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”) or the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”), “a Florida plaintiff must exhaust

his administrative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination with the FCHR

within 300 days of the allegedly unlawful employment practice.” Schoelzel v.

Volusia Cnty., Fla., No. 6:14-cv-1633-Orl, 2015 WL 368939, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 27,

2015). See also EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th Cir. 2002)

(holding that, in Florida, only those employment discrimination “claims arising

within 300 days prior” to an administrative charge are actionable); Maynard v.

Pneumatic Prods. Corp., 256 F.3d 1259, 1262-63 (11th Cir.2001) (citing 42 U.S.C.

§ 12117(a) for same proposition). Thus, any amended complaint must allege

compliance with this requirement. And if Plaintiff wishes to assert equitable

tolling (as argued in his response), he must still demonstrate that he actually filed a

charge prior to initiating this lawsuit. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S.

385, 393 (1982) (holding that the timely filing of an EEOC charge is a procedural

prerequisite “subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.”); Baldwin County

Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 n.6 (1984) (clarifying that the Court did not

declare in Zipes that the EEOC filing requirement need not ever be satisfied, but

rather held that timely filing is subject to waiver and tolling); Grier v. Sec’y of Army,

799 F.2d 721, 724 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Plaintiff argues that she should be excused from

the requirement that any charge of racial discrimination be filed with the agency

because she was counseled not to file such a charge by an Army personnel officer

and the Atlanta Office of the EEOC. However, even if her version of events is

assumed to be true, such equitable considerations are relevant to whether the

timeliness requirement for filing a charge should be subject to equitable tolling, not

whether a charge must ever be filed at all; it is her failure to exhaust or even begin

her administrative remedies that bars her suit.” (citations omitted)). See also Hines

v. Widnall, 334 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that plaintiff's failure to file

an EEOC claim absolutely barred his claims).

Further, if Plaintiff wishes to allege a claim for promissory estoppel under

Florida law, he must allege facts sufficient to establish that: (1) the plaintiff

detrimentally relied on a promise made by the defendant; (2) the defendant

reasonably should have expected the promise to induce reliance in the form of

action or forbearance on the part of the plaintiff or a third person; and (3) that

injustice can be avoided only through the enforcement of the promise against the

defendant. See Kablelink Commc’ns, LLC v. S.-Owners Ins. Co., No. 3:15-cv-873-J-

25JRK, 2015 WL 12844399, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2015) (citing W.R. Grace & Co. v.

Geodata Servs., Inc., 547 So. 2d 919, 924 (Fla. 1989)).8

IV. CONCLUSION.

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No.

61) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. No. 1-2) is DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Within twenty-one (21) days from the date of this

Order, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint, which complies in full with the

directives and guidance set forth in this Order. Defendant shall respond to any

such amended pleading within the time limits set forth in Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 15. Plaintiff is advised that failure to file an amended pleading by this

deadline and in compliance with this Order will result in the dismissal of this case,

8 Plaintiff references in his response Florida’s Drug-Free Workplace Act, Fla. Stat.

§ 112.0455. Doc. No. 66, at 6. However, that statute only applies to state agencies. See

Fla. Stat. § 112.0455(5)(g) (defining “employer” as “an agency within state government that

employs individuals for salary, wages, or other remuneration.”); see also Hudson v. City of

Riviera Beach, 982 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1344 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (noting same). And Florida’s

drug-free workplace program requirements outlined in Fla. Stat. § 440.102, which apply to

private employers, do not create a cause of action. Hudson, 982 F. Supp. at 1344; see also

Morrison v. Morgan Stanley Props., No. 06–80751–CIV, 2008 WL 1771871, at *6 (S.D. Fla.

April 15, 2008) (“There is no evidence in either the statutory language or the legislative

structure that the Legislature contemplated a private cause of action against employers

who fail to follow drug-free workplace program procedures.”).

without further notice. See Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) (a

pro se litigant “is subject to the relevant law and rules of court, including the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 863 (1989).

DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on August 25, 2026.

ay □□□

LESLIE AN PRICE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

Unrepresented Parties

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