Brown

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

ENRICO E.M. BROWN, *

Plaintiff, *

v. * Civil Action No. MJM-25-3301

DIRECTOR TERRENCE K. CLARK, et al., *

Defendants. *

********************************************************

ENRICO E.M. BROWN, *

Plaintiff, *

v. * Civil Action No. MJM-26-1183

TERRENCE CLARK, et al., *

Defendants. *

********************************************************

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Self-represented plaintiff Enrico E.M. Brown, a prisoner who is confined to the Prince

George’s County Detention Center (“PGCDC”), filed the above-referenced civil rights actions.

Brown’s first civil rights action was closed for a failure to either pay the filing fee or file a motion

seeking its waiver, but the case was reopened when the Court received his amended complaint and

motion to proceed in forma pauperis on November 14, 2025. Civil Action No. MJM-25-3301

(hereinafter, “Brown I”), ECF No. 5. The second civil rights action was filed on March 20, 2026,

together with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Civil Action No. MJM-26-1183 (hereinafter,

“Brown II”), ECF Nos. 1 & 2. Both cases concern a litany of complaints regarding conditions

alleged to exist at PGCDC. As explained below, Brown I fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted and must be dismissed; Brown II will be permitted to proceed on a limited number

of the claims raised only after Brown files an amended complaint that complies with the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

I. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

A. Brown I

In his 36-page amended complaint in Brown I, Brown raises claims regarding access to

PGCDC’s grievance procedure and to the law library. ECF No. 6. He repeatedly references other

inmates or detainees who he claims are also denied forms and denied requests for legal materials

by the law librarian or denied the opportunity to go to the library.

With respect to the grievance procedure, Brown claims that PGCDC staff are not issuing

forms when they are requested; not accepting grievances when submitted or attempting informal

resolutions; not allowing Brown to talk to a ranking officer; are confiscating grievances; and

refusing to provide copies of grievances. He claims the inmates in his housing unit were threatened

with 72 hours of lockdown as retaliation for filing grievances regarding various issues around the

detention center. ECF No. 6 at 12–15.

With respect to law library access, Brown claims that he mailed a motion on September

19, 2025, “to discharge and strike order” and enter his appearance pro se to dismiss counts 1, 2, 7,

and 8 in Maryland District Court for Prince George’s County criminal case number D-05-CR-25-

006880, but as of October 16, 2025, his motion had not been received. Id. at 17. Brown concludes

that the warden directed unknown officers to confiscate his legal mail as a retaliatory act against

him because he is a jailhouse lawyer. Id. He claims that had his motion been received, charges

against him would have been dismissed because, under Maryland law, a motor vehicle does not

include a motor scooter. Id. at 19. Brown adds that the law librarian denied him access to courts

by denying his request for a copy of a case and other requests for copies of specific legal treatises

and constitutional provisions. Id. at 26. He states that the law librarian’s conduct restricts access

to courts “as well as other(s) in current circumstance(s) in which I provide help to.” Id.

B. Brown II

The complaint in Brown II is 99 pages long and includes a list of 54 signatures of

“plaintiffs” who are also detainees at the detention center.1 ECF No. 1-1 at 6–8. Brown repeats

his claims regarding restrictive law library policies at the detention center as well as the claim that

grievance forms are not distributed when requested by detainees, as stated in Brown I, and again

claims these practices are unconstitutional. Id. at 4–8.

Brown adds to the claims raised in his first complaint, a claim regarding religious food

services and a claim regarding conditions as they existed in his housing unit at the detention center

on or about February 24 through March 4, 2026. Specifically, Brown claims that Summit Food

Service’s food policy is affecting his health because it fails to provide adequate nutrients, and Dr.

Moske and Dr. Dass are liable because they are disregarding menu restrictions for diabetics by

serving Brown high carbohydrate foods three times a day. ECF No. 1-1 at 25. He also claims that

he was denied the right to be placed on a Halal diet because he is diabetic. Id. at 35.

Brown describes the housing unit where he is confined as “dilapidated” with no working

toilet, hot water, or air flow vent. ECF No. 1-1 at 37. He claims that there are an inadequate

number of showers and sinks with hot water for kitchen and sanitation workers to use throughout

three work shifts to bathe regularly, asserting that there are five operational showers out of 12 for

96 men to use in housing unit 14. Id. at 38. He describes sewage back-ups in the housing units,

and inadequate clean-up of the sewage overflow into the common areas and into the cells of

1 Review of the signatures reveals that some are duplicates and some do not have identification

numbers and cannot be accurately identified.

detainees. Brown states that the department heads make official visits every Tuesday to every

housing unit and are clearly aware of the lack of sanitation in the housing units.

II. ANALYSIS

Title 28, United States Code, Sections 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A require this Court to

screen and dismiss any complaint that (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); see also Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 590 U.S.

___, 140 S.Ct. 1721 (2020). In addition, it is well-settled law that complaint allegations must “give

the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a pleading that sets forth a claim for relief shall contain “(1)

a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the court already has

jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought . . . .”

Each “allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). “Threadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007)). Application of these general requirements to Brown’s pleadings requires dismissal of

some claims and an amended complaint regarding others.

A. Standing

To the extent that Brown is attempting to raise claims on behalf of other detainees confined

to PGCDC, he is not permitted to do so. He has no standing to assert generalized grievances, nor

may he assert particularized claims on behalf of others. “[A]t an irreducible minimum, Article III

requires the party who invokes the court’s authority to show that he personally has suffered some

actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant and that the

injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action and is likely to be redressed by a favorable

decision.” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,

454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992). To state a civil rights claim, a prisoner must

allege that he, himself, sustained a deprivation of right, privilege, or immunity secured by

Constitution or federal law. See Inmates v. Owens, 561 F.2d 560, 563 (4th Cir. 1977). To

demonstrate standing, a plaintiff “must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s

allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Allen v. Wright,

468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control

Components, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1377 (2014)).

To the extent Brown is attempting to initiate a class action lawsuit, the Fourth Circuit has

consistently held that “this circuit does not certify a class where a pro se litigant will act as

representative of that class.” Fowler v. Lee, 18 F. App’x 164 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Oxendine v.

Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975)). The Court notes that Brown has filed a motion for

class certification and to appoint counsel in both Brown I and Brown II. “A pro se prisoner does

not have a general right to counsel in a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 action.” Evans v. Kuplinski, 713 F.

App’x 167, 170 (4th Cir. 2017). A federal district court judge’s power to appoint counsel under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) is discretionary and may be exercised where an indigent claimant presents

exceptional circumstances. See Cook v. Bounds, 518 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1975); Miller v. Simmons,

814 F.2d 962, 966 (4th Cir. 1987); Branch v. Cole, 686 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1982). Exceptional

circumstances exist where a “pro se litigant has a colorable claim but lacks the capacity to present

it.” Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1984), abrogated on other grounds by Mallard

v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915 does not authorize

compulsory appointment of counsel). As explained in Parts II.B and II.C below, Brown has failed

to demonstrate he has any colorable claims for class-wide relief that would justify appointment of

class counsel. Unless Brown can retain counsel and satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 23 for certifying a class action, this case cannot proceed as one.

If, however, Brown has included the signatures of other detainees with his pleadings

because they all intended to file a joint complaint raising the same or similar claims as Brown, the

48 detainees who signed the pleading will need to clarify that this is their intent. See Ellis v. Werfel,

86 F.4th 1032, 1037 (4th Cir. 2023) (finding insufficient support for the conclusion that lead

plaintiff was filing impermissible class action where individual plaintiffs paid the filing fee and

had separately signed the pleadings). Any of the 48 detainees who signed and intend to proceed

with this civil action will be required to sign the amended complaint and endorse it as a joint

pleading.

Notably, however, joint plaintiffs are not immunized from earning a “strike” under the

Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) for filing a complaint that is dismissed in its entirety for

failure to state a claim under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Boriboune v. Berge, 391

F.3d 852, 855–56 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting the sound practice of warning joint plaintiffs of the risk

of sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 112 as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) because

2 Fed. R. of Civ. P. 11(b) provides that:

By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper--whether by

signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it--an attorney or unrepresented party

certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after

an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:

they will be held accountable for their co-plaintiffs’ claims). The joint plaintiffs must be reminded

that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), they will not be granted in forma pauperis status if they have “on

three or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or

appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it … fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, unless” they can establish they are “under imminent

danger of serious physical injury.”

Any individual detainee who joins this civil action must either pay the full $405 filing fee

or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis bearing his original signature. See Hubbard v. Haley,

262 F.3d 1194, 1198 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that the plain language of the PLRA requires that

each prisoner litigant proceeding in forma pauperis pay the full filing fee in monthly increments).

B. Access to Administrative Remedies

Brown’s claim regarding access to administrative remedies must be dismissed in its

entirety. While Brown is correct that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to

filing suit under the PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), before an action concerning prison conditions

may be filed by a prisoner, the failure to exhaust is “an affirmative defense that should be pleaded

(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause

unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;

(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law

or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing

law or for establishing new law;

(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified,

will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further

investigation or discovery; and

(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically

so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.

Under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 11(c)(1) this court may “impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm,

or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation.”

or otherwise properly raised by the defendant.” Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Serv., Inc., 407 F.3d

674, 683 (4th Cir. 2005). To the extent that a prisoner’s attempts to exhaust the administrative

remedy process are thwarted by prison officials’ misconduct, that evidence may be presented in

response to the affirmative defense. Id. at 682. It is well established in this District that “prisoners

have no constitutional right to participate in an institutional grievance procedure[.]” Burkey v.

Baltimore Cnty., Civ. No. GJH-20-2006, 2021 WL 3857814, at *11 n.10 (D. Md. Aug. 30, 2021)

(quoting Kitchen v. Peguese, Civ. No. DKC-05-466, 2005 WL 4827386, at *3 (D. Md. 2005), aff’d,

180 F. App’x 443 (4th Cir. 2006)). Therefore, “an inability to access the administrative remedy

procedure based on an alleged refusal by prison officials to enforce the rules governing the process

does not run afoul of the due process clause.” Id. (quoting Allen v. W. Corr. Inst., Civ. No. ELH-

15-3498, 2017 WL 3607821, at *25 (D. Md. Aug. 21, 2017)); see also Young-Bey v. B.A.

Daddysboy, COS, Civ. No. JFM-15-3642, 2017 WL 3475667, at *10 (D. Md. Aug. 10, 2017);

Resper v. Schurg, Civ. No. PJM-13-1278, 2014 WL 3345131, at *3 (D. Md. July 7, 2014). The

Supreme Court clarified that administrative remedies are “unavailable” and an inmate’s duty to

exhaust “does not come into play” when (1) officers are consistently unable or unwilling to provide

relief to aggrieved prisoners; (2) the administrative scheme is so opaque or complex that it is not

practicable; or (3) prison administrators thwart prisoners from participating in the process through

intimidation, misrepresentation, or a scheme of exclusion. Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643–44

(2016). For these reasons, Brown’s claims regarding officers’ failure to provide grievance forms

or otherwise comply with the procedures in place governing the detention center’s grievance

procedure are dismissed.

C. Access to Courts

Brown’s claims regarding the alleged denial of his requests to access the law library, the

alleged failure to provide him with copies of cases and other legal materials, and the alleged failure

to send out his legal mail are all claims that imply a violation of the First Amendment right of

access to courts. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). However,

Bounds does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform

themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from

shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims. The tools it

requires to be provided are those that the inmates need in order to

attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to

challenge the conditions of their confinement.

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996). To the extent that local detention centers are designed

to incarcerate detainees for “relatively short periods[,]” there may be “no obligation to provide

access to the courts.” Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1386–87 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing Williams

v. Leeke, 584 F.2d 1336, 1344 n. 1 (4th Cir. 1978)).

In any event, Brown and any other plaintiff who choose to pursue a claim must show that

he personally has suffered an actual injury as the result of the asserted wrongful conduct. See

Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1382 (holding pretrial detainee must show actual injury). “Ultimately, a

prisoner wishing to establish an unconstitutional burden on his right of access to the courts must

show ‘actual injury’ to ‘the capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or

conditions of confinement before the courts.’” O’Dell v. Netherland, 112 F.3d 773, 776 (4th Cir.

1997) (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355). “The requirement that an inmate alleging a violation of

Bounds must show actual injury derives ultimately from the doctrine of standing, a constitutional

principle that prevents courts of law from undertaking tasks assigned to the political branches.”

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349. Actual injury occurs when a prisoner demonstrates that a “nonfrivolous”

and “arguable” claim was lost because of the denial of access to the courts. Id. at 399.

Here, Brown fails to identify with any clarity or specificity any actual injury that he has

endured to his ability to challenge any sentence or conditions of confinement. Brown identifies a

motion he claims he tried to file in his state criminal case that was not received due to alleged

interference, but Brown is represented by counsel in his criminal case3 and does not have a right

to file pro se motions in that case. As presented, his access-to-courts claims must be dismissed.

D. Other Claims

The claims asserted in Brown II for which Brown will be given an opportunity to file an

amended complaint are his claims that (1) he was denied a Halal diet or was otherwise denied

opportunities to practice his religious faith; (2) medical care at PGCDC does not meet

constitutional standards in his particular case; and (3) the conditions in his housing unit are so

unsanitary that they amount to punishment and have caused him an injury.

Religious practices in prison may be lawfully restricted where the restriction in question is

related to legitimate penological objectives. See Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 89–91 (1987).

Failure to accommodate religious dietary needs, when that failure is the result of intentional

conduct, constitutes a substantial burden on the free practice of religion under the First

Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

(“RLUIPA”). See Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187–89 (4th Cir. 2006); cf. id. at 201

(“[N]egligent acts by officials causing unintended denials of religious rights do not violate the Free

Exercise Clause.”). “[A] prisoner’s request for an accommodation must be sincerely based on a

religious belief and not some other motivation.” Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 360–61 (2015).

Prison authorities are permitted to test the sincerity of a religious belief that is being

3 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), “[t]he court may judicially notice a fact that is not

subject to reasonable dispute because it . . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”

accommodated. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725, n.13 (2005) (“[P]rison officials may

appropriately question whether a prisoner’s religiosity . . . is authentic.”). Brown’s claim that he

has been denied a Halal diet due to concerns about his health appears to challenge a restriction

with a legitimate underlying objective. See ECF No. 1-1 at 35. If there are additional facts to

support his claim that this restriction is a violation of his right to practice his religion freely, he

must include those facts in an amended complaint.

To state a constitutional claim regarding medical care, Brown must allege facts showing

that he has a serious medical need that required medical intervention and the named defendants

exhibited deliberate indifference to that need. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).

Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need requires proof that, objectively, the prisoner

plaintiff was suffering from a serious medical need and that, subjectively, the prison staff were

aware of the need for medical attention but failed either to provide it or to ensure it was available.

See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834–37 (1994); Heyer v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d

202, 209–10 (4th Cir. 2017); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 218 (4th Cir. 2016); Iko v. Shreve,

535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008). Here, Brown alleges that the food service provider is negligent

in providing too many carbohydrates to him as a diabetic and that Drs. Moske and. Dass are liable

because they have not supervised the menu. ECF No. 1-1 at 25. A constitutional violation requires

more than mere negligence. See Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695–96 (4th Cir. 1999)

(“Constitution is designed to deal with deprivations of rights, not errors in judgment . . . .”).

Further, Brown provides no factual allegation establishing that Drs. Moske and Dass had any

supervisory authority over Summit Food Service employees, and, even if they did, Brown has not

alleged enough facts to establish supervisory liability. Liability of supervisory officials “is not

based on ordinary principles of respondeat superior, but rather is premised on ‘a recognition that

supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates’ misconduct may be a causative

factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care.’” Baynard v.

Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir.

1984)). To the extent Brown has omitted these facts, he must include them in the amended

complaint.

Brown’s conditions-of-confinement claim also requires an allegation of intentional

conduct—not negligence, as stated in his complaint. See ECF No. 1-1 at 37. To establish a

sufficiently culpable state of mind, there must be evidence that a known excessive risk of harm to

the inmate’s health or safety was disregarded. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1991).

Further, conditions that are merely “restrictive [or] even harsh . . . are part of the penalty that

criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society” and do not amount to a constitutional

violation. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). The potential for harm may not amount

to the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment where a plaintiff does not allege facts

establishing a significant, serious physical or psychological injury. See Strickler v. Waters, 989

F.2d 1375, 1381 (4th Cir. 1993). Here, Brown asserts obliquely that various conditions with the

plumbing are unsanitary and could cause disease and have caused “respiratory issues,” but he does

not specifically allege that he has suffered an injury caused by the conditions described. ECF No.

1-1 at 38–39. To the extent that he has not included facts of an injury caused by the alleged

conditions in his complaint, he must include them in the amended complaint.

For each of these claims Brown must also include facts such as the names of the people

who are responsible for the alleged wrongdoing, the date(s) of the alleged incidents, and the harm

that he has suffered as a result. Brown is reminded that legal conclusions will not suffice; therefore,

the inclusion of lengthy legal argumentation will not ensure that his amended complaint meets the

requirements of this Court’s Order or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Brown is reminded

that a complaint requires a short and plain statement of the claim showing that he is entitled to

relief.4 Further, to allege that an officer violated his constitutional rights, “the complaint must

make defendant-specific allegations. “The allegations must be particular enough to allow one to

infer what each defendant did and knew.” Rice v. Adams, 172 F.4th 428, 432 (4th Cir. 2026) (citing

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79). If the amended complaint does not meet all of these requirements,

then Brown II will be dismissed.

To the extent that the 48 detainees whose signatures are included with Brown’s complaint

intend to file a joint complaint, they may only do so on claims that meet the standard for joinder

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20. Specifically, plaintiffs may join a complaint in one

action if they assert any right to relief based on the same “transaction, occurrence, or series of

transactions or occurrences; and . . . any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise

in the action.” Rule 20(a)(1). If the potential joint plaintiffs are satisfied that they can meet that

standard and want to join this action, they must sign the amended complaint and file their own

individual motions to proceed in forma pauperis bearing their signatures. It is incumbent upon

Brown to secure those signatures and to ensure the joint plaintiffs file their own motions to proceed

in forma pauperis.

III. CONCLUSION

By separate Order, which follows, Brown I (Civil Action No. MJM-25-3301) will be

dismissed, and the pending motions therein denied without prejudice as moot. In Brown II (Civil

Action No. MJM-26-1183), Brown will be granted 28 days from the date of this Memorandum

4 “Pleadings should be no longer than necessary and . . . shall not exceed forty (40) pages in length.”

Local R. 103.1(d) (D. Md. 2025).

Opinion and the accompanying Order to file an amended complaint regarding his claims as

outlined herein. The Clerk will provide him with a blank 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint form on

which to file his amended complaint. Brown is forewarned that failure to file an amended

complaint as required will result in dismissal of Brown II without prejudice and without further

notice. Brown may secure signatures of any other plaintiff who has had the opportunity to read

this Memorandum Opinion and consider the standard that must be met before signing the amended

complaint.

_August 25, 2026__ _____/S/___________________

Date Matthew J. Maddox

United States District Judge