BEALE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

___________________________________________

THOMAS BEALE, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : Civil No. 2:20-cv-05137-JMG

:

MARIROSA LAMAS, Superintendent, :

SCI-Chester, et al., :

Defendants. :

___________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GALLAGHER, J. August 24, 2026

I. INTRODUCTION

Pro se Plaintiff Thomas Beale (“Beale”) is currently incarcerated at a Pennsylvania state

correctional institution. He brought this action, asserting several constitutional violations under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against numerous correctional employees and a doctor contracted to provide

medical services at Beale’s correctional institution. At the summary judgment stage, the Court

granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motions for summary judgment as to Beale’s claims

against the correctional employees. However, the Court determined that Defendants’ motion failed

to address all claims raised by the Plaintiff, and accordingly ordered supplemental briefing.

Specifically, the Court ordered briefing on two issues: (1) the Eighth Amendment claim for

exposure to Environmental Tobacco Smoke (“ETS”) against SCI-Chester Corrections Officer J.

Lees (“C.O. Lees”), and (2) the First Amendment retaliation claim against Mark Wahl, Deputy

Superintendent, Centralized Service at SCI-Chester (“D.S. Wahl”), G. Arais, Security Lieutenant

at SCI-Chester (“Lt. Arias”), and Neko Bourne, Unit Manager at SCI-Chester (“U.M. Bourne”).

In compliance with this Court’s Order, Defendants C.O. Lees, D.S. Wahl, Lt. Arias and

U.M. Bourne (collectively “Defendants”) filed their Supplemental Brief in Support of Summary

Judgment. Beale filed a response in opposition, and Defendants subsequently filed a reply in

support of their Supplemental Brief. This opinion resolves the outstanding issues identified in the

Order and addressed in the supplemental briefing and related responses. For the reasons set forth

below, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants on these issues.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, an inmate at SCI-Chester, alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional

rights based on (1) their alleged failure to address his exposure to tobacco smoke in his housing

unit and (2) alleged retaliation after he authored a document criticizing SCI-Chester’s handling of

the COVID-19 pandemic.

A. Alleged Exposure to Tobacco Smoke

Between February and May 2019, Plaintiff alleges he was repeatedly exposed to tobacco

smoke in his housing unit despite his allergy to smoke. Pl.’s Resp. SUMF (ECF No. 179) ¶¶ 1-22.

On numerous occasions, Plaintiff reported the odor of smoke to correctional officers, including

C.O. Parker, C.O. Lyons, C.O. Goode Williams, C.O. Winstead, C.O. Devane, and C.O.

Karasinski. See Defs.’ SUMF (ECF No. 156) ¶¶ 1–33. Plaintiff contends these officers failed to

adequately respond to his complaints. Defs.’ SUMF ¶¶ 2, 5, 16, 20, 24, 28. Although Plaintiff

frequently asserted that the officers did not investigate, he acknowledged in several instances that

he did not know whether an investigation had occurred, explaining only that he never observed an

officer leave the desk or patrol the unit after he reported the smoke. See Defs.’ SUMF ¶¶ 2, 5, 16,

20, 24, 28; Pl.’s Resp. SUMF ¶¶ 2, 5, 16, 20, 24, 28.

Plaintiff also admits that he generally did not identify the inmate who was smoking or the

source of the smoke when making his complaints. See Pl.’s Resp. SUMF ¶¶ 3, 7, 12, 17, 21, 29.

He maintains that doing so would have required him to search the housing unit, which he claims

would have endangered his health because of his smoke allergy and exceeded the responsibilities

of an inmate. See id. Defendants further note that Plaintiff did not seek medical attention following

most of these incidents and did not properly exhaust administrative remedies for several of them.

See Defs.’ SUMF ¶¶ 6–33. Plaintiff responds that he had already filed grievances concerning the

recurring smoke issue and therefore believed additional grievances were unnecessary. See Pl.’s

Resp. SUMF ¶¶ 6–33.

The record reflects one formal grievance, Grievance No. 791261, filed on March 12, 2019,

in which Plaintiff complained of smoke exposure and alleged that C.O. Parker failed to investigate

his complaint. See Defs’ SUMF ¶ 7. The grievance was denied because C.O. Parker denied the

incident and Plaintiff had not identified the source of the smoke or the inmate responsible. See id.

Plaintiff maintains that identifying the smoker would have jeopardized his health. See Pl.’s Resp.

SUMF ¶ 7.

Plaintiff also alleges that on May 21, 2019, he smelled tobacco smoke and lost

consciousness. See Defs.’ SUMF ¶¶ 31–33. He does not allege that he reported the incident to

prison staff or that any correctional officer was present at the time, and Defendants contend

Plaintiff filed no grievance regarding that incident. See id. Plaintiff again maintains that he had

already grieved the ongoing smoke issue. See Pl.’s Resp. SUMF ¶¶ 32–33.

B. Alleged Retaliation for ‘Indiscretionary Acts of the DOC” Document

In October 2020, Plaintiff authored a document entitled Indiscretionary Acts of the DOC,

in which he criticized SCI-Chester’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. See Defs.’ SUMF ¶

57; Pl.’s Resp. SUMF ¶ 57. Plaintiff contends he sent the document to Senator Tim Kearney, who

forwarded it to Senator John Kane. See Pl.’s Resp. SUMF ¶ 58.

On January 30, 2021, prison officials searched Plaintiff’s cell after discovering handwritten

materials containing institutional information, including prison count schedules and related

security information. Plaintiff’s journals were confiscated due to security concerns, and Plaintiff

was placed in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) for approximately eleven to fourteen days

while the matter was investigated. See Defs.’ SUMF ¶¶ 59–62; Pl.’s Resp. SUMF ¶¶ 59–62.

Defendants maintain Plaintiff was housed in the RHU because officials believed his records

contained sensitive institutional information, while Plaintiff disputes that his writings contained

any confidential information. See Defs.’ SUMF ¶ 62; Pl.’s Resp. SUMF ¶ 62.

Following his release from the RHU, Plaintiff alleges that prison officials retaliated against

him by delaying his removal from Administrative Custody, revoking his Z-Code status, and

otherwise treating him adversely because of Indiscretionary Acts of the DOC. See Defs.’ SUMF

¶¶ 67–76; Pl.’s Resp. SUMF ¶¶ 67–76. Defendants contend Plaintiff has no evidence that

Superintendent Eason, Deputy Superintendent Wahl, Unit Manager Bourne, or Unit Manager

Neally ever read or were aware of the document before taking the challenged actions. See Defs.’

SUMF ¶¶ 68–78. Plaintiff disputes that conclusion, asserting that the timing of the events and

statements made by prison officials permit an inference that they were aware of the document and

retaliated against him because of it. See Pl.’s Resp. SUMF ¶¶ 68–78.

Plaintiff further alleges that, on November 1, 2021, C.O. Norris prevented him from

attending the law library time, causing him to miss a litigation deadline. See Defs.’ SUMF ¶¶ 79–

81. Plaintiff contends Norris acted in retaliation for his grievances, while Defendants maintain

Plaintiff has identified no evidence connecting Norris’ actions to any protected activity. See Defs.’

SUMF ¶¶ 79–81; Pl.’s Resp. SUMF ¶¶ 79–81.

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The full procedural history of this case has been recited in detail in this Court’s May 21,

2024, Memorandum Opinion and Order resolving the initial Motions for Summary Judgment. See

ECF Nos. 186, 187. For present purposes, the relevant history is what follows that Opinion.

On December 13, 2024, this Court issued an Order that additional briefing be submitted by

Defendants on two issues: (1) the Eighth Amendment claim for exposure to ETS against C.O.

Lees, and (2) the First Amendment Retaliation claim against D.S. Wahl, Lt. Arias, and U.M.

Bourne. See ECF No. 193.

On January 9, 2025, Defendants filed the Supplemental Brief in Support of their Motion

for Summary Judgement Pursuant to Court Order. See ECF No. 195. Then on April 17, 2025,

Beale filed his Response to Defendants’ Supplemental Brief. See ECF No. 203. On May 27, 2025,

Defendants filed a Response in Support of their Supplemental Brief. See ECF No. 206.

IV. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motions for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is “genuine” when the “evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Physicians Healthsource, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc.,

954 F.3d 615, 618 (3d Cir. 2020). And a fact is material if “it might affect the outcome of the suit

under governing law.” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

The party moving for summary judgment must “identify[] those portions of the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). In response, the nonmoving

party must then “designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324

(internal quotation marks omitted). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the

[nonmovant’s] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could

reasonably find for the [nonmovant].” Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir.

2015) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).

At this stage of litigation, all facts presented are viewed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Daniels v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 22-1790, 2023 WL 2707178, at *2 (3d Cir.

Mar. 30, 2023). At the summary judgment stage, the court’s role is not to weigh the evidence and

determine the ultimate truth of the allegations. See Baloga v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist., 927 F.3d

742, 752 (3d Cir. 2019) (“At the summary judgment stage, [the court’s] role is ‘not . . . to weigh

the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue

for trial[.]’” (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249)). Instead, the court’s task is to determine whether

there remains a genuine issue of fact for trial. Id.

B. Pro Se Litigants

Courts are required to “liberally construe” filings by pro se litigants and hold them to “less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Lloyd v. Presby’s Inspired Life, 251

F. Supp. 3d 891, 898 (E.D. Pa. 2017). Where a plaintiff files their complaint pro se, a reviewing

court must liberally construe his pleadings, and the court should apply the applicable law,

irrespective of whether the pro se litigant has mentioned it by name or explicitly cited it. See id.

Additionally, a pro se litigant’s verified complaint, if it includes a declaration under penalty of

perjury, may be treated as an affidavit for purposes of opposing summary judgment. Reese v.

Sparks, 760 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1985).

However, this leniency does not relieve pro se litigants of their obligations under Rule 56

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Lloyd, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 898. Specifically, a pro se

plaintiff must still point to competent evidence in the record capable of refuting the defendant’s

motion for summary judgment. Id.

C. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Generally

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought

with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The phrase “with respect to prison conditions”

refers to “all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or

particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v.

Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).

Exhaustion under the PLRA is mandatory. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006) (citing

Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). Section 1997e(a)’s mandatory exhaustion

requirement promotes numerous and significant public policies, including:

(1) avoiding premature interruption of the administrative process and giving the

agency a chance to discover and correct its own errors; (2) conserving scarce

judicial resources, since the complaining party may be successful in vindicating his

rights in the administrative process and the courts may never have to intervene; and

(3) improving the efficacy of the administrative process.

Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 75 (3d Cir. 2000).

There is no “futility” exception to the PLRA’s administrative exhaustion requirement. Id.

at 71. Thus, prisoners “must . . . exhaust administrative remedies even where the relief sought—

monetary damages—cannot be granted by the administrative process.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 85

(citing Booth, 532 U.S. at 734).

In addition, “the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion.” Id. at 83.

Requiring proper exhaustion “eliminate[s] unwarranted federal-court interference with the

administration of prisons, and thus seeks to ‘affor[d] corrections officials time and opportunity to

address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case.’” Id. at 93 (quoting

Porter, 534 U.S. at 525). “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and

other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without

imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Id. at 90-91 (footnote omitted).

For purposes of determining whether Beale exhausted administrative remedies, the

submission date of any grievance or similar document will be deemed the date written by Beale

on the respective document, consistent with the prisoner mailbox rule. “The federal prisoner

mailbox rule provides that a document is deemed filed on the date it is given to prison officials for

mailing.” Glass v. Briggs, No. 3:23-cv-182, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13108, at *7 n.4 (M.D. Pa.

2024) (citing Pabon v. Mahanoy, 654 F.3d 385, 391 n.8 (3d Cir. 2011)).

If a prisoner does not properly exhaust his or her administrative remedies, the prisoner

cannot file a lawsuit challenging prison conditions in federal court because he or she is

procedurally defaulted from doing so. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 227-29 (3d Cir. 2004); see

Small v. Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d 265, 269 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Under the PLRA, exhaustion is a

precondition for bringing suit under § 1983.”).

A prisoner cannot properly exhaust administrative remedies “by filing an untimely or

otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 83.

The prisoner also “may not satisfy the exhaustion requirement after the filing of his complaint.”

Wallace v. Miller, 544 F. App’x 40, 42 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201,

209 & n.9 (3d Cir. 2002) and Johnson v. Jones, 340 F.3d 624, 627-28 (8th Cir. 2003)). Prisons

must also comply with the demands of the system. Shifflett v. Korszniak, 934 F.3d 356, 365 (3d

Cir. 2019). As soon as a prison fails to respond to a properly submitted grievance or appeal within

the time limits prescribed by its own policies, it renders administrative remedies unavailable, and

the prisoner is fully discharged from the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. Id.

“An inmate . . . must exhaust available remedies, but need not exhaust unavailable ones.”

Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016). Thus, “an inmate is required to exhaust those, but only

those, grievance procedures that are ‘capable of use’ to obtain ‘some relief for the action

complained of.’” Id. (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. at 738). Administrative procedures are unavailable

if they (1) “operate[] as a simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to

provide any relief to aggrieved inmates”; (2) are “so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking,

incapable of use,” such as when “no ordinary prisoner can discern or navigate it”; or (3) “prison

administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination,

misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id. at 643-44; see also Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 112-13

(3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that “[s]ection 1997e(a) only requires that prisoners exhaust such

administrative remedies as are available”).

The “exhaustion of administrative remedies under the PLRA is a question of law to be

determined by the judge.” Drippe v. Tobelinski, 604 F.3d 778, 782 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must

resolve this issue “even if that determination requires the resolution of disputed facts.” Small, 728

F.3d at 269 (citing Drippe, 604 F.3d at 781). Also, where Defendants assert the affirmative defense

of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, they bear the burden of proving that Beale failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies. See Brown, 312 F.3d at 111 (“Failure to exhaust

administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that must be pled and proven by the defendant.”).

The record shows that Beale is not a stranger to the grievance process; rather, he is a prolific

filer of grievances and is well aware of the process for filing and appealing from the disposition of

those grievances. Therefore, the Court is satisfied that Beale was well versed in the DOC’s

grievance process and that this process was wholly available to him at all times relevant to the

allegations in the Amended Complaint.1

V. DISCUSSION

A. Eighth Amendment Claim for Exposure to ETS Against C.O. Lees

Beale alleged in his First Amended Complaint that on April 29, 2019, he complained to

C.O. Lees about ETS, but C.O. Lees did nothing. See Amended Compliant (“Am. Compl.”) (ECF

No. 54) ¶ 40. However, Beale has failed to produce any evidence of a timely filed grievance

1 Concerning the DOC’s grievance procedure:

DC-ADM 804 provides a general, though rigorous, mechanism for inmate

grievances. An inmate’s submission of a written grievance is reviewed and results

in an Initial Review Response or Rejection explaining the disposition of the

inmate’s grievance. Upon receipt of either response, an inmate has fifteen days to

file an appeal with the Facility Manager. DC-ADM 804, § 2.A. Upon the Facility

Manager’s resolution of that appeal, the inmate may file for Final Review by the

Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (“SOIGA”). DC-ADM 804,

§ 2.B.

Moore v. Lamas, No. 22-1007, 2023 WL 371397, at *2 (3d Cir. Jan. 24, 2023) (internal footnote

omitted); see also Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Policy Statement:

Inmate Grievance System – DC-ADM 804 (effective as of May 1, 2015), available at:

https://www.cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/Documents/DOC%20Policies/804%20Inmate%20Grievan

ces.pdf.

concerning this complaint against C.O. Lees. Defendants claim in their Supplemental Brief that as

a result, Beale has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his Eighth Amendment claim

against C.O. Lees. ECF No. 195 at 5.

Beale argues in his response to Defendants’ Supplemental Brief that summary judgment

should not be granted on the basis that Defendants failed to raise the exhaustion defense in the

initial summary judgment phase. ECF No. 203 at 2. This argument is unavailing as Supplemental

Briefing was explicitly ordered by this Court to address the omission. See ECF No. 193.

Additionally, Beale concedes in his Response to Defendants’ Supplemental Brief, that he

has failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to this claim. ECF No. 203 at 4.

Accordingly, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of C.O Lees on Beale’s ETS

claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

B. First Amendment Retaliation Claims

To establish a First Amendment Retaliation claim pursuant to section 1983, a plaintiff must

show that “(1) [they] engaged in ‘constitutionally protected conduct,’ (2) the defendant engaged

in ‘retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising [their]

constitutional rights,’ and (3) ‘a causal link existed between the constitutionally protected conduct

and the retaliatory action’” Baloga, 927 F.3d at 752 (quoting Palardy v. Twp. of Millburn, 906

F.3d 76, 80-81 (3d Cir. 2018)).

As to the third element, a plaintiff must “demonstrate[] that [their] exercise of a

constitutional right was a substantial or motivating factor in the challenged decision.” Rauser v.

Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 334 (3d Cir. 2001). If they do, “the prison officials may still prevail by proving

that they would have made the same decision absent the protected conduct for reasons reasonably

related to a legitimate penological interest.” Id.

If there is no direct evidence of causation, a plaintiff can establish causation through

circumstantial evidence by proving either:

(1) an usually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the

alleged retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to

establish a causal link. In the absence of that proof, the plaintiff must show that

from the “evidence gleaned from the record as a whole” the trier of fact should infer

causation.

Beyer v. Borough, 428 F. App’x 149, 154-55 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Lauren W. v. DeFlaminis,

480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007)). “The decision-makers must be aware of the protected conduct

for it to be a substantial or motivating factor in a decision.” Id. at 155.

A prisoner’s filing of grievances against prison officials is a constitutionally protected

activity, forming the basis for a retaliation claim if adverse actions are taken in response to such

grievances. Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003). When an inmate alleges that

retaliation rendered the administrative grievance process unavailable, the issue of exhaustion is

analyzed as part of the second element of the retaliation claim.

The Third Circuit evaluates such claims using a two-pronged test that incorporates both

subjective and objective components. Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 268 (3d Cir. 2018).

As such, they have developed a two-prong analysis. Id. The test—typically applied in the context

of threats—requires an inmate to show: (1) that “the threat actually did deter the plaintiff inmate

from lodging a grievance or pursuing a particular part of the process” and (2) that “the threat is

one that would deter a reasonable inmate of ordinary firmness and fortitude from lodging a

grievance or pursuing the part of the grievance process that the inmate failed to exhaust.” Id.

The Court will now address Beale’s retaliation claims against the D.S Wahl, Lt. Arias, and

U.M. Bourne bellow.

1. D.S. Wahl

Beale claims that Deputy Superintendent Wahl retaliated against him for filing a Request

to Staff and several grievances by making false statements concerning his Z-Code status and cell

assignments in written responses. See ECF No. 203 at 5–8, 12–14. These allegations present two

distinct retaliation theories.

The first concerns Beale’s March 24, 2021 Request to Staff and Grievance No. 921525,

both of which challenged the removal of his Z-Code status following his discussion with Unit

Manager Bourne. ECF No. 203 at 5–7. Beale alleges that Wahl retaliated against him for pursuing

these complaints by making false statements in his responses. Specifically, in March, 2021, Wahl

responded to the Request to Staff by stating that he did not observe any violation and assumed

Beale’s court-ordered Z-Code status was limited to one or two years. See ECF No. 54 ¶¶ 249–50;

ECF No. 203 at 6–7, 13–14. Similarly, in his Initial Review Response to Grievance No. 921525,

Wahl stated that “the DOC are in full compliance with the court ordered single-cell status,” that

the single-cell order was for one year subject to annual review, and that Beale’s Z-Code status was

removed after the annual review process determined there was no longer a penological need for a

single cell. ECF No. 203 at 36.

The second theory concerns Grievance Nos. 933207 and 933545, which challenged SCI-

Chester’s assignment of unvaccinated inmates to Beale’s cell despite his vaccination status. See

ECF No. 203 at 5–8. Beale alleges that Wahl retaliated against him for filing those grievances by

making false statements in his response to Grievance No. 933545. Specifically, Wahl stated that

(1) the institution makes “every attempt” to house vaccinated inmates separately from

unvaccinated inmates and (2) Beale was “not approved for a Z-Code and this has been confirmed

with the courts.” ECF No. 203 at 64.

Liberally construed, Beale’s Amended Complaint asserts retaliation claims based on these

alleged misrepresentations. See ECF No. 54 ¶¶ 249–61, 280–314. To pursue those claims,

however, Beale was required to exhaust available administrative remedies concerning the alleged

retaliatory conduct. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Although Beale filed grievances challenging his Z-

Code status and cell assignments, he did not file any grievance alleging that Wahl retaliated against

him by making false statements in his responses. Defendants therefore argue that Beale failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies as to his retaliation claims against Wahl. See ECF No. 195 at

5–7.

Beale responds that the grievance process was unavailable. As to the Z-Code-related

retaliation claim, he argues that Grievance No. 921525 was effectively exhausted because he

appealed to the Facility Manager but never received a response, preventing further review. See

ECF No. 203 at 9–12. As to the retaliation claim concerning unvaccinated cellmates, Beale argues

that prison officials failed to timely respond to Grievance No. 933207 as required by DC-ADM

804, likewise rendering the administrative process unavailable. See id. at 5–8.

Defendants have not presented evidence that Beale received a response to his appeal of

Grievance No. 921525. Accordingly, the grievance process was unavailable with respect to the

claims raised in that grievance. Likewise, Defendants have not shown that SCI-Chester responded

to Grievance No. 933207 within the fifteen-day period required by DC-ADM 804. ECF No. 203

at 5–7. Because prison officials failed to follow the grievance procedures, the administrative

remedy process was unavailable to Beale as to the claims raised in that grievance. See Ross, 578

U.S. at 642 (finding that “[a]n inmate . . . must exhaust available remedies but need not exhaust

unavailable ones.”).

Although administrative remedies were unavailable to Beale with respect to Grievance

Nos. 921525 and 933207, those grievances did not allege that Wahl retaliated against Beale by

making false statements in his responses. Nor did any other grievance in the record raise such a

retaliation claim. Accordingly, these grievances are not valid grievances for purposes of

exhausting Beale’s retaliation claims against Wahl. See Robinson v. Superintendent Rockview SCI,

831 F.3d 148, 153 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Powe v. Ennis, 177 F.3d 393, 394 (5th Cir. 1999) (per

curiam)) (“[a] prisoner’s administrative remedies are deemed exhausted when a valid grievance

has been filed and the state’s time for responding thereto has expired.”). Because Beale failed to

file a valid grievance concerning Wahl’s alleged retaliatory conduct, he failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies as to these claims.

Even assuming, however, that Beale exhausted his administrative remedies, his retaliation

claims against Wahl fail on the merits. To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, Beale

must show, among other things, that he suffered an adverse action—i.e., action “sufficient to deter

a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights.” Baloga, 927 F.3d at

752 (quoting Palardy, 906 F.3d at 80–81). Beale contends that Wahl’s allegedly false statements

regarding his Z-Code status constituted an adverse action because they were made in retaliation

for Beale’s grievances. ECF No. 203 at 12–13. Specifically, Beale argues that Wahl’s statement

that his Z-Code status was “not approved” and that this determination had been “confirmed with

the courts” would deter an inmate from filing additional grievances challenging the loss of his

single-cell status. Id. at 6, 13–14.

Although a sufficiently threatening or retaliatory false statement could, in some

circumstances, constitute an adverse action, Beale’s claim fails because the record does not support

a finding that Wahl’s statements deterred him from exercising his constitutional rights. Indeed,

after Wahl allegedly made the challenged statements, Beale continued to file grievances

concerning his Z-Code status and related cell assignments. ECF No. 54 ¶¶ 261, 280–314. His

continued pursuit of administrative remedies on the same subject demonstrates that he was not

deterred from engaging in the protected activity at issue. Accordingly, even if Beale’s retaliation

claims were exhausted, no reasonable jury could conclude that Wahl’s alleged statements

constituted an adverse action sufficient to support a First Amendment retaliation claim. Wahl is

therefore entitled to summary judgment on Beale’s retaliation claims against him.

2. Lt. Arias

Beale’s retaliation claim against Lt. Arias is based on Beale’s alleged efforts to access the

courts and his filing of a grievance. See ECF No. 203 at 7–8, 13–14. Specifically, Beale alleges

that Lt. Arias retaliated against him for preparing legal materials for a lawsuit and for filing

Grievance No. 915116 concerning missing materials. See id.

According to Beale, the alleged retaliation began on January 30, 2021, when prison

officials searched his cell after discovering handwritten materials containing institutional

information, including prison count schedules and related security information. See Defs.’ SUMF

¶¶ 59–62; Pl.’s Resp. SUMF ¶¶ 59–62. During the investigation, Beale’s journals and other

documents were confiscated, and he was placed in the RHU for approximately eleven to fourteen

days. See id. Beale alleges that the confiscated materials included documents he maintained for

litigation purposes. See id. On February 11, 2021, Lt. Arias informed Beale that he had been

cleared of the investigation and would be returned to general population. See id. Beale further

alleges that, upon returning to his cell, he discovered that his belongings had been disturbed and

that certain legal materials—including documents related to his lawsuit, a writing tablet, a copy of

The Indiscretionary Acts of The D.O.C., and other papers—were missing. See id.

Beale contends that Lt. Arias knew the confiscated materials were related to litigation

because the documents contained case captions and other indications that they were legal

materials. See ECF No. 203 at 7–8, 13–14. Beale therefore claims that Lt. Arias’s actions were

taken in retaliation for his attempt to access the courts and for filing Grievance No. 915116. See

id.

Defendants argue that Beale failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to this

retaliation claim because he never filed a grievance alleging that Lt. Arias retaliated against him.

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner must properly exhaust available administrative

remedies by presenting the same claim asserted in court through the prison’s grievance process.

See Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act § 7, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a). Thus, to exhaust a

retaliation claim against Lt. Arias, Beale was required to submit a grievance identifying retaliatory

conduct by Lt. Arias.

Although Grievance Nos. 915116 and 926035 concern the confiscation of Beale’s

materials and relate to the underlying events, neither grievance alleges that Lt. Arias acted in

retaliation for Beale’s protected activity. See ECF No. 203 at 7–8. Rather, the grievances challenge

the loss or confiscation of materials themselves. See id. Moreover, the record contains no grievance

in which Beale alleged that Lt. Arias retaliated against him for accessing the courts or filing a

grievance. See id. Because Beale failed to exhaust a retaliation claim against Lt. Arias through the

grievance process, his First Amendment retaliation claim against Lt. Arias is procedurally

defaulted.

Accordingly, Lt. Arias is entitled to summary judgment on Beale’s First Amendment

retaliation claim based on Beale’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

3. U.M. Bourne

Beale asserts three retaliation claims against U.M. Bourne: (1) that Bourne moved him to

a cell where he could not see the Officer’s desk or mailbox after a misunderstanding with C.O.

Brown regarding a Request to Staff form; (2) that Bourne placed another unvaccinated inmate in

his cell after Beale filed a grievance resulting in the removal of a prior unvaccinated cellmate; and

(3) that Bourne attempted to place another unvaccinated inmate in his cell after Beale’s Z-Code

status was reinstated following a hearing before Judge Conti. See ECF No. 203 at 9–12, 15–17.

i. Cell Move After Misunderstanding with C.O. Brown

Beale’s first retaliation claim is based on his placement of a Request to Staff form in his

cell door and his subsequent interaction with C.O. Brown on March 2, 2021, during which she

allegedly sarcastically commented on him watching her. See ECF No. 54 ¶¶ 235–39; ECF No. 203

at 9–10. Beale contends that Bourne retaliated against him the following day by moving him to a

cell from which he could no longer see the Officer’s desk or mailbox. See ECF No. 54 ¶¶ 235–39;

ECF No. 203 at 10, 15–16.

Beale has not identified any grievance concerning this incident, nor has he provided

evidence of a grievance alleging that Bourne retaliated against him by moving his cell.

Accordingly, Beale failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to this claim.

Even assuming exhaustion, the claim would fail on the merits. Although a cell transfer

could constitute an adverse action for purposes of a retaliation claim, Beale must also establish a

causal connection between his protected conduct and the alleged retaliation. See Rauser v. Horn,

241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001) (prisoner alleging retaliation must show constitutionally

protected conduct, an adverse action, and a causal link between the two). Beale has provided no

evidence that Bourne knew about his interaction with C.O. Brown, the Request to Staff form, or

any related grievance before moving him. Without evidence that Bourne was aware of the

protected conduct, temporal proximity alone is insufficient to establish causation. See Ambrose v.

Twp. of Robinson, 303 F.3d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[i]t is only intuitive that for protected

conduct to be a substantial or motivating factor in a decision, the decisionmakers must be aware

of the protected conduct.”).

ii. Placement of Second Unvaccinated Inmate

Beale next claims that Bourne retaliated against him by placing a second unvaccinated

inmate in his cell after Beale filed Grievance No. 933207, which resulted in the removal of a prior

unvaccinated cellmate. See ECF No. 203 at 10–12, 16–17.

The record does not support Beale’s assertion that Bourne was aware of Grievance No.

933207 before placing the second unvaccinated inmate in his cell on June 25, 2021. Although

Beale alleges that Bourne placed the inmate in retaliation for Grievance No. 933207, he offers no

evidence that Bourne knew of the grievance at that time. Grievance No. 933207 was filed on June

23, 2021, but Bourne was not the subject of the grievance and did not author the response to it.

Moreover, the Initial Review Responses for Grievance Nos. 933207 and 933545 were not issued

until July 19, 2021, with the response to Grievance No. 933545 dated one minute before the

response to Grievance No. 933207. ECF No. 195 at 15. Under DC-ADM 804, only the Facility

Grievance Coordinator and/or a designated Grievance Officer would have access to grievances

between their retrieval from the lockboxes and issuance of the Initial Review Responses. Id.

Bourne was neither the Facility Grievance Coordinator nor the designated Grievance Officer for

either grievance, and there is no evidence that she otherwise learned of Grievance No. 933207

before placing the inmate in Beale’s cell. Id. Thus, Beale has failed to produce evidence from

which a reasonable jury could conclude that Bourne knew of Grievance No. 933207 when she

placed the second unvaccinated inmate in his cell.

Because Beale has not produced evidence that Bourne was aware of the protected activity

before the alleged adverse action, he cannot establish the required causal connection. See Ambrose,

303 F.3d at 493. In addition, Grievance No. 933207 does not allege retaliation by Bourne, and no

other grievance in the record identifies this conduct as retaliatory. See ECF No. 203 at 10–12.

Beale therefore failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to this claim.

iii. Attempted Placement of Inmate After Z-Code Reinstatement

Beale’s final retaliation claim concerns Bourne’s alleged attempt to assign him a cellmate

after Judge Conti reinstated his Z-Code status and directed that he remain single-celled. See ECF

No. 54 ¶¶ 319–34; ECF No. 203 at 11–12, 16. Beale contends that Bourne attempted to violate his

court-ordered single-cell status in retaliation for his prior grievance activity and success in

obtaining reinstatement of his Z-Code status. See ECF No. 203 at 11–12, 16.

Unlike his other claims, the record supports that Bourne was aware of Beale’s Z-Code

status and the recent court Order. Beale alleges that Bourne directed staff to place another inmate

in his cell and continued to do so even after C.O. Budd informed her that Beale had Z-Code status.

See ECF No. 54 ¶¶ 319–33; ECF No. 203 at 15–16.

Beale filed Grievance No. 940745 on August 14, 2021, concerning Bourne’s attempt to

place another inmate in his cell and his stated intent to pursue a breach of the Settlement

Agreement. ECF No. 54 ¶¶ 325, 334; ECF No. 203 at 10–11. Beale appealed the grievance to the

Chief Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals and received no response. ECF No.

54 ¶ 398; ECF No. 203 at 10–11. The failure to respond rendered administrative remedies

unavailable as to any properly raised claims contained in that grievance. See Robinson, 831 F.3d

at 153 (quoting Powe, 177 F.3d at 394).

Nevertheless, Grievance No. 940745 did not allege that Bourne acted in retaliation, nor

does any other grievance in the record. See ECF No. 203 at 10–11. Because Beale failed to raise a

retaliation claim through the grievance process, he did not exhaust his administrative remedies as

to this claim. See Robinson, 831 F.3d at 153.

Accordingly, U.M. Bourne is entitled to summary judgment on each of Beale’s First

Amendment retaliation claims against her.

V. CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant the Commonwealth Defendants’

Motions for Summary Judgment on all the claims at issue against Commonwealth Defendants C.O.

Lees, D.S. Wahl, Lt. Arias, and U.M. Bourne.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ John M. Gallagher

JOHN M. GALLAGHER

United States District Court Judge