The opinion
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-3020
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Jon Holland; Tyane Holland; Melissa Ferrill
Plaintiffs - Appellants
v.
Martin Simmerman; City of Sikeston, MO
Defendants - Appellees
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri – Cape Girardeau
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Submitted: April 15, 2026
Filed: August 25, 2026
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Before KELLY, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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GRASZ, Circuit Judge.
George Holland was shot and killed by Sikeston, Missouri, police officer
Martin Simmerman after an armed standoff. The Holland family sued the City of
Sikeston and Simmerman, alleging several causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and state law. The City and Simmerman moved to dismiss the complaint and
provided the district court with body camera footage from officers at the scene. After
finding that the footage blatantly contradicted various allegations, the district court
granted the motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The Hollands
appeal, arguing the district court erred by determining Simmerman was entitled to
qualified immunity and official immunity, and by dismissing their claim against the
City. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
I. Background
During an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting in Sikeston, Missouri, George
Holland began experiencing a severe mental health crisis evidenced by “incoherent
and nonsensical speech.” He then “pulled out a small pistol and placed the barrel of
the pistol in his mouth.” All the meeting attendees left the building safely, but
Holland remained in the building alone with the firearm.
Officers from the Sikeston Department of Public Safety responded and
positioned themselves outside the front door of the building in a “tactically
concealed and covered position . . . .” They spoke to Holland through the open front
door, which was the only way in or out of the building. For most of the encounter,
Holland stood approximately 35 feet away from the front door in a corridor, partially
concealed by a wall and piece of furniture. He expressed suicidal ideations, spoke
incoherently, and requested to talk to a preacher and the local news. Despite repeated
officer commands, he refused to drop his firearm. But Holland did not initially point
the gun at officers nor threaten to harm them. While police spoke with Holland,
Officer Martin Simmerman stood halfway in the doorframe with his rifle aimed at
Holland.
After approximately fifteen minutes, Holland moved out of the corridor and
into the officers’ plain view. He stood in a corner, faced the officers, and held the
firearm in his right hand with its barrel pointing to his right temple. In a split second,
Holland moved the firearm down and away from his temple and simultaneously
moved his left arm towards the center of his body and the firearm. At that moment,
Simmerman fired at Holland. Holland retreated back into the corridor with the
firearm. And Simmerman, trailed closely by other officers, followed Holland into
the corridor. Simmerman then fired additional rounds into the corridor, and
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Holland’s gun slid onto the floor. In total, Simmerman fired 15 rounds at Holland
and struck him at least six times. Officers rendered aid, but Holland died from his
wounds.
The Holland family (the Hollands) sued the City of Sikeston and Simmerman.
The Hollands allege six causes of action: (Count I) excessive force in violation of
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment against Simmerman under § 1983; (Count II)
wrongful death against Simmerman under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.080(1); (Count III)
battery against Simmerman under § 537.080(1); (Count IV) a custom, policy, pattern
or practice of using excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment against the City under § 1983 and Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978); (Count V) deprivation of substantive due process in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment against Simmerman under § 1983; and (Count VI) a
custom, policy, pattern, or practice of substantive due process violations in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment against the City under § 1983 and Monell.
The City and Simmerman moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing the
Hollands failed to state any claim upon which relief could be granted and that
Simmerman was entitled to qualified and official immunity. Along with their
motion, the City and Simmerman submitted three videos from the body-worn
cameras of officers on the scene. The district court granted the motion and dismissed
the complaint with prejudice.1 First, it granted Simmerman qualified immunity on
Count I, the § 1983 excessive force claim, because the videos blatantly contradicted
the allegations that his conduct was not objectively reasonable and, notwithstanding
the videos, he did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. Second, it
1
In their response to the City’s and Simmerman’s motion to dismiss, the
Hollands requested the district court dismiss Counts V and VI without prejudice.
The district court, however, determined Simmerman and the City “are entitled to
qualified immunity on all of Decedent’s § 1983 claims,” so it dismissed Counts V
and IV with prejudice. On appeal, the Hollands do not make any arguments related
to Counts V and VI, so those issues are waived. See Waters v. Madson, 921 F.3d
725, 740–41 n.8 (8th Cir. 2019).
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granted Simmerman official immunity on Counts II and III, the state-law claims,
because, in light of the videos, it was not plausible that Simmerman acted with bad
faith or malice. And, third, it dismissed Count IV, the Monell claim, against the City
because there was no well-pled underlying constitutional violation. The Hollands
appeal.
II. Discussion
The Hollands argue the district court erred by dismissing Counts I, II, III, and
IV with prejudice. Specifically, they claim the district court incorrectly determined
Simmerman is entitled to qualified immunity and official immunity, and wrongly
concluded that there was no underlying constitutional violation to support the Monell
claim against the City. We agree that the district court erred by granting Simmerman
qualified immunity on Count I. We, therefore, reverse the dismissal of Count I and
remand for the district court to reconsider Counts II, III, and IV.
A. Count I
We review motions to dismiss based on qualified immunity de novo. Watkins
v. City of St. Louis, 102 F.4th 947, 951 (8th Cir. 2024). “To survive a motion to
dismiss, ‘a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Brown v. Linder, 56 F.4th
1140, 1143 (8th Cir. 2023)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). The plaintiff “need not allege facts in painstaking detail,” but he must allege
facts that “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Watkins, 102 F.4th at
951 (cleaned up). And, “[i]n reviewing a motion to dismiss, we may consider
matters ‘embraced by the complaint,’ such as video evidence, where no party
challenges the contents’ authenticity.” Young v. Keyes, 176 F.4th 573, 577 (8th Cir.
2026) (quoting Zean v. Fairview Health Servs., 858 F.3d 520, 526 (8th Cir. 2017)).
If a plaintiff’s allegations are blatantly contradicted by video evidence, we are not
required to accept them. See Waters v. Madson, 921 F.3d 725, 734 (8th Cir. 2019).
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Video evidence blatantly contradicts alleged facts if it “conclusively disprove[s]
plaintiff’s account of the events.” Young, 176 F.4th at 577.
A district court should dismiss a complaint when qualified immunity “is
established on the face of the complaint.” Watkins, 102 F.4th at 951 (quoting Weaver
v. Clarke, 45 F.3d 1253, 1255 (8th Cir. 1995)). “Qualified immunity shields public
officials from liability for civil damages if their conduct did not ‘violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.’” LeMay v. Mays, 18 F.4th 283, 286–87 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting
Dillard v. O’Kelley, 961 F.3d 1048, 1052 (8th Cir. 2020) (en banc)). To overcome
dismissal based on qualified immunity, “the plaintiff must plead facts showing
(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right
was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Id. at 287 (cleaned
up). “If either prong is not satisfied, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.”
Id.
Turning to Count I, excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment,2
“we consider whether the amount of force used was objectively reasonable under the
particular circumstances.” Young, 176 F.4th at 578 (quoting Kohorst v. Smith, 968
F.3d 871, 876 (8th Cir. 2020)). “‘We evaluate the reasonableness of the force used
from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,’ without the benefit of
hindsight.” Id. (quoting Kohorst, 968 F.3d at 876). In other words, “the question is
whether the officers’ actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and
2
Count I alleges excessive force in violation of both the “Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.” Claims for excessive
force under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments are analyzed differently. See
Wilansky v. Morton Cnty., 179 F.4th 633, 642 (8th Cir. 2026) (explaining that we
apply “the shocks-the-conscience standard to Fourteenth Amendment [excessive
force] claims”). The district court did not make this distinction, but, nonetheless,
dismissed the complaint in its entirety. On appeal, the Hollands do not argue they
plausibly alleged a claim for excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Therefore, this claim was abandoned. See Jasperson v. Purolator Courier Corp.,
765 F.2d 736, 740 (8th Cir. 1985).
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circumstances confronting them.” Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491,
496 (8th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up).
Here, the alleged use of excessive force — “fifteen (15) rounds” and “six”
strikes — occurred seconds apart in three separate volleys. The first volley occurred
when Simmerman fired the initial shots at Holland, who was standing in the corner,
holding the firearm, and facing law enforcement, and it was captured on video. The
second and third volleys occurred after Holland was initially shot and had moved
behind a wall into the corridor, so they were not fully captured in the videos
presented. Indeed, critically, while the videos show Simmerman firing these shots
and Holland’s firearm sliding across the floor, they do not show Holland’s actions.
The district court found that the videos blatantly contradicted the Hollands’
allegations because they show that Holland took a “menacing action” towards
officers before Simmerman shot him. Specifically, it determined the videos showed
that Holland, “in a split-second, . . . moved the gun from his right temple, lowered
the gun in front of his body with the muzzle pointed away from him, extended his
right arm, and moved his left hand up from his hip towards the gun.” Therefore, it
concluded Simmerman could have reasonably believed Holland was getting into a
“shooting stance” and going to shoot the officers, so Simmerman’s use of deadly
force was objectively reasonable and qualified immunity was warranted. The
Hollands, however, argued the excessive force claim should not be dismissed
because the videos do not depict Holland during the second and third volleys and,
thus, any related allegations could not be blatantly contradicted. But the district
court rejected this argument, stating, “The Complaint does not parse Officer
Simmerman’s rapidly successive uses of deadly force and, under these
circumstances, neither will this Court.”
First, the Hollands argue the district court erred by granting Simmerman
qualified immunity because the videos do not show Holland pointing the firearm
towards officers, advancing towards the officers, or taking a menacing action
towards the officers. Second, the Hollands argue that even if the first volley of shots
was justified, “the video does not support that same alleged justification for
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[Simmerman’s] last two volley of rounds,” so the grant of qualified immunity and
dismissal were erroneous. We disagree with the Hollands’ first argument but agree
with their second.
The videos blatantly contradict the Hollands’ allegation that “[Holland] never
. . . took menacing actions towards . . . Defendant Simmerman . . . .” In particular,
Sergeant Daniel Johnson’s body camera footage shows that Holland was holding the
firearm in his right hand and, in a split second, lowered the firearm away from his
temple while simultaneously raising his left hand towards the center of his body.
Before this, Holland refused repeated officer commands to drop the firearm and told
the officers, “I kill myself or you kill me. There’s your options. You got -- You got
no more options.” Under the totality of the circumstances and our precedent,
Holland took a menacing action.
We have held the following to be objective threats or menacing actions:
pointing a rifle outward and raising it while advancing towards officers, Maser v.
City of Coralville, 139 F.4th 1004, 1009–10 (8th Cir. 2025); reaching for and raising
a loaded gun, Aden v. City of Bloomington, 128 F.4th 952, 960 (8th Cir. 2025);
fleeing but running in the general direction of officers while carrying a gun, Liggins
v. Cohen, 971 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2020); “fail[ing] to respond to commands to
drop the weapon” and “rais[ing] the gun to [an officer’s] shin level,” Rogers v. King,
885 F.3d 1118, 1121–22 (8th Cir. 2018); and “turning to face the deputies and using
his right hand to maneuver [what appeared to be a] rifle,” but pointing the muzzle
of the rifle “toward the sky.” Dooley v. Tharp, 856 F.3d 1177, 1182 & n.2 (8th Cir.
2017). In summary, where a suspect disregards commands to drop a firearm, faces
officers, and moves the firearm in their general direction — even if not squarely
aimed at officers — we have found the suspect’s actions are menacing as a matter of
law. So, in total, Holland’s repeated refusals to drop the firearm, his positioning
towards officers, his quick lowering of the firearm, and his left hand moving towards
the direction of the firearm, was a menacing action. See Liggins, 971 F.3d at 801
(“With only a second or two to react . . . , [the officer] had reasonable grounds to
believe that the fleeing subject . . . could raise the gun and shoot. It would take only
an instant to do so if the person were ready to fire.”). As a result, Simmerman’s first
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volley was objectively reasonable, entitling him to qualified immunity to the extent
the Hollands’ claims relate to those shots.
But our inquiry does not end there. The Hollands also allege Simmerman’s
use of deadly force — “fir[ing] fifteen (15) rounds from his military-style automatic
assault rifle at [Holland] within a mere few seconds, striking [him] at least six times
and killing him” — “was excessive and not objectively reasonable.” When read in
its entirety, the complaint does not limit the use of excessive force to the first volley
of shots. Instead, it alleges that the fifteen shots and six strikes, which occurred
across all three volleys, amounted to excessive force. As a result, we agree with the
Hollands that the district court erred by impermissibly narrowing the scope of the
excessive force claim to only the first volley of shots.
Excessive force claims are not subject to heightened pleading requirements,
like, for example, fraud claims. See Harris v. St. Louis Police Dep’t, 164 F.3d 1085,
1086–87 (8th Cir. 1998). The Hollands were not required to plead fifteen separate
instances of excessive force. Further, in excessive force cases, courts must evaluate
the “‘totality of the circumstances.’” Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73, 79 (2025). Courts
cannot “put on chronological blinders” and selectively review portions of the alleged
violation. Id. at 82. Thus, the district court’s inquiry should not have ceased after
the first volley of shots; particularly, whereas here, the complaint alleges that
Simmerman used excessive force by firing fifteen rounds at Holland, striking him
six times.3
3
The district court emphasized that the complaint “focuses entirely on Officer
Simmerman’s initial use of deadly force,” and, for support, it referenced an
allegation that Holland was killed “14 minutes and 56 seconds after their first contact
. . . .” This characterization is inconsistent with pleading standards. The complaint,
when read as a whole, plausibly alleges a claim for excessive force based on all of
Simmerman’s shots. See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S.
308, 322–23 (2007) (“The inquiry, as several Courts of Appeals have recognized, is
whether all of the facts alleged, taken collectively, give rise to a strong inference of
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Simmerman, nevertheless, argues he is also entitled to qualified immunity for
the second and third volleys because Holland “remained in possession of the pistol
after the initial volleys” and “did not relinquish control of the pistol until the last
shot was fired . . . .” But the videos do not conclusively show that this is what
happened. Rather, they merely show Simmerman firing the second and third volleys
and Holland’s pistol sliding across the floor. Holland’s positioning, movements, and
state while in the corridor and out of view are not depicted.4 So, we must credit the
Hollands’ allegation that “[Holland] never threatened . . . any of these officers . . . at
any time throughout the entire episode,” at least as to the second and third volleys,
because it is not blatantly contradicted by the videos. And when we do so,
Simmerman is not entitled to qualified immunity for the second and third volleys.
See Brockington v. Boykins, 637 F.3d 503, 507 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Rather than shoot
[the suspect] as he lay helpless on the ground, a reasonable police officer would have
asked him to surrender, called for backup or an ambulance, or retreated, depending
on the facts that emerge through discovery.” (emphasis added)); see also Est. of
Hernandez v. City of Los Angeles, 139 F.4th 790, 800 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc) (“[A]
reasonable jury could find that after the second volley, the immediate threat posed
by [the suspect] had ended.”); Church v. Anderson, 898 F.3d 830, 834 (8th Cir. 2018).
B. Counts II, III, and IV
Following its dismissal of Count I, the district court dismissed Counts II and
III, the state-law claims against Simmerman, and Count IV, the Monell claim against
the City. As to Counts II and III, the district court determined that Simmerman was
entitled to official immunity under Missouri law because he “could have reasonably
believed that [Holland] was pointing or was about to point his pistol at the officers
[liability], not whether any individual allegation, scrutinized in isolation, meets that
standard.” (second emphasis added)).
4
Though Holland can be heard on the videos after the first volley, we simply
do not know his actions while in the corridor. Other evidence produced during
discovery may bear on this.
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and that he engaged in a menacing action.” 5 As to Count IV, the district court
determined that because the excessive force claim against Simmerman failed, the
Monell claim against the City “likewise fail[s].” Therefore, the district court’s
analysis on the remaining claims — Counts II, II, and IV — was driven by and
intertwined with its disposition of Count I. And, for the reasons explained above,
the district court erred by reading the Hollands’ excessive force claim too narrowly.
So because our reversal on Count I affects the remaining issues, we remand for the
district court to reconsider its dismissal of Counts II, III, and IV.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons above, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I largely agree with the court’s opinion, including its well-reasoned analysis
of the second and third volley. My only disagreement is with respect to its analysis
of the first volley. Given the quality of the video recordings, I cannot confidently
make out the direction in which Holland is moving his pistol and am unable to rule
out the possibility that the videos depict Holland in the process of pointing his pistol
at the wall to his left, or even at himself, rather than at the officers in front of him
and to his right. Accordingly, I would hold that the video evidence does not blatantly
contradict the Hollands’ allegations.
5
While this appeal was pending, the Missouri Court of Appeals decided
McGaugh v. Naudet, which discusses the availability of official immunity to well-
pled intentional torts. 733 S.W.3d 441, 462–64 (Mo. Ct. App. 2026). On remand,
the district court should consider what, if any, impact McGaugh has on this case,
bearing in mind that “[d]ecisions by the Missouri Court of Appeals may be used as
an indication of how the Missouri Supreme Court may rule . . . .” Great Lakes Ins.
SE v. Andrews, 33 F.4th 1005, 1008 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Burger v. Allied Prop.
& Cas. Ins. Co., 822 F.3d 445, 447 (8th Cir. 2016)).
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I also write separately to emphasize that the question of whether Simmerman
had a sufficient basis to use deadly force turns on “the totality of the circumstances”
and “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case,
including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate
threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest
or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Thompson v. Dill, 930 F.3d 1008, 1013 (8th
Cir. 2019); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). Regardless of how exactly
one parses the video evidence, it is difficult to conclude that it blatantly contradicts
the Hollands’ allegations when so many of the relevant facts remain unknown. This
case has not yet proceeded past the motion-to-dismiss stage, making prior cases
decided on summary judgment less helpful to our analysis, particularly when they
are distinguishable along numerous dimensions—involving briefer exchanges
before a shooting, more threatening behavior, and a greater risk of danger to officers
and third parties. See Maser v. City of Coralville, 139 F.4th 1004, 1006–10 (8th Cir.
2025); Aden as Tr. for Est. of Aden v. City of Bloomington, 128 F.4th 952, 955–57,
959–60 (8th Cir. 2025); Liggins v. Cohen, 971 F.3d 798, 799–801 (8th Cir. 2020);
Rogers v. King, 885 F.3d 1118, 1119–22 (8th Cir. 2018); Dooley v. Tharp, 856 F.3d
1177, 1178–84 (8th Cir. 2017).
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the court’s decision to affirm the
grant of qualified immunity as to the first volley, but I otherwise join the opinion in
full.
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