The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
KEREN SARAI CONCEPCION
BONILLA,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 6:25-cv-02147-AAS
FRANK BISIGNANO,
Commissioner of
Social Security Administration,
Defendant.
____________________________________/
ORDER
Plaintiff Keren Sarai Concepcion Bonilla requests judicial review of a
decision by the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) denying her
claim for disability insurance benefits (DIB) under the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. Section 405(g). After reviewing the record, including the transcript of
the proceedings before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), the
administrative record, the pleadings, and the parties’ memoranda, the
Commissioner’s decision is REMANDED.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Ms. Concepcion Bonilla filed an application for a period of disability and
DIB on April 22, 2021. (Tr. 22, 327–33). In a decision dated September 24,
2020, Ms. Concepcion Bonilla was found disabled beginning on May 25, 2018.
(Tr. 22, 76–90, 126–133). On January 5, 2023, in an initial determination, the
Social Security Administration (SSA) found that Ms. Concepcion Bonilla was
no longer disabled as of that date. (Tr. 22, 91–102, 134–137). Upon
reconsideration, a State agency Disability Hearing Officer upheld this
determination. (Tr. 22, 115–125). Thereafter, Ms. Concepcion Bonilla filed a
request for a hearing. (Tr. 22, 148).
On November 5, 2024, an ALJ held an administrative hearing. (Tr. 22,
37–54). In a decision dated December 18, 2024, the ALJ found Ms. Concepcion
Bonilla’s disability ended on January 5, 2023, and she did not become disabled
since that date. (Tr. 16–36). The Appeals Council denied Ms. Concepcion
Bonilla’s request for review, making the ALJ’s decision final. (Tr. 1–8). Ms.
Concepcion Bonilla now requests judicial review of the Commissioner’s final
decision. (Doc. 1).
II. NATURE OF DISABILITY CLAIM
A. Background
Ms. Concepcion Bonilla was 50 years old on January 5, 2023, the date
the ALJ found that medical improvement had occurred. (Tr. 134–37, 330). Ms.
Concepcion Bonilla has a high school education and no past relevant work
experience. (Tr. 29).
B. Summary of the Decision
The ALJ must follow five steps when evaluating a disability claim.1 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). First, if a claimant is engaged in substantial gainful
activity,2 she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Second, if a claimant has
no impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limit her
physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities, she has no severe
impairment and is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c); see McDaniel v.
Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1031 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that step two acts as a
filter and “allows only claims based on the most trivial impairments to be
rejected”). Third, if a claimant’s impairments fail to meet or equal an
impairment in the Listings, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).
Fourth, if a claimant’s impairments do not prevent her from doing past
relevant work, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). The ALJ
determines the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC) at this fourth
step.3 Id. Fifth, if a claimant’s impairments (considering her RFC, age,
education, and past work) do not prevent her from performing work in the
1 If the ALJ determines the claimant is disabled at any step of the sequential analysis,
the analysis ends. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
2 Substantial gainful activity is paid work that requires significant physical or mental
activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572.
3 A claimant’s RFC is the level of physical and mental work she can consistently
perform despite her limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1).
national economy, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g).
The most recent favorable ALJ decision finding that Ms. Concepcion
Bonilla was disabled is dated September 24, 2020. (Tr. 24). This most recent
favorable decision is the comparison point decision (CPD). (Id.). At the time of
the CPD, Ms. Concepcion Bonilla had these medically determinable
impairments: degenerative disc disease, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, and
hypertension. (Id.). These impairments resulted in an RFC of less than a full
range for sedentary work.4 (Id.). Specifically,
[Ms. Concepcion Bonilla] could lift/carry, push and pull 10 pounds
occasionally and a negligible amount of weight frequently. She
could stand/walk for 2 hours and sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour
workday with normal breaks. She could occasionally stoop, kneel,
crouch, crawl, balance on uneven surfaces and she could
occasionally climb ramps or stairs. She could never climb ropes or
scaffolds, but she could occasionally climb ladders. She could have
no concentrated exposure to unprotected heights or dangerous
moving machinery. She could frequently handle and finger with
her left upper extremity and occasionally handle and finger with
her right dominant upper extremity. She would be off task at least
10% of the workday and/or absent from work at least one day per
month due to pain.
(Id.).
Here, at step one of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found
4 “Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally
lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a
sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking
and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if
walking and standing are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a).
that, through the date of the December 18, 2024 decision, Ms. Concepcion
Bonilla has not engaged in substantial gainful activity. (Id.). At step two, the
ALJ found that since January 5, 2023, Ms. Concepcion Bonilla has these
medically determinable impairments: degenerative disc disease, hypertension,
carpal tunnel syndrome, and major depressive disorder. (Id.). At step three,
the ALJ found that since January 5, 2023, Ms. Concepcion Bonilla has not had
an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled
the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. (Id.).
The ALJ found that medical improvement occurred on January 5, 2023.
(Tr. 26). The ALJ further found that since January 5, 2023, the impairments
present at the time of the CPD decreased in medical severity to the point where
Ms. Concepcion Bonilla has the RFC to perform light work,5 except,
[Ms. Concepcion Bonilla can] sit, stand and walk for six hours each
in an eight hour workday; occasionally climb but never climb
ladders, ropes or scaffolds; occasional bending, kneeling, stooping,
crouching, crawling; must avoid concentrated exposure to hazards
such as heights and machinery; frequent fingering bilaterally.
5 “Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting
or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may
be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or
standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling
of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of
light work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities. If
someone can do light work, we determine that he or she can also do sedentary work,
unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability
to sit for long periods of time.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).
(Id.).
Ms. Concepcion Bonilla has no past relevant work. (Tr. 29). At step five,
with the assistance of a vocational expert, the ALJ then determined that, since
January 5, 2023, Ms. Concepcion Bonilla can perform a significant number of
jobs in the national economy. (Id.). Ms. Concepcion Bonilla can perform work
as a marker, routing clerk, and housekeeping cleaner. (Tr. 30). As a result, the
ALJ found Ms. Concepcion Bonilla’s disability ended on January 5, 2023, and
she has not become disabled again since that date. (Id.).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
Review of the ALJ’s decision is limited to reviewing whether the ALJ
applied correct legal standards and whether substantial evidence supports her
findings. McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988);
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971). Substantial evidence is more
than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance. Dale v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d
1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). In other words, there must be
sufficient evidence for a reasonable person to accept as enough to support the
conclusion. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995) (citations
omitted). The Supreme Court recently explained, “whatever the meaning of
‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is
not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019).
A reviewing court must affirm a decision supported by substantial
evidence “even if the proof preponderates against it.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357
F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). The court must not
make new factual determinations, reweigh evidence, or substitute its judgment
for the Commissioner’s decision. Id. at 1240 (citation omitted). Instead, the
court must view the entire record, considering both the evidence favorable and
unfavorable to the Commissioner’s decision. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560; see also
Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted)
(stating that the reviewing court must scrutinize the entire record to determine
the reasonableness of the Commissioner’s factual determinations).
B. Issue on Appeal
Ms. Concepcion Bonilla argues that the ALJ failed to properly analyze
whether medical improvement occurred as of January 5, 2023. (Doc. 14). Ms.
Concepcion Bonilla contends that the ALJ failed to properly compare her prior
and current medical evidence to determine whether medical severity had
decreased. (Id., p. 6). In response, the Commissioner contends that substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s findings that Ms. Concepcion Bonilla experienced
medical improvement as of January 5, 2023, and that her medical
improvement was related to her ability to work. (Doc. 18).
“An ALJ may terminate a claimant’s benefits if there is substantial
evidence that there has been medical improvement in the claimant’s
impairments related to his ability to work, and the claimant is now able to
engage in substantial gainful activity.” Klaes v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 499
F. App’x 895, 896 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(f)(1); 20 C.F.R. §
404.1594(a)). To determine whether benefits should be terminated, the ALJ
follows an eight-step process:
(1) whether the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful
activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant has an impairment or
combination of impairments that meet or equal a listed
impairment; (3) if not, whether there has been medical
improvement; (4) if so, whether the improvement is related to the
claimant’s ability to work; (5) if there is no medical improvement
or if medical improvement is not related to the claimant’s ability
to work, whether an exception to medical improvement applies; (6)
if there is medical improvement related to the claimant’s ability to
work or if an exception applies, whether the claimant has a severe
impairment; (7) if so, whether the claimant can perform his past
relevant work; and (8) if not, whether the claimant can perform
other work.
Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)).
Step three’s “medical improvement” is defined as “any decrease in the
medical severity of [the claimant’s] impairment(s) which was present at the
time of the most recent favorable medical decision that [the claimant was]
disabled . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(1). “A finding that there has been a
decrease in medical severity ‘must be based on changes (improvement) in the
symptoms, signs and/or laboratory findings associated with [the claimant’s]
impairment(s). . .’” Klaes, 499 F. App’x at 896 (quoting 20 C.F.R. §
404.1594(b)(1)). A decrease in medical severity is determined by comparing
“prior and current medical evidence which must show that there have been
changes (improvement) in the symptoms, signs or laboratory findings
associated with that impairment(s).” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(c)(1). “The ALJ must
‘actually compare’ the previous and current medical evidence to show that an
improvement occurred.” Klaes, 499 F. App’x at 896 (quoting Freeman v.
Heckler, 739 F.2d 565, 566 (11th Cir. 1984)); see also Reyes v. O’Malley, No.
8:23-cv-123-AEP, 2024 WL 939597, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2024); Lane o/b/o
R.W. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 8:20-cv-647-SPF, 2021 WL 3701559, at *3
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2021). The ALJ’s decision must be remanded for the ALJ
to apply the correct legal standard “[i]f the ALJ fails to evaluate the prior
medical evidence and make such a comparison . . .” Klaes, 499 F. App’x at 896.
Here, the ALJ failed to properly compare Ms. Concepcion Bonilla’s prior
and current medical evidence to determine whether medical severity had
decreased. Although the ALJ stated that she compared this evidence, she could
not have done so because a significant amount of prior evidence was not
included in the record. The administrative record contains Ms. Concepcion
Bonilla’s most recent favorable decision, dated September 24, 2020, which
discusses evidence not contained in the current record. (See Tr. 76–90). For
example, the “Summary of Evidence” notes that certain evidence was
considered in Ms. Concepcion Bonilla’s case when the SSA determined she was
disabled.6 None of this evidence appears in the current record.
The Commissioner argues that this error is harmless because
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision that Ms. Concepcion Bonilla
experienced medical improvement. The Commissioner presents no law
supporting this argument in the context of a termination-of-benefits case,
where the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal standard by failing to compare
the prior and current medical evidence. As Klaes specifically states that this
failure requires remand, 499 F. App’x at 896, the Commissioner’s argument is
rejected.
The ALJ’s obligation to compare the prior medical evidence with the
current medical evidence is outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(c)(1), which states:
Medical improvement is any decrease in the medical severity of
impairment(s) present at the time of the most recent favorable
medical decision that you were disabled or continued to be disabled
and is determined by a comparison of prior and current medical
evidence which must show that there have been changes
6 Specifically, these medical records include: ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF 8F
received on 09/04/2020; ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF 14f received on 09/04/2020;
APS Clinic of Puerto Rico received on 08/12/2020; Neurological Services of Orlando
received on 07/10/2020; Orange Blossom Family Health Center received on
07/02/2020; SYLMA CUEVAS PADRO PSYD received on 11/01/2019; FARMACIA
NEREIDA received on 08/20/2019, SAMUEL RIVERA NATAL MD received on
08/20/2019; CARLOS F CASIANO TORRES MD received on 02/26/2019; CARLOS F
CASIANO TORRES MD received on 02/26/2019; PR DISAB PROC UNIT received on
12/13/2018; APS AMERICAN PSYCH SYSTEMS received on 12/12/2018; ARECIBO
RADIOLOGY OPEN MRI CENTER received on 12/04/2018; CORPORACION
FONDO DEL SEGURO received on 12/04/2018; CLINICA AMBULATORIA DR.
OTOMAN received on 12/04/2018; DR. JUAN C. PERAZA DELGADO received on
12/03/2018; MELBA SOTOMAYOR, MD received on 12/03/2018. (Tr. 509–510)
(capitalization in original).
(improvement) in the symptoms, signs or laboratory findings
associated with that impairment(s).
(emphasis added).
Section 404.1594(c)(1) applied when the ALJ conducted the hearing and
when she issued her decision. Thus, the ALJ’s failure to properly compare the
prior and current medical evidence requires reversal. See also Rivera v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:17-CV-2021-ORL-41KRS, 2018 WL 5300201, at *6
(M.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 2018) (“Because the ALJ did not compare the [prior medical]
evidence with the [current medical] evidence, the finding that Rivera’s
disability ceased is not supported by substantial evidence or correct application
of the law.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 5293228 (M.D. Fla.
Oct. 25, 2018); Brown v. Berryhill, No. 3:16-CV-1344-J-34JRK, 2017 WL
6541455, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 28, 2017) (remanding because “the ALJ did not
actually perform the required comparison of the original medical evidence with
the new medical evidence”), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL
6536741 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2017).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Commissioner’s decision is REMANDED,
and the Clerk is directed to enter judgment for Ms. Concepcion Bonilla.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on August 21, 2026.
Aranda. □□□ Sasone_
AMANDA ARNOLD SANSONE
United States Magistrate Judge
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