Precious Holloway v Aer Lingus Limited et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No.: 2:26-cv-03862-AB-PVC Date: July 27, 2026

Title: Precious Holloway v Aer Lingus Limited et al

Present: The Honorable ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR., United States District Judge

Evelyn Chun N/A

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter

Attorney(s) Present for Plaintiff(s): Attorney(s) Present for Defendant(s):

None Appearing None Appearing

Proceedings: [In Chambers] ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

REMAND [Dkt. No. 18]

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Precious Holloway’s (“Plaintiff”)

Motion to Remand (“Mot.,” Dkt. No. 18). Defendant Aer Lingus Limited

(“Defendant”) filed an Opposition (“Opp’n,” Dkt. No. 20), and Plaintiff filed a

Reply (“Reply,” Dkt. No. 1-2). Plaintiff also filed a Request for Judicial Notice in

Support of Motion to Remand (“RJN,” Dkt. No. 18-2). Finding the matter suitable

for decision without oral argument, the Court took the Motion under submission.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; Local Rule 7-15. For the following reasons, the Request for

Judicial Notice is DENIED and the Motion to Remand is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from allegations that Defendant failed to properly handle

and timely return Plaintiff’s power wheelchair and failed to provide required

disability assistance during international travel. See generally Complaint

(“Compl.”), Dkt. No. 1-1.1 Plaintiff brings five causes of action: (1) violations of

Articles 17 and 19 of the Montreal Convention; (2) negligence; (3) violation of the

California Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51–52; (4) negligent

infliction of emotional distress; and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

See id. at 6–9.

Plaintiff commenced this action on March 6, 2026, in the Superior Court of

California, County of Los Angeles. See id at 1. On April 9, 2026, Defendant filed a

General Denial and Affirmative Defenses. Dkt. No. 1-2. On April 10, 2026,

Defendant removed the action to this Court, asserting federal-question jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See

Notice of Removal (“NOR”), Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 5–21.

On May 17, 2026, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Remand, arguing that

Defendant has not established federal jurisdiction because the Montreal

Convention does not completely preempt her state-law claims, the amount in

controversy does not exceed $75,000, and the state court retains concurrent

jurisdiction. See Mot. at 5–8. Defendant opposes the Motion, arguing that

Plaintiff’s Montreal Convention claim supports federal-question jurisdiction and

that diversity jurisdiction independently exists. See Opp’n at 2–8. Plaintiff did not

file a reply.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and have subject-matter

jurisdiction only over matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. U.S.

Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.

375, 377 (1994). A suit filed in state court may be removed to federal court if the

federal court would have had original jurisdiction over the suit. 28 U.S.C. §

1441(a). Federal courts have original jurisdiction where a plaintiff’s well-pleaded

complaint presents a federal question or where each plaintiff’s citizenship is

diverse from each defendant’s citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds

$75,000. Id. §§ 1331, 1332(a).

There is a strong presumption against removal jurisdiction, so it “must be

1 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s Complaint restarts its paragraph numbering following each

section heading, resulting in multiple paragraphs bearing the same numerical designation. To

avoid confusion, the Court cites to the page numbers of the Complaint rather than paragraph

numbers when referring to allegations in the pleading.

rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.”

Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Est. of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1107

(9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)).

The removing party bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Gaus v.

Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). “If at any time before final

judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case

shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

III. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, courts may take judicial notice of facts

that are “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose

accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). In connection

with the Motion to Remand.

Plaintiff asks the Court to take judicial notice of the Complaint, the Notice

of Removal and Defendant’s General Denial and Affirmative Defenses See

generally RJN. A court may consider ‘documents attached to the complaint;

documents incorporated by reference in the complaint or matters of judicial

notice.” United States v Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903,908 (9th Cir 2003). Additionally,

when ruling on a motion to remand, the court necessarily considers the complaint

and the notice of removal. Emeldi v Univ. of Or., 698 F.3d 715,731 (9th Cir. 2012).

Because the Court may consider these documents without taking judicial notice of

them, Plaintiff's request for judicial notice is DENIED

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that removal was improper because the Montreal Convention

does not completely preempt her state-law claims and because Defendant has not

established diversity jurisdiction. See Mot. The Court first considers whether

federal-question jurisdiction exists before addressing Defendant’s alternative

argument that diversity jurisdiction independently supports removal.

A. Federal Question Jurisdiction

Federal courts have federal-question jurisdiction for “all civil actions arising

under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

“Federal-question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 arises in two

situations.” Cummings v. Cenergy Int’l Servs., LLC, 258 F. Supp. 3d 1097, 1106

(E.D. Cal. 2017). “First, a court may exercise federal-question jurisdiction where a

federal right or immunity is ‘an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff’s

cause of action.’ ” Id. (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation

Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 11 (1983)). “Second, federal-question jurisdiction

arises where a state-law claim ‘necessarily raise[s] a stated federal issue, actually

disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing

any congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.’

” Id. (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S.

308, 314 (2005)).

“The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the

‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only

when a federal question is presented on the face of plaintiff’s properly pleaded

complaint.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). “A defense is

not a part of a plaintiff’s properly pleaded statement of his or her claim.”

Cummings, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 1106 (quoting Rivet v. Regions Bank, 522 U.S. 470,

475 (1998)); see also Silverstein v. Delta Airlines Inc., No. 2:11 -CV-00236-JHN-

JCx, 2011 WL 13218046, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2011) (quoting Caterpillar, 480

U.S. at 392) (stating “removal to federal court cannot be based on a federal

‘defense, including the defense of pre-emption”). Plaintiff is the “master of the

complaint” and “may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state

law.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392.

i. Plaintiff’s Montreal Claim

The Montreal Convention, which replaced the Warsaw Convention,

establishes a uniform framework governing airline liability and “applies to all

international carriage of persons, baggage or cargo performed by aircraft.” See

Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air

(“Montreal Convention”), art. 1(1), May 28, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45

(2000). The Convention addresses liability arising from passenger injury or death,

damage to or loss of baggage or cargo, and damages resulting from delays in

transportation. See id. arts. 17–19. Article 29 further provides that any action for

damages arising from the carriage of passengers, baggage, or cargo—“whether

under this Convention or in contract or in tort or otherwise”—is subject to the

conditions and limitations of liability established by the Convention:

“In the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo, any action for damages,

however founded, whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort or

otherwise, can only be brought subject to the conditions and such limits of

liability as are set out in this Convention without prejudice to the question as

to who are the persons who have the right to bring suit and what are their

respective rights.”

Id. art. 29. Although the Montreal Convention retains limitations on airline

liability, it was designed to modernize the Warsaw Convention framework by

balancing protections for air carriers with greater recognition of passenger and

shipper rights. See Weiss v. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 433 F. Supp. 2d 361, 365

(S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 309 F. App’x 483 (2d Cir. 2009).

The Convention defines “international carriage” based on the agreed places

of departure and destination, and a journey may qualify as international carriage

even if it includes domestic segments, so long as the domestic segment constitutes

an agreed stopping place within a broader international journey between two

signatory nations. See Montreal Convention art. 1(2).

Defendant claims that because “Plaintiff chose to plead a claim under the

Montreal Convention, Plaintiff’s Complaint was properly removed to this Court

under § 1331.” Opp’n at 5; see also NOR ¶¶ 13–21. Plaintiff expressly asserts a

claim for violations of Articles 17 and 19 of the Montreal Convention. See Compl.

at 6–7. Accordingly, the Complaint presents a federal claim on its face. Defendant

argues that this claim provides original federal-question jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1331 and that Plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims fall within the

Court’s supplemental jurisdiction. See Opp’n at 11–13. Plaintiff does not dispute

that she asserts a claim under the Montreal Convention but argues that the presence

of that claim does not render the entire action removable because her remaining

state-law claims are not completely preempted. See Mot. at 4–7.

The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s Montreal Convention claim presents a

federal question. The remaining question is whether Plaintiff’s state-law claims fall

within the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction or are independently transformed into

federal claims through complete preemption.

ii. Complete Preemption

“The doctrine of ‘complete preemption’ serves as a narrow exception to the

well-pleaded complaint rule.” Id., at *2 (citing Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox

Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000)). Complete preemption exists

where the “preemptive force of [a] statute[ ] is so strong that [it] ‘completely

preempt[s]’ an area of state law.” Balcorta, 208 F.3d at 1107 (citing Metropolitan

Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987)). “In such instances, any claim

purportedly based on that preempted state law is considered, from its inception, a

federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law.” Id. (citing Franchise Tax Bd.

of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 24

(1983)).

The complete preemption exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule is

very narrow. See Holman v. Laulo-Rowe Agency, 994 F.2d 666, 668 (9th Cir.

1993) (“The [complete preemption] doctrine ... is a narrow exception to the ‘well-

pleaded complaint rule.’ ”). In fact, “only three areas have been deemed areas of

complete preemption by the United States Supreme Court: (1) claims under the

Labor Management Relations Act, (2) claims under the Employment Retirement

and Insurance Security Act (ERISA), and (3) certain Indian land grant rights.”

Zatta v. Societe Air France, No. SA CV 11-0647 DOC, 2011 WL 2472280, at *2

(C.D. Cal. Jun. 21, 2011) (quotation omitted).

Complete preemption is distinct from federal preemption, which regards

whether a plaintiff’s state law claim may proceed. Dizon v. Asiana Airlines, Inc.,

240 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1046 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (“[C]omplete preemption—i.e.,

whether a plaintiff must bring a claim under the Montreal Convention in federal

court—[is] a different issue than federal preemption—i.e., whether a plaintiff's

state law cause of action may proceed when his Montreal Convention claim

fails.”). Put another way, “[t]he fact that individual claims may be preempted does

not mean the entire field is preempted, and the defense of claim preemption does

not convert a complaint brought under state law into one ‘arising under’ federal

law.” Oganesyan v. Am. Airlines Cargo, No. CV 13-6190 SVW, 2013 WL

6229173, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2013).

Ordinarily, federal preemption is a defense that does not provide a basis for

removal. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392–93 (1987). Complete

preemption is a narrow exception that applies only where federal law has such

extraordinary preemptive force that it converts a state-law claim into a federal

claim for purposes of federal-question jurisdiction. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.

Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63–66 (1987).

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s Montreal Convention claim provides a

basis for federal-question jurisdiction because the Convention completely preempts

Plaintiff’s related state-law claims. Defendant argues that the Montreal

Convention, which superseded the Warsaw Convention, should be interpreted

consistently with Warsaw Convention precedent addressing the Convention’s

preemptive effect. See Opp’n at 3–5 (citing Narayanan v. British Airways, 747

F.3d 1125, 1127 n.2 (9th Cir. 2014)). Relying primarily on El Al Israel Airlines,

Ltd. v. Tseng, Defendant argues that, where applicable, the Montreal Convention

provides the exclusive remedy for claims arising from international carriage and

precludes state-law causes of action “whether in contract or tort.” See id. at 4–5

(citing Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 161 (1999)). Defendant further argues that Plaintiff’s

negligence, emotional distress, and Unruh Act claims arise from the same

international flight, wheelchair damage, and resulting injuries as her Montreal

Convention claim, and therefore fall within the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction.

See id. at 5–6. Finally, Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot avoid federal

jurisdiction by characterizing her claims as separate “Convention” and “California”

claims because the Montreal Convention expressly preempts domestic-law claims

that fall within its scope. See id. at 5 (citing Arzu v. American Airlines, Inc., 2026

WL 1346555, at *7 (5th Cir. May 14, 2026)).

Plaintiff responds that, although her claims concerning damage to and delay

in returning her wheelchair may fall within the Montreal Convention’s scope, her

state-law claims are based on separate allegations of disability discrimination and

accessibility failures that occurred after she had disembarked the aircraft. See Mot.

at 4–7. Plaintiff argues that the Convention does not completely preempt those

claims merely because they arise from the same overall travel experience. See id.

The Court need not resolve the full scope of the Montreal Convention’s preemptive

effect to determine whether removal was proper. Unlike cases in which defendants

rely solely on complete preemption of state-law claims to establish federal

jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s Complaint expressly asserts a claim under Articles 17 and

19 of the Montreal Convention. See Compl. That claim arises under federal law

and provides an independent basis for federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331.

The remaining question is whether the Court may exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims. A federal court may exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims that are so related to claims within

the court’s original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Claims satisfy this requirement when they derive from a

common nucleus of operative fact and would ordinarily be expected to be tried

together. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).

Here, Plaintiff’s state-law claims arise from the same alleged international

carriage, the same wheelchair damage and delay, and the same alleged resulting

injuries that form the basis of her Montreal Convention claim. See Compl. at 6–9.

Although Plaintiff characterizes her state-law claims as involving additional

disability discrimination and accessibility-related conduct, those allegations remain

intertwined with the same underlying travel incident and alleged harm.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state-law claims fall within the Court’s supplemental

jurisdiction.

Because Plaintiff expressly pleaded a Montreal Convention claim and her

related state-law claims fall within the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction,

Defendant was not required to establish that the Montreal Convention completely

preempts those state-law claims to support removal. Plaintiff’s complete-

preemption argument therefore does not provide a basis for remand.

B. Diversity Jurisdiction

A defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court to federal court

when the federal district court has original jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. §

1441(a). “A suit may be removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) only

if it could have been brought there originally.” Sullivan v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc.,

813 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir. 1987).

A removing defendant bears the burden of establishing federal

jurisdiction. See Ibarra v. Manheim Investments, Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th

Cir. 2015). A federal district court has diversity jurisdiction over a matter where

the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 and there is

complete diversity among opposing parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

Any doubt about the existence of subject matter jurisdiction must be

resolved in favor of remanding the action to state court. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980

F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d

1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979)); see also Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553

F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The removal statute is strictly construed, and

any doubt about the right of removal requires resolution in favor of remand.”

(citation omitted)); Sandoval v. Republic Servs., Inc., No. 2:18-cv-01224-

ODW(KSx), 2018 WL 1989528, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2018). A removal’s

propriety “may later be tested in the federal court, either on a motion by a party to

remand, or by the court on its own motion.” Libhart, 529 F.2d at 1065.

i. Complete Diversity

Complete diversity exists only when “each defendant is a citizen of a

different State from each plaintiff.” Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437

U.S. 365, 373 (1978). For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, individuals’ state

citizenship is “determined by [their] state of domicile”: the place where they

“reside[] with the intention to remain[.]” Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d

853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001).

Here, the parties do not dispute that complete diversity exists. Plaintiff

alleges that she is a citizen of California, while Defendant is an Irish corporation

with its principal place of business in Dublin, Ireland. See NOR ¶¶ 2–3.

Accordingly, Defendant has established complete diversity of citizenship. The

remaining jurisdictional question is whether Defendant has demonstrated, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

ii. Amount in Controversy

Plaintiff argues that Defendant has not established that the amount in

controversy exceeds $75,000 because the Complaint does not specify a damages

amount and Defendant relies primarily on Plaintiff’s pre-litigation settlement

demand. See Mot. at 6–8. Plaintiff contends that the settlement demand does not

establish the amount in controversy because settlement negotiations often involve

inflated or strategic demands that do not reflect the actual value of a claim. See id.

Defendant responds that the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied

because Plaintiff demanded $95,000 before filing suit, and the Complaint seeks

compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and other relief. See

Opp’n at 6–7. Defendant further argues that Plaintiff’s allegations of physical

injury, emotional distress, damage to her wheelchair, and discriminatory treatment

support a finding that the amount at stake exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. See

id.

The Court agrees with Defendant. Although a settlement demand alone is

not necessarily dispositive of the amount in controversy, it is relevant evidence of

the amount Plaintiff placed at issue before filing suit. See Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc.,

281 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a plaintiff’s demand letter may be

considered in determining the amount in controversy where it reflects a reasonable

estimate of the value of the claim). Here, Plaintiff’s $95,000 settlement demand

exceeds the jurisdictional threshold by $20,000. See Bronach O’Connell

Declaration (“O’Connell Decl.”), ¶¶ 5–7, Ex. A. Moreover, Plaintiff’s Complaint

seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and other

available relief, and alleges injuries arising from damage to her wheelchair,

emotional distress, and Defendant’s alleged failure to provide disability-related

accommodations. See Compl. at 9–10. When considered together, these allegations

and the pre-litigation demand provide a reasonable basis to conclude that the

amount in controversy more likely than not exceeds $75,000.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s estimate of damages is speculative. But

Defendant is not required to prove the actual amount of damages Plaintiff will

recover; rather, Defendant must establish only that the amount placed in

controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum. See Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at

88–89. Given Plaintiff’s settlement demand, the types of damages sought, and the

allegations in the Complaint, Defendant has satisfied that burden.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendant has established diversity

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is

DENIED.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, because the Court has federal-question jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s Montreal Convention claim and supplemental jurisdiction over the

related state-law claims, and because Defendant has also established diversity

jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.