The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 CAYDEN CHAMBERS, Case No.: 26-cv-2275-JES-JLB
12 Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO
13 v. DISMISS
14 NATIONAL COLLEGE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION (NCAA); UNIVERSITY
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OF SAN DIEGO (USD); and DOES 1-10,
16 inclusive,
17 Defendants. [ECF Nos. 41, 43]
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Pro se plaintiff Cayden Chambers (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against the
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University of San Diego (“USD”) and the National College Athletic Association
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(“NCAA”) (collectively, “Defendants”). ECF No. 35, First Amended Complaint (“FAC”).
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Before the Court are motions by both defendants to dismiss this action. ECF Nos. 41, 43.
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For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the motions.
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I. BACKGROUND
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Plaintiff is a young man who has played college football and alleges that Defendants
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improperly found him ineligible to continue competing. FAC ¶¶ 133-138. Plaintiff has
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Autism Spectrum Disorder/ Asperger’s Syndrome, a neurodevelopmental disability which
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affects communication and the ability to process complex administrative matters. Id. ¶ 64.
1 The NCAA is an association that establishes and enforces rules governing student-
2 athlete eligibility, participation, and waiver processes for its member institutions. Id. ¶¶ 60-
3 63. These rules typically give players five total years in which they are eligible to compete
4 in up to four seasons of football. ECF No. 35-5 at 34; ECF No. 43-1 at 5. NCAA has a
5 waiver process, by which a particular season can be waived for reasons like medical
6 hardship, thus extending eligibility. See FAC ¶¶ 9, 85; ECF No. 43-1 at 9.
7 Plaintiff played football at Mt. San Jacinto College in the 2019 to 2020 season. ECF
8 No. 35-5 at 7; ECF No. 43-1 at 8. Plaintiff began the 2020-21 season at Mt. San Jacinto
9 College, but was unable to compete due to COVID-19. Id. NCAA offered a waiver of the
10 2020-21 season to all players as a result of COVID-19, which meant the 2020-21 season
11 would not count towards his student-athlete eligibility. Id. Plaintiff subsequently competed
12 in the 2021-22 season at Mt. San Jacinto College. Id.
13 Plaintiff then transferred to Concord University, where he competed in the 2022-23
14 season. Id. During the following year, 2023-24, Plaintiff began the season but was injured
15 midway through. Id. The NCAA found that he qualified for a medical hardship waiver,
16 which meant that the 2023-24 year would not count toward his student-athlete eligibility.
17 Id.
18 Plaintiff subsequently transferred to USD. Id. During the transfer process, Plaintiff
19 and USD discussed his future eligibility and a potential waiver of his 2024-25 season for
20 medical hardship. Id. ¶ 85. Plaintiff included his Asperger’s Syndrome diagnosis on his
21 “New Student Athlete Medical Form” for USD, which he submitted on July 17, 2024. ECF
22 No. 35-2.
23 On August 2, 2024, Plaintiff was evaluated for a hip injury by USD training
24 personnel. FAC ¶ 103. Plaintiff did not compete for the beginning of the 2024-25 football
25 season, but played two games at the end of the season after he was cleared for competition.
26 ECF No. 35-5 at 7; ECF No. 43-1 at 8.
27 On July 26, 2025, Plaintiff learned that his eligibility extension waiver had not been
28 approved, jeopardizing his participation in the 2025-26 season. FAC ¶ 85. Plaintiff
1 communicated with USD about the waiver denial. Id. ¶¶ 86-87. USD requested
2 reconsideration of Plaintiff’s extension waiver denial, which the NCAA denied. Id. ¶ 88.
3 USD informed Plaintiff of the denial on July 18, 2025. Id.
4 Plaintiff contacted the NCAA about the waiver denial. Id. ¶ 89. The NCAA
5 explained that requests must be submitted through member institutions, and mentioned a
6 new theory of waiver. Id. Plaintiff reached back out to USD, who advised Plaintiff that
7 they believed that new theory would not be accepted for Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 92. USD told
8 Plaintiff that it would take no further action regarding his eligibility concerns, and that his
9 further communications should be directed to USD’s Office of General Counsel. Id. ¶ 97.
10 Plaintiff alleges that records of when he was cleared for competition are inconsistent,
11 leading to issues in his waiver evaluation process. Id. ¶¶ 109-113. Plaintiff alleges that
12 Defendants relied on dates for his medical clearance that were not properly documented to
13 determine his eligibility and failed to communicate with him about his status despite his
14 reliance on prior representations. Id. ¶¶ 123-138. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
15 discriminated against him by failing to engage in an interactive process and instead
16 applying rigid screening criteria that excludes athletes with neurodevelopmental
17 disabilities Id. ¶ 144.
18 Plaintiff initially brought suit on these allegations on April 10, 2026. ECF No. 1. The
19 Court sua sponte dismissed the initial complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the parties
20 are not diverse and the complaint did not facially assert a federal claim. ECF No. 34.
21 II. LEGAL STANDARD
22 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to
23 state a claim tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s claim. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d
24 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). When considering the motion, the court must accept as true all
25 well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
26 544, 555 (2007). The court need not accept as true legal conclusions cast as factual
27 allegations. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“[t]hreadbare recitals of the
28 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are insufficient).
1 A complaint must “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,
2 550 U.S. at 570. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must include non-conclusory
3 factual content. Id. at 555; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The facts and the reasonable inferences
4 drawn from those facts must show a plausible—not just a possible—claim for relief.
5 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d
6 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The focus is on the complaint, as opposed to any new facts alleged
7 in, for example, the opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss. See Schneider v.
8 California Dep’t of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998), reversed and
9 remanded on other grounds as stated in 345 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 2003). “Determining
10 whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that
11 requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal,
12 556 U.S. at 679. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant-
13 unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.;
14 see also Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
15 When a court dismisses a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), it must then decide whether
16 to grant leave to amend. Federal Rule 15(a) provides that a district court should “freely
17 give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). A district court has
18 discretion to deny leave to amend when a proposed amendment would be futile. Chappel
19 v. Lab. Corp. of America, 232 F.3d 719, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2000). Dismissal without leave
20 to amend is appropriate only when the Court is satisfied that the deficiencies of the
21 complaint could not possibly be cured by amendment. Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 758
22 (9th Cir. 2003). In other words, if allowing a party to amend its pleading would be futile,
23 district courts properly decline to grant leave to amend. Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun
24 Microsys., Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d
25 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991)).
26 III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
27 Plaintiff brings six causes of action: (1) a claim arising under Title III of the
28 Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) against USD and NCAA; (2) violation of
1 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act against USD; (3) a claim for declaratory and
2 injunctive relief under the ADA and section 504 against both defendants; (4) violation of
3 California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act against both defendants; (5) breach of contract against
4 USD; and (6) a retaliation and coercion claim under Title V of the ADA and section 504
5 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Court analyzes Plaintiff’s federal claims below.
6 A. Title III of the ADA
7 Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not stated a claim under the ADA because he has
8 not plausibly alleged a reasonable accommodation that he was denied. ECF Nos. 41 at 15,
9 43 at 3. The Court agrees.
10 To state a claim under Title III of the ADA, Plaintiff must allege non-conclusory
11 facts showing that: “(1) he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant
12 is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; and (3)
13 the plaintiff was denied public accommodations by the defendant because of his disability.”
14 Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enters., Inc., 603 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir.
15 2010). To show the third element, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant “discriminated
16 against him by failing to make a reasonable modification in ‘policies, practices, or
17 procedures,’ necessary to accommodate his disability.” Fortyune v. Am. Multi-Cinema,
18 Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1082 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)).
19 Here, Plaintiff argues that Defendants failed to provide reasonable accommodations
20 in supporting his NCAA waiver process, which he characterizes as a lack of an interactive
21 process. FAC ¶¶ 9, 160-75. At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court disregards the
22 allegation that Defendants did not provide accommodations as conclusory, and looks
23 instead to the factual allegations underlying that claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Plaintiff
24 repeatedly alleges inconsistencies in records and communications, misrepresentations by
25 Defendants, and obstacles to contacting the parties he wanted to contact at various times
26 concerning his waiver. See generally, FAC. While Plaintiff alleges these issues amount to
27 a failure to provide an interactive process, Title III of the ADA does not create a claim for
28 lack of interactive process. Tauscher v. Phoenix Bd. of Realtors, Inc., 931 F.3d 959, 964
1 (9th Cir. 2019). Further, the FAC details a number of communications that did occur
2 between the parties about Plaintiff’s waiver denial. Id. ¶¶ 85-97. Plaintiff makes a number
3 of allegations related to the process, but his narrative account describes an unfair process,
4 not a discriminatory one that could have been remedied by accommodation. See generally,
5 FAC. Because Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that either Defendant discriminated
6 against him by failing to make a reasonable accommodation for his disability, he has not
7 stated a claim under the ADA. See Fortyune v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d at 1082.
8 Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s ADA claim is therefore GRANTED.
9 B. Rehabilitation Act
10 USD argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under section 504 of the
11 Rehabilitation Act because he has not plausibly alleged a USD program or benefit which
12 he was otherwise qualified for but denied participation in on the basis of his disability. ECF
13 No. 41 at 18. The Court agrees.
14 To state a claim under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must show
15 that he was excluded from a federally funded program solely on the basis of a disability.
16 Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001). To do so, the plaintiff
17 must allege deliberate indifference, meaning “both knowledge that a harm to a federally
18 protected right is substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that the likelihood.” Id. at
19 1139.
20 Here, Plaintiff alleges that USD denied him access to the NCAA waiver and
21 eligibility process. FAC ¶ 170. However, as discussed above, the FAC and its attachment
22 show that USD did communicate with the NCAA on Plaintiff’s behalf, including appealing
23 the denial of his waiver. Id. ¶¶ 92-93. Plaintiff’s complaints about inconsistencies in USD’s
24 communications about the waiver process do not amount to deliberate indifference because
25 they do not show that USD failed to act, or excluded him from any process. See Duvall,
26 260 F.3d at 1139. The motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Rehabilitation Act claim is therefore
27 GRANTED.
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1 C. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
2 Declaratory and injunctive relief claims fail if there is no underlying causes of action.
3 City of Reno v. Netflix, Inc., 52 F.4th 874, 878 (9th Cir. 2022). Plaintiff’s claims for
4 declaratory and injunctive relief here arise from his ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims,
5 which fail for the reasons set forth above. See FAC ¶¶ 176-181. The motions to dismiss
6 Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory and injunctive relief are therefore GRANTED.
7 D. Retaliation and Coercion Claims
8 USD argues that Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action for retaliation and coercion under
9 the ADA and Section 504 fails because Plaintiff has not pled retaliatory action. ECF No.
10 41 at 26. The Court agrees.
11 To state a claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must show that a defendant took an adverse
12 action—retaliation, interference, coercion, or intimidation—against him because of the
13 exercise of his rights under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a); Brown v. City of Tucson, 336
14 F.3d 1181, 1186-88 (9th Cir. 2003).
15 Here, Plaintiff alleges that USD retaliated against him for raising claims under the
16 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”) by asserting its disagreement with
17 his position on FERPA compliance and banning Plaintiff’s parents from coming to USD
18 campus. FAC ¶¶ 176-181. In the context of the other allegations in the complaint, Plaintiff
19 has not alleged any facts plausibly showing that the disagreement between the parties about
20 the University’s responsibility to communicate with his parents constitutes retaliation,
21 interference, coercion, or intimidation, rather than a good faith dispute at a litigious stage
22 of communications. See ECF No. 35-5 at 56-57 (communications between Plaintiff’s
23 mother and USD employees concerning the FERPA dispute); ECF No. 35-4 at 16-17 (letter
24 explaining that Plaintiff’s parents continued communications with other USD offices after
25 being instructed to only contact USD general counsel and banning Plaintiff’s parents from
26 coming to campus without clearance from USD general counsel); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
27 Thus, under federal pleading standards, Plaintiff has not stated a claim for retaliation under
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1 the ADA. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is
2 therefore GRANTED.
3 E. Leave to Amend
4 Regarding leave to amend, the Court notes Plaintiff’s pro se status and the civil rights
5 framing of the federal claims. However, the procedural history of this case also reflects that
6 disability discrimination is not the core of Plaintiff’s claims but a pleading modification to
7 attempt to stay in federal court. At the initial hearing in this case, the Court explained to
8 Plaintiff that his complaint was subject to dismissal because the parties were not diverse
9 and the complaint only stated state law claims sounding in contract law. See ECF No. 1
10 (initial complaint alleging only state law causes of action). However, the complaint did
11 mention the ADA and Rehabilitation Act in passing (not in a claim), and alleged that
12 Plaintiff had a disability. Id. Out of an abundance of caution, the Court asked Plaintiff if he
13 would be able to state a claim under those statutes if granted leave to amend, cautioning
14 Plaintiff as to the elements of those claims. Because Plaintiff answered in the affirmative,
15 the Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend should he be able to state a claim under one of
16 those federal statutes. ECF No. 34. However, upon review of the FAC and the briefing in
17 this matter, it is apparent that Plaintiff cannot allege facts to show these claims under
18 federal pleading standards. The amended complaint attempts to create jurisdiction by
19 adding conclusory allegations of discrimination to state law claims. But conclusory
20 allegations are insufficient to state a claim in federal court. In consideration of the above,
21 the Court finds that leave to amend would be futile. The Court thus GRANTS Defendants’
22 motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s federal claims with prejudice. See Chappel, 232 F.3d at 725-
23 26.
24 F. Supplemental Jurisdiction
25 Because the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s federal claims, it must next decide whether
26 to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims.
27 Courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims arising from a
28 common nucleus of facts to federal claims, but have the discretion to deny supplemental
1 || jurisdiction as well. City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997).
2 “With respect to supplemental jurisdiction in particular, a federal court has subject-matter
3 || jurisdiction over specified state-law claims, which it may (or may not) choose to exercise.
4 || A district court's decision whether to exercise that jurisdiction after dismissing every claim
5 || over which it had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF
6 || Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (internal citations omitted). Federal courts regularly
7 || decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when all federal claims
8 dismissed. Union Block Assocs., LLC v. Keane, No. 1:24-CV-00038-DCN, 2026 WL
9 || 883634, at *14 (D. Idaho Mar. 31, 2026) (collecting cases).
10 Here, all of Plaintiffs federal claims have been dismissed. Further, as explained
11 || above, the context of the case shows a risk of artful pleading for the purpose of obtaining
12 || federal court jurisdiction, and not based upon the facts of the case. The Court thus exercises
13 discretion to DENY supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, and
14 || DISMISSES the case in its entirety. The Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs state law claims
15 without prejudice.
16 IV. CONCLUSION
17 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS the motions to dismiss
18 || Plaintiffs first, second, third, and sixth claims with prejudice. As all federal claims are
19 || dismissed, the Court DENIES jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, and
20 || DISMISSES the FAC in its entirety. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to CLOSE this
21 || case.
22 IT IS SO ORDERED.
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54 Dated: August 11, 2026 ee Sm.
25 Honorable James E. Sunmons Jr.
United States District Judge
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