Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 ANUJ MAHENDRA PATEL, Case No.: 1:26-cv-04617-CDB (HC)

12 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO

DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

13 v. CORPUS FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

14 WARDEN OF FCI MENDOTA CAMP,

(Docs. 1, 5)

15 Respondent.

21-Day Deadline

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Clerk of the Court to Assign District Judge

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18 Background

19 Petitioner Anuj Mahendra Patel is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action

20 seeking habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, filed on June 15, 2026. (Doc. 1). In his

21 petition, Petitioner challenges the results of a disciplinary proceeding by the U.S. Bureau of Prisons

22 (“BOP”) that resulted in his loss of good conduct time and commissary privileges and requests in

23 relief, among other things, restoration of the good conduct time. Id. at 1. He asserts that exhaustion

24 of administrative remedies should be excused because exhaustion “would likely render any relief

25 ineffective because the disciplinary sanctions directly affect prerelease placement, custody

26 calculation, and release-related determinations,” and that he is “actively pursuing administrative

27 remedies” but that “due to the limited time before prerelease placement,” were the Court to require

he complete the process of exhaustion, it would render relief “ineffective.” See id.

1 On June 18, 2026, the Court ordered Petitioner to show cause why the Court should not

2 dismiss the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (Doc. 4). On June 29, 2026,

3 Petitioner filed a timely response and a motion to amend certain facts within his petition. (Docs.

4 5, 6). On July 13, 2026, Petitioner filed a motion for status and expedited ruling. (Doc. 7).

5 Governing Authority

6 “As a general rule, [28 U.S.C.] § 2255 provides the exclusive procedural mechanism by

7 which a federal prisoner may test the legality of detention.” Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 955

8 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted). Thus, a federal prisoner who wishes to challenge

9 the validity or constitutionality of his federal conviction or sentence must do so by moving the court

10 that imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence under § 2255. Alaimalo v.

11 United States, 645 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2011).

12 In contrast to challenges to the legality of a conviction and sentence, a petition by a federal

13 prisoner challenging the manner, location, or conditions of a sentence’s execution is brought under

14 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the district of confinement. See Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864

15 (9th Cir. 2000). The BOP’s calculation of sentencing credit is an issue pertaining to the execution

16 of a sentence which a habeas petitioner may challenge through such a petition. See Zavala v. Ives,

17 785 F.3d 367, 370 n.3 (9th Cir. 2015). A district court must dismiss a habeas petition if it “plainly

18 appears” that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. Valdez v. Montgomery, 918 F.3d 687, 693 (9th

19 Cir. 2019) (quoting Rule 4).

20 Before filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, a federal prisoner challenging any

21 circumstance of imprisonment must first exhaust all administrative remedies. Martinez v. Roberts,

22 804 F.2d 570, 571 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). The requirement that federal prisoners exhaust

23 administrative remedies before filing a habeas corpus petition was judicially created; it is not a

24 statutory requirement. Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other

25 grounds by Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1995). Thus, “because exhaustion is not required

26 by statute, it is not jurisdictional.” Id. If a petitioner has not properly exhausted his claims, the

27 district court, in its discretion, may either “excuse the faulty exhaustions and reach the merits or

1 The first step in exhausting administrative remedies is a request for informal resolution. 28

2 C.F.R. § 542.13. When informal resolution procedures are inadequate, the BOP makes available

3 to inmates a formal three-level administrative remedy process: (1) a Request for Administrative

4 Remedy (“BP-9”) filed at the institution where the inmate is incarcerated; (2) a Regional

5 Administrative Remedy Appeal (“BP-10”) filed at the Regional Office for the geographic region

6 in which the inmate's institution is located; and (3) a Central Office Administrative Remedy Appeal

7 (“BP-11”) filed with the Office of General Counsel. 28 C.F.R. § 542.10 et. seq.

8 Discussion

9 In his petition, Petitioner appears to assert that his placement in a halfway house is

10 scheduled for September 28, 2026, if his good time credits are restored, and thus the petition

11 requires expedited review. (Doc. 1 at 1, 3-4). In his motion filed on June 29, 2026, Petitioner

12 represents that the “true, legally mandated release date to community custody is, in fact, June 30,

13 2026.” Id. at 1. Petitioner provides that the “local case manager’s unauthorized stripping of 125

14 second chance Act days is the sole mechanical reason his placement reflects a delayed November

15 1, 2026 timeline [sic].” (Doc. 6).

16 Petitioner states that he has submitted a BP-11 in early June 2026. He further provides that,

17 in February 2026, he filed a BP-8 and BP-9 challenging his sentence calculations. (Doc. 5 at 2).

18 “The local Unit Manager actively intervened” with an “explicit promise that the errors would be

19 corrected internally if Petitioner withdrew the grievance.” Petitioner states he then withdrew the

20 BP-9 and the “Unit Team” failed to “honor this agreement.” In support, Petitioner cites to Ross v.

21 Blake, 578 U.S. 632 (2016). However, Ross v. Blake is inapposite as it relates to the Prison

22 Litigation Reform Act, which does not apply to habeas petitions challenging duration of

23 confinement. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2).

24 Regardless, Petitioner has not set forth grounds for waiving administrative remedies. As

25 explained in the prior order to show cause (Doc. 4), the Court specifically rejects the notion that

26 the limited time remaining before Petitioner expects to transition to a halfway house warrants

27 excusal. See Thompson v. Hendrix, No. 3:22-cv-00560-SI, 2022 WL 4549825, at *2–3 (D. Or.

1 for a faster path to federal court justifies excusing the exhaustion requirement applicable to this

2 case”); Galvan v. Duron, No. CV 25-5668 CV (PVC), 2026 WL 817196, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 19,

3 2026) (“But as noted, Petitioner’s First Step Act time credits could be applied to reduce his

4 supervised release term. Therefore, exhausting Petitioner’s administrative remedies was not

5 futile”) (citation omitted).

6 Petitioner does not refute that he will be placed in a halfway house upon release, nor

7 otherwise provide that his credits could not be provided to any term of supervised release at a

8 halfway house. Further, though Petitioner asserts that he withdrew his BP-9 based on a promise

9 from an official that went unfulfilled, he does not allege that his ability to file administrative

10 remedies was curtailed in some way. At best, Plaintiff’s representations demonstrate only a

11 temporary unavailability of administrative remedies. Indeed, Petitioner states that his BP-11 is

12 submitted and pending.

13 Thus, Petitioner’s assertions fail to show why he could not exhaust administrative remedies.

14 See Sperow v. Graber, No. CV 13-1940 DMG JCG, 2014 WL 1291406, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31,

15 2014) (“Petitioner argues that exhaustion should be excused because his counselor’s unavailability

16 for two days precluded him from obtaining the necessary BOP forms. But Petitioner’s argument is

17 unavailing because his counselor’s temporary unavailability does not qualify as a “circumstance [

18 ] render[ing] administrative remedies effectively unavailable.”); Chappel v. United States, No. CV

19 13-7309-CJC (AGR), 2015 WL 7271808, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2015) (citing cases and noting

20 that “[n]umerous courts have dismissed federal prisoners’ sentencing-calculation petitions for

21 failure to exhaust administrative remedies, without considering the merits”).

22 Thus, as Petitioner did not exhaust his administrative remedies, and because Petitioner does

23 demonstrate sufficient basis for waiver of exhaustion, the undersigned will recommend that the

24 petition be dismissed.

25 Conclusion and Recommendations

26 The Clerk of the Court is directed to assign a District Judge.

27 For the foregoing reasons, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1 administrative remedies;

2 2. Petitioner’s motions to amend the release date (Doc. 6) and for expedited ruling (Doc.

3 7) be denied as moot; and

4 3. The Clerk of the Court be directed to close this case.

5 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

6 || assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 21 days after

7 | being served with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written

8 | objections with the Court. Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned, “Objections to

9 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations” and shall not exceed 15 pages without leave

10 | of Court and good cause shown. The Court will not consider exhibits attached to the Objections,

11 | buta party may refer to exhibits in the record by CM/ECF document and page number. Any pages

12 | filed in excess of the 15-page limitation may be disregarded by the District Judge when reviewing

13 | these Findings and Recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

14 A party’s failure to file any objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of

15 | certain rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014).

16 | ITIS SO ORDERED.

| Dated: _ July 17, 2026 | by

18 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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