Champagnie

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

SHERRYGAY CHAMPAGNIE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 3:25-cv-518-WWB-PDB

PACE CENTER FOR GIRLS, INC. and

MARY MARX,

Defendants.

/

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Second

Amended Complaint (Doc. 48)1 and Plaintiffs’ Opposition (Doc. 51). For the reasons set

forth below, Defendant’s Motion will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Sherrygay Champagnie, is a black woman of Jamaican national origin.

(Doc. 46, ¶ 5). Plaintiff worked as a math teacher for Defendant, Pace Center for Girls,

Inc, (“PCGI”) at the Collier Center in Immokalee, Florida from April 6, 2020, until her

“constructive discharge” on September 1, 2021. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 17). PCGI is a non-profit

corporation headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida that operates educational centers

throughout Florida. (Id. ¶ 10). Defendant Mary Marx was the Chief Executive Officer of

PCGI during the relevant times of Plaintiff’s employment. (Id. ¶ 11). Plaintiff alleges that

1 After Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs Rosene Johnson, Anne-

Marie Mavenyengwa, LaVita Johnson-Spears, and Chantell Miles settled their claims

against Defendants. (See Doc. 64 at 1; Doc. 66 at 1; Doc. 72 at 1). Therefore, the Court’s

analysis is limited to the claims asserted only by Plaintiff Champagnie.

Defendants engaged in a “systematic pattern and practice of racial discrimination” against

her and other black employees beginning in the spring of 2021. (Id. ¶¶ 15–16).

Champagnie was supervised by Tim Snyder, a white male. (Id. ¶ 17). Plaintiff

alleges she began to face discriminatory treatment in the fall of 2020 from Snyder. (Id. ¶

19). On various occasions, Plaintiff alleges Snyder would “barge into her classroom” to

solicit negative feedback from students without notice, and “disclosed her medical

information to students without consent.” (Id. ¶¶ 19, 21). Snyder allegedly dismissed

“student verbal abuse” toward Plaintiff by saying she was “too sensitive because she was

Jamaican” and “that is how they are in Jamaica.” (Id. ¶ 24). Snyder also, in front of

students, allegedly told Plaintiff that she could not vote because she is not a citizen,

causing students to ask if she was “illegal.” (Id. ¶ 23).

According to Plaintiff, Snyder would also invasively surveil her by following her to

restrooms and waiting outside for her. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 22). Other times, Snyder would

allegedly physically grab her arm to demand meetings, including meetings outside of work

hours. (Id. ¶¶ 21–22). Snyder allegedly did not treat other white, non-Jamaican teachers

the same way, including Laurel Sandidge, a science teacher, and Mike Miller, an English

teacher. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 25). Because of Snyder’s alleged conduct, Plaintiff reported him to

Executive Director Marianne Kearns on October 20, 2020, and November 2, 2020, and

to PCGI’s Human Resources Manager, Shannon McQuinn, multiple times between

October 2020 and May 2021. (Id. ¶¶ 26–27). Neither Kearns nor McQuinn took any

corrective measures. (Id.).

After Plaintiff filed her complaints, her alleged mistreatment grew. Staff would

allegedly call her “N----r,” “B---h,” and “C--t,” with the consent of Snyder and Kearns. (Id.

¶ 28).2 Snyder increasingly interrupted Plaintiff’s classroom and engaged in stalking

behavior. (Id.). On April 26, 2021, English teacher Mike Miller allegedly banged on an

office door so loudly while Plaintiff was on an emergency medical call that her physician

asked if he should call police. (Id. ¶ 30). In fear for her safety, Plaintiff began to hide in

locked classrooms and only moved to and from her classroom and vehicle with an escort.

(Id. ¶ 28). Kearns allegedly dismissed Plaintiff’s concerns as a product of anxiety and

told her that she should not tell others she was harassed. (Id. ¶ 31). Kearns also told

Plaintiff that Snyder would not be removed and that anything she said would get back to

management. (Id.).

Plaintiff later reported both Snyder and Kearns to PCGI’s Chief Financial Officer,

Thresa Giles, on May 6 and 7, 2021. (Id. ¶ 32). According to Plaintiff, an investigation

conducted by PCGI’s in-house counsel substantiated her allegations of harassment.

(Id.).3 As a result of that investigation, Plaintiff alleges that PCGI leadership, including

Marx, initially arrived at the Collier Center to terminate both Kearns and Snyder. (Id. ¶ 33).

However, Marx instead ordered a second investigation into Plaintiff’s claims, which

ultimately reached an opposite conclusion. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that neither she nor any

corroborating witness were interviewed in the second investigation. (Id.).

2 Plaintiff also alleges that staff members disparaged others on the basis of national

origin. For instance, Plaintiff alleges that, on January 6, 2021, Snyder “condoned staff

members discussing how to harm Vice President Kamala Harris, ‘the Jamaican.’” (Doc.

46, ¶ 29). She further alleges that a Program Director, Kelly Starke, “laughed” at that

discussion and “allowed [it] to continue.” (Id.).

3 Plaintiff alleges she faced retaliation from Kearns after this first investigation. At

one point, Kearns asked Plaintiff, “why are you still here?” (Doc. 46, ¶ 34).

After the second investigation was finished, PCGI allegedly prohibited Plaintiff from

entering the Collier Center, denied her request for a transfer to a nearby center, and

offered to transfer her to the Citrus Center approximately 230 miles away. (Id. ¶ 35).

PCGI then denied Plaintiff’s request for relocation assistance, which Plaintiff alleges

forced her constructive discharge on September 1, 2021. (Id. ¶ 36). Based on the

foregoing, Plaintiff brought this suit, alleging that Defendants are liable to her for

discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, and constructive discharge pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (Id. ¶¶ 41–83).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to

dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In

determining whether to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court accepts the factual

allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in a light most favorable to the

non-moving party. See United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1269 (11th Cir.

2009). Nonetheless, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations

contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions,” and “[t]hreadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Moreover, “naked assertions devoid

of further factual enhancement” are insufficient. Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “To survive a motion to

dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Racial and National Origin Discrimination

Plaintiff raises two claims for discrimination under § 1981, one for race-based

discrimination and another for discrimination based on national origin. Section 1981

provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same

right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white

citizens[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). “Although § 1981 does not itself use the term race, the

[Supreme] Court has construed the section to forbid all racial discrimination in the making

of private as well as public contracts.” Fitzpatrick v. Koch Foods of Ala., LLC, No. 2:19-

cv-553, 2023 WL 3937421, at *9 (M.D. Ala. June 9, 2023) (quoting Saint Francis Coll. v.

Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609 (1987)).

The plain text of § 1981 “applies to claims of discrimination based on race, not

national origin.” Tippie v. Spacelabs Med., Inc., 180 F. App’x 51, 56 (11th Cir. 2006); see

also Bodya v. Hilti, Inc., 159 F. App’x 91, 92 (11th Cir. 2005). Nonetheless, “national origin

discrimination” in some contexts can be “so closely related to racial discrimination as to

be indistinguishable.” Bullard v. OMI Ga., Inc., 640 F.2d 632, 634 (5th Cir. 1981)

(quotation omitted)4; see Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 613 (holding that the history of

4 The Eleventh Circuit adopted all former Fifth Circuit decisions made before

October 1, 1981, as binding precedent. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209

(11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

§ 1981 shows that “Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes

of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry

or ethnic characteristics” even if that would not “be classified as racial in terms of modern

scientific theory”). “Thus, while discrimination purely on the basis of national origin does

not create a cause of action under section 1981,” binding precedent holds that a complaint

“alleging racial and ethnic discrimination clearly states a cause of action under the

statute.” Bullard, 640 F.2d at 634 (quotation omitted).

Count II of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint asserts a stand-alone claim for

discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 based solely on national origin. That is not

permissible. Moeinpour v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala., No. 2:21-cv-1302, 2022 WL 164999,

at *1 n.1 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 18, 2022) (“Section 1981 does not provide a cause of action for

national origin discrimination; that statute relates only to race discrimination.”); see also

Edwards v. Prime, Inc., No. 08-AR-1016, 2008 WL 9393800, at *9 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 11,

2008) (holding that § 1981 does not authorize a cause of action for sex or national-origin

discrimination and dismissing stand-alone claims of each). Therefore, Count II must be

dismissed.

However, the Court’s dismissal of Count II does not mean that the allegations

concerning Plaintiff’s national origin are irrelevant to Count I, which raises a claim for

racial discrimination. For instance, Plaintiff alleges that her co-workers would explicitly

call her racial slurs with the knowledge and support of her supervisors, and that those

same supervisors dismissed her sensitivity to discrimination because she was Jamaican.

(Doc. 46, ¶¶ 24, 28). As such, the Court finds that Count I may rely on a relationship

between national-origin and race-based discrimination and will consider both to discern

whether Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a case for discrimination overall.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s discrimination claim fails because it does not

allege an adverse employment action under the McDonnell Douglas5 evidentiary

framework. However, “neither McDonnell Douglas nor ‘convincing mosaic’ is a pleading

standard that should be used at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.” Davis v. Miami-Dade Cnty., No.

23-12480, 2024 WL 4051215, at *2 (11th Cir. Sept. 5, 2024); see also Martinez-Lopez v.

GFA Ala. Inc., 797 F. Supp. 3d 1309, 1364 (N.D. Ga. 2025) (describing the McDonnell

Douglas framework as “useful for guidance purposes” at the pleading stage). Rather, “in

order to state a claim under § 1981, [plaintiff] must” plausibly “allege (1) intentional racial

discrimination (2) that caused a contractual injury.” Ziyadat v. Diamondrock Hosp. Co., 3

F.4th 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2021).6 “A contractual injury includes any injury relating to ‘the

making, performance, modification, [or] termination of [the] contract[ ],’ or to ‘the

enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual

relationship.’” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)).

Here, Plaintiff has alleged that she had a contractual relationship with PCGI to

teach mathematics to students at the Collier Center. She alleges she was abruptly barred

from the Collier Center, thus prohibited from performing her job, and given a transfer to

the Citrus Center approximately 230 miles away, which Plaintiff alleges would impose a

seven-hour commute. That changed condition could qualify as a contractual injury. See

5 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

6 There is no dispute Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that she is a member of a

racial minority. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1271 (11th Cir. 2004);

(Doc. 46, ¶ 5).

Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 355 (2024) (“Many forced transfers leave

workers worse off respecting employment terms or conditions. (After all, a transfer is not

usually forced when it leaves the employee better off.).”); see also Walker v. Baptist Health

Sys., Inc., No. 3:25-cv-588, 2025 WL 3902262, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 2025) (reasoning

that a Plaintiff being forced to “float” between hospital departments could constitute a

disadvantageous change of the place of work), report & recommendation adopted, 2026

WL 49811 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 7, 2026).

Nevertheless, the Second Amended Complaint fails to plausibly allege that this

contractual injury was motivated by intentional racial discrimination. Critically, the

Complaint does not identify a decision-maker. See Walker v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins.

Co., 286 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2002) (“When evaluating a charge of employment

discrimination . . . we must focus on the actual knowledge and actions of the decision-

maker.” (emphasis added)); see also Obukwelu v. Tallahassee Mem’l Healthcare, Inc.,

No. 4:15-cv-55, 2017 WL 11672903, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2017) (“The biases of one

who neither makes nor influences the challenged personnel decision are not probative in

an employment discrimination case.” (quoting Holifield v. Reno, 155 F.3d 1555, 1563–64

(11th Cir. 1997))). Although Plaintiff includes one allegation that “Defendant PCGI,

through its agents and employees, including Kearns, Snyder and Defendant Marx

individually, discriminated against Plaintiff because of her race,” (Doc. 46, ¶ 47), the

Second Amended Complaint does not identify who made the decision to bar Plaintiff from

the Collier Center and transfer her to the Citrus Center, or even state what parties were

involved in those decisions. The closest Plaintiff gets to identifying a decision-maker is

her allegation that “PCGI leadership, including Defendant Marx” arrived at the Collier

Center sometime after May 7, 2021, to terminate Kearns. (Id. ¶¶ 32–33). But Plaintiff

does not specify whether this applies to any of the decisions made about her.

Even if Plaintiff were to argue that Snyder, Kearns, and Marx were all decision-

makers, Plaintiff does not plausibly allege how any were motivated by racial animus. As

to Snyder, the Second Amended Complaint appears to focus on his references to

Plaintiff’s Jamaican national origin and citizenship, and points to conduct surrounding

those statements. (Doc. 46, ¶¶ 19, 21–24). Those characteristics are distinct from race.

To the extent that Plaintiff believed Snyder used Plaintiff’s national origin as a proxy for

her race or ethnic characteristics, Plaintiff fails to allege factual matter suggesting as

much. Faulk v. City of Orlando, 731 F.2d 787, 790 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that “ill

treatment . . . without reference to” racially or ethnically “discriminatory intent” fails to state

of claim of intentional discrimination in violation of § 1981). In fact, the Second Amended

Complaint does not even allege that Snyder used Plaintiff’s national origin or citizenship

status as a stand-in for her appearance.

The pleading is even more deficient with respect to Kearns and Marx. As to

Kearns, Plaintiff only identifies three allegations: (1) Kearns allegedly told Plaintiff she

was not being harassed and was just experiencing “anxiety”; (2) Kearns allegedly said

that “Snyder would not be removed”; and (3) Kearns allegedly asked Plaintiff why she

was still at the Collier Center after reporting Snyder. (Doc. 46, ¶¶ 31, 34). But, even

interpreted in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, those allegations only show Kearns may

have been aware of Plaintiff’s belief that Snyder harbored discriminatory beliefs toward

Plaintiff based on her national origin, not that Kearns individually shared or acted upon a

racially discriminatory animus. Walker, 286 F.3d at 1274. Finally, Plaintiff does not

identify any conduct or comments by Marx whatsoever from which the Court could infer

that she harbored racial discrimination toward Plaintiff or acted because of Plaintiff’s race.

Therefore, the Court cannot deduce whether Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that a

decision-maker was motivated by racial animus and will dismiss Count I.

B. Hostile Work Environment

A party may also bring a hostile work environment claim under § 1981. Shields v.

Ft. James Corp., 305 F.3d 1280, 1282–83 (11th Cir. 2002). A prima facie case of a hostile

work environment requires a plaintiff to establish that “(1) [s]he belongs to a protected

group; (2) [s]he was subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based

on a protected characteristic; (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to

alter the conditions of h[er] employment; and (5) h[er] employer was responsible for the

hostile work environment.” Copeland v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 97 F.4th 766, 774–75 (11th

Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted). But at the pleading stage, all that a plaintiff must plausibly

allege is that intentional racial discrimination caused a contractual injury that related to

“the making, performance, modification, [or] termination of contracts, [or] the enjoyment

of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” Shields,

305 F.3d at 1282 n.2 (quotation omitted).

First, Defendants argue that most of the allegations do not show Plaintiff faced

hostility or disparagement based on race. Secondly, to the extent Plaintiff alleges she

was called racial slurs, Defendants argue that the Second Amended Complaint does not

allege when that occurred or how often it occurred. In Response, Plaintiff argues that the

alleged harassment she faced from Snyder was “brutal” and that this harassment was

“[u]nquestionably” because of her race and national origin. (Doc. 51 at 11–12).

Again, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint does not appear to focus on the kind

of race-based hostility that § 1981 requires.7 As said before, most of the allegations

pertaining to Snyder focus only on Plaintiff’s Jamaican national origin and citizenship,

(Doc. 46, ¶¶ 23–24), and do not include any reference to race, ethnic characteristics, or

her appearance, (id. ¶¶ 21–22). Only after Plaintiff allegedly reported Snyder for the first

time does she assert she faced any kind of race-based harassment from co-workers in

the form of racial slurs. But she does not allege how often she faced this treatment or

how Snyder exactly condoned that conduct. See Gonazlez v. Kellogg Co., No. 8:15-cv-

32-T, 2015 WL 1538151, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2015) (“Isolated or sporadic incidents of

harassment do not satisfy the ‘severe or pervasive’ standard of a hostile work

environment claim.”). Rather, Plaintiff relies only on conclusory allegations that Snyder,

Kearns, or others harassed her specifically because of her race. (Doc. 46, ¶¶ 15, 19). To

the extent that Snyder, Kearns, or others used her Jamaican national origin as a stand-in

for her race, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is devoid of any allegation from which

the Court could plausibly infer racial discrimination. Tonkyro v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans

Aff’s, 995 F.3d 828, 836 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding that conduct must be “motivated by” the

protected characteristic relevant to the discrimination claim and not some other

characteristic). Thus, Count III will be dismissed.

C. Retaliation

Additionally, “[§] 1981 also encompasses claims of retaliation.” Nevins v. DCH

Health Sys., No. 25-12124, 2026 WL 1103517, at *4 (11th Cir. Apr. 23, 2026); Bryant v.

7 The Court’s analysis could change if the claim brought were a hostile work

environment based on national origin under Title VII.

Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1301 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553

U.S. 442, 457 (2008)). A prima facie case for retaliation under § 1981 requires that a

plaintiff allege “(1) [s]he participated in a protected activity, (2) [s]he suffered an adverse

employment action,8 and (3) there is a causal connection between the protected activity

and adverse action.” Gildyard v. Children’s Network of S.W. Fla., LLC, No. 2:24-cv-702,

2025 WL 2106675, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 28, 2025). But Plaintiff need only assert enough

factual matter to plausibly allege a claim for retaliation based on her race.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not pleaded the first or third elements of a

retaliation claim. As to the first element, Defendants argue Plaintiff did not engage in a

protected activity because the Second Amended Complaint does not indicate that she

specifically reported race-based discrimination. “[I]n order to constitute statutorily

protected activity capable of supporting a § 1981 retaliation claim, an employee’s

complaint must reasonably convey that she is opposing discrimination based specifically

upon race, versus some other type of discrimination or injustice generally.” Cochran v. S.

Co., No. 14-569, 2015 WL 3508018, at *2 (S.D. Ala. June 3, 2015) (quotation omitted).

When Plaintiff asserts that she reported Snyder on October 30, 2020, and

November 2, 2020, she merely alleges that she reported his “harassment,” not that she

specifically reported any racially discriminatory behavior. (Doc. 46, ¶ 26). Plaintiff further

alleges she reported Snyder’s “behavior” to PGCI’s HR manager “multiple times” between

8 To the extent Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is

deficient because it does not allege a serious or material adverse employment action,

that argument fails. In 2024, the Supreme Court abrogated Eleventh Circuit precedent

that held an adverse employment action must be a “serious and material change” in the

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S.

346, 353 & n.1 (2024) (citing, among others, Webb-Edwards v. Orange Cnty. Sheriff’s

Off., 525 F.3d 1013, 1033 (11th Cir. 2008)).

October 2020 and May 2021, and that she also reported his “conduct” to PCGI’s Chief

Financial Officer on May 6–7, 2021. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 32). It is possible that conduct could

include Snyder’s alleged “knowledge and support” of Plaintiff’s colleagues calling her

racial slurs after she initially filed complaints. (Id. ¶ 28). But Plaintiff does not precisely

plead when she was allegedly called racial slurs; so, it is equally possible she reported

some other kind of discrimination. (Id.). Without that detail, the Court cannot conclude

Plaintiff plausibly alleges that she engaged in a protected activity relevant to her § 1981

retaliation claim, or that any adverse action was causally related to such an activity. See

Gildyard v. Children’s Network of S.W. Fla., LLC, No. 2:24-cv-702, 2025 WL 1093331, at

*7 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2025). Accordingly, Count IV will be dismissed.

D. Constructive Discharge

Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim for constructive discharge must be

dismissed because she fails to plausibly allege a race-based hostile work environment

claim. The Court agrees. Smith v. Ace Towing & Recovery, LLC, No. 5:23-cv-1761, 2025

WL 1547735, at *3 (N.D. Ala. May 30, 2025) (holding that the “[c]reation of a hostile work

environment is a necessary predicate to a hostile-environment constructive discharge

case” (quoting Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 149 (2004))). Accordingly, the

Court will dismiss Count V of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint.

E. Leave to Amend

“A district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend h[er] complaint

sua sponte when the plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, never filed a motion to

amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court.” Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy

Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff has neither filed a motion

for leave to further amend her pleading nor requested such relief in her Response.

Consequently, this Court is not obligated to permit Plaintiff to amend her pleading sua

sponte. Nevertheless, the instant Motion and Response addressed over twenty different

claims brought by five different Plaintiffs, and only one Plaintiff remains in this case. That

necessarily limited the briefing applicable to Plaintiff’s claims, which have not been

dismissed prior to this Order. Therefore, in the interests of justice and for the benefit of

the Court, Plaintiff will be afforded one final opportunity to amend her pleading as to

Counts I, III, IV, and V.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED as

follows:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 48) is

GRANTED as set forth in this Order.

2. Count II of the Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.

3. Counts I, III, IV, and V of the Second Amended Complaint are DISMISSED

without prejudice.

4. On or before August 31, 2026, Plaintiff may file an amended pleading to correct

the deficiencies noted in this Order. Failure to timely file an amended pleading

may result in the dismissal of this case without further notice.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida on August 18, 2026.

WENDY W. B

UNITED STATES T JUDG

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record