Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 GHANNAM D GH L ALMUTAIRI, A- No. 1:26-cv-04575-TLN-CKD P

246-058-611,

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Petitioner,

13 FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

v.

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WARDEN, CALIFORNIA CITY

15 IMMIGRATION PROCESSING

CENTER, et al.,

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Respondents.

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18 Petitioner Ghannam D GH L Almutairi is detained by Immigrations and Customs

19 Enforcement (“ICE”) and seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The

20 petition, respondents’ opposition requesting dismissal, and petitioner’s reply are before the court.

21 (ECF Nos. 1, 6, 7.) This matter was referred to the undersigned by operation of Local Rule

22 302(c)(17) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned

23 recommends the petition be granted and respondents be ordered to provide petitioner a bond

24 hearing.

25 I. Background

26 Petitioner is a national of Kuwait. (ECF No. 6-1 at 1.) Petitioner arrived at the Los

27 Angeles International Airport on December 20, 2025, and was found inadmissible to enter the

28 United States. (Id. at 2; ECF No. 6-2.) He has been detained continuously since then.

1 Petitioner expressed a fear of returning to his native country and was referred to an

2 immigration judge (IJ) for a credible fear hearing. (ECF No. 6-1 at 2) On March 17, 2026, an

3 immigration judge (IJ) ordered petitioner removed to Kuwait. (ECF No. 6-3.) Petitioner reserved

4 appeal. (Id. at 4.) On April 7, 2026, the Board of Immigration appeals acknowledged receipt of

5 petitioner’s timely appeal. (ECF No. 6-4.)

6 II. Legal Standard

7 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every

8 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)

9 (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a petitioner in

10 custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A district court’s

11 habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533

12 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); Nadaraja v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[In] cases

13 that do not involve a final order of removal, federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the

14 district court” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 where the petitioner “challenges [their] confinement

15 on statutory and constitutional grounds.”).

16 III. Discussion

17 Petitioner asserts violations of his substantive and procedural rights under the Fifth

18 Amendment’s Due Process Clause. (ECF No. 1 at 12-13.) He seeks release unless he is provided

19 with a bond hearing before an immigration judge where, to justify continued detention, the

20 government must establish by clear and convincing evidence he presents a risk of flight or danger

21 to the community. (Id. at 15.) Respondents contend petitioner is lawfully detained and subject to

22 mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). (ECF No. 6 at 2.) Respondents argue

23 petitioner has no procedural or substantive right to be free from immigration detention, or to a

24 bond hearing, and that his detention is not indefinite or prolonged. (Id. at 2-6.)

25 Petitioner’s detention during deportation proceedings is a constitutionally valid aspect of

26 the process. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). The government has significant interests

27 in detaining noncitizens pending removal. See generally Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th

28 1189, 1208 (9th Cir. 2022). Petitioner does not establish a substantive due process violation or

1 present any authorities showing he is entitled to an order of release. However, the undersigned

2 concludes due process requires that petitioner receive a hearing.

3 Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and has no statutory

4 right to a hearing as to his detention. However, the Supreme Court has left open the question

5 whether due process requires that persons in prolonged mandatory immigration detention receive

6 individualized bond hearings. See Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 255 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing

7 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018)). The Ninth Circuit has expressed reservations as to

8 whether a noncitizen may be detained for an unreasonably prolonged period, even where they are

9 detained pursuant to a statute requiring their mandatory detention. Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d

10 at 256 (“We have grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention

11 without any process is constitutional or that those who founded our democracy precisely to

12 protect against the government’s arbitrary deprivation of liberty would have thought so.”).

13 “While neither the Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court have endorsed a bright-line rule

14 for when a noncitizen’s detention becomes constitutionally impermissible, nearly all district

15 courts that have considered the issue agree that prolonged mandatory detention pending removal

16 proceedings, without a bond hearing, will—at some point—violate the right to due process.”

17 Nasar v. Warden of California City Det. Ctr., No. 2:26-CV-00433-DC-AC (HC), 2026 WL

18 731160, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2026) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).

19 Here, petitioner’s immigration detention has surpassed six months, and it is unknown how

20 long the remainder of his removal proceedings will take. Petitioner states a cognizable procedural

21 due process claim.

22 Courts examine procedural due process claims in two steps. Kentucky Dep’t of

23 Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). The first step is determining whether there

24 exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second step examines the

25 procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the

26 Constitution. Id.

27 Petitioner has a protected liberty interest at stake. The Due Process Clause protects

28 persons in the removal process from “arbitrary prolonged detention.” Rodriguez v. Marin, 909

1 F.3d at 256. Noncitizens have a well-established liberty interest in their freedom from detention.

2 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693.

3 To determine whether petitioner received process due with respect to that protected liberty

4 interest, the court will use the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The

5 Mathews test considers three factors: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous

6 deprivation and probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3)

7 the government’s interest. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.

8 Petitioner has a “substantial” private interest in freedom from prolonged detention. See

9 generally Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1207 (9th Cir. 2022) (noting general circuit

10 precedent “that an individual’s private interest in ‘freedom from prolonged detention’ is

11 ‘unquestionably substantial’”). Petitioner has been detained for almost seven months and has

12 never been granted a hearing where he could argue for his release pending removal based on

13 individualized consideration of the relevant risks.

14 As for procedures in place, there do not appear to be any that could mitigate against the

15 risk of arbitrary prolonged detention. See Sola v. Holder, 720 F.3d 1134, 1135 (9th Cir. 2013)

16 (“[t]he BIA does not have jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of the statutes it

17 administers”) (citing Padilla–Padilla v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 972, 977 (9th Cir. 2006)). Nor does it

18 appear petitioner would ever be afforded a bond hearing at any point in the future during

19 pendency of his removal proceedings given that respondents maintain he is subject to mandatory

20 detention and not entitled to such a hearing. Thus, petitioner’s only available process for his

21 prolonged detention due process claim is through a habeas petition. A bond hearing before an IJ

22 would mitigate the risk of erroneous deprivation because it would require the government to

23 establish petitioner presents a flight risk or danger to the community if released.

24 The government has an interest in protecting the public from noncitizens who have been

25 determined to be dangerous and in ensuring successful execution of removal orders through

26 detention of removable noncitizens. Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208 (citing Demore v. Kim, 538

27 U.S. 510, 515, 528). However, respondents’ interest in petitioner’s continued detention without a

28 bond hearing is low. The only permissible reason for petitioner’s continued detention is any risk

1 of flight or danger to the community. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; see also Hernandez v. Sessions,

2 872 F.3d 976, 994 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he government has no legitimate interest in detaining

3 individuals who have been determined not to be a danger to the community and whose

4 appearance at future immigration proceedings can be reasonably ensured by a lesser bond or

5 alternative conditions.”). Respondents do not assert that providing petitioner with a bond hearing

6 would be particularly burdensome. Respondents do not assert that petitioner’s continued

7 detention is necessary for any particular reason.

8 Being required to provide petitioner a bond hearing will not undercut the government’s

9 interests. Limiting detention to noncitizens who are shown to be either dangerous or a flight risk

10 may serve the public’s interest, and the government’s interest, by limiting the fiscal and

11 administrative burdens attendant to immigration detention. See Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 996

12 (noting the “staggering” costs to the public of immigration detention as compared to supervised

13 release programs). Thus, the government’s interest is minimal in detaining petitioner further

14 without a hearing to determine whether the detention is justified.

15 The Mathews factors favor petitioner. The undersigned will recommend the petition be

16 granted and petitioner receive a bond hearing before an immigration judge at which the

17 government bears the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that he is either a

18 flight risk or a threat to safety to justify his continued detention. See Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th

19 133, 157 (2nd Cir. 2024) (noting that where an individual’s liberty is at stake due to continued

20 detention, the Supreme Court has consistently used a clear and convincing evidentiary standard).

21 IV. Recommendation

22 For the reasons set forth above, IT IS RECOMMENDED as follows:

23 1. Respondents’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 6) be DENIED.

24 2. The petition for writ of habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 be GRANTED and

25 respondents be ordered to provide petitioner a bond hearing before an Immigration

26 Judge, within seven (7) days of adoption of these findings and recommendations, at

27 which the government bears the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence

28 that petitioner is either a flight risk or danger to the community to justify his continued

1 detention.

2 3. The Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment for petitioner and close this case.

3 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

4 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within seven (7) days

5 || after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

6 || objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

7 || “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the

8 | objections shall be filed and served within seven days (7) after service of the objections. The

9 || parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

10 || appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

11 || Dated: July 16, 2026 fed) / dha

MIG f- A.

"2 CAROLYNK.DELANEY

13 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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