The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
O.G.M., No. 4:26-CV-00780
Petitioner, (Chief Judge Brann)
v.
JESSICA SAGE, in her official
capacity as Warden, FCI Lewisburg, et
al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AUGUST 21, 2026
O.G.M. has been detained by the United States Department of Homeland
Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement since October 29, 2025.1 Earlier
this year, O.G.M. filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting that his
detention without a bond hearing violated his due process rights.2 This Court granted
that petition and directed the Government to provide O.G.M. with an individualized
bond hearing at which he may present evidence.3
On May 13, 2026, and May 20, 2026,4 an immigration judge (“IJ”) held a
bond hearing and denied bond for O.G.M.5 O.G.M. now moves for this Court to
1 Doc. 1 at 10-11.
2 See Doc. 1.
3 Docs. 14, 15.
4 The bond hearing was initially delayed to permit O.G.M. to submit additional evidence to the
immigration court. Doc. 20 at 9; Doc. 22 at 16; Doc. 22-1 at 2-4.
enforce its judgment. A review of the available evidence demonstrates to the Court
that, regardless of whether it may have reached a different result if presented with
this question on de novo review, the bond hearing was sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of the United States Constitution. Consequently, the Court will deny
O.G.M.’s motion.
I. BACKGROUND
O.G.M., a citizen and native of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, entered
the United States of America in April of 2023; he has lived in the United States
continuously since then, and was later granted Temporary Protective Status.6 On
October 29, 2025, O.G.M. was arrested and ICE initially refused him a bond hearing,
asserting that he was subject to mandatory detention.7
In March of 2026, O.G.M. filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition asserting that he
was entitled to a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).8 This Court agreed,
holding that O.G.M. was being improperly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and
that the denial of a bond hearing violated his due process rights.9 Consequently, this
Court ordered that the Government “provide O.G.M. with an individualized bond
hearing at which he may present evidence.”10
6 Doc. 1 at 4, 10.
7 Id. at 10-11.
8 See Doc. 1.
9 Docs. 14, 15.
10 Doc. 15 at 1.
In May of 2026, an IJ held two bond hearings and denied bond for O.G.M.11
At those hearings, the IJ noted that he had reviewed the evidence submitted and
considered “the entire record before [him], including the witness letters, the letter
from the defense attorney, victim recantation letters,” and had heard arguments from
both O.G.M. and the Government.12 Ultimately, however, the IJ concluded that
O.G.M. failed to establish that he is not a danger, determined that no amount of bond
could effectively mitigate the danger that O.G.M. posed, and denied bond.13
In reaching the conclusion that O.G.M. presents a danger that may not be
mitigated by any form of bond, the IJ focused heavily on O.G.M.’s recently
dismissed criminal charges.14 The IJ noted that the incident underlying those charges
occurred when O.G.M. “had stabbed the alleged victim in the back that was so
severe, it had apparently caused a collapsed lung.”15 Although the criminal charges
had been dismissed, the IJ gave this fact little weight since “it was due to the victim’s
not wanting to prosecute.”16 Finally, the IJ reasoned that O.G.M.’s explanation that
the incident was self-defense did not withstand scrutiny, as O.G.M. exited the fight,
went into a building to retrieve a knife, and then stabbed the other individual in the
11 Doc. 16-1; Doc. 22-1.
12 Doc. 22-1 at 14-15.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 14.
16 Id.
back while that individual was fighting with O.G.M.’s brother.17 The IJ emphasized
that, even if there were
some aspect [of] self-defense, there is zero indication that the assailant
had any weapon, and this court finds it extremely dangerous to, rather
than calling the police or calling for help, and where it is two
individuals against one, to go inside, grab a knife, and stab someone
multiple times in the back to the extent that they suffer a collapsed lung,
wherein the victim there . . . is lucky they didn’t lose their life.18
On June 19, 2026, O.G.M. filed this motion to enforce the Court’s judgment.19
He asserts that the IJ failed to conduct an adequately individualized hearing, as the
IJ purportedly relied upon a single mechanistic factor—the dismissed criminal
charge against O.G.M.—and ignored other evidence that demonstrates O.G.M. is
not dangerous.20 O.G.M. also argues that the failure to record a portion of the May
13 hearing violates his due process rights, as an IJ is required to record a proceeding
to permit judicial review of the decision.21
Third, O.G.M. contends that the IJ failed to hold an impartial bond hearing,
as the IJ “has a pattern of denying bond to the majority of noncitizens who appear
before him.”22 This all occurs, O.G.M. states, in the context of a presidential
administration that has actively worked to deny bond to any immigration detainees
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Doc. 19.
20 Doc. 20 at 12-16.
21 Id. at 16-18.
22 Id. at 18; see id. at 18-22.
and has pressured IJs to follow suit, meaning that immigration courts can no longer
be trusted to hold impartial bond hearings.23 Finally as related to the bond hearing,
O.G.M. asserts that the IJ improperly failed to consider alternatives to detention.24
O.G.M. additionally asserts that his continued detention is unlawful because he held
valid TPS status prior to his arrest.25
Respondents contend that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider O.G.M.’s
motion and, in any event, the motion fails on its merits.26 Respondents first argue
that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) strips this Court of jurisdiction to review the IJ’s bond
hearing determination, and that O.G.M. failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies, which further bars consideration of the motion.27
Second, they assert that O.G.M. received an individualized bond hearing in
accordance with the Court’s Order, as the IJ considered all evidence and heard their
arguments, but determined that O.G.M. was a danger, and O.G.M. merely seeks to
relitigate the merits of the bond hearing.28 They further argue that the failure to
record a portion of the bond hearing did not violate O.G.M.’s due process rights, as
the bond hearing itself was adequate.29
23 Id. at 18-22.
24 Id. at 22-24.
25 Id. at 24-25.
26 Doc. 22.
27 Id. at 5-10.
28 Id. at 10-15.
29 Id. 15-17.
O.G.M. has filed a reply brief, rendering this matter ripe for disposition.30 For
the reasons discussed below, the motion will be denied.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
The Government first argues that this Court may not examine the IJ’s bond
determination pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e).31 That statute provides that “[n]o court
may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section
regarding the detention of any alien or the revocation or denial of bond or parole.”32
Despite that rather definitive language, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit has explicitly held that “[n]othing in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) prevents
[courts] from deciding whether the immigration officials had statutory authority to
impose mandatory detention” and that “Section 1226(e) does not limit habeas
jurisdiction over constitutional claims or questions of law.”33 Stated differently,
although courts “lack jurisdiction to review any discretionary determinations
underlying the IJ’s bond decision, [they] may review whether the bond hearing was
fundamentally unfair.”34
30 Doc. 23.
31 Doc. 22 at 5-7.
32 8 U.S.C. § 1126(e).
33 Sylvain v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 714 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Singh v. Holder, 638
F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2011)).
34 Ghanem v. Warden Essex Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. 21-1908, 2022 WL 574624, at *2 (3d Cir.
Feb. 25, 2022).
And beyond a court’s ability to examine the constitutional adequacy of a bond
hearing, it is well established that a “court has the inherent power to enforce its own
orders.”35 Courts therefore have “continuing jurisdiction to address alleged
noncompliance with [a] conditional writ of habeas corpus.”36 O.G.M. challenges
both the constitutional sufficiency of the bond hearing and maintains that the hearing
failed to comply with the Court’s Order granting his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.37 Both arguments fall within exceptions to § 1226(e)’s bar on review of a
bond determination, and that section therefore does not divest this Court of
jurisdiction to consider O.G.M.’s motion.
The Government next argues that O.G.M. has failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies related to the bond hearing, and consequently this Court
should decline to review the motion.38 As other courts have discussed, whether an
individual must exhaust administrative remedies by appealing a denial of bond is an
“area of unsettled law in the Third Circuit and in this District” and “there are several
decisions in this district reaching conflicting conclusions about whether exhaustion
is required.”39
35 E.O.H.C. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d 177, 194 (3d Cir. 2020).
36 Gibbs v. Frank, 500 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Phifer v. Warden, 53 F.3d 859, 865
(7th Cir. 1995)).
37 See Doc. 19.
38 Doc. 22 at 7-10.
39 Shonhai v. Lowe, No. CV 3:24-229, 2026 WL 538865, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2026).
The Court need not determine whether exhaustion of administrative remedies
is required because, even when exhaustion is necessary, courts will not enforce that
requirements if exhaustion “would be futile, if the actions of the agency clearly and
unambiguously violate statutory or constitutional rights, or if the administrative
procedure is clearly shown to be inadequate to prevent irreparable harm.”40 As it
relates to an appeal of the denial of bond, futility is apparent because “‘it is not at all
clear that the BIA could evaluate the legality of the IJ’s bond determination in
relation to [a district court’s order]—the BIA has, for example, consistently refused
to reach and decide constitutional questions.’”41
Assuming that O.G.M. was required to exhaust his administrative remedies,
that requirement would be excused here, as exhaustion would be futile since the
Board of Immigration Appeals likely would not take up the constitutional question.
In any event, although the Court finds that the motion is without merit, it will
nevertheless address the substance of this motion.
B. Merits
Turning to the merits of O.G.M.’s motion, O.G.M. asserts that the bond
hearing was deficient for four reasons. First, he contends that the IJ erred in relying
on a single, mechanistic factor to deny bond.42 Second, O.G.M. argues that the
40 Id. (quoting Lyons v. U.S. Marshals, 840 F.2d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 1988)).
41 Id. (quoting Y.S.G. v. Andrews, No. 25-cv-1884, 2025 WL 2979309, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 22,
2025)).
42 Doc. 20 at 12-16.
failure to record a portion of the bond hearing warrants release from custody.43 Third,
he argues that the bond hearing was partial, as the IJ routinely denies bond, and the
Presidential Administration is pressuring IJs to deny bond.44 Fourth, he maintains
that the IJ failed to consider alternatives to detention.45
“Throughout all phases of deportation proceedings, petitioners must be
afforded due process of law.”46 The Due Process Clause guarantees individuals “an
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”47 “This
guarantee comprises three key protections: (1) factfinding based on a record
produced before the decisionmaker and disclosed to him or her; (2) the opportunity
to make arguments on his or her own behalf; and (3) an individualized determination
of his or her interests.”48 “In other words, petitioners must receive a full and fair
hearing that allows them a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on their
behalf.”49
Importantly, for a bond hearing to adequately provide an individualized
determination, any evidence relied upon by an IJ “must be individualized and
support a finding that continued detention is needed to prevent him from fleeing or
43 Id. at 16-18.
44 Id. at 18-22.
45 Id. at 22-24.
46 Serrano-Alberto v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 859 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 2017).
47 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
48 Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
49 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
harming the community.”50 This means that “[m]echanistic reliance on factors that
are common to all § 1226([a]) detainees will not suffice.”51
As an initial matter, the Court cannot conclude that the IJ erroneously held
that O.G.M. bore the burden of proof. This Court held that O.G.M. was entitled to a
bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a),52 and the law is clear that, in a bond
hearing “under § 1226(a)[,] the burden remains on the detainee at all times.”53 The
line of Third Circuit cases addressing the burden of proof for prolonged detention
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) is simply inapplicable here.54 Consequently, the IJ properly
placed the burden of proof on O.G.M.55
Turning then to O.G.M.’s first argument, he asserts that the IJ relied on a
single, mechanistic factor to deny bond—O.G.M.’s past criminal charges—without
considering the evidence that O.G.M. asserts he presented to demonstrate that he is
not a danger.56 O.G.M. asserts, and the record is clear, that he presented significant
50 Santos v. Lowe, No. 1:18-CV-1553, 2020 WL 4530728, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2020) (quoting
German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2020)).
51 Id. (quoting Wilkins v. Doll, No. 1:17-CV-2354, 2018 WL 3388032, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 12,
2018).
52 Doc. 14 at 7.
53 Borbot v. Warden Hudson Cnty. Corr. Facility, 906 F.3d 274, 279 (3d Cir. 2018).
54 See id. To the extent that O.G.M.’s motion may be construed as arguing that his detention has
become unconstitutionally prolonged, Doc. 20 at 27-28, such an argument does not relate to
the underlying judgment in this matter, which was based only on O.G.M.’s detention under the
wrong statutory authority without a bond hearing. Any argument related to prolonged detention
therefore is not properly brought in this motion.
55 See Modebadze v. Soto, No. CV 26-1687 (MAS), 2026 WL 1067835, at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 17,
2026) (“Because the burden of proof under section 1226(a) remains on aliens at all times . . .
the immigration judge did not misapply the standard of proof by requiring Petitioner to show
that he was not a flight risk at his bond hearing”).
56 Doc. 20 at 12-16.
quantities of evidence to the IJ for consideration.57 But the record is equally clear
that the IJ “considered the entire record before” him before rejecting O.G.M.’s
motion for bond.58 To the extent that O.G.M. asserts the vast weight of the evidence
supports the notion that he is not dangerous, it is well established that “this Court
lacks the authority to ‘reweigh the evidence’ presented at the bond hearing.”59
Consequently, the weight of the evidence alone cannot compel a finding that the
bond hearing was constitutionally infirm.
As to O.G.M.’s contention that the IJ relied on a single, mechanistic factor in
denying bond, the Court disagrees. Rather, contrary to O.G.M.’s contention that the
IJ relied solely on the “arrest by law enforcement,”60 the IJ gave careful
consideration to the incident that formed the basis of the underlying criminal charges
and concluded that the incident’s severity—a stabbing that hospitalized the alleged
victim—along with O.G.M.’s conduct during the incident indicated
dangerousness.61 In particular, the IJ found it troubling that O.G.M. failed to call law
enforcement or otherwise seek help during the fight but, instead, went into a
57 Id. at 7-8.
58 Doc. 22-1 at 14. See id. at 5-6, 8-9, 14-15.
59 Collado Nunez v. Oddo, No. 25-CV-143J, 2026 WL 1170973, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 2026)
(quoting Ghanem v. Warden Essex Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. 21-1908, 2022 WL 574624, at *2,
3 (3d Cir. Feb. 25, 2022)).
60 Doc. 20 at 13.
61 Doc. 22-1 at 14-15.
building, retrieved a knife, and then returned to stab the individual in the back several
times.62
This is precisely the type of individual analysis that due process demands
when rendering a bond determination. The IJ did not indicate that all individuals are
inherently dangerous if they are charged with a particular crime. Rather, he
determined that O.G.M. is dangerous based on the circumstances present during that
specific, relatively recent incident. This is unlike other cases where IJs may have
failed to assess a detainee’s “danger to the community on a current basis” and instead
determined that “presenting danger to the community at one point by committing
crime . . . place[d] them forever beyond redemption.”63 Because the IJ made an
individualized assessment that O.G.M. is dangerous based on the particular facts and
circumstances surrounding his criminal arrest, reliance on that arrest to determine
that O.G.M. is dangerous did not violate O.G.M.’s due process rights.64
As to O.G.M.’s second argument that the failure to record a portion of the
bond hearing violated his due process rights,65 the Third Circuit has held, in other
contexts, that the Government is required to “make a record” of an immigration
hearing to satisfy due process.66 But, as the Third Circuit emphasized, that record
62 Id.
63 Chi Thon Ngo v. I.N.S., 192 F.3d 390, 398 (3d Cir. 1999).
64 Regardless of whether O.G.M. is correct in his inference that the New York Police Department
“did not believe him to pose a significant danger to the community,” Doc. 20 at 14, the IJ
considered him to be a danger, and that determination alone is what the Court must evaluate.
65 Id. at 16-18.
66 Gayle v. Warden Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst., 12 F.4th 321, 335 (3d Cir. 2021).
need only be “‘of sufficient completeness’ for ‘adequate and effective appellate
review.’”67
Here, the record presented to this Court is sufficient to permit effective review
of the constitutionality of the bond hearing. The missing portion of the proceeding,
by O.G.M.’s own recounting, included counsel’s arguments that: (1) O.G.M.
possessed valid TPS; (2) was not a danger or flight risk; and (3) there were valid
alternatives to detention.68 But these were merely arguments to the immigration
court, and do not impact this Court’s understanding of the IJ’s decision.
The record as presented to the Court included arguments from both parties as
to the relevant issue that undergirded the IJ’s decision—the incident that led to
O.G.M.’s dismissed criminal charges.69 And most importantly, the recorded portion
of the hearing contained the entirety of the IJ’s reasoning for concluding that O.G.M.
is dangerous and that no amount of bond could mitigate that danger.70 Accordingly,
the failure to record one portion of the bond hearings does not demonstrate that
O.G.M.’s due process rights were violated.
The Court further cannot accept O.G.M.’s third and fourth reasons for
asserting that the bond hearing was deficient. As to O.G.M.’s discussion of the
political pressure that surrounds IJs, O.G.M. cites several articles and court decisions
67 Id. (quoting Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 (1971) (ellipsis omitted)).
68 Doc. 20 at 16.
69 Doc. 22-1 at 6-13.
70 Id. at 14-15.
that indicate rates of bail grants are down, and that political pressure may play a role
in this decline.71 However, there is no evidence in the record that such influence
played a role in the bond decision issued in this matter. O.G.M. presents some
evidence that this particular IJ denies bond at a higher rate than the average IJ72 but,
again, there is no evidence that O.G.M. was denied bond for any improper reason.
And while the discussions to which O.G.M. cites are suggestive that IJs as a
whole are perhaps improperly denying bond to individuals who would otherwise be
released from custody, there is a difference between what one suspects is occurring
and what one knows to be occurring. Regardless of what may be occurring
elsewhere, this Court must base its decisions on the facts of this case and the relevant
law, and the facts do not permit the conclusion that the IJ here based his decision on
anything other than the evidence presented at the bond hearing.
As to O.G.M.’s fourth argument, that the IJ did not consider alternatives to
detention, the record permits the inference that the IJ considered—and rejected—
alternatives to detention. The IJ determined that O.G.M. was a danger, and that “no
amount of bond” could mitigate the danger that he posed.73 This reasoning
sufficiently indicates that the IJ considered alternatives to detention, but found that
the danger presented by O.G.M. could only reasonably be mitigated by detention.
71 Doc. 20 at 18-22.
72 See Doc. 20-5.
73 Doc. 22-1 at 14-15.
Finally, O.G.M. asks that this Court release him based on his TPS status.74
However, as this Court observed when first addressing O.G.M.’s petition, although
another district judge has granted declaratory judgment finding that TPS status
remains valid for Venezuelans, there is no coercive effect to that decision, and the
termination of TPS for Venezuelans remains valid.75 Consequently, “a binding court
decision does not exist that has set aside [the] 2025 termination of” TPS for
Venezuelans, and release based upon O.G.M.’s prior status under that program is
not appropriate.76
In sum, the record reflects that the IJ here conducted a proper bond hearing,
gave individual consideration to O.G.M.’s circumstances, and appropriately denied
bond after determining that O.G.M. is dangerous. It is not the place of this Court to
reweigh the evidence or impose its views on the IJ’s decision. Accordingly, that
decision withstands constitutional scrutiny, and O.G.M.’s motion to enforce the
judgment will be denied.
74 Doc. 20 at 24-25.
75 O.G.M. v. Sage, No. 4:26-CV-00780, 2026 WL 1242754, at *3 n.35 (M.D. Pa. May 6, 2026).
76 Pokhrel v. Oddo, No. 3:26CV01052, 2026 WL 1758206, at *11 (W.D. Pa. June 15, 2026).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, O.G.M.’s motion to enforce the judgment will be
denied.
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge