Beck

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DOUGLAS LYNN BECK, :

Plaintiff : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-1958

V. : (JUDGE MANNION)

SGT. BOOTH, ef ai/., :

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the Court are pro se Plaintiff Douglas Lynn Beck

(“Beck”)s application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP

Application”) and complaint in which he asserts claims under 42 U.S.C.

§1983 for violations of his constitutional rights against one state correctional

officer who allegedly retaliated against him by spraying him with OC spray,

another state correctional officer who allegedly failed to conduct a proper

investigation into the other officer's use of the OC spray, and the correctional

institution’s superintendent. For the reasons stated below, the Court will: (1)

grant the IFP Application and allow Beck leave to proceed in forma pauperis

in this case; (2) dismiss his Section 1983 claim against the superintendent

without prejudice to him filing an amended complaint to the extent he can

assert a cognizable claim against her; and (3) dismiss his Section 1983 claim

against the correctional officer who allegedly failed to conduct an adequate

investigation.

I. BACKGROUND

Beck, a convicted and sentenced state prisoner who is currently

incarcerated at Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution Camp Hill (“SCI

Camp Hill’), commenced this action by filing his complaint, his IFP

Application, and a prisoner trust fund account statement, all of which the

Clerk of Court docketed on July 14, 2026. (Docs. 1-3.) Because Beck did

not submit a certified account statement as required by the in forma pauperis

statute, see 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2) (“A prisoner seeking to bring a civil action

... Without prepayment of fees or security therefor... shall submit a certified

copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the

prisoner for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the

complaint. . ., obtained from the appropriate official of each prison at which

the prisoner is or was confined.”), an Administrative Order issued requiring

the Superintendent of SCI Camp Hill to submit Beck’s certified account

statement to the Clerk of Court. (Doc. 5.) The Clerk of Court docketed Beck's

certified account statement on July 29, 2026. (Doc. 7.)

In his complaint, Beck names as Defendants: (1) Sgt. Booth (“Booth”),

a correctional officer at SCI Camp Hill; (2) Security Lieutenant Rose ("Rose’),

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also a correctional officer at SCI Camp Hill; and (3) Lindsey Kendall

(“Kendall”), the Superintendent of SCI Camp Hill. See (Doc. 1 at 1, 2-3). As

for Beck’s factual allegations and legal claims, he alleges that Booth started

working on his cell block (L Block) in November 2025. See (id. at 4). On

November 26, 2025, Beck wrote a letter to non-Defendant Deputy Albert

regarding Booth’s “behavior.” (/d. at 4, 5 (cleaned up)). Beck’s letter stated:

This is to inform you of a situation with Sgt. Booth on L Block.

He has been doing [sic] very aggressive cell searches under the

guise of cell tap inspections.

| won't go into what he does because I’m sure you can imagine.

All of this is in direct violation of cell tap/search policy.

But what you need to know is there is more than a few young

gang bangers taiking about letting the air out of him. (Stabbing if

you don’t know.)

| pray this doesn’t happen, and | try to talk rationally to them, but

| don’t know how much good it does.

I’m sending a copy of this out so when this happens no one can

say y'all didn’t know,

| will also speak to L/M Bilous today about this.

(/d. at 11 (cleaned up)). As a result of this letter, Booth “was reprimanded for

his behavior on L Block.” (/d. at 4, 5 (cleaned up)).

On December 12, 2025, Beck and the other inmates on his block were

ordered to return to their cells. See (id. at 5). While Beck was complying with

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this order, Booth “pursued” him and “assaulted” him with OC Spray from

approximately fifteen to twenty feet from behind Beck. See (id. (cleaned up)).

Beck asserts that there is a video recording of the entire incident, which

“supports [his] claim 100%.” (/d. (cleaned up)).

Following this incident, Rose investigated (via Investigation No. 2025-

A-1207) Beck's claim regarding Booth’s alleged abuse and use of excessive

force. See (id. at 6). During this investigation, Rose viewed the video of the

incident, which Beck alleges “clearly shows . . . Beck complying with [the]

order for everyone to go to their cells” only to have Booth deploy his OC

Spray “from 15° — 20’ behind .. . Beck” and hit Beck with the spray. (/d. at 7

(cleaned up)). Beck asserts that Booth’s use of the OC Spray violated the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’ use-of-force

policy because “at no time did... Beck pose any threat to... Booth, himself,

others, or property, nor was the use of force necessary to restore order.” (/d.

(cleaned up)). Yet, Rose "still chose to make the fraudulent claim that... .

Beck’s allegations were .. . unfounded.” (/d. (cleaned up)). Because Rose

conducted a “sham investigation,’ Beck asserts that Rose violated his

“Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and furthered the retaliation

against... . Beck, violating his First Amendment rights.” (/d. (cleaned up)).

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Beck also submitted a grievance dated January 2, 2026, pertaining to

Booth’s use of the OC Spray. (/d. at 9.) Beck’s grievance described the

events at issue as follows:

This grievance is to address the attack/assault that | suffered at

the hands of Sgt. Booth on 12-12-25 while housed on LA Block.

Facts of this grievance: (1) Sgt. Booth started on L Block in

November 2025. He was very aggressive in everything he did.

(2) | wrote a letter to Deputy Albert about Sgt. Booth’s behavior

on November 26, 2025. (3) A week or so later Sgt. Booth was

reprimanded by his superiors. Guys heard it all over the block

(not myself). (4) On 12-12-25, | was standing by the phones

waiting for my 5:30 call. Sgt. Booth started yelling like a maniac

for everyone to take it in. | was complying and asked for a

grievance. | was halfway up the stairs when Sgt. Booth said:

Write something else and see what happens to you! | stopped

and said: So now you're threatening me? You'll read about that

shit too! He started toward me. | got to the top of the stairs, and

he was about halfway up when he stopped his spray. | laughed

at him and said: Isn’t that the stupid ass behavior that they just

chewed your ass for?

He got his spray and came upstairs. | was 15-20 ft. away from

him headed for my cell. | said: The way you're acting, | need a

lieutenant. As | looked over my right shoulder, he sprayed me. |

walked into my cell and put my head in my sink. His actions were

egregiously abusive, retaliatory and in direct violation of use of

force policy. | posed no threat to him, others, myself or property.

| reserve the right to amend this grievance at any time during the

process of exhausting my administrative remedies.

As of right now, medicai has not seen me for the damage to my

right ear, and | just started medication attempting to clear up my

vision in my right eye. At this point | don’t know what my

compensatory damages will be or my punitive ask will be. Relief

| can ask for now is my medical issues to be address [sic]

immediately. Second to be moved back to LA Block where | feel

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safer around guys | know while i’m dealing with my diminished

sight and hearing. For all video of this incident to be preserved,

place LA Block time 5:00 p.m. until after 9:00 p.m. and all video

of myself for the rest of the night going to medical and R.H.U. For

Sgt. Booth to not ever be allowed on my block. For any and all

retaliation from any staff to cease immediately.

My family is in the process of retaining me an attorney. However,

| am open to listening to any honest and serious negotiation in

an attempt to resolve this matter.

(/d. at 10 (cleaned up)).

Beck asserts that due to Booth’s deployment of the OC Spray, he has

blurry vision in his right eye, he sustained damage to the lens of his eye

which required medication for months, he had/has ringing in his right ear

which caused vertigo and also required medication for months, and he

suffers from anxiety and fear of more retaliation and assaults. See (id. at 8).

He also asserts Section 1983 First Amendment retaliation and Eighth

Amendment excessive force claims against Booth as well as Section 1983

First Amendment retaliation and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims

against Rose. See (id. at 6-7). For relief, Beck seeks nominal,

compensatory, and punitive damages. See (id. at 8).

ll. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Applications for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis

Under 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(1), a district court “may authorize the

commencement .. . of any [civil] suit, . . . without prepayment of fees or

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security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a

statement of all assets such prisoner possesses that the person is unable to

pay such fees or give security therefor.”' /d. This statute

“is designed to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful

access to the federal courts.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

324, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed2d 338 (1989). Specifically,

Congress enacted the statute to ensure that administrative court

costs and filing fees, both of which must be paid by everyone

elise who files a lawsuit, would not prevent indigent persons from

pursuing meaningful litigation. [Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d

1080, 1084 (3d Cir. 1995)]. Toward this end, §1915(a) allows a

litigant to commence a civil or criminal action in federal court in

forma pauperis by filing in good faith an affidavit stating, among

other things, that [they are] unable to pay the costs of the lawsuit.

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324, 109 S.Ct. 1827.

Douris, 293 F. App’x at 131-32.

B. Screening Complaints Under 28 U.S.C. §§1915A and

1915(e)(2)

The Court must “review... a complaint in a civil action in which a

prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of

a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). If such a complaint fails to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court must dismiss the

complaint. See id. §1915A(b)(1). The Court has a similar screening

'“The reference to prisoners in §1915(a)(1) appears to be a mistake.

In forma pauperis status is afforded to all indigent persons, not just

prisoners.” Douris v. Middletown Twp., 293 F. App’x 130, 132 n.1 (3d Cir.

2008) (unpublished).

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obligation regarding actions filed by individuals proceeding in forma

pauperis. See id. §1915(e)(2)(B\ii) (“[T]he [C]ourt shall dismiss the case at

any time if the [C]ourt determines that... the action or appeal . . . fails to

state a claim on which relief may be granted... .”).

In reviewing legal claims under Sections 1915A(b) or 1915(e)(2)(B),

the Court applies the standard governing motions to dismiss filed under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Smithson v. Koons, No.

15-cv-1757, 2017 WL 3016165, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 26, 2017) (“The legal

standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim under

§1915A(b)(1) [and] §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) . . . is the same as that for dismissing

a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 3008559 (M.D.

Pa. July 14, 2017); Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (M.D. Pa.

2010) (explaining that when dismissing a complaint pursuant to Section

1915A, “a court employs the motion to dismiss standard set forth under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)’). To avoid dismissal under Rule

12(b)(6), a plaintiff must set out “sufficient factual matter’ in the complaint to

show that their claims are facially plausible. Ashcroft v. iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009). This plausibility standard requires more than a mere possibility

that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. “[W]here the well-

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pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility

of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not ‘show[n]’ ~ ‘that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” /qba/l, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2)).

When evaluating the plausibility of a complaint, the Court accepts as

true all factual allegations and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn

from those allegations, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See

id.; In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010).

However, the Court will not accept legal conclusions as true, and “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not survive a district

court's screening under Sections 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B). Bell Ail. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).

In addition, in the specific context of pro se litigation, the Court must

be mindful that a document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed.” Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); see Higgs v. Att'y Gen., 655 F.3d 333,

339 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that “when presented with a pro se litigant, we

have a special obligation to construe [their] complaint liberally” (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, a pro se complaint, “however

inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)

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(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106).

Moreover, when construing a pro se complaint, the Court will “apply the

relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name it.” Mala

v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013). However, pro

sé litigants “cannot flout procedural rules—they must abide by the same rules

that apply to all other litigants.” /d. at 245.

Cc. Section 1983

Section 1983 is the vehicle by which private citizens may seek redress

for violations of federal constitutional rights committed by state officials. See

42 U.S.C. §1983. This statute states in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution of laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress....

id. “Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights,” but is merely a means

through which “to vindicate violations of federal law committed by state

actors.” Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa.

2004) (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002)). “To

state a claim under §1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right

secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show

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that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of

state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

DISCUSSION

A. ThelFP Application

After reviewing the IFP Application, it appears that Beck lacks the

financial means to prepay the filing fee in this matter. Therefore, the Court

will grant the IFP Application and allow Beck to proceed in forma pauperis in

this action.”

B. Screening of Beck’s Complaint

After screening Beck’s complaint, the Court finds that he pleads

plausible First Amendment retaliation and Eighth Amendment excessive

force claims against Booth. On the other hand, the Court will dismiss Beck’s

Section 1983 claims against Rose and Kendall because he fails to plead a

plausible Section 1983 claim against either Defendant.

1. Claim Against Kendall

Although Beck names Kendall as a Defendant in the caption and body

of his complaint, see (Doc. 1 at 1, 3), he neither includes any factual

2 However, because Beck is a prisoner, he is advised that he will be

obligated to pay the filing fees for this case in installments in accordance with

the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA’), regardless of the outcome. See

28 U.S.C. §1915(b).

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allegations describing her role in any alleged constitutional violation nor

identifies his legal claim against her in his complaint. See (fd. at 4-8). Thus,

he fails to plead a plausible Section 1983 claim against Kendall because he

does not allege her personal involvement in any constitutional violation.

A defendant cannot be liable for a violation of a plaintiff's civil rights

unless the defendant was personally involved in the violation:

In the § 1983 context, .. . the Supreme Court... . require[s] a

“showing of direct responsibility” by the named defendant and. .

_ eschew{[s] any “theory of liability” in which defendants played

“no affirmative part in depriving any[one] .. . of any constitutional

rights,” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 376~77 [(1976)|—

including theories of vicarious or respondeat superior liability,

see [iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676]; see also Merklin v. United States,

788 F.2d 172, 175 (3d Cir. 1986). Instead, “[b]ecause vicarious

liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead

that each Government-official defendant, through the official's

own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” /qba/, 556

U.S. at 676. . . (emphasis added). “Each Government official,

his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own

misconduct.” /d. at 677 .. . (emphasis added).

Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 290 (3d Cir. 2018) (some

alterations in original).

“A plaintiff makes sufficient allegations of a defendant's personal

involvement by describing the defendant’s participation in or actual

knowledge of and acquiescence in the wrongful conduct.” Chavarriaga v.

Dep’t of Corr, 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Rode v.

Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)); Dooley v. Wetzel, 957

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F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (stating that “[p]ersonal involvement requires

particular ‘allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and

acquiescence” (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207)); see also Baraka v.

McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007) (explaining that Section 1983

defendants “must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs to be

liable and cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation which

[they] neither participated in nor approved”). Additionally, if a plaintiff seeks

to hold a supervisory official liable for unconstitutional acts by her or her

subordinates, his allegations must satisfy one of two theories of supervisory

liability: First, “[iJndividual defendants who are policymakers may be liable

under §1983 if it is shown that such defendants, with deliberate indifference

to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or

custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm[;]” and second, “a

supervisor may be personally liable under §1983 if [they] participated in

violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person

in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in [their] subordinates’

violations.” A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juv. Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572,

586 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); see Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766

F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014) (explaining requirements for supervisory liability

in section 1983 claim and describing “two general ways in which a

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supervisor-defendant may be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by

subordinates"), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S.

822 (2015).

Here, Beck does not include any allegations detailing Kendall's

personal involvement in any constitutional violation in his complaint.

Accordingly, he fails to plead a plausible Section 1983 claim against Kendall,

and the Court will dismiss his Section 1983 claim against her.

2. Claims Against Rose

Beck asserts that Rose violated his Fourteenth Amendment due

process rights by allegedly conducting an inadequate or “sham’ investigation

into Booth’s alleged abuse and use of excessive force. See (Doc. 1 at 6-7).

He also asserts that Rose’s conduct constituted further retaliation in violation

of the First Amendment. See (id. at 7). In both instances, Beck fails to assert

plausible Section 1983 claims against Rose.

a. Due Process Claims

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides

in pertinent part that: “No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law.” U.S. Cons. amend. XIV, §1. “The core

concept of due process is protection against arbitrary government action

[and, a]s that concept has developed, it has come to have both substantive

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and procedural components.” Evans v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr, 645 F.3d

650, 658 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,

845 (1998)). The substantive component “limits what government may do

regardless of the fairness of procedures that it employs,” Boyanowski v. Cap.

Area Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 2000), whereas the

procedural component “governs the manner in which the government may

infringe upon an individual's life, liberty, or property.” Evans, 645 F.3d at 662.

In this case, Beck fails to plead a plausible due process claim based

on Rose’s alleged failure to properly investigate his claims of abuse and use

of excessive force against Booth because there is no life, liberty, or property

interest involved with investigating another person:

[Jt is well established that "there is no constitutional right to the

investigation or prosecution of another.” Sanders v. Downs, 420

F. App’x 175, 180 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see also Linda

R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (‘{A] private citizen

lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or

nonprosecution of another.”). Second, “an allegation of a failure

to investigate, without another recognizable constitutional right,

is not sufficient to sustain a section 1983 claim.” Graw v.

Fantasky, 68 F. App’x 378, 383 (3d Cir. 2003) (quotations

omitted); see also Boseski v. N. Arlington Municipality, 621 F.

App’x 131, 135 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) ("Boseski has no

cognizable claim against a government entity for its failure to

investigate or bring criminal charges against another

individual.”).

Hernandez v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 25-cv-2018, 2025 WL 3207519, at “4 {E.D.

Pa. Nov. 17, 2025); see also Hakala v. Kiem, No. 09-cv-833, 2009 WL

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3852787, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2019) (‘[T}he failure to favorably address,

respond to and/or investigate . . . do[es] not implicate a constitutional right.”

(citing Bailey v. Palakovich, No. 06-cv-1640, 2007 WL 1450698, at *3-4

(M.D. Pa. May 14, 2007))). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Beck's due

process claim against Rose based on Rose’s alleged failure to adequately

investigate Booth’s alleged use of force against Beck.

b. First Amendment Retaliation

Beck alleges that Rose “furthered the retaliation against [him]” by, inter

alia, ultimately determining that his claims against Booth were unfounded.

(Doc. 1 at 7.) To plead a prima facie First Amendment retaliation claim, a

plaintiff must allege that: “(1) [their] conduct was constitutionally protected;

(2) [they] suffered an adverse action at the hands of prison officials; and (3)

[their] constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating

factor in the decision to discipline [them].” See Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d

417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). As for the first element of a

plaintiff's prima facie case, the filing of lawsuits and prison grievances

constitutes activity protected by the First Amendment. See id. (reiterating

prior holding that a prisoner-plaintiff engages in constitutionally protected

activity when they file a grievance against a prison official (citing Mitchell v.

Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003))); Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 6414,

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653 (3d Cir. 2002) (acknowledging its prior holding “that falsifying

misconduct reports in retaliation for an inmate's resort to legal process is a

violation of the First Amendment's guarantee of free access to the courts”

(citation omitted)); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223-25 (3d Cir. 2000)

(concluding that the prisoner-plaintiff stated a First Amendment retaliation

claim where he alleged that he had been kept in administrative segregation

in retaliation for filing civil rights claims against prison officiais).

Regarding the second element of a plaintiff's prima facie case, an

adverse action is one that is “sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness

from exercising [their] [constitutional] rights[.]” Mitchell, 318 F.3d at 530

(second alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted); Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2015), as amended

(Mar. 24, 2015) (explaining that an adverse action must be “sufficient to deter

a person of ordinary firmness from exercising [their] constitutional rights . . .”

(citation omitted)). However, to be actionable under Section 1983, the

alleged adverse action must be more than de minimis. See McKee v. Hart,

436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that the alleged retaliatory

conduct “need not be great in order to be actionable, but it must be more

than de minimis” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

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And, finally, with respect to the third element of a plaintiffs prima facie

case, the Court observes that, “[b]Jecause motivation is almost never subject

to proof by direct evidence,” a plaintiff must typically “rely on circumstantial

evidence to prove a retaliatory motive.” Wafson, 834 F.3d at 422. The

plaintiff “can satisfy [their] burden with evidence of either (1) an unusually

suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the

allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing

that suggests a causal link.” /d. (footnote omitted).

In this case, there are two significant issues with Beck’s retaliation

claim against Rose. First, unlike his retaliation claim against Booth, Beck

does not specifically plead that Rose retaliated against him for any protected

activity. In other words, Beck does not identify the protected activity in which

he engaged which led to Rose’s alleged deficient investigation, and it is

unclear from the complaint whether he alleges that his letter complaining

about Booth is the protected activity at issue.

Second, and more importantly, although Beck complains about Rose’s

investigation into his abuse and excessive force claims, Beck does not

actually allege that Rose failed to investigate anything. Instead, he

acknowledges that Rose “watched the video of... Booth assaulting ... him’

but ultimately determined that Beck's claim was unfounded. (/d. at 7.) Thus,

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the substance of Beck’s allegations demonstrates that he merely disagrees

with the outcome of Rose's investigation. Considering that merely denying a

grievance is not a sufficiently adverse action for purposes of a First

Amendment retaliation claim, see Owens v. Coleman, 629 F. App’x 163, 167

(3d Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (“The denial of grievances is not an ‘adverse

action’ for retaliation purposes.”); Lee v. Mason, No. 23-cv-793, 2024 WL

4341352, at *15 (M_D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2024) ("[Wle agree with the caselaw that

the denial of one grievance is not sufficiently adverse to deter an inmate of

ordinary firmness from continuing to exercise their [Flirst [A]Jmendment

right.”), Rose's ultimate conclusion that Beck’s claim of abuse and excessive

force was unfounded after conducting an investigation is not sufficiently

adverse to deter an inmate of ordinary firmness from continuing to exercise

their First Amendment rights. Accordingly, the Court will also dismiss Beck’s

First Amendment retaliation claim against Rose.

C. Leave to Amend

Before dismissing all or part of a civil rights complaint for failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted, a district court must permit a

curative amendment unless the amendment would be inequitable or futile.

See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247,

252 (3d Cir. 2007) (‘[l]n civil rights cases district courts must offer

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amendment—irrespective of whether it is requested—when dismissing a

case for failure to state a claim unless doing so would be inequitable or

futile.”); Grayson v. Mayview St. Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002)

(stating general rule that court should grant leave to amend unless doing so

would be futile). Here, the Court finds that it would be futile to grant Beck

leave to amend his Fourteenth Amendment due process and First

Amendment retaliation claims against Rose. As such, the Court will dismiss

those claims with prejudice.

As for any Section 1983 claims against Kendall, it appears that Beck

names Kendall as a Defendant in this case simply because she is the

Superintendent of SCI Camp Hill, which is an improper basis upon which to

seek to hold her liable for any alleged constitutional violation. Nevertheless,

the Court will grant Beck an opportunity to replead his claim against Kendall

should he possess facts that would establish a plausible Section 1983 claim

against her. If Beck chooses not to replead this claim through an amended

complaint, the Court will deem his inaction as his desire to proceed on only

his Section 1983 First Amendment retaliation and Eighth Amendment

excessive force claims against Booth.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will: (1) grant the IFP Application

and allow Beck leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this case; (2) dismiss

with prejudice Beck’s Section 1983 claims against Rose; and (3) dismiss

Beck’s Section 1983 claim(s) against Kendall without prejudice to him

repleading a claim against her through an amended complaint. If Beck does

not timely file an amended complaint, this action will proceed on only his

Section 1983 First and Eighth Amendment claims against Booth asserted in

his complaint. An appropriate Order follows.*

United States District Judge

DATE: t/a [26

26-1958-01

3 The Order will provide Beck more information on the filing of an

amended complaint.

a Pf «