Salgado

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RICARDO SALGADO, :

Petitioner, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-1863

V. : (JUDGE MANNION)

WARDEN, FCI LEWISBURG, :

Respondent. :

MEMORANDUM

Pending before the Court is Ricardo Salgado’s (“Petitioner”) petition for

a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241. (Doc. 1). For the

reasons stated herein, Petitioner's petition will be DENIED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a citizen and national of Mexico. (Doc. 8-3 at 12). He

entered the United States as an IR1 spouse of a United States citizen on

February 1, 2008. /d. at 3. On February 8, 2008, Petitioner applied for 1-485

lawful permanent residency. /d. His application was approved on February

20, 2008, and his permanent residency expires on March 24, 2028. /d.

Petitioner was never granted voiuntary departures or returns. /d. at 4.

Since his arrival to the United States, Petitioner has accumulated a

concerning criminal record. On December 2, 2014, Petitioner was arrested

by the Whitfield County Sheriff's Office (Georgia) for attempt or conspiracy

to violate the Georgia Controlled Substance Act; trafficking of cocaine, illegal

drugs, marijuana, or methamphetamine; and use of communication facility in

commission of a felony involving controlled substances. /d. at 4. These

charges were subsequently dismissed. /d.

On March 30, 2022, Petitioner was arrested by the Whitfield County

Sheriff's Office for battery- family violence and cruelty to children-1" degree.

id.; see also (Doc. 8-4). On December 2, 2022, Petitioner pleaded guilty to

simple battery- family violence, and disorderly conduct. /d. He was

sentenced to thirty days of confinement and eleven months of probation. /d.

On August 27, 2022, Petitioner was arrested by the Whitfield County Sheriff's

Office for stalking. /d. On November 30, 2022, Petitioner was convicted and

sentenced to thirty days of confinement. /d. On June 5, 2024, Petitioner was

arrested by the Whitfield County Sheriff's Office for aggravated assault-

family violence, and aggravated stalking- family viclence. On August 27,

2024, he was convicted of simple assault- family violence and simple battery-

family violence. /d. He was sentenced to seventy-nine days of confinement

followed by twelve months of probation. /d. On February 27, 2025, Petitioner

was arrested by the Whitfield County Sheriff's Office for violating his

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probation, and on March 4, 2025, he was sentenced to sixty days of

confinement. /d.

ICE encountered Petitioner after his February 27, 2025 arrest. /d. at 3.

Petitioner was served immigration documents in the Spanish language using

an interpreter, including a warrant for arrest of alien (I-200), notice of custody

determination (1-286), and notice of rights and request for disposition (i-826).

id. at 5. Near the end of his sixty-day-sentence, Petitioner was served a

notice to appear (“NTA”) before an immigration judge, charging him as

removable under Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) §237(a)(2)(E)(i) as

an alien having been convicted of a crime of domestic violence, stalking or

child abuse, neglect, or abandonment. (Doc. 8-5).

On September 18, 2025, immigration Judge Jennifer Piatesky ordered

Petitioner removed, and denied his application for cancellation of removal for

lawful permanent residents. (Doc, 8-2). Petitioner subsequently appealed

from Judge Piatesky’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA’).

On July 7, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant pro se petition for habeas

corpus, arguing that his detention has become illegally prolonged and that it

does not appear that his removal will occur in the reasonably foreseeable

future because the appeal remains pending, (Doc. 1). However, three days

later, on July 9, 2026, the BIA denied Petitioner's appeal. (Doc. 8-6). On July

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27, 2026, Respondent filed a response to the petition. (Doc. 8). Petitioner did

not file a traverse. Thus, the petition is now ripe for disposition.

ll. LEGAL STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. §2241, district courts have the authority to grant writs

of habeas corpus where a petitioner is “in custody under or by color of the

authority of the United States .. . in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §2241(c)(1), (3).

Furthermore, “[iJt is well established that a federal habeas corpus

petitioner generally has the burden of proving facts entitling him to a

discharge from custody.” Goins v. Brierley, 464 F.2d 947, 949 (3d Cir. 1972).

However, “[w]ith respect to certain factual issues, the burden of proof may

be shifted to the state because of specific policy considerations or because

the available evidence is likely to be in the hands of the state.” /d.

lil. DISCUSSION

a. Jurisdiction

The Court’s authority to hear noncitizen habeas petitions under 28

U.S.C. §2241 is limited in some circumstances by 8 U.S.C. §§1252(g), (b)(9),

and (a)(2)(B)(ii).

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§1252(g) states that:

Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any

other provisions of law .. . no court shall have jurisdiction to

hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising

from the decision or action by the Attorney General to

commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute

removal orders against any alien under this chapter.

8 U.S.C. §1252(g). Here, the Court’s jurisdiction is not barred by §1252(g)

as the petition does not challenge the commencement of removal

proceedings, the Attorney General’s decision to adjudicate, nor the

execution of a removal order. See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination

Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (finding that §1252(g)(2) divests the court

of jurisdiction “only to [these] three discrete actions[.]’).

§1252(b)(9) states that “[jJudicial review of all questions of law and fact

... arising from any action taken or proceedings brought to remove an alien

from the United States ... shall be available only on judicial review of a final

order [of removal].” 8 U.S.C. §1252(b\(9). Here, the Court's jurisdiction is not

barred by §1252(b)(9) as the petition does not seek review of any law or fact

arising from a removal proceeding. See E.0.H.C. v. Sec’y United States

Dept. of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d 177, 186 (3d Cir. 2020) (finding that

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§1252(b)(9) “does not reach claims that are independent of, or wholly

collateral to, the removal process[.]").

§1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) prohibits district courts from reviewing discretionary

detention choices of the Attorney General or Secretary of Homeland

Security. 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B)(il). Here, the Court’s jurisdiction is not

barred by §1252(a)(2)(B\(ii) as the petition does not challenge a

discretionary detention choice. See Patel v. O'Neil, 2025 WL 3516865, at *3

(M.D.Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (“section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) is inapposite because the

Respondents’ ‘statutory detention power is “not a matter of discretion” to

which §1252(a)(2)(B){ii) applies[.]’") (internal citations omitted).

Finally, courts considering the issue of whether a petitioner is being

wrongfully detained without a bond hearing “have almost universally held

that they have jurisdiction,” and, therefore, that §§1252(g), (b)(9), and

(a)(2)(B)(ii) do not apply. Pafe/, 2025 WL 3516865 at *3.

b. Exhaustion of administrative remedies

“A petitioner challenging agency action must generally first exhaust

administrative remedies; however, in habeas proceedings, ‘exhaustion

exists as a judicially created doctrine applied at the Court's discretion.” Vadel

v. Lowe, 2025 WL 3772059, at *3 (M.D.Pa. Dec. 31, 2025) (quoting

Kashranov v. Jamison, 2025 WL 3188399, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 14, 2025)).

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Here, further administrative review would be pointless, as Petitioner is

detained under 8 U.S.C. §1231, which precludes immigration judges from

holding a bond hearing. See Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573

(2022) (holding that the Government is not required to offer bond hearings

after six months of detention to noncitizens held beyond the 90-day removal

period set by §1231).

c. Merits

Petitioner argues that his detention has become unlawfully prolonged

and that he, therefore, should be released from custody. When an

immigration detainee has been given a final order of removal, his detention

is governed by 8 U.S.C. §1231. Under the statute, the Government “shall

remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days.” 8 U.S.C.

§1231(a)(1)(A). This ninety day “removal period begins on the latest of the

following: (i) The date the order of removal becomes administratively finall[;]

(ii) If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of

the removal of the alien, the date of the court’s final order[;] (iii) If the alien is

detained or confined (except under an immigration process), the date the

alien is released from detention or confinement.” 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(1)(B).

In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that the Government

may not detain aliens indefinitely following a final order of removal. 533 U.S.

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678, 689 (2001). Indeed, “once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable,

continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” /d. at 699. However,

the court noted that it “doubt[ed] that when Congress shortened the removal

period to 90 days in 1996 it believed that all reasonably foreseeable removals

could be accomplished in that time.” /d, at 701. Accordingly, the court

reasoned that detention for up to 6 months following a final order of removal

is “presumptively reasonable.” /d.

“After this 6-month period, once the alien provides good reason to

believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonabiy

foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to

rebut that showing.” /d. Further, “for detention to remain reasonable, as the

period of prior postremoval grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably

foreseeable future’ conversely would have to shrink,” /d.

Here, Petitioner's order of removal became final on July 9, 2026, when

the BIA dismissed his appeal. (Doc. 8-6); 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(1)(B). As of the

date of this Memorandum, the ninety-day period to effectuate Petitioner's

removal, ie. Wednesday, October 7, 2026, has not lapsed. 8 U.S.C.

§1231(a)(1)(A). Thus, Petitioner’s detention under §1231 has not become

unconstitutionally prolonged from the date his order of removal became final

to the last date within the period of removal. The petition is premature.

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The Court notes, however, that Petitioner may file subsequent habeas

petitions if it turns out that his detention does, in fact, become unreasonably

prolonged. Indeed, given the routine nature of deportations to Mexico, any

significant future delay would strike the Court as likely unreasonable.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2241 will be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. An

appropriate order follows.

United States District Judge

DATE: +: 2/26

26-1863-01