Joseph

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

FRANCIS F. JOSEPH,

A# 073 035 843,

Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-02428

v. (SAPORITO, J.)

WARDEN PIKE COUNTY

CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM

The petitioner, Francis F. Joseph, is a noncitizen detained in the

custody of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)

at Pike County Correctional Facility, an ICE detention facility located in

Pike County, Pennsylvania. In December 2025, Joseph filed a pro se

petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2441. On

February 23, 2026, we granted the petition and ordered that he receive

an individualized bond hearing within 21 days. Joseph has now moved to

enforce our prior order granting relief, arguing that he was not provided

with a constitutionally adequate hearing as we had ordered.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Joseph is a native and citizen of India. He was admitted to the

United States in 2000 on an H-1B visa, and he was granted lawful

permanent resident status in 2004.

In 2023, following a jury trial in a Colorado federal district court,

Joseph was convicted of two felony health care fraud offenses and

sentenced to serve 30 months in prison. He was incarcerated in a federal

correctional institution to serve this criminal sentence until December 4,

2024.

During this period of incarceration, federal immigration authorities

initiated removal proceedings against him as an alien convicted of an

aggravated felony—in this instance, an offense of fraud or deceit

resulting in a loss exceeding $10,000—pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Upon his release from federal prison on December 4,

2024, Joseph was taken into custody by ICE for civil immigration

detention. In April 2025, he was transferred to Pike County Correctional

Facility, where he remains today.

On November 10, 2025, an immigration judge ordered Joseph

removed to India and denied his applications for withholding of removal

and for relief under the Convention Against Torture. On December 6,

2025, Joseph timely appealed that decision to the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”), where it remains pending.

On December 16, 2025, this court received and filed Joseph’s pro se

petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In his

petition, Joseph contended that his ongoing mandatory detention

without a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) was unconstitutional.

At the time, he had been held in ICE pre-removal custody, pursuant to

§ 1226(c), for more than a year without having received an opportunity

for a bond hearing.

On February 23, 2026, we granted Joseph’s petition, finding that

his ongoing detention under § 1226(c)—at that time, more than fourteen

months without a bond hearing—had become unreasonably long, such

that it constituted an arbitrary deprivation of liberty without due process

of law. , No. 3:25-cv-02428, at *2–3, 2026 WL 497532

(M.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2026), Doc. 18.

, 965 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2020);

, 808 Fed. App’x 61, 65 (3d Cir. 2020) (per

curiam). We ordered that Joseph be provided with an individualized bond

hearing within 21 days, at which the government would bear the burden

of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that his continued

detention was necessary to prevent him from fleeing or harming the

community. Doc. 19; , 2026 WL 497532, at *4.

Seven days later, on March 2, 2026, Joseph was brought before an

immigration judge for a bond hearing. Following that hearing, the

immigration judge issued a succinct written order summarily denying

bond on the stated ground of “[f]light risk.” Doc. 21-1.

On March 10, 2026, the court received and filed a pro se submission

from Joseph, signed and dated by the petitioner on March 3, 2026, which

we have liberally construed as a motion to enforce the court’s prior

judgment granting habeas relief. Doc. 23.

, 704 F.3d 239, 244–46 (3d Cir. 2013) (discussing a court’s

obligation to liberally construe pleadings and other submissions,

particularly when dealing with imprisoned litigants). On April 3,

2026, the respondent filed his brief in opposition to the petitioner’s

motion to enforce, together with several exhibits in support. Doc. 33;

Doc. 34. In addition, the court has considered a series of additional

“supplemental” pro se submissions by the petitioner providing updated

factual information and additional legal argument. Doc. 25; Doc. 26; Doc.

31; Doc. 35; Doc. 36; Doc. 37; Doc. 38; Doc 39; Doc. 40; Doc. 43; Doc. 44;

Doc. 48; Doc. 49; Doc. 50; Doc. 51; Doc. 52; Doc. 53; Doc. 54; Doc. 56.

II. DISCUSSION

In his motion, Joseph contends that immigration officials have

failed to provide him with a constitutionally adequate individualized

bond hearing, and thus they have failed to comply with this court’s prior

order granting his petition for habeas relief. He states that, although he

had previously received a copy of this court’s order granting habeas relief

one day earlier, he was not provided with advance notice that his

bond hearing would be held on March 2, 2026. He was verbally notified

of the 1:00 p.m. hearing scheduled before an immigration judge that same

morning, at approximately 11:30 a.m.1 He attempted to contact his

immigration lawyer, but his counsel was unavailable due to hearings in

other client matters. As a result, Joseph was forced to appear before the

immigration judge without a lawyer. Based on an audio recording and

unverified transcript of the bond hearing, submitted into the record by

1 We note that the record includes evidence that written notice of

the March 2, 2026, hearing was mailed to the petitioner on February 24,

2026, addressed to Joseph “c/o Custodial Officer.” It is unclear who

received the notice or when, but Joseph states that he personally did not

receive the written notice until 10:00 p.m. on March 2, 2026, several

hours the hearing took place.

the respondent, the immigration judge declined to consider a

continuance, advising Joseph—incorrectly—that this habeas court had

ordered that a bond hearing be conducted within seven days, and thus

they were required to proceed with the hearing that day with or without

counsel.2 The bond hearing itself lasted only several minutes. Although

Joseph had no opportunity to assemble and present any documentary

evidence or witness testimony at the hearing, he verbally proffered

substantial evidence in support of his position that he neither posed a

danger to the community nor a flight risk.3 In response, the government

proffered no evidence beyond Joseph’s federal criminal conviction for

2 As noted above, our order afforded the parties a period of

in which to conduct the bond hearing, mindful of the logistical

challenges that a seven-day period might pose, both to the government

and to the petitioner and his counsel.

3 Joseph was permitted to speak for approximately six minutes

before he was stopped by the immigration judge. Joseph pointed to his

decades-long residence in the United States, his established career as a

medical provider there, several court and agency findings that he was

neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, a state medical board

ruling deeming him fit to continue practicing medicine despite his

criminal charges, and a state family court order granting him custody of

his minor child. He further pointed to his clean prison disciplinary record

and to his completion of numerous rehabilitation programs while

incarcerated. In his rebuttal, Joseph was permitted to speak for about

one minute more, pointing out that, if released on bond, he would be

subject to three layers of supervision—ICE, U.S. Probation Services, and

the state medical board.

health care fraud and the removal order previously entered in his

immigration case, which remained pending on appeal to the BIA. The

immigration judge then denied bond, finding that, based on his criminal

history and the removal order, Joseph presented a significant risk of

flight. Afterward, the immigration judge issued a succinct written order

summarily denying bond on the stated ground of “[f]light risk,” without

any further elaboration.

The respondent raises several arguments in opposition to the

petitioner’s motion. First, the respondent argues that a jurisdiction-

stripping provision of the Immigration and Naturalization Act prevents

this court from reviewing the immigration court’s bond decision. Second,

the respondent argues that the court is precluded from considering the

instant motion because the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative

remedies. Finally, the respondent argues that the petitioner received a

fundamentally fair individualized bond hearing in accordance with this

court’s order granting his habeas petition.

A. Jurisdiction

The respondent first argues that this court lacks jurisdiction to

review the immigration court’s bond determination.

It is well established that a federal habeas court “has the inherent

power to enforce its own orders.”

, 950 F.3d 177, 194 (3d Cir. 2020). More specifically, a federal habeas

court retains jurisdiction to determine whether a respondent has

complied with the terms of a conditional order granting habeas relief.

, 500 F.3d 202, 206 (3d Cir. 2007).

This jurisdiction, however, is subject to a statutory provision, 8

U.S.C. § 1226(e), that limits the jurisdiction of a federal court to review

bond proceedings in immigration cases. Under this statute, “[t]he

Attorney General’s discretionary judgment regarding the application of

this section shall not be subject to review. No court shall set aside any

action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding

the detention of any alien or the revocation or denial of bond or parole.”

8 U.S.C. § 1226(e); , ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2026 WL

1018335, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2026) (“The Attorney General has

delegated the authority to make these custody determinations to

immigration judges under the implementing regulations.”) (citing 8

C.F.R. §§ 1003.19, 1236.1).

Nevertheless, “although § 1226(e) restricts jurisdiction in the

federal courts in some respects, it does not limit habeas jurisdiction over

constitutional claims or questions of law.” , No. 25-cv-

02061, 2026 WL 2263555, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2026) (quoting

, 638 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2011));

, 784 Fed. App’x 75, 77 (3d Cir. 2019) (“Though

we may not review discretionary decisionmaking involved in the denial

of a bond, we retain the power to review the legal standard underlying

immigration officials’ actions and to evaluate legal and constitutional

claims on that basis.”); , 826 F. Supp. 3d 545, 553 (D.N.J.

2026) (“[W]hile this Court does not have jurisdiction to review the

[immigration judge’s] discretionary decision to grant or deny bond, it may

review whether a bond hearing was fundamentally unfair and thus

violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” (citing

, No. 21-1908, 2022 WL

574624, at *2 (3d Cir. Feb. 25, 2022)). This distinction “preserves a

district court’s inherent power to enforce its habeas orders by ensuring

that the individualized bond hearings are not shams and otherwise

comply with the detainee’s due process rights.” , No. 24-

229, 2026 WL 538865, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2026), , No.

26-1566 (3d Cir. Mar. 17, 2026); , 826 F. Supp. 3d at 553

(quoting ).

B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The respondent next argues that this court lacks jurisdiction to

consider the petitioner’s motion because he failed to exhaust available

administrative remedies—i.e., by appealing the immigration judge’s

order denying bond to the BIA—before bringing this motion.

We first note that administrative exhaustion is not a jurisdictional

question in this case. “Where Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion

is required. But where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion,

sound judicial discretion governs.” , 503 U.S. 140,

144 (1992) (citations omitted); , 336 F.3d 228,

230 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting ). “No statute requires

administrative exhaustion in habeas proceedings under § 2241.”

, 819 F. Supp. 3d 362, 369 (M.D. Pa. 2025). Rather, “exhaustion

exists as a judicially created doctrine applied at the Court’s discretion.”

; , No. 18-cv-1553, 2020 WL 4530728,

at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2020) (“[T]he exhaustion requirement imposed by

courts relating to habeas corpus petitions filed by immigration detainees

is a prudential benchmark which is not compelled by statute.”).

Regardless, as our sister court has stated in a similar case,

it is not clear that there is any exhaustion issue here at

all. This is not a newly-filed habeas petition in which

Petitioner seeks habeas review of the [immigration

judge]’s decision denying bond. Instead, Petitioner

seeks federal habeas relief from his lengthy mandatory

detention under Section 1226(c). And as to that issue,

the writ already has been conditionally granted.

Petitioner asks this Court to review the [immigration

judge]’s hearing for compliance with that Order.

Accordingly, it appears that there is nothing left for

Petitioner to exhaust.

, No. 24-cv-221, 2025 WL 2653707, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Sept.

16, 2025) (citation omitted).

Moreover, as we have concluded in prior cases before this court

presenting similar circumstances, the respondent’s argument regarding

exhaustion is undermined by the fact that significant judicial resources

have already been expended in this case, and the fact that this court has

already concluded that Joseph’s detention has become unreasonably long,

meaning that any appeal to the BIA would result in further extending his

already unreasonably long incarceration. ,

543 F. Supp. 3d 69, 71 n.1 (M.D. Pa. 2021); , 2020 WL

4530728, at *2. Thus, we conclude that the exhaustion doctrine does not

preclude this court’s consideration of the petitioner’s motion to enforce.

C. The Individualized Bond Hearing and Due Process

Finally, the respondent argues that the bond hearing before an

immigration judge provided to Joseph on March 2, 2026, was

fundamentally fair, and thus complied both with due process and with

this court’s order granting his habeas petition.

“For a bond hearing to be fundamentally fair and comport with due

process, a detainee ‘(1) is entitled to factfinding based on a record

produced before the decisionmaker and disclosed to him or her; (2) must

be allowed to make arguments on his or her own behalf; and (3) has the

right to an individualized determination of his or her best interests.’”

, 826 F. Supp. 3d at 555 (quoting , 2022 WL 574624, at *2)

(brackets omitted). “To determine whether a bond hearing was

individualized, courts look first to whether the immigration judge

committed plain error by misidentifying or misapplying the relevant

legal precepts.” , No. 21-cv-01192, 2021 WL 8362027, at *2

(M.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2021); , No. 25-cv-02061, 2026

WL 2263555, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2026) (quoting ).

A bond hearing is individualized if it is not so arbitrary

that it would offend fundamental tenets of due process.

And if there is a discernable rational basis for the

underlying administrative decision, and the

immigration judge applies the correct legal standards,

that suffices.

, No. 25-cv-7427, 2026 WL 395711, at *2 (E.D.

Pa. Feb. 12, 2026) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);

, 826 F. Supp. 3d at 555 (quoting ).

These requirements presuppose an impartial

decisionmaker. They also require that the decision be

grounded in the evidence presented at the hearing and

accompanied by a statement indicating the reasons for

the decision and the evidence relied upon. Absent such

features, a bond hearing cannot satisfy the demands of

due process.

, 826 F. Supp. 3d at 555 (citations omitted) (citing ,

397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970)).

With respect to the second element of fundamental fairness

identified by the court, the Third Circuit has previously

recognized that aliens in removal proceedings “have a statutory right to

counsel, and a constitutional right to counsel based on the Fifth

Amendment’s guarantee of due process of law.” , 402

F.3d 398, 408 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted);

, 331 F.3d 369, 374 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is clear that aliens have

both a statutory and a constitutional right to counsel . . . .”);

, 822 F. Supp. 3d 255, 257 (D.N.H. 2026) (recognizing that a

petitioner had “both a statutory and constitutional right to counsel now

and at the upcoming bond hearing”). This right is further codified in the

immigration regulations. , 49 F.4th 293, 298

& n.15 (3d Cir. 2022) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 292.5).

Aliens in removal proceedings are entitled to Fifth

Amendment Due Process protection, which guarantees

them a fundamentally fair removal hearing. A

proceeding may be fundamentally unfair if an alien is

prevented from reasonably presenting his case, and we

have held that the right to counsel is so fundamental

to the proceeding’s fairness that a denial of that right

could rise to the level of fundamental unfairness.

Therefore, although the Fifth Amendment does not

mandate government-appointed counsel for aliens at

removal proceedings, it indisputably affords an alien

the right to counsel of his or her own choice at his or

her own expense.

, 611 F.3d 171, 181 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted); , 615

Fed. App’x 752, 756 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The right to counsel in an

immigration proceeding is limited to the right to obtain counsel at no cost

to the Government.”). A violation of the fundamental right to counsel so

undermines the structure of the hearing that it necessarily makes the

proceedings fundamentally unfair. , 53 F.4th 761,

766 (3d Cir. 2022); , No. 24-1963, 2026

WL 2924867, at *2 (3d Cir. Oct. 15, 2025); , 611 F.3d at 180–82. To

paraphrase the Supreme Court, which has explained:

“The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little

avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by

counsel.” We do not say that counsel must be provided

at [a bond] hearing, but only that the [alien] must be

allowed to retain an attorney if he so desires. Counsel

can help delineate the issues, present the factual

contentions in an orderly manner, conduct cross-

examination, and generally safeguard the interests of

the [alien].

, 397 U.S. at 270–71 (quoting , 287 U.S. 45,

68–69 (1932)) (citation omitted).

Here, there was no necessity for the exceptionally hasty bond

hearing conducted by the immigration judge, only seven days into the

twenty-one day period provided by our order conditionally granting

habeas relief, leaving plenty of time for other reasonable arrangements

to be made that would have permitted Joseph to be represented at the

bond hearing by his privately retained counsel.

, 49 F.4th 293, 299–300 (3d Cir. 2022); , 516 F.2d 310,

314 (3d Cir. 1975). Moreover, even if the immigration judge and counsel

for both Joseph and the government were unable to identify a mutually

convenient time within that 21-day period for a rescheduled bond

hearing, the option of a motion for a reasonable extension of that time

period remained available in this habeas proceeding. Fed. R. Civ. P.

6(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(4); R. 12, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254.

Refusing to continue the bond hearing under the circumstances

presented to permit Joseph to be represented by his retained counsel

constituted a violation of his due process and statutory right to counsel.

, 49 F.4th at 299–300; , 516 F.2d at 314. This violation

of Joseph’s fundamental right to counsel so undermined the structure of

the bond hearing conducted on March 2, 2026, that it necessarily made

those proceedings fundamentally unfair. , 53 F.4th at 766;

, 2026 WL 2924867, at *2; , 611 F.3d at 180–82.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petitioner’s motion to enforce will be

granted, the immigration judge’s bond decision of March 2, 2026, will be

vacated, and the government will be directed to provide Joseph with a

constitutionally adequate individualized bond hearing before an

immigration judge, at which he may be represented by counsel retained

at his own expense. Our order granting this relief will require that the

bond hearing be conducted within a specified period of time, but that time

period may be subject to a reasonable extension of time if necessary,

whether by mutual agreement of the parties or by a motion for an

extension of time filed in this habeas court, which shall be granted for

good cause shown.

An appropriate order follows.

Dated: August 20, 2026

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.

United States District Judge