The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MICHAEL D. WARNER CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 25-943
BRAD E. COX, ET AL. SECTION “O”
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court in this civil action and adversary proceeding are a combined
motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6),1 and
three motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2).2
The Chapter 7 trustee of seven jointly administered debtor estates sued
twenty-six defendants in this Court on forty-seven counts, alleging that the officers
who ran a Louisiana oil-and-gas business drained it of more than a hundred million
dollars for the benefit of themselves, their families, and a network of affiliated
companies and trusts, leaving vendors and other creditors unpaid. The bankruptcy
cases are pending in Texas, where most of the defendants live, are organized, or keep
their offices. Seizing on that geography, one defendant argues that only the
bankruptcy court in Texas may hear the Trustee’s claims at all. Three groups of
defendants argue that this Court cannot reach them because they lack contacts with
Louisiana.
Neither argument succeeds. The first rests on a statute that confers
jurisdiction on district courts rather than bankruptcy courts, and reading it as
1 ECF No. 75.
2 ECF Nos. 30, 36, 85.
defendant urges would nullify the surrounding grant of jurisdiction and render the
bankruptcy venue statutes incoherent. The second rests on a framework that does
not govern this proceeding. Because this is a bankruptcy proceeding, the Bankruptcy
Rules govern it. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7004 authorizes service of
process anywhere in the United States in a proceeding related to a bankruptcy case,
whether that proceeding is pending before a bankruptcy judge or before a district
judge. Where service reaches nationwide, the forum is the United States, and contacts
with Louisiana are not the question. Every movant is present in the United States,
and most have said so under oath in the very declarations they filed to defeat
jurisdiction.
Accordingly, for these reasons and those that follow, the Court DENIES IN
PART the combined motion, denying the Rule 12(b)(1) portion and reserving the
Rule 12(b)(6) portion, and DENIES the three Rule 12(b)(2) motions.
I. BACKGROUND
Because this is the Court’s first substantive ruling in this proceeding, and
because several related motions remain pending, the Court sets out the background
at some length.
A. Seven Affiliated Oil and Gas Companies Filed for Bankruptcy in
2023, and Their Cases Are Now Pending Under Chapter 7 in the
Southern District of Texas.
Cox Operating L.L.C. and certain affiliates were established in 2003 to acquire
oil and gas leases and to operate producing wells in Louisiana state waters and on
the Outer Continental Shelf of the Gulf of Mexico, primarily adjacent to Louisiana.3
By 2023 the group operated more than 750 wells across 470 structures in 60 fields.4
Cox Operating served as the operator for wells and related structures owned by the
other entities in the group and provided them operational, administrative, and
financial services.5 It listed its headquarters in Dallas, Texas, though its day-to-day
operations were run from an operational headquarters in New Orleans, Louisiana,
until shortly before the bankruptcy filings.6
On May 12, 2023, four trade creditors filed an involuntary Chapter 7 petition
against Cox Operating in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana. A fifth creditor joined the next day. Together they asserted
claims exceeding $2.85 million.7
Two days later, Cox Operating and six affiliates filed voluntary Chapter 11
petitions in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas.8
The seven debtors are MLCJR LLC and M21K, LLC, both Texas limited liability
companies; EPL Oil & Gas, LLC, Energy XXI Gulf Coast, LLC, and Energy XXI GOM
LLC, all Delaware limited liability companies; and Cox Operating L.L.C. and Cox Oil
3 ECF No. 12 ¶ 71.
4 Id. ¶ 74.
5 Id. ¶¶ 74, 77.
6 Id. ¶¶ 75–76.
7 Id. ¶ 63; Ch. 7 Involuntary Pet. at 2, In re Cox Operating, L.L.C., No. 23-10734 (Bankr. E.D.
La. May 12, 2023), Dkt. No. 1; Joinder Involuntary Ch. 7 Bankr. Pet. at 1, No. 23-10734, Dkt. No. 3.
8 ECF No. 12 ¶ 64; In re MLCJR LLC, No. 23-90324 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 14, 2023); In re
M21K, LLC, No. 23-90325 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 14, 2023); In re EPL Oil & Gas, LLC, No. 23-90326
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 14, 2023); In re Cox Operating L.L.C., No. 23-90327 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 14,
2023); In re Cox Oil Offshore, L.L.C., No. 23-90328 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 14, 2023); In re Energy XXI
Gulf Coast, LLC, No. 23-90329 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 14, 2023); In re Energy XXI GOM LLC, No. 23-
90330 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 14, 2023).
Offshore, L.L.C., both Louisiana limited liability companies.9 The bankruptcy court
consolidated the seven cases for joint administration on May 16, 2023, under the
caption In re MLCJR LLC, et al., No. 23-90324 (CML).10
On May 23, 2023, the Louisiana bankruptcy court transferred the involuntary
case to the Southern District of Texas. See In re Cox Operating, LLC, 652 B.R. 49, 59–
60 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2023).11 It found venue proper in both Texas and Louisiana but
concluded that transferring the case was in the interest of justice.12 Id. at 54–55, 59.
The Texas bankruptcy court entered an agreed order incorporating the transfer order
and dismissing the now-transferred involuntary case on June 28, 2023.13
The debtors sold substantially all of their producing assets by February 2024
and moved to convert their cases to Chapter 7, which the bankruptcy court granted
on February 28, 2024.14 Plaintiff Michael D. Warner was elected Chapter 7 trustee of
the seven estates and qualified on May 8, 2024.15
9 ECF No. 12 ¶¶ 19–26; Ch. 11 Voluntary Pet. at 1, 5–6, In re MLCJR LLC, No. 23-90324, Dkt.
No. 1; Ch. 11 Voluntary Pet. at 1, 5–6, In re M21K, LLC, No. 23-90325, Dkt. No. 1; Ch. 11 Voluntary
Pet. at 1, 5–7, In re EPL Oil & Gas, LLC, No. 23-90326, Dkt. No. 1; Ch. 11 Voluntary Pet. at 1, 5–6, In
re Cox Operating L.L.C., No. 23-90327, Dkt. No. 1; Ch. 11 Voluntary Pet. at 1, 5–6, In re Cox Oil
Offshore, L.L.C., No. 23-90328, Dkt. No. 1; Ch. 11 Voluntary Pet. at 1, 5–6, In re Energy XXI Gulf
Coast, LLC, No. 23-90329, Dkt. No. 1; Ch. 11 Voluntary Pet. at 1, 5–6, In re Energy XXI GOM, LLC,
No. 23-90330, Dkt. No. 1.
10 ECF No. 12 ¶ 65; Order at 3, In re MLCJR LLC, No. 23-90324, Dkt. No. 103.
11 ECF No. 30-4.
12 ECF No. 30-4 at 5–6, 14–15; see also ECF No. 12 ¶ 66.
13 ECF No. 12 ¶ 66; Order at 2–3, No. 23-90324, Dkt. No. 526.
14 ECF No. 12 ¶¶ 67–68; Debtors’ Emerg. Mot. to Convert ¶¶ 1–3, 15, No. 23-90324, Dkt. No.
1661; Order at 2–5, No. 23-90324, Dkt. No. 1720.
15 ECF No. 12 ¶¶ 16, 69–70; Order at 2, No. 23-90324, Dkt. No. 1919; Notice of Bond &
Acceptance of Election, No. 23-90324, Dkt. No. 1996.
B. The Trustee Filed This Action Alleging That Four Officers and
Directors Looted Cox Operating for Their Own Benefit and for the
Benefit of Affiliated Entities and Trusts.
The Trustee filed this action in this Court on May 12, 2025, styling it both a
“Civil Action and Adversary Proceeding.”16 The Operative Complaint is the Second
Amended Adversary Complaint and Jury Demand, as amended in three particulars
by the Third Amended and Supplemental Adversary Complaint and Jury Demand.17
It pleads forty-seven counts against twenty-six named defendants and fifteen John
Doe defendants, and it sorts the named defendants into three groups.
The Officer & Director Defendants are four individuals said to have run
Cox Operating and its affiliates: Brad E. Cox, Chairman of the Board of Cox
Operating and of each affiliate entity; Craig Sanders, President and Chief Executive
Officer of Cox Operating, each debtor, and each affiliate entity; Vincent DeVito,
General Counsel and Executive Vice President of the same entities; and Joseph
Winkler, Controller of Cox Operating, with access to the financial records of each
debtor and affiliate.18 Brad Cox, Sanders, and Winkler are alleged to reside in Texas,
16 ECF No. 1; ECF No. 12 ¶ 1.
17 ECF Nos. 12, 12-1, as amended by ECF No. 29. The Third Amended and Supplemental
Adversary Complaint (“TAC”) states that the Trustee submits it “for the sole purposes of correcting (1)
a misnomer with respect to the trustee of the Bradley Edwin Cox Trust . . ., and (2) the description of
the Crespi Estate,” and it amends paragraph 32, the Exhibit A glossary entry for the Bradley Edwin
Cox Trust, and paragraph 215. ECF No. 29 at 1–2. It is a partial amendment and does not supersede
the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). Winkler contends that the Third Amended Complaint is the
operative pleading. ECF No. 75-1 ¶¶ 2, 7. The Nonresident Cox Defendants take the opposite and
correct view. ECF No. 30-1 at 2 n.1 (“The Motion to Amend seeks leave to correct a misnomer of a
defendant and to revise the description of a property alleged in the TAC. Otherwise, the SAC is the
operative complaint . . . .”); see also ECF No. 59 at 4 n.3; ECF No. 93 at 3. The Court also assumes the
SAC’s references to Exhibits B, C, and D, e.g., ECF No. 12 at 6 n.4, 66–67, relate to those that were
filed with the First Amended Complaint and not refiled. See ECF Nos. 3-2, 3-3, 3-4.
18 ECF No. 12 ¶¶ 27–31.
and DeVito in Virginia.19
The Trust Defendants are three Texas trusts, sued through their trustees.
The sole beneficiary of the Bradley Edwin Cox Trust is Brad Cox. The sole beneficiary
of the Charlee Lochridge Cox Dynasty Trust is Brad Cox’s minor child. The sole
beneficiary of the Edwin L. Cox “B” Trust is Brad Cox, and that trust is the sole
member of three of the defendant entities.20
The Affiliate Defendants are twenty-one entities that the Officer & Director
Defendants are said to have created and controlled, and that received transfers from
Cox Operating.21 They are organized under the laws of Texas, Louisiana, or
Delaware, except for two whose state of organization the Trustee has not identified.22
Three names in this case are similar and are not interchangeable. Cox Oil
Offshore, L.L.C. is a Louisiana entity and one of the seven debtors, so the Trustee
sues on its behalf. Cox Oil LLC is a Delaware entity and a defendant. Cox Oil and
Gas LLC is a Texas entity and a different defendant.23
According to the Operative Complaint,24 Cox Operating and the other debtors
were dominated and controlled by the four Officer & Director Defendants, who
19 Id. ¶¶ 27–30.
20 Id. ¶¶ 32–35. Plaintiff substituted William Graham for the Arden Trust Company as the
named trustee of the Bradley Edwin Cox Trust. ECF No. 29 at 2. The Arden Trust Company
nevertheless remains a named defendant with counsel enrolled. It joined a consent motion for an
extension of time before the substitution, see ECF No. 16 at 2, and has filed nothing since.
21 ECF No. 12 ¶¶ 36–57.
22 Id. ¶¶ 53–54 (stating that the Trustee “has not yet determined whether [RCL Pelican or RC
L S Bay LLC] w[ere] legally formed, and if so, under the laws of which State”).
23 Id. ¶¶ 25, 41–42.
24 The Court recites these allegations to explain the nature of this suit. It does not decide
whether any of them states a claim, and nothing in this Order should be read as a finding on the
merits. Motions raising that question are pending and are not resolved here. See ECF Nos. 34, 35, 84,
and the Rule 12(b)(6) portion of ECF No. 75.
ignored corporate formalities and fiduciary duties and used Cox Operating as a
“personal slush fund.”25 By January 1, 2017, Cox Operating was insolvent, because
its assets consisted largely of related-party receivables of dubious value. Those
receivables grew from roughly $41 million in early 2017 to more than $100 million
and were worthless.26
During the same period, Cox Operating paid Brad Cox a base salary of
$950,000 per month; made quarterly distributions to him described as returns on
equity in the amount of his federal income tax obligations, despite the absence of flow-
through taxable income; and made equity distributions exceeding $180 million to
Brad Cox and other defendants at a time when no debtor had net revenues sufficient
to permit lawful distributions.27 Each distribution path led back to Brad Cox.28 Cox
Operating also funded the purchase, renovation, and upkeep of three luxury
properties held by defendant entities and trusts: an estate in Dallas held by the
Dynasty Trust, an approximately 15,000-acre ranch near Athens, Texas, held in part
by EasTex Deer Meadow, LLC, and a chalet in Vail, Colorado held by LSC 27, LLC
or the Dynasty Trust.29
Lacking working capital, Cox Operating ran what the Trustee alleges was a
“Vendor Ponzi scheme,” under which revenue attributable to one vendor’s goods and
services was used to pay other overdue vendors who threatened to stop performing.30
25 ECF No. 12 ¶¶ 3–4, 9.
26 Id. ¶¶ 7, 78.
27 Id. ¶¶ 11, 81–82, 87–88.
28 Id. ¶¶ 83–86.
29 Id. ¶¶ 27, 89.
30 Id. ¶¶ 109–15.
Vendor trade debt grew from roughly $21 million at the end of 2018 to more than
$144 million by mid-2021, with an increasing share more than ninety days past due.31
As of the bankruptcy filings, the debtors scheduled trade debts exceeded $250 million,
secured lender debt exceeded $200 million, and surety bond and plugging-and-
abandonment obligations exceeded $1 billion.32
Counts One through Five assert claims for breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and
abetting those breaches, civil conspiracy, single-business-enterprise liability, and
enforcement of a commitment to fund the debtors’ operations. Counts Six through
Forty-Seven seek declaratory relief and the avoidance and recovery of transfers under
state and federal law.
C. The Trustee Effectuates Service of Process, and Defendants Move
to Dismiss Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2),
12(b)(6), and to Transfer Venue to the Southern District of Texas.
The Trustee pleads that this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and
that this proceeding is both core and non-core under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (B), (H),
and (O).33 He pleads venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1409(c).34 And he pleads that the Court
may exercise personal jurisdiction over each defendant either because the defendant
is a Louisiana citizen or because it has minimum contacts with Louisiana, and that
the Court may in any event “assert personal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334
and effectuate nationwide service of process pursuant [to] Bankruptcy Rule 7004.”35
31 Id. ¶¶ 112–13.
32 Id. ¶ 116.
33 Id. ¶ 60.
34 Id. ¶ 61.
35 Id. ¶ 62.
The Trustee served summonses and the pleading by mail.36 No defendant has moved
to dismiss for insufficient process or insufficient service of process.
The defendants who have appeared37 organize themselves differently than the
Operative Complaint does. The Court uses the parties’ own labels.
The Cox Defendants are seventeen defendants represented by common
counsel: Brad Cox, DeVito, and fifteen Affiliate Defendants.38 All seventeen have
moved to transfer venue and to dismiss for failure to state a claim.39 A smaller subset
of ten—the Nonresident Cox Defendants—moved separately to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction.40 The remaining seven Cox Defendants did not.
The Graham Defendants are three Trust Defendants sued through their
common trustee and five Affiliate Defendants: William Graham, in his capacities as
named trustee of the Bradley Edwin Cox Trust, named co-trustee of the Charlee
Lochridge Cox Dynasty Trust, and named trustee of the Edwin L. Cox “B” Trust;
EasTex Deer Meadow, LLC; WIN Management, LLC; Windward Capital Assets, LLC;
RCL Capital Management LLC – Series No. 10 (Southern Bay); and RCL Capital
36 ECF Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 13, 18, 19, 42, 43, 46, 47, 48; ECF No. 49 at 3–4.
37 CLS Development, LLC, an Affiliate Defendant, was served on September 15, 2025, and has
not appeared. ECF No. 48.
38 See, e.g., ECF No. 30-2 ¶ 2; ECF No. 83 at 1. The fifteen Affiliate Defendants are Cox
Interests, LLC; Cox Investment Partners, LP; Cox Gathering LLC; Cox Management Dallas, LLC; Cox
Oil and Gas, LLC; Cox Oil, LLC; CW Facilities, LLC; Dallas Estate Management, LLC; Flow Line
Transportation, LLC; Half Moon Lake, L.L.C.; Lochridge Energy Services P&A, LLC; LSC 27 LLC;
Phoenix Petro Services, LLC; Proteus Energy LLC; and Quarantine Bay LLC.
39 ECF Nos. 31, 34.
40 ECF No. 30 at 2; ECF No. 30-1 at 1. The Nonresident Cox Defendants are Brad E. Cox;
Vincent DeVito; Cox Investment Partners, LP; Cox Management Dallas, LLC; Cox Oil and Gas, LLC;
CW Facilities, LLC; Dallas Estate Management, LLC; LSC 27 LLC; Phoenix Petro Services, LLC; and
Proteus Energy LLC. The motion and memorandum identify “Cox Investment Partners” as a limited
liability company but the caption, the docket, and Brad Cox’s declaration identify it as “Cox Investment
Partners, LP,” and the Court uses the latter. ECF No. 12 ¶ 38; ECF No. 30-2 ¶ 8.
Management LLC – Series No. 7 (Pelican).41 All eight moved to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, to transfer venue, and to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
Craig Sanders, individually and as co-trustee of the Charlee Lochridge Cox
Dynasty Trust, filed the same three motions.42 Joseph Winkler filed a combined
motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), and separately moved to transfer
venue.43
Eleven motions are therefore pending. The Court now resolves one in part, and
three others in full: first, the Rule 12(b)(1) portion of Winkler’s combined motion, and
second, the three Rule 12(b)(2) motions filed by the Nonresident Cox Defendants, the
Graham Defendants, and Sanders. The Court will address the remaining motions to
transfer venue and, if necessary, the motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
in separate orders.44
41 ECF No. 36 at 1; see also ECF No. 88 at 1.
42 ECF Nos. 84, 85, 86. Sanders originally filed his Rule 12(b)(2) motion at ECF No. 70 and his
memorandum in support at ECF No. 77. The Clerk marked both deficient, and Sanders refiled them
at ECF Nos. 85 and 85-1. Pages of the refiled documents bear the stamps of both filings.
43 ECF Nos. 75, 76.
44 The Graham Defendants ask the Court to decide their motion to transfer venue under 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) before reaching personal jurisdiction, reasoning in part that doing so would allow the
Court to avoid “a novel constitutional issue” by rendering the personal jurisdiction motion moot. ECF
No. 60 at 7–10. Although “[t]he question of personal jurisdiction . . . is typically decided in advance of
venue,” district courts may “reverse the normal order” where “there is a sound prudential justification
for doing so[.]” Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979). The Court declines to do so
here. As discussed below, the Graham Defendants’ personal jurisdiction arguments do not pose a novel
constitutional issue. And resolving the jurisdictional disputes now aids in addressing the threshold
question under the § 1404(a) analysis: whether the transferee court “would have had subject matter
jurisdiction, the defendants would have been subject to personal jurisdiction, and venue would have
been proper.” Shull v. United Barge Lines, No. 09-5515, 2010 WL 745006, at *5 n.5 (E.D. La. Feb. 26,
2010) (Barbier, J.) (citing Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960)).
II. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standards.
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; without jurisdiction conferred
by statute, they lack the power to adjudicate claims.” In re FEMA Trailer
Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., 668 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
“Rule 12(b)(1) motions challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the district
court[.]” McLin v. Twenty-First Jud. Dist., 79 F.4th 411, 415 (5th Cir. 2023) (citation
omitted). A claim is “properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction when
the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate” it. In re FEMA
Trailer, 668 F.3d at 286 (citation and quotation omitted). The plaintiff “bears the
burden of proof in establishing that jurisdiction does in fact exist.” Porretto v. City of
Galveston Park Bd. of Trs., 113 F.4th 469, 481 (5th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). In
examining its jurisdiction, the Court may consider “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the
complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the
complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed
facts.” Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation
omitted).
“When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12
motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before
addressing any attack on the merits.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161
(5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). The Court must satisfy itself of its jurisdiction
whether or not a party raises the question. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).
Personal jurisdiction is “an essential element of the jurisdiction of a district
court, without which the court is powerless to proceed to an adjudication.” Ruhrgas
AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999) (citation modified). Because the
Court decides these motions without holding an evidentiary hearing, it “must accept
as true the uncontroverted allegations in the [complaint] and resolve in favor of [the
plaintiff] any factual conflicts posed by the affidavits.” Shambaugh & Son, L.P. v.
Steadfast Ins. Co., 91 F.4th 364, 369 (5th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). The plaintiff
has “the burden to make a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction is proper.”
Id. (citation omitted). But that “prima-facie-case requirement does not require the
[C]ourt to credit conclusory allegations, even if uncontroverted.” Panda Brandywine
Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 869 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
B. The Court Has Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(b).
Section 1334(b) provides that, “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (e)(2), and
notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or
courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have original but not
exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or
related to cases under title 11.”
The Court first explains why this proceeding falls within that grant, then
addresses two arguments that it does not. Winkler contends that § 1334(e)(1) places
the Trustee’s claims within the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court in
Texas. Five of the Nonresident Cox Defendants contend that Counts One through
Five fall outside § 1334 altogether. Although only Winkler moves under Rule 12(b)(1),
the answer does not belong to him alone. If the Court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction, it could not adjudicate the claims of any party. The Court therefore
resolves the question for the proceeding as a whole.
1. This Adversary Proceeding Arises Under Title 11 and Is, at a
Minimum, Related to a Case Under Title 11.
In Matter of Wood, the Fifth Circuit considered whether a suit among the
directors and stockholders of a medical clinic, one of whom had filed a Chapter 11
petition, fell within § 1334(b). 825 F.2d 90, 91–92 (5th Cir. 1987). The district court
dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the Fifth Circuit reversed. Id.
In doing so, the court supplied the definitions that govern here.
A proceeding “arises under” title 11 when it “involve[s] a cause of action created
or determined by a statutory provision of title 11.” Id. at 96. A proceeding is “related
to” a case under title 11 when “the outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have
any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.” Id. at 93 (quoting Pacor,
Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984)). And the categories need not be
sorted one against another, because they “operate conjunctively to define the scope of
jurisdiction,” so that “it is necessary only to determine whether a matter is at least
‘related to’ the bankruptcy.” Id.
This proceeding satisfies the first definition and comfortably satisfies the
second. The Trustee brings it on behalf of seven Chapter 7 estates against those he
says drained the debtors of the assets that would otherwise have paid their
creditors.45
45 ECF No. 12 ¶¶ 1, 16, 19–26, 60.
Seventeen of the counts arise under title 11. Of those seventeen, sixteen counts
seek avoidance of fraudulent transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 548 and Count Forty-Seven
seeks avoidance of preferential transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 547.46 Those causes of
action exist under title 11. Congress also listed them among the matters a bankruptcy
judge may hear and determine. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H) (core proceedings include
“proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances”).
The remaining counts are at least related to the bankruptcy. Counts Six and
Seven ask the Court to declare that identified property, a chalet in Vail and an estate
in Dallas, belongs to the debtors’ estates. Counts One through Five seek money
judgments for injuries to Cox Operating and a declaration that the defendants are
liable for the debtors’ debts. Eighteen counts seek avoidance of the same transfers
under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, one under the Colorado Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act, and one under the Louisiana revocatory action. Two more
seek recovery of improper equity distributions under Louisiana and Texas corporate
statutes, and one seeks a declaration that the transfers are nullities.47 Recovery on
any of them would enlarge the fund available to creditors, and a proceeding whose
46 Id. at 68–115 (Counts Nine, Eleven, Thirteen, Fifteen, Seventeen, Nineteen, Twenty-One,
Twenty-Three, Twenty-Five, Twenty-Seven, Thirty, Thirty-Two, Thirty-Four, Thirty-Six, Thirty-
Eight, and Forty); id. at 126 (Count Forty-Seven).
47 Counts Eight, Ten, Twelve, Fourteen, Sixteen, Eighteen, Twenty, Twenty-Two, Twenty-
Four, Twenty-Six, Twenty-Nine, Thirty-One, Thirty-Three, Thirty-Five, Thirty-Seven, Thirty-Nine,
Forty-Two, and Forty-Four arise under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, TEX. BUS. &
COMM. CODE § 24.001, et seq. Id. at 64–123. Count Twenty-Eight arises under the Colorado Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-8-101, et seq. Id. at 95–97. Count Forty-Five arises
under the Louisiana Revocatory Action, LA. CIV. CODE art. 2036 et seq. Id. at 123–25. Counts Forty-
One and Forty-Three seek recovery of improper equity distributions under LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
12:1324, et seq., and TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 101.206. Id. at 115–17, 119–20. Count Forty-Six seeks a
declaration that the transfers are nullities under LA. CIV. CODE art. 2029, et seq. Id. at 125–26.
outcome would enlarge or diminish that fund could conceivably affect the estate being
administered. Because the § 1334(b) categories operate conjunctively, the Court need
go no further.48
Five of the Nonresident Cox Defendants argue that the claims against them
appear only in Counts One through Five, that those counts state claims under state
law, and that they therefore neither arise under nor relate to the bankruptcy.49 The
premise of the pleading is accurate, but the conclusion mistakes the test. Wood itself
involved state-law claims among the officers of a closely held corporation, and the
Fifth Circuit found jurisdiction. 825 F.2d at 93–94. Congress made the same point
directly: “[a] determination that a proceeding is not a core proceeding shall not be
made solely on the basis that its resolution may be affected by State law.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)(3). If state-law character will not by itself make a proceeding non-core, it
cannot place the proceeding outside § 1334 altogether. Wood kept the two questions
separate, taking up jurisdiction first and the “placement of that jurisdiction” second.
825 F.2d at 94–95. The consequence of non-core status is the allocation of adjudicative
authority under § 157(c)(1), under which a district judge enters the final judgment.
48 Accord Brickley for CryptoMetrics, Inc. Creditors’ Tr. v. ScanTech Identification Beams Sys.,
LLC, 566 B.R. 815, 829–32 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (following withdrawal of the reference, a district court
sorted a Chapter 11 trustee’s adversary proceeding into counts arising under title 11, brought under
11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 548, and 550, and counts related to the bankruptcy case, and exercised jurisdiction
over both). Because the debtors’ cases were converted to Chapter 7 and no plan was confirmed, the
more exacting post-confirmation standard that Brickley applied to the related claims has no
application here. See id. at 829.
49 ECF No. 59 at 8–10. The five are DeVito, Cox Oil and Gas, LLC, Dallas Estate Management,
LLC, Cox Management Dallas, LLC, and CW Facilities, LLC. The argument appears for the first time
in their reply memorandum.
The Court concludes that it has subject-matter jurisdiction under § 1334(b). It
expresses no view on which counts are core, and which are non-core, a question no
party has asked it to decide.
2. Section 1334(e)(1) Does Not Place the Trustee’s Claims Within
Another Court’s Exclusive Jurisdiction.
Winkler argues that “[t]he only court that has jurisdiction of the Trustee’s
causes of action is the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
Texas, Houston Division, because that Court has exclusive jurisdiction of all the
Debtor’s property which includes the claims asserted in this Civil Action.”50 His
reasoning proceeds in three steps: (1) a debtor’s causes of action are property of the
estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541; (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)(1) gives the court where the
bankruptcy case is pending exclusive jurisdiction over property of the estate; and (3)
no other court may therefore adjudicate these claims.51 The first step is undisputed,
and the second paraphrases the statute. The third does not follow.
Section 1334(e) confers exclusive jurisdiction on “[t]he district court in which a
case under title 11 is commenced or is pending” in two categories:
(1) of all the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the
commencement of such case, and of property of the estate; and
(2) over all claims or causes of action that involve construction of section
327 of title 11, United States Code, or rules relating to disclosure
requirements under section 327.
50 ECF No. 75-1 ¶ 1.
51 Winkler locates the exclusive jurisdiction in the bankruptcy court. Id. ¶ 4. Section 1334(e)
names the district court. The bankruptcy judges of the Southern District of Texas “constitute a unit of
the district court,” 28 U.S.C. § 151, and hear the debtors’ cases on referral from that court under 28
U.S.C. § 157(a). Section 157(b), which Winkler also cites, lists what a bankruptcy judge may hear and
determine once a district court has referred a matter. It presupposes the jurisdiction it allocates.
28 U.S.C. § 1334(e).52 Although § 1334(e)(1) confers exclusive jurisdiction over
property, § 1334(b) confers jurisdiction over “all civil proceedings,” and that
jurisdiction is “original but not exclusive.” The two provisions operate on different
objects, and Winkler’s argument moves from one to the other without accounting for
the difference.
The Fourth Circuit addressed that move directly. In Valley Historic Ltd.
Partnership v. Bank of New York, a Chapter 11 debtor brought a post-confirmation
adversary proceeding for breach of contract and tortious interference, and, after
failing to establish jurisdiction under § 1334(b), argued that § 1334(e) supplied it
because the claims were property of the estate. 486 F.3d 831, 837 (4th Cir. 2007). The
court rejected the argument, explaining that the debtor was “viewing two
conceptually distinct jurisdictional grants as if they are the same . . . .” Id. Section
1334(b) “invests district courts with original but not exclusive jurisdiction over ‘civil
proceedings.’ In contrast, § 1334(e) is a broad grant of exclusive jurisdiction over a
debtor’s property; it does not invest district courts with jurisdiction to conduct civil
proceedings.” Id. Even had the claims remained property of the estate, “the Debtor
would still have had to establish jurisdiction under § 1334(b), since § 1334(e) does not
by itself create jurisdiction to conduct civil proceedings.” Id. at 838; accord In re
Ostroff, 433 B.R. 442, 453 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2010) (“Jurisdiction over the property of
52 Winkler’s memorandum quotes the provision but renders paragraph (1) as “(i),” omits
paragraph (2) altogether, and transcribes “property of the estate” as “property of fee estate.” ECF No.
75-1 ¶ 5. The Court quotes the statute as enacted.
the debtor under § 1334(e) does not equate to jurisdiction under § 1334(b) over a
proceeding that relates to such property.” (citation omitted)).
That reading accords with the Fifth Circuit’s. Porretto described § 1334(e)(1)
as granting “limited, exclusive in rem jurisdiction,” whose function is to “divest[] any
other court of the authority to take jurisdiction over the res being administered by
the trustee for the benefit of unsecured creditors[.]” 113 F.4th at 483–84 (quoting
Ostroff, 433 B.R. at 452). Section 1334(b), not subsection (e)(1), is the provision that
“provides federal jurisdiction over civil proceedings that may affect the rights of a
debtor or the administration of the bankruptcy estate.” Id. at 486 (citing In re TXNB
Internal Case, 483 F.3d 292, 298 (5th Cir. 2007)).
Courts in this circuit have applied this distinction to the argument Winkler
makes. In Landry v. Exxon Pipeline Co., landowners sued a debtor’s liability insurers
under Louisiana’s direct action statute, and the defendants argued that because the
policies were property of the estate, the suit had to be adjudicated where the
bankruptcy was pending. 260 B.R. 769, 774, 781 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2001). The court
acknowledged that “at first blush it might appear that if an action involves property
of the estate, a federal forum, and more specifically, the district court handling the
bankruptcy case involving the estate to which such property belongs, is the only
proper forum for adjudication of claims to such property[.]” Id. at 781. It held
otherwise, because § 1334(e) “more properly denotes a grant by Congress of in rem
jurisdiction over property,” and “must be harmonized with the provisions of § 1334(b)
granting non-exclusive jurisdiction over matters ‘arising under,’ ‘arising in,’ and
‘related to’ bankruptcy and/or bankruptcies.” Id.
This district applied that reasoning to claims that were themselves property of
bankruptcy estates. Patterson v. Morris, 337 B.R. 82 (E.D. La. 2006). In Patterson,
Borrowers who had filed for bankruptcy sued a law firm and its lender clients on
state-law claims that had accrued before their petitions, and the defendants argued
that the claims “are property of their individual bankrupt estates, and thus any
action to recover proceeds paid involves an adjudication of rights in and to property
in a bankruptcy estate that must be adjudicated in bankruptcy court.” Id. at 95. The
court rejected the argument, reasoning that the suit was “not an in rem action by
plaintiffs to recover property of the estate,” but “an in personam action to establish
liability and a right to be paid for the damages allegedly suffered.” Id. Relying on
Landry, the court explained that “the imposition of liability is separate and distinct
from the satisfaction of that liability,” so “the exclusivity of federal jurisdiction over
property of the estate does not extend to resolution of a claim which might, or will,
have as its telos the distribution of property of the estate.” Id. (quoting Landry, 260
B.R. at 783). Rather, that “exclusivity extends only so far as the actual distribution,
management, and control of that property is concerned.” Id. (quoting Landry, 260
B.R. at 783).
In sum, the Court’s jurisdiction over this proceeding rests on § 1334(b).53
Winkler cites no authority for the contrary inference his argument actually
53 The Cox Defendants separately contend in their motion to dismiss pursuant to FED. R. CIV.
P. 12(b)(6) that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Count Six, which seeks a declaration
requires.54 The Court has found none. The Court denies the Rule 12(b)(1) portion of
Winkler’s motion.55
C. The Court Has Personal Jurisdiction Over Movants Because Each
Has Sufficient Minimum Contacts with the United States.
The Court now turns to the motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(2) brought by the Nonresident Cox Defendants, Graham Defendants, and
Sanders (collectively, the “Movants”). Movants argue that they lack the continuous
and systematic contacts that general jurisdiction requires and the suit-related
contacts that specific jurisdiction requires, measuring both against Louisiana and
invoking Louisiana’s long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.56 As explained below, that is not the governing inquiry.
that the estate of Cox Operating owns real property in Colorado, because an action to determine title
to land may be brought only in the state where the land lies. ECF No. 34-1 at 30–31. They assert the
same is true with respect to Count Seven. Id. at 31 n.10. The Cox Defendants rely on the local action
doctrine, which the Fifth Circuit treats as a limit on subject-matter jurisdiction rather than on venue,
and which the parties therefore cannot waive. See Hayes v. Gulf Oil Corp., 821 F.2d 285, 290–91 (5th
Cir. 1987). That doctrine is distinct from § 1334, and the Court’s holding that § 1334(b) supplies
jurisdiction over this proceeding does not resolve it. The argument is raised in a motion this Order
does not reach, and the Court will, if necessary, address it alongside the other Rule 12(b)(6) motions.
54 The Trustee makes the same observation. ECF No. 93 at 7 (“Winkler does not cite a single
case depriving a district court of subject matter jurisdiction over non-core claims . . . like those asserted
in this Adversary Proceeding.”).
55 Winkler adds a single sentence: “If this Court has jurisdiction, this Court should abstain.”
ECF No. 75-1 ¶ 6. He identifies no statutory provision, addresses no element of any abstention
doctrine, and cites no authority. The Trustee does not respond. See generally ECF No. 93. A request in
this form does not present the question for decision, and the Court does not consider it.
56 ECF No. 30-1 at 6–17; ECF No. 36-1 at 3–8; ECF No. 85-1 at 6–12. Sanders’s memorandum
states that he “incorporates for all such purposes the arguments and authorities of his co defendants.”
ECF No. 85-1 at 1. On closer review, Sanders’s memorandum reproduces the Nonresident Cox
Defendants’ memorandum with his name added throughout. Compare, e.g., ECF No. 30-1 at 4 (“The
Trustee does not allege that any of the Nonresident Cox Entity Defendants have a connection to
Louisiana.”), with ECF No. 85-1 at 4 (“The Trustee does not allege that any of the Nonresident Cox
Entity Defendants, including Craig Sanders, have a connection to Louisiana.”). The argument section
carries the same graft. For example, its heading addresses general jurisdiction over “the Nonresident
Cox Defendants,” and it reasons that “the Trustee cannot establish a prima facie case for general
jurisdiction over Defendant Craig Sanders because he has not sufficiently alleged that any of the
Nonresident Cox Defendants ‘reached out beyond [Texas]’” to Louisiana. ECF No. 85-1 at 8 (citation
omitted). The Trustee argues that a memorandum drafted this way never raised the personal
1. Bankruptcy Rule 7004 Authorizes Nationwide Service of
Process in This Proceeding, and the Movants’ Contacts with the
United States Therefore Govern.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(a)(2) provides that the Civil Rules “apply to
bankruptcy proceedings to the extent provided by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure.” The Bankruptcy Rules, in turn, govern “the procedure in cases under the
Bankruptcy Code, Title 11 of the United States Code.” FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001(a).
Congress authorized those rules for “the practice and procedure in cases under title
11.” 28 U.S.C. § 2075. Each of these provisions is keyed to the kind of case, not to the
identity of the court.57
Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d) provides that “[a] summons and complaint (and all
other process, except a subpoena) may be served anywhere within the United States.”
Rule 7004(f) then specifies methods of establishing personal jurisdiction, drafted in
terms of the nature of the proceeding:
Establishing Personal Jurisdiction. If exercising jurisdiction is
consistent with the United States Constitution and laws, serving a
summons or filing a waiver of service under this Rule 7004 or the
applicable provisions of FED. R. CIV. P. 4 establishes personal
jurisdiction over a defendant:
(1) in a bankruptcy case; or
(2) in a civil proceeding arising under the Code, or arising in or related
to a case under the Code.
jurisdiction defense on Sanders’s behalf, and that he has waived it. ECF No. 90 at 4–7. The Court does
not reach that argument because, as explained below, the motion fails on its merits.
57 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9001(b)(4) advisory committee’s note to 1987 amendment (“The rule
is also amended to include a definition of ‘court or judge.’ Since a case or proceeding may be before a
bankruptcy judge or a judge of the district court, ‘court or judge’ is defined to mean the judicial officer
before whom the case or proceeding is pending.”).
FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(f). Put plainly, in a civil proceeding arising under title 11, or
arising in or related to a case under title 11, Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d) authorizes
service of process anywhere within the United States, and Rule 7004(f) makes such
service effective to establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant served so long
as “exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution and
laws[.]” The Court has already determined this adversary proceeding is, at a
minimum, related to a case under title 11, and no Movant disputes that it was served
in compliance with Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d). The only question is what it means for
the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Movants to be “consistent with the
United States Constitution and laws[.]” FED. R. BANKR. P. 7004(f).
That question is not open in this circuit. In Double Eagle Energy Services,
L.L.C. v. MarkWest Utica EMG, L.L.C., a Chapter 11 debtor sued two non-debtors on
a contract claim in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana. 936 F.3d 260, 262–63 (5th Cir. 2019). The debtor later assigned the claim
to a creditor, and the defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the assignment
destroyed § 1334(b) jurisdiction and that the district court therefore lacked personal
jurisdiction over them. Id. at 263. A magistrate judge agreed on both points, and the
district court adopted the recommendation and dismissed. Id.
The Fifth Circuit vacated. Id. at 265. After concluding that the time-of-filing
rule preserved the § 1334(b) jurisdiction that existed when the suit was filed, the
court turned to personal jurisdiction:
Unlike Rule 4, Bankruptcy Rule 7004 permits nationwide service of
process without limitation to the reach of the forum state’s courts. There
remains the requirement of a constitutionally sufficient relationship
with the forum. With nationwide service, the forum is the United States.
So minimum contacts with the United States (Fifth Amendment due
process) suffice; minimum contacts with a particular state (Fourteenth
Amendment due process) are beside the point.
Id. at 264 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Because the defendants were
“residents of the United States,” they had “enough contact with the United States
that haling them into federal court ‘does not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.’” Id. (quoting Busch v. Buchman, Buchman & O’Brien, Law
Firm, 11 F.3d 1255, 1258 (5th Cir. 1994)); see also Lentz v. Trinchard, 730 F. Supp.
2d 567, 577–78 (E.D. La. 2010) (applying Busch to a Chapter 7 trustee’s related
proceeding).
The Nonresident Cox Defendants and the Graham Defendants respond that
even under the Fifth Amendment a court must separately assess whether the
plaintiff’s chosen forum is fair and reasonable, relying on decisions of the Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits.58 Those decisions do not bind this Court, and the governing test is
the one stated in Double Eagle. In any event, each cited decision places the burden
on the defendant to show a constitutionally significant inconvenience and describes
such cases as rare. Peay, 205 F.3d at 1212–13; Managed Care, 939 F.3d at 1158;
Republic of Panama, 119 F.3d at 946–48. Republic of Panama adds that “[w]here . . .
Congress has provided for nationwide service of process, courts should presume that
nationwide personal jurisdiction is necessary to further congressional objectives.” 119
58 ECF No. 59 at 6 (citing Peay v. BellSouth Med. Assistance Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1212 (10th
Cir. 2000), and Managed Care Advisory Crp., LLP v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 939 F.3d 1145, 1158
(11th Cir. 2019)); ECF No. 60 at 4–6 (citing Peay, 205 F.3d at 1211, and Republic of Panama v. BCCI
Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 940 (11th Cir. 1997)).
F.3d at 948. The defendants also invoke Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization,
where the Supreme Court observed that “the Fifth Amendment might entail a similar
‘inquiry into the reasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction in the particular
case.’” 606 U.S. 1, 23 (2025) (citation omitted).59 But Fuld’s observation is best
characterized as dicta, as the Court did “not determine whether such analysis is
constitutionally required” and expressly “decline[d] to import the Fourteenth
Amendment minimum contacts standard into the Fifth Amendment” because the
latter “necessarily permits a more flexible jurisdictional inquiry . . . .” Id. at 16, 23.
The Nonresident Cox Defendants raise two further objections to applying Rule
7004 here, but neither succeeds. First, they contend that the Operative Complaint’s
use of collective allegations cannot support access to the Rule.60 That objection would
have force under a state-specific contacts framework, because personal jurisdiction is
assessed defendant by defendant. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980)
(“The requirements of International Shoe . . . must be met as to each defendant over
whom a state court exercises jurisdiction.”). Under the Fifth Amendment inquiry the
Rule makes applicable, the only individualized fact required of a defendant is its
presence in the United States. Double Eagle, 936 F.3d at 264. Second, they contend
that reading the Rule to permit a suit outside the district where the bankruptcy is
pending defeats the centralizing purpose of Bankruptcy Rule 1001(a).61 But a rule’s
59 ECF No. 59 at 6; ECF No. 60 at 6.
60 ECF No. 59 at 9–10.
61 ECF No. 59 at 1–4; ECF No. 60 at 2–3.
purpose does not narrow its plain text, nor can it displace controlling and contrary
precedent.
Accordingly, contacts with the United States under the Fifth Amendment
govern, and contacts with the particular state in which the court sits do not. Any
Movant who resides in the United States has sufficient minimum contacts that
requiring them to answer in a federal court does not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice. Id. As detailed below, each Movant’s own submissions
place it within the United States, whether by declaration, affidavit, or representation
to the Court.
2. Each Movant’s Own Submissions Establish Its Presence in the
United States.
Brad Cox declares that he is “a resident and citizen of the State of Texas, where
I am registered to vote.”62 DeVito declares that he is “a resident and citizen of the
Commonwealth of Virginia, where I am registered to vote.”63 And both declare that
Cox Oil and Gas, LLC and Dallas Estate Management, LLC are Texas limited
liability companies; that LSC 27, LLC, Cox Management Dallas, LLC, CW Facilities,
LLC, Phoenix Petro Services LLC, and Proteus Energy LLC are Delaware limited
liability companies; that Cox Investment Partners, LP is a Delaware limited
partnership; and that each of those entities “has a principal place of business in
Dallas, Texas.”64 That accounts for all ten Nonresident Cox Defendants.
62 ECF No. 30-2 ¶ 3.
63 ECF No. 30-3 ¶ 3.
64 ECF No. 30-2 ¶¶ 7–8; ECF No. 30-3 ¶¶ 7–8.
William Graham attests in each of his three trustee capacities that he “is a
resident of Dallas, Texas,” and that each of the three trusts was “created and
administered in the State of Texas” with an “administrative situs” at a Dallas
address.65 He avers that EasTex Deer Meadow, LLC is a Texas limited liability
company with a Dallas principal office that owns real property near Athens, Texas,
and that Windward Capital Assets, LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with
the same Dallas principal office.66 The Graham Defendants filed no declaration for
the two RCL entities. But they represent on behalf of all eight movants that they are
“Texas-based” and that “[w]ithout question, the Southern District of Texas would
have jurisdiction over the Graham Defendants.”67 Neither RCL entity contends that
it lacks contacts with the United States. Indeed, no Movant makes that contention,
and the Court has no occasion to find otherwise as to any of them.
Sanders filed no declaration. However, his memorandum states that he “is a
resident and citizen of Texas and conducts business in Dallas, Texas.”68 Graham’s
declaration separately identifies Sanders as “a resident of the State of Texas.”69 That
is the only individualized fact the governing standard requires.
65 ECF No. 36-2 ¶¶ 3–5; ECF No. 36-3 ¶¶ 3–5; ECF No. 36-6 ¶¶ 3–4, 7.
66 ECF No. 36-5 ¶¶ 4–5, 8–10; ECF No. 36-4 ¶¶ 4, 7–9.
67 ECF No. 60 at 10. The Nonresident Cox Defendants make the same concession. ECF No. 59
at 1 n.2 (“The Cox Defendants do not dispute that the Southern District of Texas may exercise personal
jurisdiction over them.”).
68 ECF No. 85-1 at 2.
69 ECF No. 36-6 ¶ 6. The same declaration states that DeVito succeeded Sanders as co-trustee
of the Dynasty Trust. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. The caption continues to name Sanders in that capacity, and Sanders
moves in that capacity. ECF No. 85 at 2. The Court takes the motion as filed and expresses no view on
who presently serves as co-trustee.
Because each Movant was served with process in compliance with Bankruptcy
Rule 7004 in a civil proceeding related to a case under title 11, and because each is
present in the United States, the Court has personal jurisdiction over each of them.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Joseph Winkler’s Motion70 to Dismiss Pursuant to
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) is DENIED IN PART, insofar as it seeks
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court does
not reach the portion of the motion seeking dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), which
remains pending.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion71 to Dismiss the Complaint
for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2) filed by Brad E.
Cox; Vincent DeVito; LSC 27, LLC; Dallas Estate Management, LLC; CW Facilities,
LLC; Cox Management Dallas, LLC; Cox Investment Partners, LP; Cox Oil and Gas,
LLC; Phoenix Petro Services, LLC; and Proteus Energy, LLC is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion72 to Dismiss the Complaint
for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2) filed by William
Graham, in his capacities as named trustee of the Bradley Edwin Cox Trust, named
co-trustee of the Charlee Lochridge Cox Dynasty Trust, and named trustee of the
Edwin L. Cox “B” Trust; EasTex Deer Meadow, LLC; WIN Management, LLC;
70 ECF No. 75.
71 ECF No. 30.
72 ECF No. 36.
Windward Capital Assets, LLC; RCL Capital Management LLC — Series No. 10
(Southern Bay); and RCL Capital Management LLC — Series No. 7 (Pelican) is
DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Craig Sanders’s Motion’? to Dismiss
the Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2),
filed individually and in his capacity as co-trustee of the Charlee Lochridge Cox
Dynasty Trust,is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 21st day of August, 2026.
BRANDON S. LONG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
73 ECF No. 85.
28