LONG

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

SHERONE LONG,

Civil Action No. 25-1597

Plaintiff,

v. OPINION AND ORDER

PLAINFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT,

August 20, 2026

Defendant.

SEMPER, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant Plainfield Police

Department’s (“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF 37, “Motion”), and Magistrate Judge

Jessica S. Allen’s Report and Recommendation, which denies Defendant’s Motion. (ECF

38, “R&R.”) For the reasons set forth below, the Court ADOPTS Judge Allen’s R&R and

DENIES Defendant’s Motion without prejudice.

WHEREAS on June 27, 2025, the Court entered a Pretrial Scheduling Order

setting a fact discovery deadline of December 31, 2025. (ECF 11.) On November 19,

2025, the deadline was extended to April 30, 2026. (ECF 21.) From the time the fact

discovery deadline was extended through February 5, 2026, Plaintiff failed to provide his

Rule 26 initial disclosures or otherwise comply with Defendant’s discovery demands.

(R&R at 2.) The Court rejected Defendant’s initial request for leave to file a motion to

compel discovery, but obliged Defendant’s second request after Plaintiff failed to respond

by February 26, 2026. (Id.) Plaintiff later contended that his delay was due to his phone

being stolen and his address changing. (Id.); and

WHEREAS after granting Plaintiff an extension until May 8, 2026 to comply with

his outstanding discovery obligations, Plaintiff again failed to timely serve the materials

on Defendants. (Id.) Subsequently, the Court granted Defendant’s request for leave to file

a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to provide discovery on May 13, 2026.

(Id. at 3.) Plaintiff then served his answers to Defendant’s Rule 33 Interrogatories on the

Court’s docket on May 18, 2026. (Id.) Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss on May 27,

2026. (ECF 37.) Plaintiff has not opposed the Motion. (Id.); and

WHEREAS on July 31, 2026, Judge Allen issued her R&R, recommending that

the Court deny Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss without prejudice. (See R&R at 1.) Judge

Allen reasoned that the Court should not take the extreme measure of dismissing Plaintiff’s

complaint at this time because Plaintiff demonstrated his attempt to comply with his

discovery requirements and the Court’s orders. (Id. at 4.) Judge Allen noted the factors

set forth in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984),

which guides the Court’s decision of whether to impose the sanction of involuntary

dismissal of a complaint. (Id.) Noting the Third Circuit’s preference that cases be resolved

on their merits, Judge Allen held that involuntary dismissal of the complaint is not

warranted at this time, as Defendant will not be prejudiced by granting Plaintiff one final

opportunity to satisfy his discovery obligations. (Id. at 5 (citing Scarborough v. Eubanks,

747 F.2d 871, 878 (3d Cir 1984) (“[D]oubts should be resolved in favor of reaching a

decision on the merits.”)).) Furthermore, Judge Allen reasoned that “courts in this Circuit

considering Poulis-governed motions to dismiss have frequently been willing to provide

non-compliant parties with one final opportunity to comply with discovery obligations

prior to dismissal of a complaint.” (Id. (citing cases))1; and

WHEREAS of August 14, 2026, the deadline for the parties to oppose Judge

Allen’s R&R passed, and no objections were filed. (Id. at 3.) Absent objections, a “party

may lose its right to de novo review by the district court.” EEOC v. City of Long Branch,

866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2007)).

However, a baseline level of “reasoned consideration” is still required, which generally

constitutes review for plain error. Id. (citing Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 878

(3d Cir. 1987)); and

WHEREAS the Court has reviewed the R&R for plain error and finds that Judge

Allen’s decision was reasonable. Judge Allen cited multiple cases from this Circuit where

courts have extended a final opportunity to litigants to serve outstanding discovery

obligations upon a motion to dismiss a complaint as a sanction. (R&R at 4-5.) Judge Allen

also noted the broad discretion the Court has to make decisions regarding the management

of its docket. See, e.g., In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982);

and

WHEREAS the Court finds that the Poulis factors are split under the facts

presented.2 Plaintiff claims that his delay in providing discovery has been due to

1 See, e.g., Ballister v. NJ Dep’t of Corr., No. 17-573, 2025 WL 1057580, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 14,

2025); Austin v. McDonald, No. 21-1106, 2023 WL 11983716, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2023)

(rejecting R&R when absent plaintiff appeared and filed objection; providing plaintiff one final

opportunity to comply); Brown v. Cohen, No. 17-3436, 2021 WL 4099729, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 9,

2021) (denying Poulis motion without prejudice to allow final chance to comply); Dambrowski v.

Financial Recovery Servs., Inc., No. 05-3548, 2006 WL 8457153, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2006)

(denying Poulis motion to dismiss to allow plaintiff one final opportunity to respond to

interrogatories).

2 The Poulis factors are: (1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to

the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) the

history of noncompliance; (4) whether the conduct of the party or attorney was willful or in bad

circumstances outside of his control, such as his phone being stolen. (R&R at 3.)

Defendant has not shown that it will be prejudiced by waiting until another stage in this

litigation to move to dismiss the complaint. See Brown, 2021 WL 4099729, at *2 (holding

a defendant is not prejudiced when they remain “free to seek appropriate discovery

remedies if Plaintiff does not comply with his discovery obligations in the future”).

Additionally, Plaintiff’s later attempts to satisfy his discovery duties show that his tardiness

in prosecuting this action is not entirely willful or a sign of bad faith. (Id. at 4.) Further,

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, which presents grounds for some, but not unlimited leniency.

See Wortman v. Umrani, No. 05-1411, 2006 WL 2347853, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 11, 2006).

On the other hand, Plaintiff has an established history of noncompliance, and his claims

appear to be weak. (R&R at 2-3.) With the factors being split, it is reasonable for a judge

to decide not to impose the “harsh sanction” of dismissal. Lopez v. Cousins, 435 F. App’x

113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2011) (vacating the order of the district court dismissing a complaint

for failure to prosecute when the Poulis factors are split); and

WHEREAS the Court therefore concludes that Judge Allen’s recommendation to

deny Defendant’s Motion without prejudice was a sound exercise of her discretion. See

Schwartz v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 06-3173, 2007 WL 1797647, at *3 (D.N.J. June 20,

2007) (“The decision to dismiss a party’s pleading is within the court’s discretion.”).

Accordingly, Judge Allen’s R&R does not constitute clear error and the Court opts to adopt

it. For the reasons stated above,

IT IS on this 20th day of August 2026, hereby

1. ORDERED that Judge Allen’s Report and Recommendation (ECF 38) is

faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal; 3 and (6) the meritoriousness of the

claim or defense. See Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868.

ADOPTED; and it is further

2. ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF 37) is DENIED without

prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Jamel K. Semper

HON. JAMEL K. SEMPER

United States District Judge

Orig: Clerk

CC: Jessia S. Allen, U.S.M.J.

Parties