Korede

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TUNDE FEMI KOREDE, :

Plaintiff : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-1404

Vv. : (JUDGE MANNION)

ANGELA HOOVER, Warden, :

Clinton County Correctional

Facility, et al., :

Defendants

MEMORANDUM

Currently before the Court are pro se Plaintiff Tunde Femi Korede

(“Korede”)’s complaint and motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO

Motion’). For the reasons stated below, the Court will dismiss the complaint

without prejudice to Korede filing an amended complaint and dismiss the

TRO motion as moot.

l. BACKGROUND

Korede commenced this action by filing his complaint and TRO motion,

both of which the Clerk of Court docketed on May 21, 2026. (Docs. 1, 3.) He

also remitted the filing fee. See (Docket Notation Accompanying Doc. 1).

In his complaint, Korede names as Defendants (1} Angela Hoover

(“Hoover”), the Warden of the Clinton County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”):

(2) CCCF’s Medical Director (“Director”); and (3) John/Jane Doe CCCF

medical personnel (“Does”). See (Doc. 1 at 1, 3).’ Korede’s allegations relate

to events that have occurred during his unidentified period of confinement at

the CCCF. See (id. at 3-5).

Korede alleges that he has “a documented history of severe cardiac

disease, including chronic systolic and diastolic heart failure and dilated

cardiomyopathy.” (/d. at 3.) His “[mJedical records reflect significantly

reduced cardiac function, including an ejection fraction of approximately 25%

and reports as low as 11%, indicating severe impairment.” (/d. at 4.)* In

addition, “[clardiology evaluations have identified [him] as a high-risk patient

with potential for life-threatening arrhythmias and sudden cardiac arrest.”

(/d.); see also (id. at 2 (alleging that his medical conditions “place [hin] at a

high risk of sudden cardiac arrest and death’)).

' Korede has not complied with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10

insofar as he does not list the Does as Defendants in the caption of his

complaint. See (id. at 1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (“The title of the complaint

must name all the parties; the title of other pleadings, after naming the first

party on each side, may refer generaily to other parties.”); see also Luo v.

Wang, 71 F.4th 1289, 1296 (70th Cir. 2023) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

10(a) requires the names of all parties to appear in the caption of a complaint,

and the title of all other pleadings must name the first party on each side.”).

Instead, he names them as Defendants in only the body of his complaint.

See (Doc. 1 at 3).

2 Korede attaches to his complaint (1) a progress note dated February

14, 2024, from Dr. Alanna Morris of the Emory Advanced Heart Failure Clinic,

see (Doc. 1-3 at 2-3), and (2) a report from a November 29, 2007 CT scan

of Korede’s abdomen and pelvis. See (id. at 6-9).

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Defendants “have been made aware” of Korede’s medical condition

“through medical records, complaints, and repeated requests for care.” (/d.)

Korede also “submitted multiple sick call requests and grievances regarding

his condition.” (/d. at 2.)°> As such, “his medical needs have been known or

readily available to those responsible for his custody and care.” (/d. at 5.)

Despite Defendants’ knowledge of Korede’s medical condition, they

have failed to “take reasonable steps to address the known risk.” (/d. at 4.)

Instead, his treatment has consisted of “medication management and

minimal follow-up, without meaningful specialist intervention.” (/d.) He has

also “not received necessary advanced cardiac intervention, including but

not limited to implantable cardiac devices such as a pacemaker or

defibrillator.” (/d.) Due to Defendants’ alleged failures, Korede “experiences

ongoing symptoms including shortness of breath at rest, dizziness, fatigue,

and episodes of near collapse.” (/d.)

Korede also alleges that he has experienced “continuous and

coordinated” detention “between locai and federal authorities, including [the

CCCF] and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement [(“ICE”)J.” (/d. at 4—

5.) He asserts that “Defendants cannot avoid constitutional responsibility by

° Korede avers that "in the alternative, the grievance process was

unavailable or ineffective.” (/d.).

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characterizing [his] custody as fragmented or shifting between agencies”

because he “has remained under government control.” (/d. at 5.) However,

Korede asserts that he has experienced a “failure to ensure continuity of care

across [his] custodial settings,” which “has resulted in gaps in treatment and

a lack of appropriate specialist intervention” and has “further exacerbated

his] condition” (/d.) He also “remains in custody under conditions [placing]

him at ongoing and increasing risk of serious harm or death.” (/d.)

Based on these allegations, Korede raises the following claims under

42 U.S.C. §1983 against Defendants: (1) deliberate indifference to his

serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution; (2) violations of his substantive due process

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment relating to his conditions of

confinement and lack of continuity of medical care; (3) failure to provide

continuity of care; and (4) liability under Monell v. Department of Social

services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) due to an

unconstitutional policy, practice, or custom. See (id. at 6-8). He asserts that

he “faces an immediate and substantial risk of . . . [s}udden cardiac arrest,

pjermanent injury[, or djeath,” and “[e]Jach day without proper treatment

increases the likelihood of catastrophic harm.” (/d. at 8.) For relief, he seeks

compensatory damages and injunctive relief in the nature of an order

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directing that he receives “immediate and adequate cardiac evaluation and

treatment’ and a “transfer to a medical facility capable of providing necessary

care." (/d. at 9.) Alternatively, he seeks his release from confinement “if

constitutionally adequate medical care cannot be provided.” (/d.)

li. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Initial Screening Under 28 U.S.C. §1915A

The Court must “review . . . a complaint in a civil action in which a

prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of

a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). If such a complaint fails to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court must dismiss the

complaint. See id. §1915A(b)(1).

In reviewing legal claims under Sections 1915A(b), the Court applies

the standard governing motions to dismiss filed under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). See Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471 (M.D.

Pa. 2010) (explaining that when dismissing a complaint pursuant to Section

1915A, “a court employs the motion to dismiss standard set forth under

[Rule] 12(b)(6)"); see also Harris v. Wetzel, 822 F. App’x 128, 130 (3d Cir.

2020) (unpublished) (“[O]Jur review of a §1915A(b)(1) dismissal for failure to

state a claim is guided by the same de novo standard used to evaluate

motions to dismiss under [Rule] 12(b)(6).” (citations omitted)). Thus, to avoid

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dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must set out “sufficient factual

matter” in the complaint to show that their claims are facially plausible.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This plausibility standard

requires more than a mere possibility that the defendant is liable for the

alleged misconduct. “[Wjhere the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court

to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has

alleged — but it has not ‘show[n]’ — ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.” /qbal,

556 U.S. at 679 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

When evaluating the plausibility of a complaint, the Court accepts as

true all factual allegations and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn

from those allegations, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See

id.; In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010).

However, the Court will not accept legal conclusions as true, and “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not survive a district

court’s screening under Sections 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B). Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S, 544, 555—56 (2007).

In addition, in the specific context of pro se litigation, the Court must

be mindful that a document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed.” Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). see Higgs v. Att'y Gen., 655 F.3d 333,

339 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that “when presented with a pro Se litigant, we

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have a special obligation to construe [their] complaint liberally” (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, a pro se complaint, “nowever

inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106).

Moreover, when construing a pro se complaint, the Court will “apply the

relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name it.” Mala

v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013). However, pro

se litigants “cannot flout procedural rules—they must abide by the same rules

that apply to all other litigants.” /d. at 245.

B. Section 1983

Section 1983 is the vehicle by which private citizens may seek redress

for violations of federal constitutional rights committed by state officials. See

42 U.S.C. §1983. This statute states in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution of laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress....

Id. “Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights”; rather, it is “merely a

means through which to vindicate violations of federal law committed by state

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actors.” Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa.

2004) (citing Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002) and

Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996)). “To state a claim under

§1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the

Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West

v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Ill. DISCUSSION

A. Screening of Korede’s Complaint

1. Deliberate-Indifference-to-Serious-Medical-Needs

Claim

a. Korede’s Incarceration Status During the Events

Alleged in His Complaint

Before addressing whether Korede alleges a plausible deliberate-

indifference-to-serious-medical-needs claim against Defendants, the Court

must determine his incarceration status during his confinement at the CCCF,

because it affects whether the Eighth Amendment, which applies to

individuals already convicted and sentenced, or the Fourteenth Amendment,

which applies to pretrial detainees, applies to this claim. Korede does not

explicitly allege whether he is confined at the CCCF as a convicted and

sentenced prisoner or as a pretrial detainee when the events at issue in his

□□□

complaint allegedly occurred. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 164 (3d

Cir. 2005) (“Hubbard !’) (explaining that the Eighth Amendment applies to

individuals who have been convicted and sentenced); Thomas v.

Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d 217, 223 n.4 (3d Cir. 2014) (“As a pretrial

detainee, Thomas is not subject to the Eighth Amendment's protections;

rather, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause governs.” (citing

A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juv. Det. Ctr, 372 F.3d 572, 579 (3d

Cir. 2004))): see also City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244

(1983) (explaining that the Eighth Amendment “has no application” until the

government obtains a “formal adjudication of guilt,” and that pretrial

detainees’ rights “are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections

available to ... convicted prisoner[s]’). Nevertheless, it appears from an

allegation in the complaint, a notation on the docket, and the public records

that Korede is confined in the CCCF as an immigration detainee.

As stated above, Korede alleges that his “detention has been

continuous and coordinated between local and federal authorities, including

[the CCCF] and [ICE].” (Doc. 1 at 4—5.) The docket also shows that Korede

has an Alien Registration Number (“A#’) (029-626-658). As for the available

public records, ICE’s Online Detainee Locator System

(https://locator.ice.gov/odis/#/search) shows that the individual with that A#,

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whose name is noted as “Tunde Femi Oyedele,” is in ICE custody at the

CCCF.

The public records also show that on April 10, 2024, Korede was

sentenced to twenty-seven months of federal confinement, to be followed by

three years of supervised release, after pleading guilty to conspiracy to

commit fraud (18 U.S.C. §1341) in the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Ohio. See United States v. Korede, No. 23-cr-116-2 (N.D.

Ohio), ECF No. 36.4 According to the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)’s

Inmate Locator (https:/Awww.bop.gov/inmateloc/), Korede is no longer in

BOP custody as of April 10, 2026, and it does not appear from the Unified

Judicial System of Pennsylvania Web Portal

(https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/CaseSearch) that Korede has any pending

criminal charges in the Pennsylvania state courts.

Overall, based on the information available at this stage, the Court will

consider Korede as an immigration detainee during the events described in

4 The docket in Korede’s federal criminal case indicates that almost a

year after his sentencing, he filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a

sentence under 28 U.S.C. §2255, which the Northern District of Ohio

dismissed on June 17, 2025. See id., ECF Nos. 43, 45, 46. Then, on

December 1, 2025, Korede filed a motion for a reduction in sentence under

18 U.S.C. §3582{c)(1)(A), which the Northern District of Ohio dismissed as

moot on April 15, 2026, due to Korede’s release from federal incarceration

on April 10, 2026. See id., ECF Nos. 47, 57, and Unnumbered Dkt. Entry

After ECF No. 57.

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his complaint. So considered, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process

Clause applies to his deliberate-indifference-to-serious-medical-needs

claim. See Jabbi v. City of Clinton Cnty., No. 21-cv-1818, 2022 WL 509110,

at *2 n.18 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2022) (“Because Jabbi was an immigration

detainee in federal custody being housed in a state facility (rather than a

convicted prisoner), his claims implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments, not the Eighth Amendment.” (citing Hope v.

Warden York Cnty. Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 325 (3d Cir. 2020), E.D. v.

Sharkey, 928 F.3d 299, 306-07 (3d Cir. 2019), and Hubbard /, 399 F.3d at

166-67 (3d Cir. 2005))); see also E.D., 928 F.3d at 306-07 (“This Circuit has

longed viewed the legal rights of an immigration detainee to be analogous to

those of a pretrial detainee.”).

b. Plausibility of Korede’s Claim

Because “the Fourteenth Amendment affords pretrial detainees

protections “at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available

to a convicted prisoner,” courts apply the same standard “pertaining to

prisoners’ claims of inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment]

when evaluating whether a claim for inadequate medical care by a [pretrial]

detainee is sufficient under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Natale v. Camden

Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting City of Revere,

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463 U.S. at 244 and citing Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468, 472 (3d Cir.

1987)). To state a constitutional claim based on the failure to provide medical

treatment, a prisoner-plaintiff must allege facts indicating that prison officials

were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical needs. See

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). Thus, the relevant inquiry is

whether a defendant was: (1) deliberately indifferent (the subjective

component) to (2) the plaintiff's serious medical needs (the objective

component). See Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d

326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987); West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1979).

As for the objective component, “[a] medical need is serious, . . . if it is

one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one

that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for

a doctor's attention.” Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 347 (internal quotation marks

omitted). A serious medical need also exists where “failure to treat can be

expected to lead to substantial and unnecessary suffering.” Cofburn v. Upper

Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991).

Regarding the subjective component, a prisoner-plaintiff must show

that the prison official “acted or failed to act despite [their] knowledge of a

substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 841. A prison official is

not deliberately indifferent “unless the official knows of and disregards an

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excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of

serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” /d. at 837. An

incarcerated plaintiff properly alleges deliberate indifference “where the

prison official (1) knows of a prisoner's need for medical treatment but

intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment

based on a non-medical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving

needed or recommended medical treatment.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d

192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d

526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (explaining that a prisoner-plaintiff can show

deliberate indifference where prison official “intentionally denfied] or

delay[ed] access to medical care or intentionally interfer[ed] with the

treatment once prescribed” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).

Allegations of medical malpractice and mere disagreement regarding proper

medical treatment are insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. See

Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).

The deliberate indifference standard “affords considerable latitude to

prison medical authorities in the diagnosis and treatment of the medical

problems of inmate patients,” and courts must accordingly “disavow any

attempt to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of their particular course

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of treatment’ so long as it ‘remains a question of sound professional

judgment.” Pearson, 850 F.3d at 538 (quoting Inmates of Allegheny Cnty.

Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979)). A claim that “a physician

has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not

state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.”

ld. (quoting Esfelle, 429 U.S. at 106). Thus, claims that a physician has

“inadequately diagnosed and treated” a plaintiff's medical condition does not

amount to a violation of the Eighth Amendment if the physician was

exercising their professional judgment in their diagnosis and treatment. /d.

Here, Korede sufficiently pleads that he has a serious medical need

based on his heart condition. However, he has not plausibly pleaded that any

Defendant was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. In the

first instance, although Korede alleges that he “has not received necessary

advanced cardiac intervention, including but not limited to implantable

cardiac devices such as a pacemaker or defibrillator,” he does not allege that

any medical professional ever determined that these forms of cardiac

intervention were recommended or needed. See (Doc. 1 at 3-5).

Additionally, his medical records attached to his complaint, one from more

than two years ago, see (Doc. 1-3 at 2~3), and the other from almost twenty

years ago, see (id. at 6-9), support his assertion that he has a serious

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medical condition but do not provide any information as to the type of medical

treatment Korede should be receiving in May 2026. Therefore, Korede has

not plausibly alleged that any Defendant prevented him from receiving

needed or recommended medicai treatment.

Korede also fails to allege that any Defendant has delayed necessary

medical treatment for a non-medical reason, or that any Defendant knew

about his need for medical treatment but intentionally refused to provide it.

Although Korede alleges that Defendants knew about his “condition,” see

(Doc. 1 at 4), he does not allege that they knew about his need for medical

treatment and intentionally refused to provide it.

As to Korede’s claim against Hoover, she is a non-medical prison

official, see Thomas v. Dragovich, 142 F. App’x 33, 39 (3d Cir. 2005)

(unpublished) (explaining that wardens/superintendents of correctional

facilities are “undisputably administrators, [and] not doctors”), and Korede

alleges that he received some medical treatment. See (Doc. 1 at 4). “As a

general rule, non-medical prison officials are not deliberately indifferent . . .

simpiy because they failed to respond directly to medical complaints of a

prisoner who was already being treated by the prison doctor or because they

deferred to the judgment of the medical staff treating the inmate.” Durmer v.

O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 66 (3d Cir. 1993). Therefore, to state a plausible

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deliberate-indifference claim against Hoover, Korede must allege facts

plausibly showing that she possessed actual knowledge or a reason to

believe that “prison doctors or their assistants [were] mistreating (or not

treating)” him. See Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236. Korede fails to include any

allegations that Hoover had reason to believe that his medical providers were

mistreating or failing to treat him.

Overall, the gist of Korede’s factual allegations is that he merely

disagrees with his medical treatment at the CCCF. Korede acknowledges

that he has received treatment for his medical condition through “medication

management and minimal follow-up.” (/d.) However, he believes that he

requires “meaningful specialist intervention.” (/d.) He also believes that he

requires “advanced cardiac intervention, including but not limited to

implantable cardiac devices such as a pacemaker or defibrillator.” (/d.)

These types of allegations constitute a “mere disagreement as to the proper

medical treatment,” see Spruill, 372 F.3d at 235, and are insufficient to state

a plausible Section 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to his serious

medical needs. See Robinson v. Sec’y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 663 F. App’x 96,

98 (3d Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (affirming district court's dismissal of

prisoner-plaintiff's deliberate-indifference-to-serious-medical-needs claim

based on defendant-doctor’s denial of plaintiff's “requests for an MRI or CT

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scan as well as his demands to see a specialist” because they constituted a

“mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment” (quoting Spruill, 372

F.3d at 235)); Severino-Mota v. Lidwell, No. 22-cv-2030, 2024 WL 69154, at

*4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2024) (“Plaintiff's belief that he should have received

different treatment and should have been transported to an outside specialist

constitutes a ‘mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment,’ and is

not an actionable Eighth Amendment claim.” (quoting Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at

346)); Anderson v. Price, No. 20-cv-356, 2022 WL 4357481, at “5 (M.D. Pa.

Sept. 20, 2022) (“Plaintiffs belief that he needed to see a specialist and

Defendant Price recommended Plaintiff speak to the medical director

concerning his request to see a specialist, who determined that there was no

need to involve a specialist, such allegations, at best, demonstrate Plaintiff's

disagreement with the type of treatment rendered.”), aff'd, No. 22-3058, 2023

WL 5814664 (3d Cir. Sept. 8, 2023); Buttofph v. Prime Care Med. Inc., No.

16-cv-325, 2020 WL 1285324, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2020) (concluding

that prisoner-plaintiff’'s “main argument, that he should have been referred to

a specialist or scheduled for surgery sooner, constitutes a ‘mere

disagreement as to the proper medical treatment” (quoting Lanzaro, 834

F.2d at 346)). Accordingly, Korede fails to allege a plausible deliberate-

indifference-to-serious-medical-needs claim in his complaint.

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2. Korede’s Request for Release from Confinement

Among Korede’s requests for relief is a request that he be released

from confinement if he cannot receive “constitutionally adequate medical

care,” (Doc. 1 at 9.) This request for relief is not cognizable in a civil rights

action and must instead be pursued through a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (“[W]hen a state

prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment,

and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate

release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal

remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.”); Hope, 972 F.3d at 323 (“Where a

petitioner seeks release from detention, habeas (not a §1983 action seeking

release) is proper.”).

3. Korede’s Substantive-Due-Process Claim Based on

the Conditions of His Confinement

Korede raises a standalone substantive-due-process claim based on

alleged “[p]unitive [clonditions of [c]onfinement.” (Doc. 1 at 6.) He asserts

that he is confined “under conditions that expose him to a substantial risk of

death without adequate medical care.” (/d. at 7.) As explained below, Korede

has not pleaded a plausible conditions-of-confinement claim in his complaint.

Similar to Korede’s deliberate-indifference-to-serious-medical-needs

claim, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs

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claims brought by pretrial detainees challenging their conditions of

confinement. See Hubbard |, 399 F.3d at 166. To establish a constitutional

violation under the Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial detainee plaintiff would

have to plausibly allege that the challenged conditions of confinement

amount to punishment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979) (“In

evaluating the constitutionality of conditions or restrictions of pretrial

detention that implicate only the protection against deprivation of liberty

without due process of law, we think that the proper inquiry is whether those

conditions amount to punishment of the detainee.”); see also Bistrian v. Levi,

696 F.3d 352, 373 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Given pretrial detainees’ federally

protected liberty interests .. . under the Due Process Clause. . . a detainee

may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due

process of law.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), abrogated

on other grounds by Bistrian, 912 F.3d 79, 96 (3d Cir. 2018). When analyzing

whether a condition of confinement amounts to punishment, the inquiry

generally turns on whether the challenged conditions have a purpose other

than punishment and whether the conditions are excessive in relation to that

purpose. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-39 (“A court must decide whether the

[particular restriction or condition accompanying pretrial detention] is

imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of

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some other legitimate governmental purpose.”); Hope, 972 F.3d at 326

(explaining that, when evaluating claims of punitive conditions of

confinement, ‘[t]he touchstone for the constitutionality of detention is whether

conditions of confinement are meant to punish or are ‘but an incident of some

other legitimate governmental purpose.” (quoting Hubbard v. Taylor, 538

F.3d 229, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Hubbard /!’))); Hubbard |, 399 F.3d at 158

(discussing analysis of whether condition of confinement constitutes

punishment for Fourteenth Amendment purposes). In addition, the Court

should consider the totality of the circumstances in assessing whether a

prisoner’s conditions of confinement violate the Fourteenth Amendment. See

Hubbard 538 F.3d at 236, 238 (examining totality of circumstances to

determine whether conditions of confinement constitute Fourteenth

Amendment violation); Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 67 (3d Cir. 1996)

(explaining that “to determine whether conditions of confinement violate the

Eighth Amendment, it is necessary to examine the totality of the conditions

at the institution”); Union Cnty. Jail Inmates v. Di Buono, 713 F.2d 984, 1000-—

01 (3d Cir. 1983) (discussing that “the overall length of confinement is only

one factor among several that must be considered by a district court in

evaluating the totality of circumstances relevant to any alleged constitutional

deficiency in shelter’).

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“Unconstitutional punishment typically includes both objective and

subjective components.” Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir.

2007). “[T]he objective component requires an inquiry into whether the

deprivation was sufficiently serious and the subjective component whether

the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” /d. (internal

quotation marks and alterations omitted). In general, when alleging a

sufficiently culpable state of mind, a detainee must assert that prison officials

acted with deliberate indifference, meaning that they consciously

disregarded a serious risk to the detainee’s health or safety. See Wilson v.

seifer, 501 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1991); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837

(“[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [they] must also

draw the inference.”): cf. Edwards v. Northampton Cnty., 663 F. App’x 132,

135 (3d Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (“[W]e agree with the District Court and find

no reason to apply a different standard here as we have applied the

‘deliberate indifference’ standard both in cases involving prisoners, and

pretrial detainees[.]" (internal citations omitted)). Furthermore,

[i]In determining whether restrictions or conditions are reasonably

related to the Government's interest in maintaining security and

order and operating the institution in a manageable fashion,

courts must heed our warning that “[sJuch considerations are

peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of

corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence

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in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their

response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer

to their expert judgment in such matters.”

Bell, 441 U.S. at 541 n.23 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827

(1974)).

Here, presuming that Korede can prosecute a _ conditions-of-

confinement claim that is essentially duplicative of his deliberate-

indifference-to-serious-medical-needs claim, he fails to state a plausible

conditions-of-confinement claim because, as explained above, he does not

allege sufficient facts showing that Defendants were deliberately indifferent,

that they consciously disregarded a serious risk to his health or safety.

Although Korede alleges that he has a serious heart condition of which

Defendants were aware, his allegations constitute mere disagreements with

his medical treatment. Moreover, Korede’s acknowledgement that he has

received medical treatment necessarily shows that Defendants did not

consciously disregard a risk to his health. Accordingly, Korede fails to allege

a plausible conditions-of-confinement claim in his complaint.

4. Korede’s Failure to Provide Continuity of Care Claim

Korede asserts a Section 1983 claim based on Defendants’ alleged

failure to “ensure continuity of care, including necessary specialist evaluation

and intervention.” (Doc. 1 at 7.) The Court is unaware of any such standalone

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cause of action and construes this claim as a separate claim for deliberate

indifference to his serious medical needs. So construed, Korede fails to plead

a plausible claim for relief,

lt is also entirely unclear from Korede’s complaint how Defendants

have allegedly failed to ensure his continuity of care since he arrived at

CCCF. Other than his attached medical records from February 2024 and

November 2007, Korede does not allege any facts to the medical care he

was receiving prior to his arrival at CCCF, which appears to have occurred

less than two months ago. Moreover, to the extent that he is seeking an

appointment with a specialist or the insertion of a pacemaker, Korede does

not allege that his medical provider prior to his confinement at CCCF

scheduled an appointment with a specialist or determined he needed a

pacemaker. In other words, Korede fails to allege any facts showing how

Defendants did not ensure his continuity of care following his incarceration

at CCCF. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss this claim for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted.

5. Korede’s Monell Claim

Korede alleges that “Defendants’ actions were taken pursuant to

policies, practices, or customs that resulted in inadequate medical care.”

(Doc. 1 at 8.) He asserts that they failed to implement (1) “any system to

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ensure timely specialist referral for detainees with serious cardiac conditions”

or (2) "adequate systems to identify and treat detainees with serious medical

conditions.” (/d.) He further asserts that Defendants’ failure directly caused

the violation of his constitutional rights. See (id.).

The Court will dismiss Korede’s Monel! claim because such a claim lies

only against a municipality, and he does not name a municipality as a

defendant in his complaint. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 695 (explaining that the

Court was addressing “the §1983 cause of action against a focal

government’ (emphasis added)); Soberanis v. Spellman, No. 25-cv-676,

2026 WL 1209140, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. May 4, 2026) (“Under Monell, the proper

defendant is the municipality itself... ."), report and recommendation

adopted, 2026 WL 1494441 (N.D.N.Y. May 28, 2026). Additionally, even if

Korede named a municipality as a Defendant in his complaint, the Court has

already explained that he fails to allege a plausible constitutional violation in

his complaint. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Korede’s Monell claim for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

B. Leave to Amend

Because the Court has determined that Korede’s complaint is subject

to dismissal for failure to state a claim under Section 1915A(b}(1), the Court

must decide whether to give him leave to file an amended complaint.

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Although district courts should generally give leave to amend, they may

dismiss a complaint with prejudice where leave to amend would be

inequitable or futile. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete

Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[l]n civil rights cases

district courts must offer amendment—irrespective of whether it is

requested—when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim unless doing

so would be inequitable or futile.”); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293

F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (“When a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend

a deficient complaint after a defendant moves to dismiss it, the court must

inform the plaintiff that [they have] leave to amend within a set period of time,

unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.”). “In determining whether

[amendment] would be futile, the district court applies the same standard of

legal sufficiency as [it] applies under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” In re Burlington

Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997).

Here, the Court will grant Korede leave to file an amended complaint

as to his claim that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious

medical needs. As for his conditions-of-confinement and failure-to-ensure-

continuity-of-care claims, those claims are either duplicative of or properly

characterized as deliberate-indifference-to-serious-medical-needs claims. If,

however, Korede desires to assert unconstitutional conditions of

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confinement that are not duplicative of his deliberate-indifference-to-serious-

medical-needs claim, he may do so in an amended complaint. Similarly, if

Korede desires to pursue a deliberate-indifference-to-serious-medical-needs

claim based on an alleged lack of continuity of care following his arrival at

the CCCF, he should not do so as a standalone cause of action and include

any relevant factual allegations as part of his deliberate-indifference claim.

As for his Monell claim, he may not replead this cause of action if the named

Defendants remain the same because there is no municipality named as a

Defendant. Thus, if Korede desires to pursue a Monel! claim, he must name

a municipal defendant.® Finally, Korede may not seek his release from

incarceration as a request for relief in an amended complaint.

C. Korede’s TRO Motion

Korede moves for a temporary restraining order requiring Defendants

to, inter alia, “provide immediate cardiac evaluation by a qualified specialist”

and transfer him to “an appropriate medical facility if necessary.” (Doc. 3 at

6). Because the Court will dismiss Korede’s complaint, the Court will deny

his TRO Motion as moot. See, e.g., Draves v. City of N.Y., No. 25-cv-3305,

> The Court expresses no opinion on the viability of such a cause of

action should Korede include it in an amended complaint.

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2026 WL 1256983, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2026) (“Because the complaint is

dismissed, Draves’s motion for a preliminary injunction is denied as moot.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court will dismiss Korede’s

complaint, grant him leave to file an amended complaint, and deny as moot

his TRO Motion. An appropriate Order follows.®

United States District Judge

DATE: (fou 2b

26-1404-01

® The Order will provide additional information to Korede about the filing

of an amended complaint.

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