The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
JOHANA KARELIS GONZALEZ ) CASE NO. 4:26-CV-1470-JJH
QUINTERO, )
) JUDGE JEFFREY J. HELMICK
Petitioner, ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
)
v. ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE
) JENNIFER DOWDELL
WARDEN, MAHONING COUNTY JAIL, ARMSTRONG
)
)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
)
Respondent.
)
I. INTRODUCTION
Petitioner, Johana Karelis Gonzalez Quintero (“Ms. Gonzalez Quintero”) filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and named the Warden of the Mahoning County
Jail (“Warden”) as the Respondent. (ECF No. 1). In the petition, Ms. Gonzalez Quintero alleges
that her due process rights are being violated because she is being detained at the Mahoning County
Jail. (Id.) Ms. Gonzalez Quintero also requests that this Court grant her petition for a writ of habeas
corpus and order and order immediate release from ICE custody. (Id.) In the alternative, she
requests that the Court order an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge. Finally,
she requests that the Court grant any other relief the Court deems just and proper. (Id.)
This matter was referred to me on July 18, 2026 under Local Rule 16.2 to prepare a report
and recommendation on Ms. Gonzalez Quintero’s petition. (See ECF non-document entry dated
July 18, 2026). For the following reasons, I recommend that the Court DISMISS the petition
because the Warden is not the proper Respondent. I also RECOMMEND that the Court DENY
II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Ms. Gonzalez Quintero filed her petition on June 29, 2026. (ECF No. 1.) She then filed a
Civil Cover Sheet on July 10, 2026 and styled it as a supplement to the petition. (ECF No. 2.)
This matter was referred to me on July 18, 2026. On July 20, 2026, I entered an Initial
Order stating that:
(1) Respondent shall file an Answer to the Petition within 14 days from the date of this Order
and show cause why the petition should not be granted and the writ prayed for issued;
(2) Petitioner shall have 14 days from the date of the filing of the Answer to reply by filing
a Traverse;
(3) Respondent shall have seven (7) days from the filing of the Traverse to respond by filing
a Reply. Respondent should reply to the Traverse when the Traverse raises issues or
arguments not addressed in the Answer. The Court shall consider Respondent’s decision
not to file a Reply as certification that all issues and arguments raised by Petitioner have
been fully addressed.
(ECF No. 4.)
On July 27, 2026, Respondent filed a Motion for an Order Requiring Petitioner to Show
Cause. (“Government’s Motion to Show Cause,” ECF No. 6.) Respondent’s Motion to Show Cause
requested that this Court enter an order requiring Ms. Gonzalez Quintero to affirmatively state under
the penalty of perjury that she did in fact personally sign the Petition and did so in compliance with
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Id.) First, Respondent points out that – although
Ms. Gonzalez Quintero has been detained at the Mahoning County Jail since May 30, 2026 – the
U.S. Postal Service’s Priority Mail tracking number reveals that the petition signed on June 22, 2026
was mailed from Hollywood, Florida on the same date. (Id.) And the return address on the Priority
Mail is to a residence in Cleveland, Ohio. (Id.) Second, the Government points out that the signature
on the petition differs from Ms. Gonzalez Quintero’s signature on the Civil Cover Sheet that was
submitted to the Court after the filing of the petition, further calling into question whether Ms.
Gonzalez Quintero actually signed the petition. (Id., comparing ECF No. 1 at PageID # 9 with ECF
No. 2, Civil Cover Sheet, PageID # 11, 14.)
On July 28, 2026, I issued an order directing Ms. Gonzalez Quintero to file a response to the
Respondent’s Motion to Show Cause on or before August 11, 2026. (Non-document order dated July
28, 2026).
On August 3, 2026, Respondent filed a Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
(ECF No. 8.) First, Respondent points out in a footnote that there is a pending Motion to Show
Cause, and that “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be signed and verified by the
person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf,” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2242. Thus, Respondent argues that “the petition is required to be signed by Petitioner or a
recognized ‘next friend.’” (Id., PageID # 25, n.1.) Second, Respondent argues in another footnote
that a writ of habeas corpus may only be issued to the person having custody of the detainee, and in
the ICE habeas context that person is the Field Office Director for ICE. (Id.¸ PageID # 25, n.2.)
Respondent therefore maintains that the Warden of the Mahoning County Jail is not a proper
respondent. Finally, Respondent argues in the Return of Writ that Ms. Gonzalez Quintero is lawfully
detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), without a bond hearing, as an arriving alien placed in removal
proceedings.
On August 4, 2026, Ms. Gonzalez Quintero filed a two-page response styled as a “Reply to
Motion to Dismiss.” (ECF No. 9.) In this filing, Ms. Gonzalez Quintero does not provide any factual
response to Respondent’s Motion to Show Cause. (Id.) Rather, she maintains that she lawfully
entered the United States through the CBP One process on March 6, 2023 and has fully cooperated
with immigration authorities. (Id.) Ms. Gonzalez Quintero further states that she has approved
Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and employment authorization, reflecting prior authorization to
remain and work in the United States. She also argues that although her “asylum application was
denied, that decision is not final because [she] intends to timely appeal to the Board of Immigration
Appeals,” so her immigration proceedings remain ongoing. (Id.) Finally, she states that she has
strong family ties to the United States and no criminal history, and Respondent has produced no
evidence that she is a danger to the community or a genuine risk of flight. (Id.)
Though the deadline for Ms. Gonzalez Quintero to file a Traverse was August 17, 2026, she
has not filed a Traverse to date.
III. ANALYSIS
The Warden argues he is not the proper respondent in this case. I agree.
A district court must direct a writ of habeas corpus “to the person having custody of the
person detained.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. In the immigration context, the Sixth Circuit has held that,
although the warden of the facility where the alien is detained “technically has day-to-day control,”
the “INS District Director for the facility where the petitioner is located has power over alien
habeas petitioners.” Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 320 (6th Cir. 2003) (quotations omitted).
Accordingly. “a detained alien generally must designate his immediate custodian—the District
Director for the district where he is being detained—as the respondent to his habeas corpus
petition.” Id.
Relying on Roman, several courts in this district have held that the District Director is the
proper respondent and that other respondents should be dismissed. See Martinez Hernandez v.
Raycraft, No. 3:25-CV-02591-DAR, 2026 WL 698639, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 12, 2026) (report
and recommendation) (recommending dismissal of respondents other than ICE District Director);
Hu v. Raycraft, No. 4:26-cv-113, 2026 WL 539117, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2026) (report
and recommendation) (same). I similarly hold the Warden is not the proper respondent here.
Moreover, Ms. Gonzalez Quintero has not named the District Director or anyone else other than
the Warden as a respondent.
Accordingly, I recommend that the Court dismiss the petition because the Warden is not the
proper respondent. I also recommend that the Court deny as moot the Government’s Motion to
Show Cause.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons set forth above, I RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS the petition (ECF
No. 1) because the Warden is not the proper respondent. I also recommend that the Court DENY
AS MOOT the Government’s Motion to Show Cause (ECF No. 6).
Dated: August 19, 2026 /s Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong
Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Local Rule 72.3(b) of this Court provides:
Any party may object to a Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings,
recommendations or report made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof, and failure to file
timely objections within the fourteen (14) day period shall constitute a
waiver of subsequent review, absent a showing of good cause for such
failure. Such party shall file with the Clerk of Court, and serve on the
Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically
identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations, or report to
which objection is made and the basis for such objections. Any party may
respond to another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being
served with a copy thereof. The District Judge to whom the case was assigned
shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may
accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations
made by the Magistrate Judge. The District Judge need conduct a new hearing
only in such District Judge’s discretion or where required by law, and may
consider the record developed before the Magistrate Judge, making a
determination on the basis of the record. The District Judge may also receive
further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the Magistrate
Judge with instructions.
Id. (emphasis added).
the right to raise the issue on appeal either to the district judge or in a subsequent appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals, depending on how or whether the party responds to the report and
recommendation. Berkshire v. Dahl, 928 F.3d 520, 530 (6th Cir. 2019). Objections must be
specific and not merely indicate a general objection to the entirety of the report and
recommendation; a general objection has the same effect as would a failure to object. Howard v.
Sec’y of Health and Hum. Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991).
Stated differently, objections should focus on specific concerns and not merely restate the
arguments in briefs submitted to the magistrate judge. “A reexamination of the exact same
argument that was presented to the Magistrate Judge without specific objections ‘wastes judicial
resources rather than saving them, and runs contrary to the purpose of the Magistrates
Act.’” Overholt v. Green, No. 1:17-CV-00186, 2018 WL 3018175, *2 (W.D. Ky. June 15, 2018)
(quoting Howard). The failure to assert specific objections may in rare cases be excused in the
interest of justice. See United States v. Wandahsega, 924 F.3d 868, 878-79 (6th Cir. 2019).