VINCENT

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

:

P.V., : Civil Action No. 25-16368 (SRC)

:

Plaintiff, :

: OPINION

v. :

:

COMMISSIONER OF :

SOCIAL SECURITY, :

Defendant. :

:

:

CHESLER, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on the appeal by Plaintiff P.V. (“Plaintiff”) of the

final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) determining that he was

not disabled under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). This Court exercises jurisdiction

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and, having considered the submissions of the parties without

oral argument, pursuant to L. CIV. R. 9.1(b), finds that the Commissioner’s decision will be

affirmed.

In brief, this appeal arises from Plaintiff’s application for disability insurance benefits,

filed July 1, 2022, alleging disability beginning December 1, 2020. A hearing was held before

ALJ Paul Goodale (the “ALJ”) on May 16, 2024, and the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on

August 26, 2024. Plaintiff sought review of the decision from the Appeals Council. After the

Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, the ALJ’s decision became the

Commissioner’s final decision, and Plaintiff filed this appeal.

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In the decision of August 26, 2024, the ALJ found that, at step three, Plaintiff did not

meet or equal any of the Listings. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual

functional capacity to perform the full range of work at all exertional levels, with certain

additional nonexertional limitations. At step four, the ALJ also found that Plaintiff had no past

relevant work. At step five, the ALJ determined, based on the testimony of a vocational expert,

that there are other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy which the

claimant can perform, consistent with his medical impairments, age, education, past work

experience, and residual functional capacity. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not been

disabled within the meaning of the Act.

On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner’s decision should be reversed and the

case remanded with five arguments: 1) at step two, the ALJ erred by finding two of Plaintiff’s

health impairments non-severe; 2) at step three, the determination is not supported by substantial

evidence; 3) at step four, the RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence; 4) at

step five, the determination is not supported by substantial evidence; and 5) the Appeals

Council’s subsequent decision about supplemental evidence was improper.

Plaintiff’s case on appeal suffers from two principal defects: 1) its failure to deal with the

issue of the burden of proof at the first four steps of the sequential evaluation process; and 2) its

failure to deal with the harmless error doctrine. As to the burden of proof, Plaintiff bears the

burden in the first four steps of the analysis of demonstrating how his impairments, whether

individually or in combination, amount to a qualifying disability. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S.

137, 146 n.5 (1987).

As to the harmless error doctrine, the Supreme Court explained its operation in a similar

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procedural context in Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009), which concerned review of

a governmental agency determination. The Court stated: “the burden of showing that an error is

harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.” Id. In such a

case, “the claimant has the ‘burden’ of showing that an error was harmful.” Id. at 410.

Plaintiff thus bears the burden, on appeal, of showing not merely that the Commissioner

erred, but also that the error was harmful. At the first four steps, this requires that Plaintiff also

show that, but for the error, he might have proven his disability. In other words, when appealing

a decision at the first four steps, if Plaintiff cannot articulate the basis for a decision in his favor,

based on the existing record, he is quite unlikely to show that an error was harmful.

Plaintiff’s appeal rests on a series of arguments which contend, generally, that the ALJ

failed to do something that the law requires. The problem for Plaintiff, however, in one word,

is: Shinseki. It is not enough to show the presence of an error. Pursuant to Shinseki, Plaintiff

bears the burden of proving that he was harmed by this error. Plaintiff’s brief, however, fails to

recognize this. Instead of demonstrating that any alleged error was material and prejudicial,

Plaintiff argues only that the ALJ erred. At steps two and four, Plaintiff bears the burden of

proof of disability; on appeal, Shinseki requires, additionally, that Plaintiff show that an error

was harmful. None of Plaintiff’s arguments are even directed to satisfying the requirements of

Shinseki. Since Plaintiff, on appeal, must demonstrate that an error was harmful, but has failed

to do so, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not satisfied the requirements of Shinseki.

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in failing to find that Plaintiff’s seizure disorder

and obesity were severe impairments at step two. At step two, the ALJ found the following

severe impairments: depressive disorder; bipolar disorder; anxiety disorder; and attention deficit

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hyperactivity disorder. (Tr. 26.)

The Third Circuit has interpreted the relevant Rulings and Regulations to hold that “[t]he

step-two inquiry is a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims.” Newell v.

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 347 F.3d 541, 546 (3d Cir. 2003). The Newell Court further emphasized:

An impairment or combination of impairments can be found “not severe” only if

the evidence establishes a slight abnormality or a combination of slight

abnormalities which have “no more than a minimal effect on an individual’s

ability to work.” SSR 85-28, 1985 SSR LEXIS 19 at *6-8. Only those

claimants with slight abnormalities that do not significantly limit any “basic work

activity” can be denied benefits at step two. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 158

(O'Connor, J., concurring). If the evidence presented by the claimant presents

more than a “slight abnormality,” the step-two requirement of “severe” is met,

and the sequential evaluation process should continue. See Smolen v. Chater, 80

F.3d at 1290. Reasonable doubts on severity are to be resolved in favor of the

claimant.

Newell, 347 F.3d at 546; accord McCrea v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 370 F.3d 357, 360 (3d Cir.

2004) (“The burden placed on an applicant at step two is not an exacting one. . . . Any doubt as

to whether this showing has been made is to be resolved in favor of the applicant.”) In McCrea,

the Third Circuit reaffirmed the severity standard announced in Newell and added that, in light of

the low threshold for severity, findings that an impairment is not severe “should be reviewed

with close scrutiny” and are “certain to raise a judicial eyebrow.” McCrea, 370 F.3d at 357.

This Court finds that the ALJ erred at step two in not finding that Plaintiff’s seizure

disorder and obesity qualified as severe impairments. Because any doubt must be resolved in

favor of the applicant, and because the ALJ acknowledged the evidence of a seizure disorder and

obesity in the record (Tr. 26-27), the ALJ’s step two decision is in error. Nonetheless, Plaintiff

has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by this error, as required by Shinseki. At step

two, the ALJ found four other severe impairments. Had the total count been six, instead of four,

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it would not have made any difference to the outcome, and Plaintiff’s brief acknowledges that

courts in this district have generally agreed that this sort of error at step two is harmless. (Pl.’s

Br. at 10.) This Court finds no prejudice to Plaintiff in the error at step two. Plaintiff has failed

to persuade this Court that the error at step two harmed him.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61 states: “At every stage of the proceeding, the court

must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party’s substantial rights.” This

Court finds that the ALJ’s error at step two did not affect Plaintiff’s substantial rights under the

Social Security Act. It can only be harmless error.

Plaintiff next challenges the ALJ’s analysis at step three, arguing that the determination

that Plaintiff did not meet the requirements of any Listing was not supported by an adequate

rationale and is not supported by substantial evidence. Again, the problem here for Plaintiff is

Shinseki’s requirement that Plaintiff prove that the error was material and prejudicial.

Plaintiff’s brief does not muster the evidence that could support the determination that Plaintiff

met all the requirements for any specific Listing. Instead, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not

explain the rationale for the decision at step three clearly enough. The Court has reviewed the

ALJ’s decision at step three and finds that the ALJ provided a detailed and clear explanation of

the basis in the evidence of record for the determination that Plaintiff did not meet the

requirements of Listings 12.02, 12.04, and 12.06. (Tr. 27-28.) Plaintiff has made no

demonstration that, in fact, specific evidence of record supports any other conclusion. In the

absence of such a demonstration, this Court cannot find that any potential errors at step three

resulted in any material prejudice to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff next challenges the residual functional capacity determination at step four,

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arguing that the ALJ’s determination is not supported by substantial evidence. The key

difficulty with this section of Plaintiff’s brief is that Plaintiff acknowledges that the ALJ

considered the three key medical opinions, and the underlying medical records offered to support

them, and also performed and explained the persuasiveness analysis mandated by 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520c, and ended up finding the opinion of the state agency reviewer, Dr. Wielczko, to be

most persuasive based on its consistency with the evidence of record. In short, because Plaintiff

has acknowledged that the ALJ performed the step four RFC determination pretty much entirely

in accordance with the law and applicable Regulations, the Court does not discern the basis for

Plaintiff’s contention that the determination is not supported by substantial evidence. In part,

Plaintiff refers to the treating physician rule, which is inapplicable to this case, since the

disability claim was filed years after 2017; that rule was superceded by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c,

which the ALJ appears to have followed.

Plaintiff suggests – without citing specific pieces of evidence – that the evidence might

have supported further limitations based on epilepsy and obesity. Even if this is true – and this

Court need not reach this issue – a large body of evidence often supports multiple and various

interpretations. At step four, § 405(g) tasks this Court only with evaluating whether the factual

determinations on which the RFC determination is based are supported by substantial evidence.

The Supreme Court has stated that “substantial evidence” “means—and means only—'such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”

Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 203 L. Ed. 2d 504 (2019) (quoting

Consolidated Edison, 305 U. S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 L. Ed. 126 (1938)). Plaintiff has

neither argued nor persuaded that no reasonable finder of fact could have interpreted the

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evidence in this record in the way that the ALJ did at step four. In short, the law requires that.

for Plaintiff to prevail on this particular substantial evidence challenge to the RFC determination,

he would need to persuade that no finder of fact could have reasonably concluded that Dr.

Wielczko’s opinion deserved the greatest weight under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c; Plaintiff’s brief

acknowledges that he must do so, but Plaintiff does not make any detailed and persuasive

argument on this key point. (Pl.’s Br. at 21.) To the contrary, Plaintiff merely acknowledges

the ALJ’s determination that Dr. Wielczko’s opinion was consistent with the evidence of record.

At step four, the ALJ wrote a detailed paragraph which explained the basis for his

determination that Dr. Wielczko’s opinion was consistent with the evidence of record, and

therefore persuasive. The ALJ cited a number of key issues and cited a considerable amount of

evidence. (Tr. 30.) Plaintiff’s brief presents no real challenge to this persuasiveness

determination. Plaintiff has given this Court no basis to find that the ALJ’s decision about the

weight to be accorded to Dr. Wielczko’s opinion is not supported by substantial evidence.

Absent that, Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of proof under Shinseki that a substantial

evidence error at step four materially harmed him. Plaintiff’s references to the treating

physician rule are not relevant to this case, since the claim was filed in 2022, well after the

effective date of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c.

Next, Plaintiff challenges the determination at step five, but merely repeats his step four

argument that the RFC is incorrect. (Pl.’s Br. at 25-26.) The Court just considered this step

four argument and rejected it.

Last, Plaintiff argues that the Appeals Council’s subsequent decision not to allow

supplemental evidence into the record was improper. This Court has no authority to review the

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dynamics of the internal decision-making process at the United States Social Security

Administration; § 405(g) authorizes judicial review of only the final decision of the

Commissioner, and Plaintiff has cited no contrary authority. Third Circuit law is quite clear

about the limited scope of the statutory term, “final decision:”

A “final decision” is a particular type of agency action, and not all agency

determinations are final decisions. See, e.g., Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99,

107-08, 97 S. Ct. 980, 51 L. Ed. 2d 192 (1977) (judiciary may not review

Secretary’s decision refusing to reopen claim for disability benefits). The Social

Security Act does not define “final decision”; its meaning is left to the Secretary

to define by regulation. Under the regulations, an Appeals Council decision to

dismiss an untimely request for review is not a final decision within the meaning

of section 405(g) such that the district court would have jurisdiction to review that

decision.

Bacon v. Sullivan, 969 F.2d 1517, 1519-20 (3d Cir. 1992). Plaintiff has cited no authority for

the proposition that Appeals Council decisions about supplemental evidence fall within the ambit

of the final decisions of the Commissioner subject to judicial review pursuant to § 405(g).

Plaintiff has failed to persuade this Court that the ALJ erred in his decision, or that

Plaintiff was harmed by any errors. This Court finds that the Commissioner’s decision is

supported by substantial evidence and is affirmed.

s/ Stanley R. Chesler

STANLEY R. CHESLER, U.S.D.J.

Dated: August 18, 2026

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