Edwards

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

DISTRICT OF IDAHO

In re:

CARL BRUCE HOOPER and LACEY Case No. 26-40038-BRW

DARLENE HOOPER,

Chapter 7

Debtors.

BRITTANY EDWARDS,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Adv. No. 26-08003-BRW

CARL BRUCE HOOPER and LACEY

DARLENE HOOPER,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

In this adversary proceeding, Plaintiff Brittany Edwards (“Plaintiff”) seeks a

determination that her claims against Debtor-Defendants Carl Bruce Hooper and Lacey Darlene

Hooper (“Defendants”) are excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)(A) and

(a)(6).1 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 13) (the

“Motion”) filed on June 9, 2026, along with a statement of undisputed facts, memorandum, and

supporting exhibits. The Motion relies on the preclusive effect of an Idaho state court judgment

obtained prior to bankruptcy. Defendants did not respond to the Motion but later filed a Motion

1 Hereinafter, unless otherwise indicated, all section citations are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11

U.S.C. §§ 101–1532, all citations to a “Rule” are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and

citations to a “Civil Rule” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

for Continuance (Doc. No. 15) on July 15, 2026, the day before the hearing on the Motion.2 On

July 16, 2026, the Court held the hearing on the Motion (the “Hearing”), took the matter under

advisement, and denied Defendants’ Motion for Continuance. After considering the record and

arguments of Counsel, the following constitutes the Court’s decision. Rule 7052.

I. JURISDICTION, AUTHORITY, AND VENUE

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 157(a) and 1334(b) as referred to it by the district court pursuant to General Order No.

349. This adversary proceeding is a “core” proceeding and is within this Court’s constitutional

authority to determine via final judgment or order. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I) and (O). Finally,

venue is appropriate in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Undisputed Facts

Plaintiff has identified the following as undisputed material facts.3 Defendants failed to

respond to the Motion or provide a statement of disputed and undisputed facts as required by this

Court’s Local Rules. See LBR 7056-1(b)(2).

Prepetition, on May 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Mr. Hooper and Hooper

2 At a pre-trial conference held June 4, 2026, Defendants sought a continuance to permit them to

retain counsel. The Court granted the motion, but expressly stated that it was not staying Plaintiff from

prosecuting the adversary proceeding as she saw fit and that given this, Defendants should obtain counsel

promptly if they determined to do so. See Doc. No. 12 (minute entry). Plaintiff filed the instant Motion

for Summary Judgment shortly thereafter. The day before the hearing on the motion, Defendants filed a

motion, again seeking a continuance because they had not yet obtained counsel. Later, and notably,

Defendants had counsel informally appear on their behalf at a hearing on August 5, 2026, in a different

adversary proceeding against them (26-08004-BRW). At that time, their intended counsel was made

aware of the instant adversary proceeding and its status, however, to date, no formal notice of appearance

has been filed in either case.

3 Submitted as part of the Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff also provided the state court

complaint detailing the factual background upon which summary judgment was granted. See Doc. No.

13, Ex. D.

Homes LLC in the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho (the “State Court”), Case No.

CV26-25-0511, asserting claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, conversion, fraud, and

violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (“ICPA”).4 On August 15, 2025, the State Court

granted summary judgment to Plaintiff and entered an “Order Re Motion for Summary

Judgment” against Mr. Hooper as to “each and every count of the Complaint and Demand for

Jury Trial filed May 16, 2025.” Doc. No. 13, Ex. A (emphasis in original). The order explicitly

found Mr. Hooper liable for “Breach of Contract, Unjust Enrichment, Conversion, Fraud, and

Violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (Unlawful and Deceptive Acts).” Id.

Subsequently, on August 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint adding

Performance Fencing LLC (“Performance Fencing”) as a defendant and asserting claims for

unjust enrichment and alter ego/piercing the corporate veil. Performance Fencing failed to

answer or otherwise defend the action. As a result, on September 25, 2025, the State Court

entered an “Order for Default” against Performance Fencing. Doc. No. 13, Ex. B.

That same day, September 25, 2025, the State Court also entered a final judgment (the

“Judgment”) against Hooper Homes LLC, Mr. Hooper, and Performance Fencing. The

Judgment found Mr. Hooper liable to Plaintiff Brittany Edwards for breach of contract, unjust

enrichment, conversion, fraud, and violation of the ICPA and awarded Plaintiff $246,663.64 in

damages and $17,046.41 in attorney fees and costs. Doc. No. 13, Ex. C. The Judgment also held

Hooper Homes LLC liable for those same claims with the same $264,663.64 in damages, but

4 The action involved a residential construction project Plaintiff hired Mr. Hooper and his entity,

Hooper Homes LLC, to complete. Plaintiff alleged that after providing funds to Mr. Hooper, those funds

were not applied towards the project but instead were diverted elsewhere, leaving materialmen unpaid.

Further, she alleged that they did not complete the project as agreed, requiring her to hire a third party to

finish the work at a higher cost.

$8,434.91 in attorney fees and costs.5 Id. Additionally, the Judgment held Performance Fencing

liable to Plaintiff for unjust enrichment, alter ego, and piercing the corporate veil with the same

$246,663.64 in damages, but attorney fees and costs of $3,813. Id.

Throughout the state court litigation, Defendants were married. The debt established by

the State Court litigation was likewise incurred during Defendants’ marriage. On January 26,

2026, Defendants filed a joint chapter 7 case.

On March 27, 2026, Plaintiff initiated this adversary proceeding seeking a declaratory

judgment that the State Court debt, consisting of $264,663.64 in damages and attorney fees and

costs of $20,859.41,6 is excepted from discharge under § 523(a) and that Defendants’ marital

community property remains liable for it pursuant to § 524(a) and (b). Defendants filed an

Answer to the complaint on May 12, 2026, generally denying the allegations of Plaintiff’s

complaint.

Subsequently, Plaintiff filed the Motion arguing that Defendants are precluded from

relitigating these issues under the doctrine of collateral estoppel as the elements were already

litigated in the State Court. As stated, the Motion was not opposed by Defendants.

III. APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standards

Civil Rule 56(a), incorporated by Rule 7056, provides that a “court shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact,” and when

5 The statement of undisputed facts submitted by Plaintiff stated that the Judgment awarded

Plaintiff $17,046.41 in attorney fees and costs against Hooper Homes. However, the Court believes this

is a scrivener’s error as the Judgment itself, at Exhibit C, provides an award of the above-stated $8,434.91

in attorney fees and costs.

6 This amount of attorney fees and costs includes the $3,813 in attorney fees Plaintiff incurred in

the alter ego and veil piercing remedies she pursued against Performance Fencing and the $17,046.41 in

attorney fees incurred for the claims she pursued against Mr. Hooper.

viewing the evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, “the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Civil Rule 56(a); Rule 7056; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 322–23 (1986); Far Out Prods., Inc. v. Oskar, 247 F.3d 986, 992 (9th Cir. 2001). A

“genuine” dispute exists where there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find in

favor of the non-moving party, and a fact is “material” where it might affect the outcome of the

case. Far Out Prods., 247 F.3d at 992 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248–49 (1986)).

In resolving a motion for summary judgment, the court only determines whether a

material factual dispute exists requiring trial; the court does not weigh evidence. Covey v.

Hollydale Mobilehome Estates, 116 F.3d 830, 834 (9th Cir. 1997). Where evidence is genuinely

disputed on a particular issue, such as by conflicting testimony, that issue “is inappropriate for

resolution on summary judgment.” Direct Techs., LLC v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 836 F.3d 1059, 1067

(9th Cir. 2016). In cases where intent is at issue, summary judgment is seldom granted;

however, “summary judgment is appropriate if all reasonable inferences defeat the claims of one

side, even when intent is at issue.” Gertsch v. Johnson & Johnson, Fin. Corp. (In re Gertsch),

237 B.R. 160, 165 (9th Cir. BAP 1999) (citations omitted). Summary judgment may be defeated

by evidence “such that a reasonable juror drawing all inferences in favor of the respondent could

return a verdict in the respondent's favor.” Reza v. Pearce, 806 F.3d 497, 505 (9th Cir. 2015).

On the other hand, “‘[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to

find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial,’ and summary judgment is

appropriate.” Zetwick v. County of Yolo, 850 F.3d 436, 441 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ricci v.

DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009)).

The moving party bears the initial burden in demonstrating that there is no genuine issue

of material fact. Idaho Dep’t Labor v. Tileh (In re Tileh), 665 B.R. 447, 452 (Bankr. D. Idaho

2024) (citations omitted); Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 852 (9th Cir. 1998). Where the non-

moving party bears the ultimate burden of proving an element at trial, they must sufficiently

demonstrate the existence of that element to survive the motion for summary judgment, In re

Tileh, 665 B.R. at 452, and “may not rely on denials in the pleadings but must produce specific

evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery materials, to show that the dispute exists.”

Barboza v. New Form, Inc. (In re Barboza), 545 F.3d 702, 707 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bhan v.

NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991)). Where a party does not properly

support an assertion of fact, or fails to address another party’s assertion of fact, the Court may:

(1) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact;

(2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion;

(3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting

materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that

the movant is entitled to it; or

(4) issue any appropriate order.

Civil Rule 56(e).

Under this standard, without such opposition, Plaintiff has established as a matter of

undisputed fact that Mr. Hooper owes Plaintiff a debt under the Judgment. See Cheirett v. Biggs

(In re Biggs), 563 B.R. 319, 323 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2017). Nevertheless, the Court must still

determine whether Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff asserts that the

Judgment finding Mr. Hooper liable for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, conversion, fraud,

and violation of the ICPA and Performance Fencing liable for unjust enrichment, alter ego, and

piercing the corporate veil should be afforded preclusive effect and permit this Court to conclude

such debt is excepted from discharge under §§ 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(6).

B. Issue Preclusion7

Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, prevents parties from relitigating factual issues

that have already been determined by previous litigation. Herrera v. Scott (In re Scott), 588 B.R.

122, 131 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2018) (citing Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Keating, 186 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th

Cir. 1999)). In doing so, “[a] bankruptcy court may rely on the preclusive effect of a state court

judgment as the basis for granting summary judgment.” In re Biggs, 563 B.R. at 324 (citing

Plyam v. Precision Dev., LLC (In re Plyam), 530 B.R. 456, 462 (9th Cir. BAP 2015)). This

doctrine applies in exception to discharge proceedings. Khaligh v. Hadaegh (In re Khaligh), 338

B.R. 817, 824 (9th Cir. BAP 2006) (citing Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284-85, n.11

(1991)). “If an element of a claim under § 523(a) was decided in prior litigation, the debtor will

be precluded from contesting that element in the § 523 action.” Mann Mort., LLC v. Howell (In

re Howell), 2026 WL 852297, at *4 (9th Cir. BAP Mar. 27, 2026). This Court has previously

explained that

[a]s a matter of full faith and credit, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 requires

federal courts to apply the pertinent state’s issue preclusion laws to

determine whether relitigation of an issue is precluded in a

subsequent federal action. The party asserting issue preclusion

bears the burden of proving its applicability under state

law. Harmon v. Kobrin (In re Harmon), 250 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th

Cir. 2001). The party must also provide “a record sufficient to

reveal the controlling facts and pinpoint the exact issues litigated in

the prior action.” Kelly v. Okoye (In re Kelly), 182 B.R. 255, 258

(9th Cir. BAP 1995), aff.’d, 100 F.3d 110 (9th Cir. 1996). Any

reasonable doubts as to what was decided by a prior judgment

should be resolved against a finding of issue preclusion. Id.

7 Plaintiff also argues in the Motion that federal claim preclusion supports entry of summary

judgment and bars any collateral attack on the Judgment. However, there is no indication that an

exception to discharge claim was contemplated in the State Court litigation, especially considering it was

prepetition. Further, the question of whether a debt is excepted from discharge falls outside the scope of

state court litigation, as bankruptcy courts have exclusive jurisdiction in that regard. Dominguez v. Elias

(In re Elias), 302 B.R. 900, 907 n.7 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003). Therefore, claim preclusion does not apply

and only issue preclusion is examined here. Id.

In re Scott, 588 B.R. at 131.

Under Idaho law, issue preclusion applies where:

(1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a

full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier

case; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the

issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be

precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was

a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party

against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a

party to the litigation.

In re Tileh, 665 B.R. at 455 (quoting Byrd v. Idaho State Bd. of Land Comm’rs, 505 P.3d 708

(Idaho 2022)).

Therefore, the question before the Court is whether, under Idaho preclusion law, the

Judgment establishes that the debt owed by Defendants was obtained by fraud under

§ 523(a)(2)(A) or by willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6) such that further litigation of

the issue is precluded in this adversary proceeding.

1. Full and Fair Opportunity to Litigate the Issue

First, the Court must determine whether Defendants had a full and fair opportunity to

litigate this issue during the prior state court action. This is a relatively low standard that merely

requires that an argument could have been made in a prior proceeding. In re Scott, 588 B.R. at

132 (citing Bach v. Bagley, 229 P.3d 1146, 1157 (Idaho 2010)).

Here, Mr. Hooper appeared in the state court action and answered Plaintiff’s state court

complaint. See Doc. No. 13, Ex. G. He did not subsequently respond to Plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment. However, such failure, or election not to proceed, does not negate his full

and fair opportunity to litigate. As such, this first element is satisfied. See In re Biggs, 563 B.R.

at 325 (finding that this element was met under similar circumstances).

2. Identity of Issues

Under this element, the Court must determine whether the issues litigated in the State

Court are identical to those presented in this adversary proceeding. In doing so, the Court must

compare and consider whether the elements of the causes of action underlying the Judgment for

breach of contract, unjust enrichment, conversion, fraud, and violation of the ICPA against Mr.

Hooper individually, and for unjust enrichment and alter ego and veil piercing against

Performance Fencing, are the same as those in this discharge proceeding under §§ 523(a)(2)(A)

and (a)(6).

a) Section 523(a)(2)(A)

An individual debtor will not be discharged from any debt:

(2) for money, property, services, or an extension renewal, or

refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by –

(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud,

other than a statement respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s

financial condition[.]

§ 523(a)(2)(A).

To state a claim under § 523(a)(2)(A) for fraud or misrepresentation the plaintiff

must show by a preponderance of evidence:

(1) misrepresentation, fraudulent omission, or deceptive conduct by

the debtor; (2) knowledge of the falsity or deceptiveness of his

statement or conduct; (3) an intent to deceive; (4) justifiable reliance

by the creditor on the debtor’s statement or conduct; and (5) damage

to the creditor proximately caused by its reliance on the debtor’s

statement or conduct.

In re Tileh, 665 B.R. at 457; Ghomeshi v. Sabban (In re Sabban), 600 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir.

2010).

i. Performance Fencing LLC – Unjust Enrichment, Alter Ego,

and Veil Piercing

Plaintiff contends that the Judgment finding Performance Fencing liable for unjust

enrichment, and alter ego and piercing the corporate veil, and awarding Plaintiff $246,663.41 in

damages and $3,813 in attorney fees and costs is imputed to Mr. Hooper individually, as his alter

ego, and satisfies the elements for exception from discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A). Specifically,

Plaintiff argues that Performance Fencing’s “corporate manipulation constitutes

nondischargeable actual fraud” and relies upon T Street LLC v. Jacques (In re Jacques), 615

B.R. 608 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2020). Doc. No. 13 at 13-14. While In re Jacques demonstrates that

an alter ego, veil piercing claim may establish personal liability that is excepted from discharge,

such result is not automatic. The entity’s liabilities may be imputed to the individual, but those

liabilities must still be proven to be an exception to discharge. In re Jacques, 615 B.R. at 632,

634. Further, an alter ego or veil piercing claim is not an independent cause of action, but “a

remedy that, without an underlying substantive cause of action, does not lead to substantive

relief.” Gugino v. Clark’s Crystal Springs Ranch, LLC (In re Clark), 525 B.R. 107, 126 (Bankr.

D. Idaho 2014) (quoting Grimmett v. McCloskey (In re Wardle), 2006 WL 6811026 (9th Cir.

BAP Jan. 31, 2006)). Thus, the Court must consider whether the elements for unjust enrichment,

the underlying substantive cause of action against Performance Fencing, align with those under

§ 523(a)(2)(A).

To prove unjust enrichment under Idaho law, a plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) there was

a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of such

benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for the

defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the value thereof.” Turcott v.

Est. of Bates, 443 P.3d 197, 204 (Idaho 2019).

These elements are not identical to those under § 523(a)(2)(A).

Unlike a § 523(a)(2)(A) claim, unjust enrichment requires neither a

finding that the defendant made false representations upon which

the plaintiff relied, nor a finding that the defendant acted with any

particular intent. Gilbert v. Progressive Nw. Ins. Co., 577 P.3d 519,

533 (Idaho 2025) (“Unjust enrichment arises from a contract

implied-in-law, not from the intent of the parties, but as a remedy

imposed to achieve equity.”). In contrast, a claim under

§ 523(a)(2)(A) requires a finding that the defendant made a

knowingly false representation with the intent to deceive the

creditor, In re Laraway, 2010 WL 3703272, at *7 (Bankr. D. Idaho

Sept. 13, 2010), and the creditor justifiably relied on that

representation. Fetty v. DL Carlson Enters., Inc. (In re Carlson),

426 B.R. 840, 855 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2010).

Bentley v. Grubb (In re Grubb), 2026 WL 2172407, at *5 (Bankr. D. Idaho July 28, 2026).

Because a claim under § 532(a)(2)(A) requires findings not otherwise necessary to establish

unjust enrichment under Idaho law, the State Court’s finding that Performance Fencing was

liable for unjust enrichment is not entitled to preclusive effect under § 523(a)(2)(A).

Therefore, despite such liability and imputation to Mr. Hooper, the awarded damages,

costs, and fees are not entitled to preclusive effect and not excepted from discharge under this

theory.8 Under this analysis, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to the attorney fees

and costs of $3,813 included in the Judgment against Performance Fencing is denied.

ii. Mr. Hooper – Fraud

Plaintiff asserts that the elements of Idaho common law fraud, the primary basis for the

Judgment against Mr. Hooper individually, fully encompass the elements under § 523(a)(2)(A),

precluding re-litigation in this proceeding. Under Idaho law,

nine elements must be proven by clear and convincing evidence to

sustain a cause of action for fraud: “1) a statement or a

representation of fact; 2) its falsity; 3) its materiality; 4) the

8 Notably, however, the State Court already held Mr. Hooper personally liable for the

$246,663.64 in damages by his own individual conduct. See Doc. No. 13, Ex. A & C.

speaker’s knowledge of its falsity; 5) the speaker’s intent that there

be reliance; 6) the hearer’s ignorance of the falsity of the statement;

7) reliance by the hearer; 8) justifiable reliance; and 9) resultant

injury.”

Killgore Adventures, LLC v. Marek (In re Marek), 468 B.R. 406, 410 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2012)

(quoting Taylor v. McNichols, 243 P.3d 642, 661-62 (Idaho 2010)). These elements of fraud

track those of § 523(a)(2)(A). In re Marek, 468 B.R. at 410; see also Clarke v. Latimer (In re

Latimer), 2014 WL 2441469, at *3 (Bankr. D. Ha. May 29, 2014) (applying Idaho law and

finding that § 523(a)(2)(A) and actual fraud under Idaho law are “essentially the same”); In re

Davis, 2012 WL 4831494, at *4 (Bankr. D. Idaho Oct. 10, 2012) (concluding that the court is

satisfied that “the elements of fraud under Idaho law are the same as those required for an

exception to discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A)”). Both require a false statement or

misrepresentation, knowledge of the falsity, an intent to deceive/induce reliance, justifiable

reliance, and a resultant injury/damage. Even if the Defendants assert that there was an error by

the State Court in analysis of these elements, such argument is unavailing. Any perceived error

is irrelevant in determining its preclusive effect—such judgment cannot be collaterally attacked.

In re Marek, 468 B.R. at 411.

Thus, the issues litigated in the State Court finding Mr. Hooper personally liable for fraud are the

same as those under § 523(a)(2)(A), satisfying this element of issue preclusion. Because this

element is met and the remaining causes of action stem from the same set of underlying facts, the

Court need not consider Plaintiff’s supplemental arguments under § 523(a)(2)(A) or § 523(a)(6).

3. Issue was Actually Decided and a Final Judgment on the Merits was

Entered

Courts differ as to whether default judgments, consent judgments, and uncontested

summary judgments meet issue preclusion’s “actually litigated” requirement. See Union Nat’l

Bank of Marseilles v. Leigh (In re Leigh), 165 B.R. 203, 218-19 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993)

(discussing the two lines of cases allowing or disallowing the application of collateral estoppel).

However, for purposes of res judicata, including both true res judicata and collateral estoppel, the

Idaho Supreme Court has held that absent evidence of fraud or collusion, a default judgment is

entitled to preclusive effect. Waller v. State Dep’t. of Health & Welfare, 192 P.3d 1058, 1062

(Idaho 2008); Idaho Dep’t of Labor v. John (In re John), 677 B.R. 700, 708 (Bankr. D. Idaho

2025). Likewise, a grant of summary judgment is entitled to preclusive effect. Andrus v.

Nicholson, 186 P.3d 630, 634 (Idaho 2008) (citing Ross v. Ross, 789 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Idaho

1990)); see also In re Biggs, 563 B.R. at 326 (finding that a state court’s entry of summary

judgment met these two preclusion elements even where it was unopposed).

Nevertheless, some cases and jurisdictions utilize a case-by-case approach, imposing

certain requirements to afford default or summary judgments preclusive effect. For example,

under Arizona law, preclusion requires a party’s actual litigation and participation. Child v.

Foxboro Ranch Estates, LLC (In re Child), 486 B.R. 168, 175-76 (9th Cir. BAP 2013). Thus, in

Arizona, neither default judgments nor unopposed summary judgments, which are identical for

all practical purposes to a default judgment, qualify as the basis for preclusion. Id. at 175.

Under California law, default judgments may be entitled to preclusive effect, but two

limitations are placed thereon—the defendant must have had personal, actual knowledge of the

litigation and the record must show “an express finding upon the allegation for which preclusion

is sought[,]” but this express finding requirement may be “waived if the court in the prior

proceeding necessarily decided the issue.” Price v. Reddin (In re Reddin), 626 B.R. 845, 855

(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2021) (quoting Cal-Micro, Inc. v. Cantrell, 329 F.3d 1119, 1123-24 (9th Cir.

2003) (internal citations and quotations omitted). In In re Baloch, a California state court default

judgment found a debtor-defendant liable for fraud but “[w]hile the state court did not make

explicit findings on each of the fraud elements, it could not have rendered a finding on the

ultimate issue of [debtor-defendant’s] fraud (as it did) unless it implicitly found that each of the

fraud elements had been established.” In re Baloch, 2014 WL 764357, at *4 (9th Cir. BAP Feb.

26, 2014). Thus, in that case the state court’s implicit findings as to the fraud elements were

sufficient to be considered actually litigated and afforded preclusive effect. Id. at 4-5.

Although Idaho does not impose such additional requirements or restrictions, the Court

can employ a similar analysis to the Judgment. Much like in In re Baloch, the State Court found

Mr. Hooper liable for fraud, among other causes of action, without providing explicit findings as

to each element. However, to reach that conclusion, the State Court necessarily had to find that

each element had been met, albeit implicitly. Further, despite a lack of findings of fact or

conclusions of law in the Judgment, courts have nevertheless found that a state court judgment

may be entitled to preclusive effect. See In re Latimer, 2014 WL 2441469, at *1, 2 n. 7

(applying Idaho law, likening an unopposed summary judgment to a default judgment, and

finding that the state court’s summary judgment, which did not include written findings of fact or

conclusions of law, and subsequent order granting punitive damages, actually decided all of the

issues necessary to support its judgment); Digit. Sys. Eng’g, Inc. v. Moreno (In re Moreno), 414

B.R. 485, 492 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. 2009) (applying Arizona law and finding that the state court’s

minute entry granting partial summary judgment had “implicitly reached the issues essential to

its judgment, [such] that [the] judgment supports a finding of facts necessary for

nondischargeability pursuant to § 523(a)(2)”); Harris v. Curley (In re Curley), 666 B.R. 673,

682-83 (Bankr. D. Or. 2024) (indicating that under Oregon law, the actually litigated

requirement is met even where the judgment was entered by default without findings); Tobin v.

Sans Souci Ltd. P’ship (In re Tobin), 258 B.R. 199, 203 (9th Cir. BAP 2001) (stating that

“[w]hile the transcript of the state court summary judgment hearing is not in the record before us,

the parties do not dispute (and we infer from the state court judgment) that the issues were

litigated at summary judgment”); but see Strong v. Dir. of State of Idaho, 2005 WL 1421445, at

*6 (D. Idaho June 15, 2005) (concluding that the state court’s order granting summary judgment

and dismissing the suit was insufficient to determine whether a judgment on the merits was

entered because the judgment did not specify the reasons beyond those “articulated at hearing”

and the court did not have the hearing transcript or judgment reflecting whether such dismissal

was with or without prejudice)9; Helber v. Cline (In re Cline), 614 B.R. 284, 289 (Bankr. S.D.

Ohio 2020) (finding that a single-page state court default judgment without listing the causes of

action or providing factual findings or legal conclusions, was insufficient to be entitled to

preclusive effect.)

The Judgment did not include explicit findings of fact or conclusions of law, however, it

specifically found Mr. Hooper liable for fraud. As such, the issues were “actually decided” and

constitute “a final judgment on the merits,” satisfying the third and fourth elements for issue

preclusion.

4. Identity of Parties

The element of the identity of the parties is also met because Plaintiff and Mr. Hooper

were both parties in the State Court action. However, Mrs. Hooper, joint debtor and a named

defendant in this adversary proceeding, was not a party in the State Court litigation. As such,

9 While Strong ultimately found that summary judgment was inappropriate, it is distinguishable

from the instant case based on the underlying facts, its defensive use of res judicata, or claim preclusion,

rather than offensive issue preclusion, and the court’s concern and uncertainty about whether the state

district court’s dismissal was with or without prejudice.

issue preclusion as to Mrs. Hooper is not appropriate. The Motion is denied to the extent it seeks

a determination on summary judgment that the debt is excepted from discharge as to Mrs.

Hooper.

C. Damages

After determining that the Judgment has met all the elements of issue preclusion under

Idaho law for its finding of fraud and is entitled to preclusive effect and thus excepted from

discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A) as to Mr. Hooper, the Court must now consider the amount in

damages to be excepted from discharge given the State Court’s collective award of damages for

all causes of action. Although the Judgment does not allocate specific damages to each

individual cause of action, Plaintiff argued at the Hearing that the requested damages are

attributable to each individual count, and all counts. For example, Plaintiff stated that even if she

only sued for fraud, the amount in damages would have been the same. This is consistent with

the allegations and damages sought in the State Court complaint. Doc. No. 13, Ex. D.10

Effectively, the same course of related conduct underlies each claim against Defendant that

resulted in a single loss suffered by Plaintiff (i.e. $246,663.64). In In re Baloch, the BAP found

that all the plaintiff’s damages were attributable to a defendant’s fraud where it was “clear that

[the plaintiff] suffered a single loss and that fraud and breach of contract were pled as alternate

theories of relief based on the same loss.” In re Baloch, 2014 WL 764357, at *5; see also Rael v.

Gonzales (In re Gonzales), 667 B.R. 357, 374 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2025) (citing Beard Rsch., Inc. v.

Kates (In re Kates), 485 B.R. 86, 111 (Bank. E.D. Pa. 2012) (holding that the court need not

10 However, the Court notes that the damages sought under each cause of action alleged in the

State Court complaint vary. The counts for fraud, breach of contract, and alter ego/veil pierce included

both the $96,663.64 and $150,000 in damages while the claims for unjust enrichment and conversion only

sought $96,663.64 in damages. The claim for ICPA requested “actual damages.”

determine whether the five successful state court claims were “nondischargeable and, if any of

them are not, allocate the nondischargeable claims among them” because the plaintiff’s injuries

were caused by debtor-defendant’s “single course of related conduct”)).

The same could be said here as Plaintiff’s claims against Mr. Hooper are merely

different legal avenues to reach the same loss—the $96,663.64 in damages for money paid but

not applied to the project and the $150,000 in increased costs to finish the project. Further,

where the damages for each cause of action are indistinguishable from the others, the Court will

consider them as a lump sum. See Erickson v. Bundy (In re Bundy), 673 B.R. 492, 514 (Bankr.

D. Utah 2025) (finding that the bankruptcy court must apply the entire Idaho default judgment as

“[t]o do otherwise would constitute an impermissible re-opening” of the judgment).

Further, once it has been established that a debtor obtained money, property, or services

by fraud, as has been done here, “any debt arising therefrom is excepted from discharge,”

including attorney fees and costs. Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 218 (1998).

Therefore, the Judgment is entitled to preclusive effect, as discussed above, and the

$246,663.64 in damages and $17,046.41 in attorney fees and costs are excepted from discharge

under § 523(a)(2)(A) as to Mr. Hooper.11

D. Liability of the Postpetition Community Property for the Non-Dischargeable

Debt

Plaintiff also seeks a determination that Defendants’ community property is liable for the

debt determined to be excepted from discharge as to Mr. Hooper, pursuant to § 524(a)(3).12 So

11 As determined above, the State Court’s award of $3,813 in attorney fees and costs against

Performance Fencing LLC is not entitled to preclusive effect.

12 This statute provides:

(a) A discharge in a case under this title— . . . (3) operates as an injunction

against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment

(Continued)

long as the debt is determined to be a community claim, by natural operation of § 524(a)(3), this

debt would be collectable against Defendants’ community property postpetition.

Mr. Hooper’s liability for purposes of excepting a debt from discharge under

§ 523(a)(2)(A) is established by the Judgment’s preclusive effect. Such liability, however,

cannot be imputed to Mrs. Hooper and her sole and separate property, on this record at the

summary judgment stage, because generally, “a marital union alone, without a finding of a

partnership or other agency relationship between spouses, cannot serve as a basis for imputing

fraud from one spouse to the other for purposes of excepting a debt from discharge under

§ 523(a)(2)(A).” M.O. v. Del Rosario (In re Del Rosario), 668 B.R. 618, 628 n. 8 (9th Cir. BAP

2025) (quoting Tsurukawa v. Nikon Precision, Inc. (In re Tsurukawa), 258 B.R. 192 (9th Cir.

BAP 2001)) (quotations omitted); see also Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, 598 U.S. 69, 80-83 (2023)

(holding that a partner’s vicarious liability for fraud debts may be nondischargeable regardless of

whether the debtor himself committed the fraud). Such analysis, however, “applies only to

determine whether the innocent spouse gets her own discharge, and thus whether her sole and

separate property will be free from the debt or liable for it.” Arcadia Farms Ltd. v. Rollinson (In

re Rollinson), 322 B.R. 879, 884-85 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005) (noting that Tsurukawa did not

address community property or § 524(a)(3)); In re San Vincente, 2023 WL 415161, at *7 (Bankr.

S.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2023). The Judgment does not name Mrs. Hooper as a defendant or attribute

of process, or an act, to collect or recover from, or offset against, property

of the debtor of the kind specified in section 541(a)(2) of this title that is

acquired after commencement of the case, on account of any allowable

community claim, except a community claim that is excepted from

discharge under section 523 . . . , in a case concerning the debtor’s spouse

commenced on the date of the filing of the petition in the case concerning

the debtor . . . .

§ 524(a)(3) (emphasis added).

any liability to her. Therefore, the Motion is denied as to Mrs. Hooper individually, except as

provided in § 524(a)(3). To the extent that Plaintiff seeks a determination that the Judgment

should be excepted from Mrs. Hooper’s discharge, a trial in this case will likely be necessary.

Notwithstanding Mrs. Hopper’s lack of personal liability for the Judgment, any award

against Mr. Hooper is presumed to be a community debt, if it was incurred during the marriage.

The Code defines a “community claim” as a “claim that arose before the commencement of the

case concerning the debtor for which property of the kind specified in section 541(a)(2) of this

title is liable, whether or not there is any such property at the time of the commencement of the

case.” § 101(7). Whether a debt is a community claim is a question of state law. F.D.I.C. v.

Soderling (In re Soderling), 998 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1993). “In Idaho, indebtedness incurred

by a spouse during marriage is presumed to be a community obligation.” United States Trustee

v. Warr (In re Warr), 410 B.R. 891, 896 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009) (citing Simplot v. Simplot, 526

P.2d 844, 851 (Idaho 1974)). Further, Idaho courts have “long held that the separate debts of

either spouse may be paid from community property[,]” even where they are not incurred for the

benefit of the community. Credit Bureau of E. Idaho, Inc. v. Lecheminant, 235 P.3d 1188, 1192-

93 (Idaho 2010). Thus, the Judgment at issue is a community claim and may be satisfied with

community assets as provided in § 524(a)(3).13

IV. CONCLUSION

Each of the state law preclusion factors have been met and the Judgment as to its finding

of fraud is entitled to preclusive effect. For purposes of this adversary proceeding, Plaintiff has

13 While “[n]ormally, the discharge causes community property acquired post-petition to be free

from pre-petition community claims” under § 524(a)(3), such discharge does not immunize postpetition

community property from community debt where it is excepted from discharge under § 523. In re San

Vincente, 2023 WL 415161, at *7 (quoting Rollinson, 322 B.R. at 883).

established that Mr. Hooper’s debt was obtained by fraud, that there are no genuine issues of

material fact, and that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the debt

represented by the Judgment against Mr. Hooper consisting of $264,663.64 in principal damages

and $17,046.41 in attorney fees and costs owed to Plaintiff is excepted from discharge pursuant

to § 523(a)(2)(A). The remaining $3,813.00 in attorney fees and costs sought by Plaintiff

through the Judgment finding Performance Fencing LLC liable for unjust enrichment, alter ego,

and veil piercing is not entitled to preclusive effect, and the Motion is denied to the extent it

seeks this amount. Finally, issue preclusion as to Mrs. Hooper is not appropriate and a

determination that the Judgment is excepted from her discharge is denied to the extent Plaintiff

seeks such a finding in the Motion. However, given the determination as to Mr. Hooper herein,

§ 524(a)(3) applies as to Defendants’ community property.

A separate order will be entered.

St, DATED: August 20, 2026

we Brent R. Wilson

i U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

MEMORANDUM DECISION - 20