The opinion
Case: 25-10752 Document: 78-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/20/2026
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
____________
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
No. 25-10752
Summary Calendar FILED
____________ August 20, 2026
Lyle W. Cayce
Conghua Yan, Clerk
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
The State of Texas; Leslie Starr Barrows, in Individual
Capacity; William Albert Pigg, in Individual Capacity; Lori L.
Deangelis, in Individual Capacity and Official Capacity as Associated
Judge; Panopyra P.L.L.C., A Private Company; Fuyan Wang, in
Individual Capacity; Jiayin Zheng, in Individual Capacity; Yuanli
Tang, in Individual Capacity,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:24-CV-579
______________________________
Before Richman, Southwick, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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No. 25-10752
Conghua Yan, proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of his federal
lawsuit arising from his divorce proceedings. Alleging a far-reaching
conspiracy against him, Yan sued his attorney, his ex-wife’s attorney, the
family-court judge, the State of Texas, and his ex-wife’s massage-therapy
business and two of her business associates. He sought damages under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), and state law, along with declaratory and injunctive relief. The
magistrate judge recommended dismissing all claims without leave to amend,
and the district court adopted that recommendation over Yan’s objections.
We AFFIRM.
I. Yan lacks standing to Sue Judge DeAngelis
Yan first contends that the district court erred in dismissing his claims
against Judge Lori DeAngelis for lack of standing. We disagree. Article III
confines federal jurisdiction to cases or controversies. U.S. Const. art. III,
§ 2; Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). There is no case or controversy
between a litigant and a judge acting in an adjudicatory capacity. Reule v.
Jackson, 114 F.4th 360, 365–66 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1431
(2025); see also Bauer v. Texas, 341 F.3d 352, 359–61 (5th Cir. 2003); Machetta
v. Moren, 726 F. App’x 219, 220 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).
That principle resolved Yan’s claims against Judge DeAngelis. She
presided over part of Yan’s divorce proceedings and entered the temporary
order at the heart of this suit. The order bears Yan’s signature and followed
a hearing at which he personally appeared. Although Yan now disputes the
authenticity of that signature, the order itself—referenced in and central to
his complaint—confirms that Judge DeAngelis was acting in an adjudicatory
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capacity. Yan therefore lacks standing to sue her. Accordingly, we AFFIRM
the dismissal of all claims against Judge DeAngelis. 1
II. The Claims Against Barrows and Pigg Are
Duplicative
Yan next challenges the dismissal of his § 1983 and RICO claims
against his ex-wife’s attorney, Leslie Starr Barrows, and his former attorney,
William Albert Pigg. The magistrate judge relied on res judicata and also
concluded that these claims duplicate an earlier suit. Yan v. State Bar of Texas
(Yan I ), No. 24-10543, 2025 WL 2759560 (5th Cir. Sept. 29, 2025) (per
curiam). Res judicata does not support affirmance on this record, but we
agree that the claims are duplicative. 2
The rule against claim-splitting litigation “prohibits a party or parties
in privity from simultaneously prosecuting multiple suits involving the same
subject matter against the same defendants.” Armadillo Hotel Grp., L.L.C. v.
Harris, 84 F.4th 623, 628–30 (5th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Barrows and Pigg were defendants in Yan I. 3 The two suits
also arise from the same nucleus of operative facts: the entry of a temporary
order in a divorce proceeding that was allegedly procured through fraud and
to Yan’s financial detriment. The district court therefore did not abuse its
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1
Because there is no jurisdiction, we do not address the merits of judicial immunity.
See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 98 (1998).
2 At the time the district court entered judgment here, Yan I was pending on
appeal. We later dismissed that appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction and remanded for
further proceedings. A judgment is final for res judicata purposes only when “the district
court properly entered final judgment, and that judgment never was modified on appeal.”
Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 718 F.3d 460, 468 (5th Cir. 2013). Yan I therefore does not
satisfy the finality requirement.
3
Yan I also named Judge DeAngelis, the bank that disbursed funds pursuant to
Judge DeAngelis’s temporary order, the State Bar of Texas, and attorneys from the bar’s
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel.
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discretion in dismissing the claims against Barrows and Pigg as duplicative.
We AFFIRM that dismissal.
III. The Panopyra Defendants’ RICO Claims
Yan also challenges the dismissal of his RICO claims against his ex-
wife, Fuyan Wang, her massage-therapy business, Panopyra PLLC, and two
of her business associates, Yuanli Tang and Jiayin Zheng (collectively,
Panopyra Defendants). The magistrate judge recommended dismissal as
duplicative and under Younger abstention. 4 Dismissal is nonetheless proper
but for a more straightforward reason: Yan failed to plead a plausible RICO
claim. See Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 622 (5th Cir.
2013) (“We . . . may affirm on any basis supported by the record.”).
To state a viable civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must plead a violation
of the criminal RICO statute and a resulting injury to business or property.
HCB Fin. Corp. v. McPherson, 8 F.4th 335, 338 (5th Cir. 2021). A violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1962 contains “three common elements: ‘(1) a person who
engages in (2) a pattern of racketeering activity, (3) connected to the
acquisition, establishment, conduct, or control of an enterprise.’” D&T
Partners, L.L.C. v. Baymark Partners Mgmt., L.L.C., 98 F.4th 198, 204–05
(5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Abraham v. Singh, 480 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2007)).
The pattern element requires “at least two predicate acts of racketeering
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4 Neither ground supports affirmance. The Panopyra Defendants were not parties
to Yan I and the record does not otherwise establish privity. See Armadillo, 84 F.4th at 630–
31. Nor does Younger provide a basis for affirmance. Yan’s RICO claim is not, at bottom,
a challenge to the validity of the family-court order. It is an independent claim that the
Panopyra Defendants laundered cash beginning in 2018—before the 2021 divorce
proceedings. The claim does not ask a federal court to invalidate, enjoin, or otherwise
interfere with a state-court order, and we are not persuaded that a private civil-damages
claim of this sort falls within the three “exceptional circumstances” to which Younger
narrowly applies. See Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 78 (2013) (“We have not
applied Younger outside these three ‘exceptional’ categories[.]”).
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activity.” Crowe v. Henry, 115 F.3d 294, 297 (5th Cir. 1997). Yan identifies
wire fraud and money laundering as predicate acts.5 His wire-fraud
allegations must also satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s
heightened pleading standard. See Williams v. WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d
175, 178 (5th Cir. 1997).
Yan’s allegations fall short. His complaint alleges, largely in
conclusory terms, that the Panopyra Defendants laundered cash and
structured deposits to evade reporting requirements, using overseas wire
transfers to carry out their racketeering enterprise. But as to wire fraud, Yan
does not identify a scheme to defraud or plead the use of interstate or foreign
wires in furtherance of one. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud requirements).
As to money laundering, Yan does not identify the “specified unlawful
activity” that generated the alleged proceeds or plead facts showing that any
defendant knew the property represented proceeds of unlawful activity. See
18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1), (c)(7) (money-laundering requirements).
The complaint independently fails to plead the continuity required for
a pattern of racketeering activity. See H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S.
229, 239–43 (1989). Continuity requires facts showing either “a closed
period of repeated conduct” or “past conduct that by its nature projects into
the future with a threat of repetition.” Id. at 241–42. Yan alleges neither. The
supposed scheme centers on one victim—Yan—and one objective connected
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5
Yan also alleges perjury and financial structuring as predicate acts. Perjury is not
a RICO predicate. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (listing the predicate offenses). Financial
structuring can qualify as a predicate act, id. § 1961(1)(E) (including acts indictable under
the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act), but it nonetheless “sound[s] in
fraud” for pleading purposes because its gravamen is the deliberate breaking up of
transactions to deceive a financial institution. See Lone Star Ladies Inv. Club v. Schlotzsky’s
Inc., 238 F.3d 363, 368–69 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Rule 9(b) applies by its plain language to all
averments of fraud, whether they are part of a claim of fraud or not.”).
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to the dissolution of his marriage. He alleges no facts suggesting an indefinite
threat of repetition. And we have repeatedly treated finite schemes aimed at
a limited set of victims and a singular objective as insufficient to establish
closed-ended continuity, even when the alleged conduct spans years. E.g.,
D&T Partners, 98 F.4th at 206–08; In re Burzynski, 989 F.2d 733, 743 (5th
Cir. 1993).
Because Yan has not pleaded a plausible RICO violation, we
AFFIRM the dismissal of his claims against the Panopyra Defendants.
IV. Sovereign Immunity Bars the Claims Against
Texas
Yan correctly concedes in his reply brief that his claims for declaratory
and injunctive relief against Texas are barred by sovereign immunity. Texas
has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See McCarthy ex rel.
Travis v. Hawkins, 381 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2004); Aguilar v. Tex. Dep’t of
Crim. Just., 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998). Nor does the Ex parte Young
exception permit suit against the State itself. See Bryant v. Tex. Dep’t of Aging
& Disability Servs., 781 F.3d 764, 769 (5th Cir. 2015). We therefore AFFIRM
the dismissal of Yan’s claims against Texas.
V. Supplemental Jurisdiction Was Properly Declined
Yan next argues that the district court erred by dismissing his
remaining state-law claims. We disagree. A district court “may decline” to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims if it “has dismissed
all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). We
review that decision for abuse of discretion. Heggemeier v. Caldwell Cnty., 826
F.3d 861, 872 (5th Cir. 2016). That discretion in deciding whether to retain
jurisdiction over state-law claims is “wide” and “not lightly disturb[ed]” on
appeal. Noble v. White, 996 F.2d 797, 799 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). Once
the district court properly dismissed all of Yan’s federal claims, declining to
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retain jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims was well within that
discretion.
VI. Further Amendment Would be Futile
Finally, Yan argues that the district court abused its discretion by
dismissing his claims without granting leave to amend. Rule 15 favors liberal
amendment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). But a court does not abuse its
discretion in denying leave where amendment would be futile, Avatar Expl.,
Inc. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 933 F.2d 314, 320–21 (5th Cir. 1991), particularly
where the plaintiff does not identify additional facts that would cure the
defect, Edionwe v. Bailey, 860 F.3d 287, 294 (5th Cir. 2017). Yan has already
filed multiple iterations of his complaint across two federal lawsuits arising
from the same divorce proceeding. Neither below nor on appeal has he
identified additional facts that another amendment would add, much less
facts that would cure the defects. On this record, denying further leave to
amend as futile was not an abuse of discretion.
VII. Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
7