Perdomo

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RAMIRO PERDOMO, : Civil No. 1:26-CV-00947

:

Petitioner, :

:

v. :

:

WARDEN, PIKE COUNTY :

CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, :

:

Respondent. : Judge Jennifer P. Wilson

MEMORANDUM

Before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241 filed by Petitioner Ramiro Perdomo (“Perdomo”). (Doc. 1.) Perdomo

argues that the length of his detention is unconstitutional and violates due process,

he had ineffective assistance of counsel at his immigration proceedings, and that

the immigration judge failed to examine the record in denying his asylum claim.

For the reasons that follow, the court will grant his petition as to the length-of-

detention issue and dismiss the remaining claims in the petition for lack of

jurisdiction.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Perdomo is a native and citizen of Honduras. (Doc. 8-3, p. 2.)1 He entered

the United States in 1996 at an unknown location without being admitted,

inspected, or paroled by an immigration official. (Id. at 3.) On January 19, 1999,

1 For ease of reference, the court uses the page numbers from the CM/ECF header.

Perdomo filed an application for temporary protected status (“TPS”), which was

approved on July 29, 1999, giving him TPS through July 5, 2000. (Id. at 3–4.)

Perdomo renewed his TPS status multiple times but on September 25, 2025, the

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services terminated Perdomo’s TPS.

(Id. at 4.)

On October 25, 2025, Perdomo was encountered by immigration officers,

arrested, and issued a notice to appear pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality

Act (“INA”) §§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). (Doc. 8-2; Doc. 8-3, p. 3.)

On March 17, 2026, an immigration judge denied Perdomo’s applications for

relief, found him removable and inadmissible under Sections 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and

212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA, and ordered him removed to Honduras. (Doc. 8-4.)

Perdomo appealed the immigration judge’s removal order to the Board of

Immigration Appeals, which remains pending. (Doc. 8-5.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), a district court may consider a writ of

habeas corpus when an immigration detainee is “in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” Claims related to an

immigration detainee’s request for release from confinement must be brought as a

habeas petition as these “claims fall within the ‘core’ of the writ of habeas corpus.”

Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025) (quoting Nance v. Ward, 597 U.S. 167

(2022)). Jurisdiction for “core habeas petitions . . . lies in only one district: the

district of confinement.” Id. (quoting Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443

(2004)) (internal quotations omitted). Perdomo is detained at the Pike County

Correctional Facility, which is within the Middle District of Pennsylvania. See 28

U.S.C. § 118(b).

DISCUSSION

In his petition, Perdomo sets forth a variety of arguments. He argues that his

length of detention is unconstitutional and violates his Due Process rights. (Doc. 1,

p. 2; Doc. 10.) Perdomo further argues that he had ineffective assistance of

counsel at his immigration proceedings, and there was a failure to review the

evidentiary record by the immigration judge for his asylum claims. (Doc. 1, pp. 2–

7.) In his request for relief, he asks the court to overturn the immigration judge’s

denial of his asylum claims, remand his case for a new hearing before a different

immigration judge, and provide him with a new immigration attorney. (Id. at 8.)

In opposition, Respondent argues that the court lacks jurisdiction to

intervene in Perdomo’s removal proceedings and that Perdomo has yet to exhaust

his administrative remedies. (Doc. 8, pp. 5–8.) Respondent mentions that

Perdomo is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), but does not set forth any

arguments in response to Perdomo’s unconstitutional detention claim. (Doc. 8, p.

5.)

A. The court lacks jurisdiction over Perdomo’s removal-based claims.

The INA was amended by Congress to add Sections 1252(b)(9) and (g) to

Title 8 to “prevent removal proceedings from becoming ‘fragment[ed], and hence

prolong[ed].’” Tazu v. Att’y Gen., 975 F.3d 292, 296 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Reno

v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 487 (1999)). These

sections funnel “most claims that even relate to removal” into one proceeding

starting with a petition for review of a final removal order before the court of

appeals. Id. (citing E.O.H.C. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d 177,

180 (3d Cir. 2020)). Section 1252(g) provides:

Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other

provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including Section 2241 of

title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and

1651 of such title, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or

claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action

by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases,

or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.

Thus, if a noncitizen challenges the commencement of proceedings, the

adjudication of his case, or the execution of a removal order, Section 1252(g)

“funnels jurisdiction over that challenge into a petition for review in a single court

of appeals” regardless of whether it is a constitutional or statutory challenge. Tazu,

975 F.3d at 296 (citations omitted). Similarly, Section 1252(b)(9) strips district

courts of jurisdiction of “all question of law and fact . . . arising from any action

taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States” and

requires these questions to be raised in a petition for review. Khalil v. President,

United States, 164 F.4th 259, 273 (3d Cir. 2026) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9))

(emphasis in original).

Accordingly, the court agrees with Respondent that the court lacks

jurisdiction to review Perdomo’s claims related to ineffective assistance of counsel

at his immigration proceedings and the alleged failure of the immigration judge to

review the evidentiary record for his asylum claims. Thus, the court cannot grant

him the associated relief he requests and will dismiss these claims for lack of

jurisdiction.

B. The court finds that Perdomo’s detention is unconstitutional and will

grant his petition in this regard.

Although Respondent does not set forth any arguments regarding Perdomo’s

detention, Respondent indicated that Perdomo is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(2). Thus, the court will analyze Perdomo’s unconstitutional and

prolonged detention argument from this viewpoint.2

Section 1225 of the INA is titled “Inspection by immigration officers;

expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225. It defines “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien present in the United

2 In analyzing this issue, the court considers the arguments that Respondent has made numerous

times in responding to habeas petitions before this court raising unconstitutional detention under

Section 1225(b)(2).

States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States . . . .” Id.

§ 1225(a)(1). Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides:

Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an

applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer

determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a

doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a

proceeding under section 1229a of this title.

Noncitizens subject to this mandatory detention may only be released while their

removal proceedings are pending “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant

public benefit.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288. The BIA recently decided Matter of

Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 2016 (Sept. 5, 2025), wherein the BIA held that

noncitizens who enter the United States without admission are subject to

mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A), and thus, immigration judges

lack the authority to provide a bond hearing.

Conversely, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) provides, in relevant part:

(a) Arrest, detention, and release

On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested

and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed

from the United States. Except as provided in subsection (c) and

pending such decision, the Attorney General—

(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and

(2) may release the alien on—

(a) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and

containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney

General; or

(b) conditional parole; but

(3) may not provide the alien with work authorization (including

an ‘employment authorized’ endorsement or other appropriate

work permit), unless the alien is lawfully admitted for permanent

residence or otherwise would (without regard to removal

proceedings) be provided such authorization.

Perdomo is detained pursuant to Section 1225(b)(2)(A) and there is no information

in the records to suggest that Perdomo is subject to Section 1226(c).3 (See Docs. 1,

10; Doc. 8, p. 5.)

The Second, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of

Appeals and federal district courts across the country and within this district have,

overwhelmingly, rejected Respondent’s position regarding the applicability of

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) to detainees like Perdomo, a noncitizen who previously

entered and had been living in the United States prior to his detention.4 See, e.g.,

Cunha v. Freden, 175 F.4th 61 (2d Cir. 2026) (holding that petitioner’s “detention

is governed by Section 1226(a), not Section 1225(b)(2)(A)”); Lopez-Campos v.

Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713 (6th Cir. 2026) (same); Cirrus Rojas v. Olson, No. 25-

3127, ---F.4th----, 2026 WL 2198315 (7th Cir. July 30, 2026) (same); Rodriguez

Vazquez, No. 25-6842, ---F.4th----, 2026 WL 2196424 (9th Cir. July 30, 2026)

(same); Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, No. 26-6019, 2026 WL 1876709 (10th Cir.

June 30, 2026) (same); Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Federal Detention Ctr.

3 Section 1226(c) requires detention of noncitizens who are inadmissible or deportable because

they have committed a criminal offense identified in this section. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

4 The court acknowledges that there are some district courts, as well as the Fifth and Eighth

Circuit Courts of Appeals, who have agreed with Respondent’s usual interpretation of Section

1225. Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026); Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th

1128 (8th Cir. 2026). However, none of these decisions are binding on this court.

Miami, 175 F. 4th 1258 (11th Cir. 2026) (same); Hernandez v. Kunes, No. 1:25-cv-

1847, 2026 WL 411726 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2026) (Wilson, J.) (holding Section

1225(b) was inapplicable to petitioner); Santana-Rivas v. Warden of Clinton Cnty.

Corr. Facility, No. 3:25-cv-1896, 2025 WL 3513152 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025)

(Wilson, J.) (adopting report and recommendation finding that Section 1225 was

inapplicable to petitioner); Patel v. O’Neil, No. 3:25-cv-2185, 2025 WL 3516865,

at *4 n.7 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (collecting cases within the Third Circuit as of

December 8, 2025); Quispe v. Rose, 3:25-cv-2276, 2025 WL 3537279 (M.D. Pa.

Dec. 10, 2025) (holding that petitioner was improperly detained under Section

1225(b)(2)(A)); Patel v. O’Neill, 3:25-cv-2289, 2026 WL 323121 (M.D. Pa. Feb.

6, 2026) (same). “The vast majority of courts confronting this precise issue have

rejected the Government’s interpretation, and the BIA’s interpretation of Hurtado,

as contradictory to the plain text of § 1225.” Demirel, 2025 WL 3218243 (citing

Ayala Amaya v. Bondi, No. 25-16429, 2025 WL 3033880, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 30,

2025) (collecting cases)).

The court is persuaded by and agrees with the Second, Sixth, Seventh,

Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals and the majority of federal

district courts that have ruled on this issue to date in rejecting Respondent’s

interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2)(A). Perdomo’s detention under Section

1225(b)(2)(A) is unlawful because Section 1225(b)(2)(A) “applies only to

noncitizens who are actively, i.e., affirmatively, ‘seeking admission’ to the United

States.” Bethancourt Soto v. Soto, 807 F. Supp. 3d 397, 408 (D.N.J. 2025). Thus,

this section simply does not apply to someone like Perdomo, who has been

residing in the United States for approximately thirty years. Id. (collecting cases

adopting the same conclusion).

In reaching this conclusion, the court holds that Respondent’s interpretation

of “seeking admission” violates the rule against surplusage and contradicts the

plain meaning of the statutory text. Bethancourt Soto, 807 F. Supp. at 406 (finding

that respondents’ interpretation “violates the rule against surplusage and negates

the plain meaning of the text.”); see also Patel, 2025 WL 3516865, at *5 (citing

Centeno Ibarra v. Warden of Fed. Det. Ctr. Phila., No. 25-cv-6312, 2025 WL

3294726, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2025)) (same). If Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applied

to every “applicant for admission,” the phrase “seeking admission” would become

unnecessary and surplusage.5 Bethancourt Soto, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 406–07

(citations omitted); see also United States ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res.,

5 Bethancourt Soto, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 407, provides a helpful example of why Respondent’s

interpretation violates the rule against surplusage:

[R]emoving the words “seeking admission” from § 1225(b)(2)(A) would not alter its

meaning under Respondents’ theory: “[I]n the case of an alien who is an applicant for

admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission

is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained[.]”

That result is inconsistent with the principle that courts must interpret a statute to give

meaning to “every clause and word” that Congress chose to include. See Polansky, 599

U.S. at 432, 143 S.Ct. 1720 (quotation marks omitted).

Inc., 599 U.S. 419 (2023) (explaining that “every clause and word of a statute

should have meaning” and “no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous,

void, or insignificant”). Further, “seeking admission” connotes “some affirmative,

present-tense action” such that it “requires an act currently underway not a static

condition.” Id. at *5 (citations omitted). Thus, Respondent’s argument that

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not require any “affirmative act” is contrary to the

plain meaning of the words “seeking admission.”6

Respondent’s interpretation also makes Section 1226(c)’s mandatory

detention provision superfluous and redundant. Centeno Ibarra, 2025 WL

3294726 at *6 (“Under the government’s interpretation, § 1225 would require such

mandatory detention regardless of criminal charges or convictions. If this was the

case, Congress would have no need to create additional requirements for

mandatory detention.”).

6 Again, the examples provided by the court in Bethancourt Soto, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 406–07, are

illustrative of why Respondent’s argument fails:

For example, one could deem every person in the country a “potential homebuyer,” but

they are not “seeking to buy a home,” without taking some affirmative action towards that

goal. Nor is every “employable adult” in the country “applying for a job,” simply because

jobs exist. Or, as Judge Ho explained in Benitez, “someone who enters a movie theater

without purchasing a ticket and then proceeds to sit through the first few minutes of a film

would not ordinarily then be described as ‘seeking admission’ to the theater. Rather, that

person would be described as already present there.” Benitez, ––– F.Supp.3d at ––––, 2025

WL 2371588, at *7. Further, “[e]ven if that person, after being detected, offered to pay for

a ticket, one would not ordinarily describe them as ‘seeking admission’ ... at that point—

one would say that they had entered unlawfully but now seek a lawful means of remaining

there.” Id.

In sum, Perdomo is not currently “seeking admission” to the United States.

That was his status in 1996. Therefore, Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to

him as he is not currently “seeking admission” to the United States.

Addressing Perdomo’s constitutional claims, it is undisputed that “once an

alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process

Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether

their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v.

Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (citations omitted). Thus, the court must

determine what process is due to Perdomo, who is currently subject to mandatory

detention without a bond hearing, by applying the balancing test in Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Mathews requires the court to weigh three

factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the

risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and

the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and

(3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and

administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement

would entail.” Id. at 335.

The first factor weighs heavily in Perdomo’s favor because the “official

action” has deprived him of his physical liberty. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.

507, 529 (2004) (“[T]he most elemental of liberty interests—the interest in being

free from physical detention by one’s own government.”). The second factor

similarly swings in Perdomo’s favor because he “is presently and erroneously

detained under the mandatory detention provisions of § 1225, without an

opportunity for a bond hearing.” Bethancourt Soto, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 409

(emphasis in original). As to the third factor, the court recognizes Respondent’s

interest in detaining noncitizens to ensure “the appearance of aliens at future

immigration proceedings” and “preventing danger to the community.” Zadvydas,

533 U.S. at 690. Still, this factor weighs in favor of Perdomo because Respondent

does not contend that he poses a danger to the community or that he is a flight risk.

Accordingly, the Mathews factors weigh in Perdomo’s favor and the court finds

that his mandatory detention without a bond hearing under Section 1225(b)(2)(A)

violates his procedural due process rights. See Bethencourt Soto, 2025 WL

2976572 at *8 (“Taken together, the Court finds that the Mathews factors weigh

decisively in Petitioner’s favor, and as such his mandatory detention under

§ 1225(b)(2)(A) violates his procedural due process rights.”) (citations omitted);

Patel, 2025 WL 3516865 at *6 (holding same). Thus, the court will grant

Perdomo’s petition and release him on his own recognizance as he was prior to his

detention in October 2025.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the court will grant Perdomo’s petition for writ of habeas

corpus as to his unconstitutional detention claim and order his immediate release.

The court will dismiss all other claims in Perdomo’s petition for lack of

jurisdiction. An appropriate order follows.

s/Jennifer P. Wilson

JENNIFER P. WILSON

United States District Judge

Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: August 17, 2026