The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 26-CV-61737-DAMIAN/STRAUSS
MOUNTAIN VIEW PRODUCTIONS, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
BG BIG BOAT LTD.,
Defendant.
__________________________________/
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO VACATE ATTACHMENT
THIS MATTER came before the Court upon Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Attachment
[DE 17] (the “Motion”). District Judge Melissa Damian has referred the Motion to me to take all
necessary and proper action as required by law. [DE 22] at 1. The parties agreed at the Rule E(4)(f)
hearing that the undersigned Magistrate Judge could address the Motion by order rather than by a
report and recommendation. I have thus reviewed the Motion, Plaintiff’s Response [DE 20], and
the parties’ arguments and representations at the Rule E(4)(f) hearing held before me on July 20,
2026. For the reasons stated below, the Motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This maritime action arises from an alleged breach of a charter agreement. See generally
[DE 3]. Plaintiff is a film production company that signed a charter agreement with Defendant, a
vessel owner, for the use of Defendant’s vessel for film production. Id. ¶ 9. Defendant is a company
incorporated in the Cayman Islands. See [DE 20-1] ¶ 8. Plaintiff contends that Defendant breached
the charter agreement. [DE 3] at 7-8. Per an amendment to the charter agreement, the underlying
merits of the dispute are subject to arbitration in California. See [DE 17-2] at 5.
Plaintiff filed this action in federal court for seizure of Defendant’s vessel under Rule B of
the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule B”). See [DE 3] ¶ 1; Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. B; see also
9 U.S.C. § 8 (“If the basis of jurisdiction be a cause of action otherwise justiciable in
admiralty, . . . the party claiming to be aggrieved may begin his proceeding hereunder by libel and
seizure of the vessel . . . according to the usual course of admiralty proceedings, and the court shall
then have jurisdiction to direct the parties to proceed with the arbitration . . . .”). The action started
as an in rem suit against the vessel under Rule C of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or
Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule C”).
See [DE 1] ¶ 28; Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. C. Plaintiff then amended the complaint by instead suing
Defendant directly and seeking maritime attachment and garnishment of the vessel as security
under Rule B. [DE 3] at 9-10.
On the same day that Plaintiff amended the complaint, Plaintiff filed an expedited motion
for issuance of process of attachment and garnishment. See generally [DE 4]. Judge Damian
granted that motion and directed the Clerk of Court to issue the summons and process of
attachment and garnishment. [DE 5] at 1. The Clerk of Court issued the process of attachment and
garnishment, [DE 8] at 1-2, and the United States Marshals Service seized the vessel, [DE 10] at 1.
Defendant, believing that the maritime attachment and garnishment of the vessel under
Rule B was improper, filed the Motion, which asks for the Court to vacate the attachment (among
other relief). See [DE 17] at 9. In the Motion, Defendant had separately asked for the Court to hold
a post-seizure hearing under Rule E(4)(f)1 of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime
1 “Whenever property is arrested or attached, any person claiming an interest in it shall be entitled
to a prompt hearing at which the plaintiff shall be required to show why the arrest or attachment
Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule E(4)(f)”). Id.
The Court held that hearing on July 20, 2026, taking the parties’ positions under advisement. See
[DE 23].
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule B states:
If a defendant is not found within the district when a verified complaint praying for
attachment and the affidavit required by Rule B(1)(b) are filed, a verified complaint
may contain a prayer for process to attach the defendant’s tangible or intangible
personal property—up to the amount sued for—in the hands of garnishees named
in the process.
Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. B(1)(a). Rule B is a “procedural device[] afforded to plaintiffs in order to
secure a prejudgment writ of attachment over a defendant’s piece of property . . . .” Dresdner Bank
AG v. M/V Olympia Voyager, 463 F.3d 1233, 1238 (11th Cir. 2006); Ital Brokers S.P.A. v.
Redbridge Ins. Co., No. 24-CV-21614, 2024 WL 4880513, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2024).
Proceedings under Rule B “are known as ‘quasi-in-rem’ proceedings, because they are not actions
directly against the res as a fictitious person, as is the case in in rem actions, but are actions against
a party who is not personally present in the district but whose property is present.” World Wide
Supply OU v. Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt., 802 F.3d 1255, 1259-60 (11th Cir. 2015); see Ital
Brokers, 2024 WL 4880513, at *2 n.1. The two main purposes of Rule B are “to assure a
respondent’s appearance, and to assure satisfaction in case the suit is successful.” Nehring v.
Steamship M/V Point Vail, 901 F.2d 1044, 1051 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Polar Shipping Ltd. v.
Oriental Shipping Corp., 680 F.2d 627, 637 (9th Cir. 1982)). Though, a plaintiff may not use Rule
B solely to obtain security for the suit. Nehring, 901 F.2d at 1051. “Rule B therefore requires, as
should not be vacated or other relief granted consistent with these rules.” Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R.
E(4)(f).
a precondition to its application, that the defendant not be present in the district, but that the
defendant’s property must be present there.” World Wide Supply, 802 F.3d at 1262 (11th Cir.
2015). Consequently, to secure a writ of attachment under Rule B, a plaintiff must establish
four elements:
(1) the plaintiff has an in personam claim against the defendant; (2) the defendant
cannot be found within the district where the action is commenced; (3) property
belonging to the defendant is present, or soon will be present, within the district;
and (4) there is no statutory or general maritime law proscription to the attachment.
Dannebrog Rederi AS v. M/Y True Dream, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (emphasis
added) (citing W. Bulk Carriers, Pty. Ltd. v. P.S. Intern., Ltd., 762 F. Supp. 1302, 1306 (S.D. Ohio
1991)).
Where a defendant challenges the attachment and requests a hearing, as here, the burden is
on the plaintiff to establish that reasonable grounds for the attachment existed. See id. (citing
Salazar v. Atlantic Sun, 881 F.2d 73, 79 (3d Cir. 1989)). Many courts require that the plaintiff
“come forward with sufficient evidence to show there was probable cause for the arrest or
attachment of the vessel.” 20th Century Fox Film Corp. v. M.V. Ship Agencies, Inc., 992 F. Supp.
1423, 1427 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (citations omitted); accord Nimbus Boat Rental, Corp. v. Garcel, No.
22-CV-22645, 2022 WL 11295924, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 2022), report and recommendation
adopted sub nom. Nimbus Boat Rental, Corp. v. Garcia, 2022 WL 11207330 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 19,
2022); see also Nimbus, 2022 WL 11295924, at *5 (“Probable cause exists when there is ‘[a]
reasonable belief in the existence of facts on which a claim is based and in the legal validity of the
claim itself.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson v. M/Y Dream, No. 21-60863-CIV, 2021
WL 2435455, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 12, 2021))). A court must focus its inquiry on the facts known
to the plaintiff at the time of the attachment. Dannebrog, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1311.
ANALYSIS
The parties only dispute the second element for attachment, i.e., whether Defendant could
not be found within this district. See [DE 17] at 3 (“Plaintiff . . . failed to satisfy that indispensable
prerequisite of demonstrating that Defendant cannot be found within the district.”); [DE 20] at 4.
Courts have created a two-part test for determining whether a defendant cannot be found within
the district where the action is brought. Nehring, 901 F.2d at 1051 n.6. First, the court must
determine whether the defendant was present for purposes of personal jurisdiction. See id.; Tetra
Tech Ec, Inc. v. White Holly Expeditions LLC, No. 10-CV-465-J-32, 2010 WL 3259696, at *5
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2010); Dorsett v. Carib-USA Ship Lines, Bahamas Ltd., No. 06-80977-CIV,
2007 WL 9701874, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2007). Second, the court must determine whether the
defendant was present for purposes of service of process. Nehring, 901 F.2d at 1051 n.6; Tetra
Tech, 2010 WL 3259696, at *5; Dorsett, 2007 WL 9701874, at *2. To vacate an attachment, the
answer to both parts of the test must be yes. Tetra Tech, 2010 WL 3259696, at *5. The Court
addresses each part in turn.
I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Defendant argues in the Motion that it could have been found in this district for purposes
of personal jurisdiction. See [DE 17] at 5-6. “Personal jurisdiction can be ‘general’ or ‘specific.’”
Aviation One of Fla., Inc. v. Airborne Ins. Consultants (PTY), Ltd, 722 F. App’x 870, 879 (11th
Cir. 2018) (per curiam). At the Rule E(4)(f) hearing on July 20, 2026, Defendant clarified that it
is only arguing that Defendant could have been found in this district for purposes of general—not
specific—jurisdiction. Plaintiff responds that Defendant’s argument on general jurisdiction is self-
serving and that whether Defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction was unclear. See [DE 20]
at 4-5.
Typically, determining whether personal jurisdiction exists over a defendant requires a
two-part inquiry: (1) whether personal jurisdiction exists over the defendant under Florida’s long-
arm statute, and (2) “if so, whether that exercise of jurisdiction would violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.” Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v.
Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1350 (11th Cir. 2013); see also Thompson v. Carnival Corp., 174 F. Supp.
3d 1327, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (“The first inquiry for a federal court, whether sitting in diversity
or admiralty, is to look to the long-arm statute of the state—here Florida—and the cases
interpreting that statute.” (citing Tarasewicz v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. 14-CIV-60885,
2015 WL 3970546, at *18 (S.D. Fla. June 30, 2015))). For purposes of general jurisdiction,
however, Florida’s long-arm statute2 “extends to the limits on personal jurisdiction imposed by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”; therefore, the Court only needs to
determine whether exercising general jurisdiction would exceed the Fourteenth Amendment’s
limits. Carmouche v. Tamborlee Mgmt., Inc., 789 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Fraser v. Smith, 594 F.3d 842, 846 (11th Cir. 2010)).
Under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,3 “a court may assert general
jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims
2 Florida’s long-arm statute for general jurisdiction states, “A defendant who is engaged in
substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate,
intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the
claim arises from that activity.” Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2) (emphasis added).
3 The parties presumed that the Fourteenth Amendment’s framework for personal jurisdiction
applies when assessing Rule B attachment. Indeed, Defendant built its argument on the Fourteenth
Amendment. See [DE 17] at 6 (“Defendant’s conduct within the district satisfies the requirements
set forth for personal jurisdiction under both Florida’s long arm statute and the due process clause
of the 14th Amendment.”). Accordingly, I assume for purposes of this order that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s framework for personal jurisdiction, rather than the Fifth Amendment’s framework,
is the one that applies when considering whether Rule B attachment was proper. Cf. Del Valle v.
Trivago GMBH, 56 F.4th 1265, 1274 n.3 (11th Cir. 2022) (“Because the parties have litigated the
against them when their affiliations with the State are so continuous and systematic as to render
them essentially at home in the forum State.” BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 581 U.S. 402, 413 (2017)
(citation modified). Corporations are usually only “at home” at their place of incorporation and at
their principal place of business. Id. (citations omitted). “The exercise of general jurisdiction is not
limited to these forums; in an ‘exceptional case,’ a corporate defendant’s operations in another
forum ‘may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that
State.’” Id. (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 n.19 (2014)); see, e.g., Perkins v.
Benguet Consol. Min. Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448-49 (1952) (holding that general jurisdiction existed
over foreign corporation in Ohio because WWII had forced a temporary relocation of foreign
corporation from Philippines to Ohio, where it conducted its activities during the war).
At the outset, the Court addresses Defendant’s suggestion at the hearing that personal
jurisdiction should operate differently because this case is admiralty-based and the vessel is
Defendant’s sole asset. Defendant did not provide a case standing for this proposition in the
Motion. See [DE 17] at 5-6. Regardless, the parties seem to agree that the personal-jurisdiction
inquiry for Rule B attachment focuses on “minimum contacts,” a concept associated with the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Dorsett, 2007 WL 9701874, at *2; Tetra Tech,
2010 WL 3259696, at *5. Under that standard, general jurisdiction does not vary based on the
nature of the business. See BNSF, 581 U.S. at 414 (“The Fourteenth Amendment due process
constraint . . . applies to all state-court assertions of general jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants; the constraint does not vary with the type of claim asserted or business enterprise
sued.”). The Court thus applies a traditional analysis for general jurisdiction.
personal jurisdiction issue under the Fourteenth Amendment, we do not address the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause . . . .”).
Here, reasonable grounds existed at the time of attachment for Plaintiff to have concluded
that Defendant could not be found in the district for purposes of personal jurisdiction. Defendant
argues that it was subject to general jurisdiction in Florida, but the Court is unpersuaded. The first
paradigmatic way that Defendant would be subject to general jurisdiction here is if Florida was
the place of incorporation. Yet that does not appear to be the case. As sworn to by Plaintiff’s
counsel, an investigation revealed that Defendant is a corporation formed under the laws of the
Cayman Islands. [DE 20-1] ¶ 8, at 2. So the place of incorporation cannot be the basis for
general jurisdiction.
The second paradigmatic way that Defendant would be subject to general jurisdiction is if
Defendant maintains its principal place of business here. However, it appeared from Plaintiff’s
counsel’s investigation that Defendant maintains a principal address listed in George Town,
Cayman Islands. [DE 20-1] ¶ 8, at 2. This information suggests reasonable grounds to believe that
Defendant is “at home” in the Cayman Islands, not in this district. This conclusion is reinforced
by the fact that Defendant’s registered agent for service of process had an address in the Cayman
Islands, id., that Defendant is not even registered to do business in Florida, and that Defendant
does not have a registered agent for service of process in this state, id. ¶ 9. One would imagine that
a corporation “at home” in South Florida would at least be registered to do business in the state.
And even if Defendant had registered to do business in Florida and maintained a registered agent
in the state for service of process, these facts would not give Florida courts general jurisdiction
over Defendant. See Jastrjembskaia v. InCruises, LLC, No. 23-12601, 2024 WL 5244786, at *6
(11th Cir. Dec. 30, 2024) (citing Waite v. All Acquisition Corp., 901 F.3d 1307, 1321 (11th Cir.
2018)). The circumstances of this case thus differ drastically from Rule B cases where there would
have been general jurisdiction over the defendant. Cf. Cockett Marine Oil US, Inc. v. Bravo Glob.
Supply LLC, No. A-24-CV-1440-ML, 2025 WL 2612735, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2025)
(holding that district court in Texas had general jurisdiction over limited liability company where
company was originally formed under the laws of Texas, conducted business in Texas for five
years while registered to do business there, entered into contracts in Texas, had received service
from Texas’s secretary of state, and had a registered agent and offices on file in Texas at the time
the complaint was filed). Without evidence of similar contacts, I conclude that reasonable grounds
existed at the time of attachment for Plaintiff to believe that South Florida was not Defendant’s
principal place of business for purposes of general jurisdiction.
Still, Defendant stresses that its activities in South Florida are substantial and relate to its
sole asset, the vessel. [DE 17] at 5-6. Defendant explains that it maintains the vessel in Florida,
contracts third parties in South Florida for vessel-related work, conducts business related to
supplying, staffing, and managing the vessel in South Florida, and designates a South Florida
company for notice. [DE 17] at 5-6; [DE 17-3] ¶¶ 3-11.
Although these activities are not insubstantial, there are still two problems. First, the record
only really reflects Defendant’s activities in South Florida for a brief period in 2026, not before.
See [DE 17-3] ¶¶ 4, 6. The discussion of activities before 2026 is very limited. See [DE 17-3] ¶¶ 3-
11. Some business activity in 2026 cannot overcome Plaintiff’s reasonable belief that Defendant
was not subject to general jurisdiction in South Florida. In addition to observing Defendant’s
foreign incorporation, foreign principal address, and lack of registration to do business in Florida
or a registered agent for service of process in the state, Plaintiff’s counsel also researched where
Bobby Genovese, Defendant’s sole director, resides. [DE 20-1] ¶ 10; [DE 17-3] ¶ 1. Information
published by Genovese indicated that he maintains his residence in the Bahamas. [DE 20-1] ¶ 10.
Other businesses operated by Genovese appeared to Plaintiff’s counsel to be headquartered in the
Bahamas as well. Id. ¶ 11. None of these facts suggests that Defendant is at home in Florida for
purposes of general jurisdiction. Second, courts have often rejected assertions of general
jurisdiction even where a corporation has engaged in substantial activity in the forum. See Daimler
AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137-38 (2014) (rejecting idea that general jurisdiction exists in all
forums where a corporation “engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of
business” and stating that such a formulation was “unacceptably grasping”).
A third basis for general jurisdiction would be an “exceptional case.” Though, based on the
other facts known to Plaintiff at the time of attachment, Plaintiff had reasonable grounds to believe
that the circumstances here did not constitute an exceptional case. Defendant’s contacts in this case
are more akin to the foreign corporation’s forum contacts in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia,
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984). In that case, the Supreme Court held that general
jurisdiction did not exist over a foreign corporation sued in Texas. Id. The corporation owned and
operated a helicopter that had crashed in another country. Id. Similar to Defendant, the foreign
corporation in Helicopteros had no formal place of business in the forum and was not licensed to
do business there. See id. It was not enough for general jurisdiction purposes that the corporation
sent its chief executive officer to the forum for a contract-negotiation session, accepted checks
drawn on a bank in the forum, purchased helicopters, equipment, and training services in the
forum, and sent personnel to the forum for training. Id. Defendant’s similar business activities here
are insufficient for it to have been clear to Plaintiff at the time of attachment that the Court had
general personal jurisdiction over Defendant.
Plaintiff has therefore carried its burden to show that it had reasonable grounds to believe,
at the time of the attachment, that Defendant could not be found in the district for purposes of
personal jurisdiction.
II. SERVICE OF PROCESS4
Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot meet its burden under the second prong because
Plaintiff could have served Defendant by serving process on either the captain, the entity
designated for notice to Defendant under the charter agreement, or Defendant’s own counsel, all
of which are in South Florida. See [DE 17] at 4, 6-8. Plaintiff responds that service on these parties
would not have bound Defendant. See [DE 20] at 5-11. I agree with Plaintiff and conclude that
reasonable grounds existed at the time of attachment for Plaintiff to believe that Defendant could
not be found within the district for service of process.
Rule 4(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs service of a foreign corporation,
providing two ways in which service in a judicial district of the United States must be
accomplished absent a contrary federal law or waiver of service. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1). “First,
service may be effected by following the state law regarding service of a foreign corporation in
the jurisdiction where the district court is located or where service has been made.” Aguila v.
RQM+ LLC, No. 23-24702-CIV, 2025 WL 2322438, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2025) (citing Fed.
R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1), (h)(1)(A)). Second, service may be effected “by delivering a copy of the
summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B).
Defendant does not argue that Plaintiff could have served it under state law. See [DE 17] at 7-8.
4 Defendant separately argues that Plaintiff has not met its burden because the initial affidavit
submitted by Plaintiff’s counsel, which certified that Plaintiff’s counsel performed a diligent
search, was dated around two years prior to the issuance of the attachment. See [DE 17] at 6-7; see
also [DE 4-4] at 2 (showing June 19, 2024, as date of affidavit rather than June 19, 2026, which
was the date of filing). However, Plaintiff’s counsel clarified in another sworn statement that the
date being off by two years was a scrivener’s error and that the diligent search occurred shortly
before attachment. [DE 20-1] ¶¶ 3-7. The notary book attached to this second sworn statement,
[DE 20-1] at 6, and the fact that the parties’ charter agreement was not entered into until December
2025, supports the representation that the 2024 date was, indeed, a scrivener’s error.
Defendant instead asserts that Plaintiff could have served it under Rule 4(h)(1)(B) through either
the captain of the vessel, the company designated for notice in the charter agreement, or
Defendant’s counsel. See id. Although the record indicates that these supposed agents were within
the district, none of these avenues for service clearly indicate that, at the time of attachment, service
on these parties would bind Defendant.
Starting with the captain of the vessel, reasonable grounds existed at the time of attachment
for Plaintiff to believe that attempting service through him would not bind Defendant. At the
hearing, Defendant asserted that the captain could have been served because he was a managing
or general agent under Rule 4(h). “Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not define
the term ‘managing or general agent,’ federal courts have explained that the term ‘does not refer
simply to any agent of the corporation, but rather it connotes one who operates at the corporation’s
highest levels, or at least has overall authority to make high-level decisions on the part of the
corporation.’” Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. All Ways Auto Transp., LLC, No. 24-CV-24615, 2025
WL 1257740, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2025) (quoting Estes Express Lines v. Coverlex, Inc., No.
19-CV-467, 2021 WL 3712965, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2021), report & recommendation
adopted, 2021 WL 3709639 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2021)). According to Defendant, the captain
counts as a managing or general agent because the captain is the person placed in charge of
Defendant’s sole asset and the business affairs of the asset. See [DE 17] at 7. Defendant relies on
two cases, both of which are non-binding and distinguishable. See id. at 7-8 (first quoting Alan,
Sean & Koule, Inc. v. S/V Corsta V, 286 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1374 (S.D. Ga. 2003); and then citing
Neset v. Christensen, 92 F. Supp. 78, 83 (E.D.N.Y. 1950)).
Alan dealt with whether statements by former captains could bind the owner of a vessel
under general agency-law principles. 286 F. Supp. 2d at 1373-75. Former captains had admitted
that the plaintiff in Alan should have been paid in full for the repair work done to the vessel. Id.
The court explained that under the general rules of agency law, the vessel owner could only be
bound by statements made by the former captains before the plaintiff knew of the captains’
termination of employment. Id. The case did not address whether a captain is a managing or general
agent under Rule 4(h). See id.
Neset did deal with service on a captain, but critical distinctions exist. See 92 F. Supp. at
82-83. In Neset, the district court held that service of process on a vessel’s captain was sufficient
to confer jurisdiction over the Norwegian corporation that owned the vessel. Id. at 83. The plaintiff,
a Norwegian seaman that resided in New York, had sued for damages stemming from personal
injuries sustained while working on a vessel at sea. Id. at 80. The plaintiff argued that the captain
was a “managing agent” of the Norwegian corporation for purposes of Rule 4. Id. at 82. Although
the court concluded that service on the captain was sufficient, the district court had explained that
the captain was employed by the foreign corporation and that “there [was] nothing . . . to negate
the usual authority in the master to act for the owner.” Id. at 80, 82-83. The district court also
stressed that its conclusion would “result in substantial justice to the parties,” as the alternative
ruling would have required the plaintiff to go litigate in Norway. Id. at 83. The plaintiff would
also have had to get witnesses (presumably other crewmembers) to Norway, even though none of
the ports of call for the vessel included a Norwegian port. Id.
At most, Neset stands for the proposition that a captain may be a managing or general agent
under some circumstances. See id. It does not mean that a captain is automatically a managing
agent for purposes of Rule 4(h) just because they are placed in charge of a foreign corporation’s
only asset. See id.; see also Ganpat v. E. Pac. Shipping, PTE. LTD., 434 F. Supp. 3d 441, 460
(E.D. La. 2020) (discussing and distinguishing Neset to hold that “Captain Bona does not qualify
as a managing agent of Eastern Pacific”). Unlike the captain in Neset, who was alleged to be
employed by the foreign corporation, 92 F. Supp. at 80, the captain of the at-issue vessel is not an
employee of Defendant, [DE 20-1] ¶ 1.1, at 10 (listing separate entity as employer). Moreover,
whereas nothing in the record in Neset “negate[d] the usual authority in the master to act for the
owner,” 92 F. Supp. at 82, the captain’s employment agreement in this case expressly limits his
authority to bind the owner, see [DE 20-1] ¶ 3.8.4, at 18. The employment agreement states that
“[t]he Captain shall not, have any right or power to bind . . . the Ship Owner to any engagement,
obligation or contract without first consulting with . . . the Ship Owner as is appropriate to the
circumstances.”). Even if Plaintiff did not have access to the employment agreement at the time it
sought attachment under Rule B, that would only underscore the point: it is unclear whether service
on a captain would be sufficient just because a captain may sometimes be a managing or general
agent under Rule 4(h). See Transamerica Leasing Inc. v. Amazonica, No. 97-0556-CB-S, 1997
WL 834554, at *3 (S.D. Ala. June 26, 1997) (“[M]ere knowledge that a shipowner has an agent is
not tantamount to knowledge that service of process on the agent would be effective.”). Lastly, the
Neset court’s discussion of equitable factors to reach a conclusion that resulted in “substantial
justice” suggests that the case is limited to its facts. See 92 F. Supp. at 83.
In short, at the time it sought attachment, Plaintiff had reasonable grounds to believe that
service on the captain of the vessel would not be effective.
Turning next to the company designated for notice in the charter agreement, Defendant
argues that Plaintiff could have served Defendant at a Fort Lauderdale address designated for
“[a]ny notice given or required to be given by any party” to the charter agreement. [DE 17-1] ¶ 25,
at 10. The Fort Lauderdale address for notice under the charter agreement is the address of a
separate entity, Aquazeal LLC (“Aquazeal”). See id. at 2. Aquazeal is defined as a stakeholder
under the charter agreement. Id. The definition for “STAKEHOLDER” explains Aquazeal’s role
and places limits on its authority:
An agent, named on Page One of this Agreement and appointed in accordance with
industry-accepted procedures, that shall receive, hold, and disburse funds from the
Instalments, the Security Deposit and any other payments made by the Parties to
this Agreement. The Stakeholder shall hold all funds received in escrow in a
designated bank account in the currency of this Agreement and make disbursements
only in accordance with the terms of this Agreement or upon receipt of mutually
agreed written instructions from the Parties. The Stakeholder shall not have
independent authority to act otherwise.
Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
The designation of Aquazeal for notice under the charter agreement does not mean that
attempting service on Defendant by serving Aquazeal would have bound Defendant. Simply put,
being designated as an agent for “notice” is not the same thing as being designated as an authorized
agent for “service” under Rule 4(h). As Plaintiff points out, it had already given “notice” to
Defendant, which is why counsel for both parties had prior communications with each other. See
[DE 20] at 10-11. Moreover, any supposed authority of Aquazeal to accept service for Defendant
is muddied by the limitation placed on Aquazeal when defining it as “STAKEHOLDER” in the
charter agreement. [DE 17-1] at 8 (“The Stakeholder shall not have independent authority to act
otherwise.”). Plaintiff thus had reasonable grounds to believe that, at the time of attachment,
service of process on Aquazeal would not bind Defendant.
Lastly, Defendant argues that Plaintiff could have served Defendant through Defendant’s
counsel, with whom Plaintiff had been in contact prior to seeking Rule B attachment. [DE 17] at
8. According to Defendant, Plaintiff’s obligation under Rule B to perform a diligent search means
that Plaintiff should have asked Defendant’s counsel whether counsel could accept service for
Defendant, at least under the circumstances of this case. The Court disagrees. Generally, “service
of process is not effectual on an attorney solely by reason of his capacity as attorney.” Ransom v.
Brennan, 437 F.2d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 1971)5 (citation omitted); Hadden v. Univ. Acct. Servs., No.
18-81385-CIV, 2020 WL 607112, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 7, 2020) (quoting Durbin Paper Stock Co.
v. Hossain, 97 F.R.D. 639, 639 (S.D. Fla. 1982))). Instead, “[t]he party must have appointed his
attorney as his agent for service of process before personal jurisdiction is obtained over the party
by service on his attorney.” Hadden, 2020 WL 607112, at *2 (quoting Durbin, 97 F.R.D. at 639).
No submitted evidence suggests that, at the time of attachment, Defendant had taken the
affirmative step of appointing Defendant’s counsel as an agent for purposes of service of process.
Although Defendant argues that Plaintiff should have asked whether Defendant’s counsel
would accept service, Defendant’s Motion points to no cases enforcing a similar requirement
before pursuing attachment under Rule B. See [DE 17] at 8. The Court is reluctant to subscribe to
a view that, applied more broadly, could undermine a plaintiff’s ability to obtain personal
jurisdiction over a defendant in the Rule B context. See, e.g., Ital Brokers, 2024 WL 4880513, at
*2 (“Under Supplemental Rule B, in personam jurisdiction over the defendant is obtained by
compelling its appearance through attachment of its goods and chattels, or credits and effects.”
(quoting Linea Navira De Cabotaje, C.A. v. Mar Caribe De Navegacion, C.A., 169 F. Supp. 2d
1341, 1351 (M.D. Fla. 2001))). Asking whether counsel would accept service could tip off a
would-be defendant and motivate them to take moveable property (like a vessel) out of the district
before attachment under Rule B can occur. Defendant argued at the hearing that this hypothetical
is different from the facts in this case because the vessel at issue was not going anywhere, but the
general principle stands. The Court will not import an obligation to ask defense counsel whether
they can accept service into a Plaintiff’s existing obligation to perform a diligent search before
5 “All Fifth Circuit decisions issued before October 1, 1981, are binding precedent in this Court.”
Wainberg v. Mellichamp, 93 F.4th 1221, 1226 n.3 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing Bonner v. City of
Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc)).
pursuing Rule B attachment, especially without a clear basis to do so. Consequently, it was not
clear at the time of attachment that Defendant could be found in the district for service of process
purely because Defendant retained counsel in the district that had been in communication with
Plaintiffs counsel.
Because it was not clear at the time of attachment whether serving the captain, Aquazeal,
or Defendant’s counsel would have bound Defendant, I conclude that Plaintiff had reasonable
grounds to believe Defendant could not be found in the district for service of process.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has established that it had reasonable grounds to believe that Defendant could not
have been found within the district for purposes of either personal jurisdiction or service of process.
Therefore, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Motion [DE 17] is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 16th day of August 2026.
United States Magistrate Judge
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