Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION

CASE NO. 25-60952-CIV-DIMITROULEAS/HUNT

EDMARK PROPERTIES, LLC,

and RONALD J. WITKO

as Trustee of the

RONALD J. WITKO TRUST,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ARGAMAN GROUP, LLC,

and MIKHAEL E. KEIFITZ, JD, MBA, LNHA,

d/b/a the LAW OFFICES OF MIKHAEL E.

KEIFITZ, ESQ.,

Defendants.

__________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THIS CAUSE is before this Court on Plaintiffs’ Verified Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

and Costs against Defendant Argaman Group, LLC. ECF No. 37. The Honorable William

P. Dimitrouleas referred Plaintiffs’ Motion to the undersigned for a report and

recommendation. ECF No. 38; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636; S.D. Fla. L.R., Mag. R. 1. Upon

thorough review of the Motion, the case file, and applicable law, the undersigned

respectfully RECOMMENDS the Motion be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART

as set forth below.

This action initially arose out of allegations that Defendants in this case breached

their respective contracts with Plaintiffs. ECF No. 1. On June 25, 2025, the Clerk issued

an entry of default as to Defendant Argaman Group LLC, and this Court ultimately entered

a Default Judgment against Argaman on August 1, 2025.1 ECF Nos. 12; 25. In its order,

the Court retained jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and costs. ECF No.

21. Plaintiff now moves for said fees and costs. No opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion was

filed, and the matter is now ripe for review.

As an initial matter, the undersigned finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable

attorneys’ fees and costs. Under the “American Rule,” litigants are not entitled to an

award of attorney’s fees for prevailing in litigation “unless a statute or contract provides

otherwise.” Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 253 (2010) (citation

omitted). Pursuant to the contracts between Defendant Argaman and each Plaintiff, “[i]n

any litigation permitted by this Contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover

from the non-prevailing party costs and fees, including reasonable attorney’s fees,

incurred in conducting the litigation.” ECF No. 1-4 at ¶ 17; ECF No. 1-5 at ¶ 17. In the

instant case, per the default judgment, Plaintiffs are the prevailing party. As the prevailing

party, per the terms of the contract agreement, Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable

attorney’s fees and costs.

This Court uses the lodestar method to calculate reasonable attorney’s fees,

multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended.

Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988). A

1 Although this case involves multiple defendants, this Motion concerns only Defendant

Argamon Group. The remaining Defendant, while active in this litigation, was not named

in the single count against Argaman Group. ECF No. 24. As such, the Court may

consider the fees Motion. See Gen. Star Nat'l Ins. Co. v. MDLV, LLC, No. 21-24284-CIV-

MORENO/GOODMAN, 2024 WL 3994657, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2024), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 21-24284-CIV-MORENO/GOODMAN, 2024 WL 3983994

(S.D. Fla. Aug. 28, 2024). Further, Plaintiff avers the fees in question are attributable to

work concerning Argaman Group.

reasonable hourly rate for attorney’s fees is determined by evaluating “the prevailing

market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably

comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Id. (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,

895 (1984)); see also ACLU v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 438 (11th Cir. 1999) (“The significant

disparity in their experience should be reflected in the rates awarded.”); Brown v. Sch. Bd.

of Broward Cty., No. 08-61592-CIV-DIMITROULEAS, 2010 WL 3282584, at *3 (S.D. Fla.

June 30, 2010) (reducing the requested hourly rate).

The movant bears the burden of proving the requested rate is consistent with

prevailing market rates. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299. In addition to evidence presented by

the movant, “[a] court . . . is itself an expert on the question and may consider its own

knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an

independent judgment either with or without the aid of witnesses as to value.” Id. at 1303

(quoting Campbell v. Green, 112 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir. 1940)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Thus, even when the submitted evidence is deficient, a court has the power to

make a fee award without the need of further pleadings or an evidentiary hearing. Id.

Moreover, “[a]n evidentiary hearing is unnecessary for issues about which the

district court possesses sufficient expertise: ‘Such matters might include the

reasonableness of the fee, the reasonableness of the hours, and [the] significance of the

outcome.’” Thompson v. Pharmacy Corp. of Am., 334 F.3d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Norman, 826 F.2d at 1309). The primary issues here are the reasonableness of

counsel’s hourly rate and the reasonableness of the number of hours expended, matters

over which this Court possesses sufficient expertise.

I. Fees

A. Reasonable Hourly Rate

Plaintiff seeks attorneys’ fees based upon professional services rendered. When

“determining what is a ‘reasonable’ hourly rate and what number of compensable hours

is ‘reasonable,’” this Court must consider twelve factors. Meyrowitz v. Brendel, No. 16-

81793-CIV-MARRA/MATTHEWMAN, 2018 WL 4440492, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 17, 2018).

These factors are:

(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions;

(3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion

of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the

customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations

imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the

results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys;

(10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the

professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.

The reasonable hourly rate is defined as the prevailing market rate in the

relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably

comparable skills, experience, and reputation. The fee applicant bears the

burden of establishing the claimed market rate. The Court may use its own

experience in assessing the reasonableness of attorney’s fees.

Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

This Court has considered the attorneys’ affidavits and the twelve factors.

Because of their practice, reputation, and legal experience, counsel request the following

hourly rates:

• Laura M. Reich, a partner in the litigation and arbitration department of Harper

Meyer LLP who was admitted to the Florida Bar in 2006, requests a rate of

$495.00 per hour.

• Juan B. Andrade Duenas, an associate in the litigation and arbitration

department of Harper Meyer LLP who was admitted to the Florida Bar in 2023,

requests a rate of $350.00 per hour.

Comparable fee awards indicate the proposed rates are within rates previously

awarded in the Southern District. See, e.g., Domond v. PeopleNetwork APS, 750 F. App’x

844, 848 (11th Cir. 2018) (determining that the average partner rate of $655.00 was

reasonable); Karpel v. Knauf Gips KG, No. 21-24168-CIV-SCOLA, 2023 WL 22173, at *2

(S.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2023) (finding that attorney rates ranging from $365.00 to $595.00 were

reasonable).

Accordingly, the requested hourly rates are approved.

B. Hours Reasonably Expended

Upon determination of the hourly rate, a court must determine the reasonable

number of hours expended in the litigation. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433

(1983). Inquiry into the reasonable number of hours focuses on an attorney’s exercise of

“billing judgment,” such as the attorney’s exclusion of hours “that would be unreasonable

to bill a client, and therefore to one’s adversary irrespective of the skill, reputation, or

experience of counsel.” Barnes, 168 F.3d at 428 (quoting Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis omitted). Fee applicants must exclude

hours that were not “reasonably expended” or that are determined to be “excessive,

redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” from their fee calculations. Hensley, 461 U.S. at

434.

According to Defendant, Reich, a partner, spent 22.9 hours working on the case.

Andrade, an associate, spent 3.5 hours on the case. The attorneys aver that these hours

were spent reviewing Plaintiffs’ records, preparing the complaint, communicating with

Plaintiffs, and preparing relevant motions. Having examined the docket and the included

billing records, the undersigned finds the number of hours claimed reasonable.

C. Lodestar Amount and Adjustment

“[T]here is a ‘strong presumption’ that the lodestar figure is reasonable, but that

presumption may be overcome in those rare circumstances in which the lodestar does

not adequately take into account a factor that may properly be considered in determining

a reasonable fee.” Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 553 (2010). The Supreme Court

has specifically identified three circumstances that may justify a deviation from the

lodestar amount: 1) “where the method used in determining the hourly rate employed in

the lodestar calculation does not adequately measure the attorney’s true market value,

as demonstrated in part during the litigation”; 2) “if the attorney’s performance includes

an extraordinary outlay of expenses and the litigation is exceptionally protracted”; and 3)

when there are “extraordinary circumstances in which an attorney’s performance involves

exceptional delay in the payment of fees.” Id. at 554–56.

In this case, the undersigned finds no reason to depart from the lodestar

calculation. Therefore, Defendant should be awarded $11,335.50 for Reich (22.9 hours

at $495.00 per hour), and $1,225.00 for Andrade (3.5 hours at $350.00 per hour), for a

total fees award of $12,560.50.

II. Costs

Plaintiffs also seek to recover from Defendant Argaman the $405.00 filing fee and

the $110.00 fee for service of process on Defendant Argaman. Plaintiffs submitted

appropriate documentation of these costs with their Motion. ECF No. 37-3. Accordingly,

Plaintiffs request that the Court award Plaintiffs the costs incurred in the amount of

$515.00.

The costs of service and filing fees are routine expenses in litigation, which the

undersigned finds are compensable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (enumerating costs that court

may tax). An exception arises when a Plaintiff uses a private process server. See EEOC

v. W & O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 624 (11th Cir. 2000). Such costs are recoverable provided

the rate charged does not exceed the cost of having a U.S. Marshal effect service. See

id. 28 C.F.R. § 0.114(a)(3) states that the current rate is “$65 per hour (or portion thereof)

for each item served by one U.S. Marshals Service employee, agent, or contractor, plus

travel costs and any other out-of-pocket expenses.” It appears that the amount requested

is slightly higher for the two items served than it would be for service by a U.S. Marshal,

and therefore only $65.00 of that cost is recoverable. Plaintiffs should therefore be

awarded costs of only $470.00.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiffs’ Verified

Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs against Defendant Argaman Group, LLC, ECF No.

37, be GRANTED to the extent that Plaintiff should be awarded attorney’s fees in the

amount of $12,560.50, and costs in the amount of $470.00, for a total award of

$13,030.50. The Motion should otherwise be DENIED.

Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and

Recommendation, any party may serve and file written objections to any of the above

findings and recommendations as provided by the Local Rules for this district. 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1); S.D. Fla. Mag. R. 4(b). The parties are hereby notified that a failure to timely

object waives the right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on

unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report and

Recommendation. 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (2018); see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).

DONE AND SUBMITTED at Fort Lauderdale, Florida this 16th day of July 2026.

Re mn It

PATRICKM.HUNT =

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

The Honorable William P. Dimitrouleas

All Counsel of Record