ZARROW

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ROSALEE V. ZARROW, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 26-CV-3726

:

FAITH DALESSIO, :

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM

MARSTON, J. August 10, 2026

Pro se Plaintiff Rosalee V. Zarrow brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against her rental manager, Faith Dalessio.1 She also seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

For the following reasons, the Court will grant Zarrow leave to proceed in forma pauperis and

dismiss her Complaint.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS2

Zarrow’s allegations are brief. She asserts that

Under color of law, Faith Dalessio et al. discriminated against I (The

Plaintiff) by allowing others to intimidate, destroying car property

(Tires) and continues not to get the necessary living conditions

together as to force I (The Plaintiff) out of dwelling from initially

breaching the contract . . .

(Compl. at 4.) She further alleges that on May 31, 2026:

1 Zarrow adds “et al.” after Dalessio’s name, implying that there are additional

Defendants. (Compl. (Doc. No. 2) at 1–2.) However, no additional Defendants are named in the

Complaint.

2 The facts set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Zarrow’s Complaint (ECF No.

2). The Court adopts the pagination assigned to the Complaint by the CM/ECF docketing

system. Where the Court quotes from the Complaint, punctuation, spelling, and capitalization

errors will be cleaned up as needed.

[a]s I (The Plaintiff) was returning back to the vehicle after coming

back from shopping, I (The Plaintiff’s) passenger side of vehicle

was flat. I (The Plaintiff) let FAITH DALESSIO et al. know what

happened because there are no security cameras on the property to

avoid car theft or other violent situations. I (the Plaintiff) is being

discriminated against for standing up for my rights.

(Id.) Zarrow alleges she is “having a mental injury because the rental manager is causing

problems because of exercising my rights as a tenant. I (The Plaintiff) is having a physical injury

because I (The Plaintiff) is being forced, coerced against my will to not stand for my rights as a

tenant.” (Id. at 5.) She asserts a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim and also cites

“Section 804(c) of the FHA of discrimination.”3 She seeks millions of dollars in monetary

damages. (Id.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court will grant Zarrow leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that

she is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) requires the Court to screen the Complaint and dismiss it if it is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks damages from an immune defendant.

Furthermore, the Court must dismiss the Complaint if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the

3 The Court infers, based on the context of the Complaint, that Zarrow is referring to

Section 804(c) of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., which makes it unlawful:

To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published

any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or

rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial

status, or national origin, or an intention to make any such

preference, limitation, or discrimination.

42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). The statute has no apparent relevance to the facts alleged in

Zarrow’s Complaint.

court must dismiss the action.”); see also Grp. Against Smog & Pollution, Inc. v. Shenango, Inc.,

810 F.3d 116, 122 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that “an objection to subject matter jurisdiction

may be raised at any time [and] a court may raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte”). A plaintiff

commencing an action in federal court bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. See

Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The burden of

establishing federal jurisdiction rests with the party asserting its existence.”) (citing

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006)). “Jurisdictional [issues]

. . . may be raised at any time and courts have a duty to consider them sua sponte.” Wilkins v.

United States, 598 U.S. 152, 157 (2023) (internal quotations omitted). In assessing the

Complaint, the Court is mindful of its obligation to liberally construe a pro se litigant’s

pleadings. See Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Federal Claims

Zarrow attempts to invoke this Court’s federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, by

using the Court’s form complaint for a plaintiff alleging a civil rights violation and asserting due

process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a claim under the Fair Housing Act. However,

“wholly insubstantial” claims are insufficient to invoke federal question jurisdiction, even if they

purport to be predicated on a federal statute. Shapiro v. McManus, 577 U.S. 39, 45 (2015) (“We

have long distinguished between failing to raise a substantial federal question for jurisdictional

purposes . . . and failing to state a claim for relief on the merits; only ‘wholly insubstantial and

frivolous’ claims implicate the former.” (cleaned up)); Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926

F.2d 1406, 1408–09 (3d Cir. 1991) (dismissal of claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is

proper “when the claim clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of

obtaining jurisdiction or is wholly insubstantial and frivolous” (cleaned up)). The factual

scenario described in the Complaint as the basis for Zarrow’s claims, i.e., claims of harassment

by a rental manager and other private actors who are not subject to liability under § 19834 does

not raise a substantial federal question for jurisdictional purposes. Rose v. Husenaj, 708 F.

App’x 57, 60 (3d Cir. 2017) (concluding that civil rights claims were insufficiently substantial to

invoke federal question jurisdiction because “Rose’s conclusory reference to ‘civil rights’ does

not convert his tort claims against non-state actors into constitutional claims”); Yoder v. Morrow,

671 F. App’x 27, 29 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction because “[a]lthough Yoder’s complaint purported to rely on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, her

allegations do not actually implicate that federal statute”). Accordingly, the Court may not

exercise jurisdiction under § 1331.

B. State Law Claims

Zarrow’s Complaint is best construed as raising tenant’s rights claims under state law.

See Holley v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 1999) (“We apply the

applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.”). District

courts may exercise jurisdiction over cases raising claims exclusively under state law if “the

matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is

4 Zarrow has not alleged facts to support a plausible conclusion that Dalessio, the sole

defendant in this action, is a state actor. She states that “[u]nder color of law, Faith Dalessio et

al. discriminated against I (The Plaintiff) . . . .” (Compl. at 4.) The conclusory reference to

“under color of law” is not sufficient to allege that Dalessio, her rental manager, is a state actor.

See Hussein v. New Jersey, 403 F. App’x 712, 716 (3d Cir. 2010) (concluding that district court

properly dismissed plaintiff’s claims against landlords because they were not state actors and

plaintiff “present[ed] no allegation giving rise to a plausible inference that the Landlords

conspired with state actors to deprive [him] of his constitutional rights”); see also Clarke v. City

of Philadelphia, No. 25-2802, 2025 WL 2462753, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2025) (dismissing

§ 1983 claim against property manager, noting that allegations that she sought to evict plaintiff

or change the locks on her apartment did not make her a state actor).

between . . . citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). “Complete diversity requires

that, in cases with multiple plaintiffs or multiple defendants, no plaintiff be a citizen of the same

state as any defendant.” Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir.

2010). For diversity purposes, an individual is a citizen of the state where he is domiciled,

meaning the state where he is physically present and intends to remain. See Washington v.

Hovensa LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2011). Several factors may be relevant in determining

an individual’s domicile, including “declarations, exercise of political rights, payment of

personal taxes, house of residence, and place of business,” as well as “location of brokerage and

bank accounts, location of spouse and family, membership in unions and other organizations, and

driver’s license and vehicle registration.” McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Tr., 458 F.3d 281,

286 (3d Cir. 2006) (quotation marks and citations omitted). For diversity purposes, a corporation

is a citizen of the state in which it is incorporated and the state in which it has its principal place

of business. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c).

Zarrow does not allege the citizenship of the parties. However, she provides

Pennsylvania addresses for herself and Defendant Dalessio, which suggests that the parties are

not completely diverse. (Compl. at 2.) Zarrow has therefore failed to meet her burden of

demonstrating that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over any state law claims she may

be raising. See Lincoln Benefit Life Co., 800 F.3d at 105 (citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,

547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006)); Smith v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., No. 08-5689, 2009 WL

1674715, *4 (E.D. Pa. June 11, 2009) (“Diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity

between the parties . . . . [N]o single Plaintiff may be a citizen of the same state as any single

Defendant.” (citations omitted)). Accordingly, any state law claims will be dismissed without

prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Zarrow leave to proceed in forma

pauperis and dismiss her Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court concludes

that further amendment would be futile under the circumstances of this case, but notes that the

dismissal is without prejudice to Zarrow refiling her claims in state court, where federal

jurisdiction will not be an issue.5 See N.J. Physicians, Inc. v. President of U.S., 653 F.3d 234,

241 n.8 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are “by

definition without prejudice” (citation omitted)). A dismissal Order follows, which shall be

docketed separately. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58.

5 The Court expresses no opinion on the merits of Zarrow’s claims.