Diaz

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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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7 ISADORE CHRISTOPHER DIAZ, Case No. 26-cv-01087-NW

8 Petitioner,

ORDER SCREENING AMENDED

9 v. PETITION, TERMINATING MOTION

FOR EXTENSION OF TIME AS MOOT

10 EDWARD BORLA,

Re: ECF No. 12

Respondent.

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13 Petitioner Isadore Christopher Diaz, a state prisoner, filed the instant pro se amended

14 petition for writ of habeas corpus.1 See ECF No. 13. The petition is now before the Court for

15 review pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. For the reasons set forth below,

16 the Court DISMISSES Diaz’s state law claim and ORDERS Respondent to file an answer

17 showing why the petition should not be granted as to the remaining claim.

18 I. BACKGROUND

19 Diaz entered a nolo contendere plea in Santa Clara County Superior Court to second

20 degree murder (Cal. Pen. Code § 187(a)), battery causing serious bodily injury (Cal. Pen. Code

21 § 245(a)(4)), misdemeanor battery (Cal. Pen. Code § 243(d)), brandishing a weapon (Cal. Pen.

22 Code § 417(a)), and resisting arrest (Cal. Pen. Code § 148(a)(1)).2 The charges arose from a series

23 of incidents at the Buena Vista Mobile Home Park in Palo Alto on June 24, 2019, during which

24 Diaz allegedly stabbed neighbor Timothy Wood while the men smoked methamphetamine,

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26 1 Petitioner filed a motion seeking an extension of time to file his amended petition but

subsequently filed the petition before his deadline. See ECF Nos. 12, 13. The motion for

27 extension of time (ECF No. 12) is TERMINATED as moot.

1 battered a neighbor who was nearby as Diaz tried to flee the site of the murder, battered a different

2 neighbor who refused to drive him out of the mobile home park, and attempted to punch a sheriff

3 deputy after Diaz was arrested and transported to county jail. See ECF No. 13 at 16-17.

4 Diaz again alleges that the trial court violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights in denying

5 his motion to dismiss a prior strike pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th

6 497 (1996), and that the California Court of Appeal violated his Fourteenth Amendment and Sixth

7 Amendment rights when it found that Diaz could not challenge his plea despite alleged false

8 testimony by unnamed witnesses and Diaz’s “misunderstanding” of the consequences of the plea

9 due to his brain injury, which rendered his plea “involuntary,” and “unknowing and unintelligent.”

10 ECF No. 13 at 25. Specifically, Diaz alleges as follows:

11 The reason why Diaz did not really understand his plead [sic] can be

demonstrated by Psy. D. Laeeq Evered’s report indicating Diaz has

12 serious brain damage, PTSD, scores suggest he has great difficulty

processing more th[a]n modestly complex information, his accuracy

13 becomes seriously impaired, he was shot in the head, had a car

accident head injury, he is unable to adequately understand what he

14 is responding to as things become complex or stressful, Diaz ability

to understand and resolve challenges is more similar to that of a 12

15 year old child than adult. . . I didn’t really understand what I was doing

when I signed. I didn’t know I was taking two strikes.

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ECF No. 13 at 24. He cites to Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1965) in support of his claim.

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

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District courts may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on “behalf of a person in

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custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that [the person] is in

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custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.

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§ 2254. The court shall “award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause

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why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or

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person detained is not entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243.

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III. DISCUSSION

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The Court discusses Diaz’s claims below.

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A. Denial of Romero Motion

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As noted in this Court’s prior screening order, whether the trial court correctly used its

1 discretion in denying Diaz’s Romero motion is a matter of state—not federal—law. Brown v.

2 Mayle, 283 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds, 538 U.S. 901 (2003) (holding

3 that a trial court’s refusal to exercise its discretion and strike prior felony convictions is not

4 cognizable on federal habeas review). State law claims are not remediable on federal habeas

5 review, even if state law was erroneously interpreted or applied. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562

6 U.S. 216, 219 (2011) (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991)). Here, Diaz challenges

7 the correctness of the trial court’s use of its discretion and Diaz has not, despite being given the

8 opportunity to do so, explained how the trial court’s denial of his Romero motion resulted in a

9 violation of his constitutional rights. See, e.g., Smith v. Ryan, 823 F.3d 1270, 1282 (9th Cir.

10 2016). Accordingly, the Court finds that Diaz’s current Romero claim is not cognizable and must

11 be DISMISSED. As Diaz has already been granted an opportunity to address the deficiency and

12 he failed to do so, dismissal is without leave to amend. See Wheeler v. City of Santa Clara, 894

13 F.3d 1046, 1059 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Leave to amend may be denied if the proposed amendment is

14 futile or would be subject to dismissal.”).

15 B. Challenge to Plea

16 Under California law, a “plea of nolo contendere ‘is the functional equivalent of a guilty

17 plea.’” United States v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 1219, 1220 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting People v.

18 Whitfield, 46 Cal. App. 4th 947, 959 (1996)). A defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere

19 generally may not collaterally challenge a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea entered with the

20 advice of competent counsel. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 574 (1989); Mabry v.

21 Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984). Nor may a defendant collaterally attack the validity of his

22 plea merely because he made what turned out, in retrospect, to be a poor deal. Bradshaw v.

23 Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 186 (2005).

24 A defendant who pleads guilty cannot later raise in habeas corpus proceedings independent

25 claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred before the plea of guilty.

26 See Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 319–20 (1983); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266–67

27 (1973). After a defendant has entered a guilty or nolo contendere plea, the only challenges left

1 plea; and (2) adequacy of the advice of counsel. Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1002 (9th

2 Cir. 2007) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56–57 (1985)).

3 Here, to the extent that Diaz complains about alleged false testimony prior to his

4 conviction, federal habeas relief on this claim is barred by his subsequent nolo contendere plea

5 except in circumstances not present here. See Tollet, 411 U.S. at 266–67 (generally, guilty plea

6 forecloses consideration of pre-plea constitutional deprivations); see also Haring v. Prosise, 462

7 U.S. 306, 320 (1983) (jurisdictional challenge permitted on federal habeas following guilty plea);

8 Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (double jeopardy challenge permitted). However, Diaz’s

9 claim that his brain damage and psychiatric conditions impaired his ability to understand his nolo

10 contendere plea, rendering the plea “involuntary,” “unknowing[,] and unintelligent” in violation of

11 Boykin, 395 U.S. 238, is not plainly meritless, and warrants an answer from Respondent. ECF

12 No. 13 at 25.

13 IV. CONCLUSION

14 The Court orders as follows:

15 1. Diaz’s motion for an extension of time to file an amended petition (ECF No. 12) is

16 TERMINATED as moot.

17 2. Diaz states a cognizable claim under Boykin.

18 3. Diaz’s claim regarding the denial of his Romero motion is DISMISSED

19 WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

20 4. The Clerk shall serve electronically a copy of this order upon the Respondent and

21 the Respondent’s attorney, the Attorney General of the State of California, at the

22 following email addresses: SFAWTParalegals@doj.ca.gov and

23 SFAGDocketing@doj.ca.gov. The petition and the exhibits thereto are available

24 via the Electronic Case Filing System for the Northern District of California. The

25 Clerk shall also mail a copy of this order to Diaz.

26 5. Within 60 days of the issuance of this order, Respondent is ORDERED to file with

27 the Court and serve on Diaz an answer conforming in all respects to Rule 5 of the

] should not be granted. Respondent shall file with the answer and serve on Diaz a

2 copy of all portions of the state trial record that have been transcribed previously

3 and that are relevant to a determination of the issues presented by the petition.

4 6. If Diaz wishes to respond to the answer, he shall do so by filing a traverse with the

5 Court and serving it on Respondent within 30 days of his receipt of the answer.

6 7. In lieu of filing an answer, Respondent may instead file a motion to dismiss on

7 procedural grounds, as set forth in the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 4 of the

8 Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. If Respondent files such a motion, Diaz

9 must serve and file an opposition or statement of non-opposition within 28 days

10 after the motion is served and filed, and Respondent must serve and file a reply to

11 an opposition within 14 days after Diaz’ opposition is served and filed.

12 8. Diaz is reminded that all communications with the Court must be served on

13 Respondent by mailing a true copy of the document to Respondent’s counsel.

14 9. Diaz must also keep the Court and Respondent informed of any change of address

3 15 by filing a separate paper with the Clerk headed “Notice of Change of Address,”

a 16 and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so may

17 result in the dismissal of this action without prejudice.

18 IT IS SO ORDERED.

19 || Dated: July 20, 2026 ,

Noél Wise

21 United States District Judge

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