Casey

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 JUAN ANIBAL ARGUETA PALMA, Case No.: 3:26-cv-03345-RBM-VET

12 Petitioner,

ORDER GRANTING PETITION

13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

14 JEREMY CASEY, Warden of the

[Doc. 1]

Imperial Regional Detention Facility,

15

Respondent.

16

17

18 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Juan Anibal Argueta Palma’s (“Petitioner”)

19 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1.)

20 For the reasons set forth below, the Petition is GRANTED.

21 I. BACKGROUND

22 Petitioner, a citizen of El Salvador, is currently detained at the Imperial Regional

23 Detention Facility in the custody of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).

24 (Doc. 1 at 4). Petitioner was ordered removed from the United States in 1991, 1993, and

25 2005 due to prior felony convictions. (Doc. 4 at 2; see Doc. 4-1, Ex. 3 at 17.)

26 On June 2, 2017, an immigration judge (“IJ”) denied Petitioner’s application for

27 withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).

28 (See Doc. 1-4, Ex. 3 at 11.) Petitioner filed appealed the IJ’s decision with the Board of

1 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and filed a motion to reopen his immigration proceedings.

2 (See id.) The BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal on February 23, 2018. (See id.) Petitioner

3 was once again removed to El Salvador in March 2018. (See id. at 12.)

4 On February 19, 2019, Petitioner re-entered the United States without inspection and

5 was detained upon entry. (See Doc. 4-1 at 5–6.) The U.S. Department of Homeland

6 Security (“DHS”) reinstated his prior October 2005 order of removal shortly thereafter.

7 (See Doc. 4-1, Ex. 3 at 13.) After an asylum officer determined that Petitioner had a

8 reasonable fear of persecution or torture, Petitioner was placed in withholding-only

9 proceedings on May 21, 2020. (See Doc. 4-1, Ex. 6 at 64–65; Doc. 1-4, Ex. 3 at 11 n. 2.)

10 Petitioner then filed a new application in his withholding-only proceedings for withholding

11 of removal and for deferral of removal under CAT. (See Doc. 1-4, Ex. 3 at 11–12.)

12 On October 9, 2020, an IJ denied Petitioner’s application for withholding of removal

13 and deferral of removal. (See Doc. 1-4, Ex. 3 at 11.) Petitioner filed an appeal of the IJ’s

14 withholding-only decision with the BIA. (See id.)

15 On November 2, 2020, an IJ denied Petitioner’s request for release on bond based

16 on a finding that Petitioner was “a danger to the community and a flight risk.” (Doc. 4-1,

17 Ex. 3 at 16.) Petitioner appealed the IJ’s bond decision with the BIA on November 16,

18 2020 (see Doc. 4-1, Ex. 4 at 16), but was released under an Order of Supervision on

19 November 25, 2020, “[b]ecause the Agency ha[d] not affected [his] deportation or removal

20 during the period prescribed by law . . . .” (Doc. 1-2 at 5–7; see Doc. 1 at 6.) Petitioner’s

21 release was subject to certain conditions including the use of an ankle monitor and his

22 attendance at regular ICE check-ins. (See Doc. 1 at 4; Doc. 1-2 at 5–7.) An ICE officer

23 removed Petitioner’s ankle monitor during his check-in on March 18, 2022. (Doc. 1 at 4.)

24 On February 11, 2026, Petitioner was arrested and detained while working as a

25 professional truck driver. (Doc. 1 at 4, 6.) Petitioner claims that ICE agents who conducted

26 the arrest falsely told him the BIA has denied his appeal of the IJ’s withholding-only

27 determination on January 31, 2025, but the BIA did not dismiss his appeal until April 20,

28 2026. (Doc. 1 at 4.)

1 On February 16, 2026, Petitioner was issued with a Notice of Revocation of Release

2 which states that his release on an Order of Supervision was “revoked pursuant to 8 C.F.R.

3 § 241.13(i) for the following reason[ ]: . . . [c]ircumstances have changed such that there

4 is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” (Doc. 1-2 at

5 3–4.) The Notice further states that Petitioner would be afforded an informal interview on

6 February 16, 2026. (Id. at 4.) Petitioner also received a Notice to Alien of File Custody

7 Review (“Notice of Custody Review”) indicating that his “custody status will be review

8 on or around May 13, 2026.” (Doc. 1-4 at 17.) The Notice of Custody Review states that:

9 If ICE has not removed [Petitioner] from the United States within the removal

period as set forth in INA 241(a) (normally 90-days of either: 1) your entering

10

ICE custody with a final order of removal, deportation or exclusion, or 2) the

11 date of any final order you receive while you are in ICE custody), ICE’s

Deciding Official will review [Petitioner’s] case for consideration of release

12

on an Order of Supervision. Release, however, is dependent on [Petitioner]

13 demonstrating to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that [he] will not

pose a danger to the community and will not present a flight risk.

14

15 (Id.) Petitioner claims that he has not been spoken to about his release or pending charges

16 as of May 15, 2026. (See id.)

17 On April 20, 2026, the BIA dismissed Petitioner’s appeal of the IJ’s withholding-

18 only decision. (Doc. 1-4, Ex. 3 at 10–13; see Doc. 4-1, Ex. 5 at 20.) On May 4, 2026,

19 Petitioner filed a petition for relief with the Ninth Circuit challenging the IJ’s withholding-

20 only determination. (Doc. 4 at 2; see Doc. 1-4, Ex. 3 at 3.)

21 On June 1, 2026, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, commenced this action by filing the

22 instant Petition. (Doc. 1.) Respondents filed a Return to the Petition on June 12, 2026.

23 (Doc. 4.) Petitioner has not filed an optional reply brief as of the date of this Order.

24 II. LEGAL STANDARD

25 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United

26 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2).

27 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that

28 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal

1 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may

2 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit

3 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the

4 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

5 treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3).

6 III. DISCUSSION

7 Petitioner claims that ICE’s revocation of his release under an Order of Supervision

8 and subsequent detention lacked statutory authority in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s

9 Due Process Clause, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and applicable regulations set forth in 8 C.F.R.

10 §§ 241.13, 241.4. (Doc. 1 at 3–8.) Respondents do not respond to Petitioner’s regulatory

11 violation claims. Instead, that “Petitioner is not entitled to release or a bond hearing”

12 because his detention is still within the six-month presumptively reasonable period of

13 detention and 8 U.S.C. § 1231 “provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens with final

14 removal orders.” (Doc. 4 at 2.)

15 As the statutory provision governing Petitioner’s detention determines what

16 procedures Respondents must follow, the Court will address this issue first.

17 A. Detention Authority

18 “Section 1226(a) . . . applies only while ‘a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to

19 be removed from the United States’ is ‘pending’. . . .” Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 882 F.3d

20 826, 831 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). By contrast, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)

21 “governs the detention, release, and removal of individuals ‘ordered removed.’” Johnson

22 v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573, 578 (2022). Section 1231(a) also “applies to

23 [noncitizens] who were removed from the United States but later reentered without

24 authorization, were subject to reinstated orders of removal, and then sought withholding of

25 removal based on fear of persecution in the particular countries designated by their removal

26 orders.” Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 526 (2021); see Delkash v. Noem, Case

27 No. 5:25-cv-01675-HDV-AGR, 2025 WL 2683988, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025)

28 (“Detention, release, and removal of individuals ordered removed—including those, like

1 [Petitioner], with pending ‘withholding only’ proceedings—is governed by 8 U.S.C.

2 § 1231(a).”) (citing Arteaga Martinez, 596 U.S. at 578).

3 In this case, Petitioner was ordered removed in 1991, 1992, and 2005, and his

4 October 2005 removal order was reinstated on February 19, 2019. (Doc. 4 at 2; see Doc.

5 4-1, Ex. 3 at 13.) Petitioner then sought relief through withholding-only proceedings in

6 2017 and 2020. (See Doc. 4-1, Ex. 4 at 17.) Although Petitioner is still in withholding-

7 only proceedings pending the BIA’s resolution of his appeal of the IJ’s 2020 withholding

8 decision, his “reinstated removal order remains administratively final, [and] he is detained

9 pursuant to [S]ection 1231(a).” Padilla-Ramirez, 882 F.3d at 832; see Guzman Chavez,

10 594 U.S. at 526 (“[Section] 1231, not § 1226, governs the detention of [noncitizens] subject

11 to reinstated orders of removal, meaning those [individuals] are not entitled to a bond

12 hearing while they pursue withholding of removal.”). Ground 2 for violation of 8 U.S.C.

13 § 1226(a) is therefore DENIED.

14 B. Due Process

15 Petitioner claims his re-detention violates 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3) and the Fifth

16 Amendment’s Due Process Clause because Respondents revoked his release under an

17 Order of Supervision without providing adequate notice or reasons for such revocation.

18 (Doc. 1 at 4–8.) Respondents do not address these arguments.

19 The detention, and release of noncitizens who have been ordered removed is

20 governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231. This statute directs the Attorney General of the United States

21 to effect the removal of a noncitizen from this country “within a period of 90 days,” also

22 known as the “removal period.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). It also authorizes the detention

23 of a noncitizen during the removal period. § 1231(a)(2). Noncitizens who are

24 inadmissible, such as due to a prior reentry after removal, “may be detained beyond the

25 [90-day] removal period,” but § 1231 does not mandate their detention. 8. U.S.C.

26 § 1231(a)(6). Instead, the statute is limited to “a period reasonably necessary to bring about

27 [the noncitizen’s] removal from the United States” and “does not permit indefinite

28 detention.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001). Where a noncitizen does not

1 leave or is not removed within the 90-day removal period, the individual, “pending

2 removal, shall be subject to supervision.” 8. U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3).1

3 The regulations governing the release and revocation of release of noncitizens

4 subject to a final order of removal are 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4 and 241.13. Both regulations

5 provide that, upon revocation of release, the noncitizen “will be notified of the reasons for

6 revocation of his or her release,” and will be given “an initial informal interview promptly

7 after his or her return to Service custody to afford the alien an opportunity to respond to

8 the reasons for revocation stated in the notification.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.13(i)(3), 241.4(l)(1).

9 These regulations “ were intended ‘to provide due process protections to [noncitizens]

10 following the removal period as they are considered for continued detention, release, and

11 then possible revocation of release.’” Ghafouri v. Noem, No. 3:25-CV-02675-RBM-BLM,

12 2025 WL 3085726, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025) (quoting Santamaria Orellana v. Baker,

13 Civil Action No. 25-1788-TDC, 2025 WL 2444087, at *6 (D. Md. Aug. 25, 2025)).

14 It is well-established that government agencies are required to follow their own

15 regulations. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954);

16 United States v. Ramos, 623 F.3d 672, 683 (9th Cir. 2010) (“It is a well-known maxim that

17 agencies must comply with their own regulations.”) (quoting Ramon–Sepulveda v. INS,

18 743 F.2d 1307, 1310 (9th Cir. 1984)). This Court has joined most district courts and

19 “determined that where ICE fails to follow its own regulations in revoking release, the

20 detention is unlawful and the petitioner’s release must be ordered.” Azzo v. Noem, Case

21 No.: 3:25-cv-03122-RBM-BJW, 2025 WL 3535208, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2025)

22 (quoting Rokhfirooz v. Larose, 804 F. Supp. 3d 1095, 1099 (S.D. Cal. 2025)) (collecting

23 cases).

24

25

26

1 As such, Respondents’ argument that Petitioner is subject to “mandatory” detention (Doc.

27 4 at 2), directly contradicts the Order of Supervision issued by DHS issued which permitted

Petitioner’s release subject to his compliance with certain conditions. (See Doc. 1-2, Ex.

28

1 In this case, the record before the Court indicates that Petitioner did not receive any

2 notice of the reasons for his re-detention prior to his arrest or an opportunity to respond to

3 such reasons. Although both regulations require notice “upon revocation,” 8 C.F.R.

4 §§ 241.13(i)(3), 241.4(l)(1), ICE did not provide Petitioner with the Notice of Revocation

5 until five days after he was taken into custody. (See Doc. 1-2, Ex. 1 at 3–4.) The Notice

6 of Revocation incorrectly states that Petitioner’s Order of Supervision was issued “on or

7 around November 18, 2025,” but the record shows that the Order of Supervision was issued

8 on November 24, 2020. (Compare id. at 3 (Notice of Revocation), with id. at 5–7 (Order

9 of Supervision).) Moreover, the Notice of Revocation merely states that Petitioner’s

10 “release has been revoked pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)” because “circumstances have

11 changed such that there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable

12 future.” (Id. at 3.) “But ‘simply to say that circumstances had changed or there was a

13 significant likelihood of removal in the foreseeable future is not enough.’” Tan-Gutierrez

14 v. Noem, Case No.: 3:26-cv-00152-RBM-BJW, 2026 WL 194747, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 26,

15 2026) (quoting Sarail A. v. Bondi, 803 F. Supp. 3d 775, 780 (D. Minn. 2025) (cleaned up);

16 see also McSweeney v. Warden of Otay Mesa Det. Facility, Case No. 3:25-cv 02488-RBM-

17 DEB, 2025 WL 2998376, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2025) (granting habeas petition where

18 the petitioner “could not have meaningfully responded to the proffered reasons for

19 revocation when he had not yet even been informed of those reasons”). “ICE’s conclusory

20 explanation for revoking Petitioner’s release ‘did not offer him adequate notice of the basis

21 for the revocation decision such that he could meaningfully respond at the post-detention

22 informal interview.”’ Tan-Gutierrez, 2026 WL 194747, at *3 (quoting Diaz v. Wofford,

23 Case No. 1:25-CV-1079 JLT EPG, 2025 WL 2581575, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2025));

24 see Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 (1978) (“The purpose of

25 notice under the Due Process Clause is to apprise the affected individual of, and permit

26 adequate preparation for, an impending hearing.”). And, as Petitioner notes, the ICE

27 officers who re-detained him inaccurately told him the BIA had denied his appeal of the

28 IJ’s withholding of removal decision on January 31, 2025, but the BIA did not deny the

1 appeal until April 20, 2026—about two months after he was re-detained. (See Doc. 1 at 4;

2 Doc. 1-4, Ex. 3 at 10–13 (BIA decision).) The Court therefore finds that Petitioner was

3 not provided adequate notice of the reasons for revocation of his release.

4 In a similar vein, an informal interview is required “promptly after [the noncitizen’s]

5 return to Service custody.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1) (emphasis added); § 241.13(i)(3). The

6 Notice of Revocation states that Petitioner would be afforded an informal interview on

7 February 16, 2026. (Doc. 1-2 at 4.) Petitioner, however, claims that he has not been spoken

8 to about his release or pending charges as of May 15, 2026. (See Doc. 1-4 at 17.) And

9 nothing in the record indicates that Petitioner was provided with an interview in connection

10 with the revocation of his release, let alone a “prompt” interview, or otherwise afforded an

11 opportunity to respond to the reasons for his re-detention. See Hoac v. Becerra, No. 2:25

12 cv-01740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025) (finding petitioner

13 was likely to succeed on his unlawful re-detention claim as “there [was] no indication that

14 an informal interview was provided”).

15 Additionally, while the Notice of Revocation of Release indicates that Petitioner’s

16 release was revoked under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i), there is no evidence that ICE determined

17 Petitioner’s removal was significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future based on

18 any “changed circumstances.” (See Doc. 1-2, Ex. 1 at 3.) Section 241.13(i)(2) allows a

19 noncitizen’s release to be revoked only if the appropriate official “determines that there is

20 a significant likelihood that the [noncitizen] may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable

21 future” and makes that finding “on account of changed circumstances.” Petitioner alleges

22 that the ICE officers who re-detained him and an ICE officer at the detention center falsely

23 told him the BIA had denied his appeal on January 31, 2025. (Doc. 1 at 4.) Although the

24 BIA eventually denied his appeal in April 2026, the BIA’s decision had not been issued

25 until two months after Respondents had already re-detained Petitioner. (See Doc. 1-4, Ex.

26 3 at 10–13 (BIA decision).) “[T]his post-hoc rationalization cannot form the basis of

27 ‘changed circumstances’ for the purpose of re-detention.” Arostegui-Campo v. Noem, Case

28 No.: 25-CV-3064 JLS (MMP), 2025 WL 3280886, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025)

1 || (collecting cases).

2 The Court therefore finds the Government failed to comply with its own regulations.

3 doing so, ICE deprived Petitioner of his due process rights and prejudiced his interests

4 || by failing to afford him the procedural safeguards the regulations were designed to protect.

5 Diaz, 2025 WL 2581575, at *7 (“DHS’s failure to follow its own procedural

6 ||regulations may constitute a due process violation.”); M.S.L. v. Bostock, Civ. No. 6:25-cv-

7 1101204-AA, 2025 WL 2430267, at *11 (D. Or. Aug. 21, 2025) (“ICE’s failure to provide

8 || Petitioner with a timely Notice of Revocation or conduct an informal interview until nearly

9 ||a month after taking [him] into custody is a grave violation of Petitioner’s due process

10 || rights in that they deprived [him] both of meaningful notice and an opportunity to be

11 ||heard.’”). Accordingly, the Petition is GRANTED.’

12 IV. CONCLUSION

13 Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. Accordingly:

14 1. The Government is ORDERED to immediately release the noncitizen from

15 custody, subject to his preexisting Order of Supervision.

16 2. The Government SHALL NOT re-detain the noncitizen under 8 U.S.C.

17 § 1231(a)(6) unless and until the Government follows all applicable statutory and

18 regulatory procedures.

19 IT IS SO ORDERED.

20 DATE: July 24, 2026

9 HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

23

24

25

26

27

2 In light of the disposition herein, the Court declines to address the remaining grounds in

the Petition for seeking release.