Brightwell

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

JAMIYIA BRIGHTWELL, :

:

Plaintiff, : Case No. 2:26-cv-141

:

v. : Judge Algenon L. Marbley

:

FRANKLIN COUNTY OHIO, et al., : Magistrate Judge S. Courter M. Shimeall

:

Defendants. :

OPINION & ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on pro se Plaintiff Jamiyia Brightwell’s Objection (ECF

No. 16) to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 7). For the following

reasons, the Court OVERRULES Brightwell’s Objection, ADOPTS the Report and

Recommendation, and DISMISSES Brightwell’s Complaint without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

In early 2025, Plaintiff Brightwell was detained at the Franklin County Jail. She claims to

have been “lawfully released pursuant to Rule 4”1 on March 31, 2025. (ECF No. 3 ¶¶ 9–10). Despite

her release, jail staff allegedly failed to provide her with “Rule 4 paperwork or any written

documentation confirming her lawful release” or informing her that she “was required to carry

documentation to avoid re-arrest.” She returned home, unaware that her release from jail had no

documentation. (Id. ¶¶ 12–13).

On April 6, 2025, Brightwell contacted law enforcement regarding a family matter. Law

enforcement did not understand that Brightwell was released, rearrested her, transported her to the

1 Brightwell fails to specify what “Rule 4” is. She may be referencing Ohio R. Crim. P. 4(F)

(permitting the release of persons arrested for misdemeanors with the issuance of summonses).

Franklin County Jail, and booked her. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 16–18). Brightwell attempted to explain her

situation to staff at the Franklin County Jail, but to no avail.2 She was then transported to a facility

in Warren County, “where her Rule 4 matter was pending,”3 before finally being released after

eleven days. (Id. ¶¶ 19–22). An unspecified jail employee4 informed Brightwell that “her detention

resulted from staff failure to provide Rule 4 paperwork, not from any wrongdoing.” (Id. ¶ 26).

Brightwell initiated this lawsuit on February 9, 2026, claiming a violation of her civil rights

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. ¶ 1). She sues Franklin County, the Franklin County Jail, the Franklin

County Sheriff’s Office, and ten unknown correctional officers, booking officers, supervisors, and

other unknown county employees. (Id. ¶¶ 5–8). She asserts three counts: (1) unlawful detention in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment; and (3)

municipal liability against Franklin County for failure to train. (Id. ¶¶ 29–31). She is proceeding in

forma pauperis.

Pursuant to the in forma pauperis statute, the Magistrate Judge screened Brightwell’s

Complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). On May 6, 2026, the Magistrate Judge recommended

that the Complaint be dismissed without prejudice for failing to state a claim on which relief may

be granted. Brightwell timely objected.

2 Brightwell alleges that she “spoke directly with a supervisory official wearing a white coat inside

the jail, indicating a position of authority and oversight.” (ECF No. 3 ¶ 19). Brightwell does not

explain why a white coat would indicate a supervisory position.

3 Brightwell fails to explain what her “Rule 4 matter” was. She also does not explain whether her

Rule 4 matter pending in Warren County is the same Rule 4 matter for which she was released from

Franklin County Jail on March 31, 2025.

4 Brightwell fails to identify whether this unspecified jail employee was employed by Franklin

County or Warren County.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court “must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has

been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).

Where a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, the court “shall dismiss” the complaint

if it “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The

plaintiff need not provide detailed factual allegations at the pleading stage, but must “provide the

‘grounds’ of [her] ‘entitlement to relief,’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(brackets and citations omitted), in a “short and plain statement of [her] claim[s].” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2).

The court will construe a pro se plaintiff’s complaint liberally, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.

89, 94 (2007), and view it in the light most favorable to her. Lowe v. Marshall Cnty., 779 F. Supp.

3d 944, 947 (M.D. Tenn. 2025). “Dismissal of a complaint for the failure to state a claim on which

relief may be granted is appropriate only if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no

set of facts in support of [her] claim that would entitle [her] to relief.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d

863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000).

III. LAW & ANALYSIS

The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation reasoned that dismissal of Brightwell’s

three counts was appropriate. First, it recommended dismissal of Brightwell’s municipal liability

claim against Franklin County because she had failed to allege an unconstitutional policy or custom,

as required under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Cty. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Second, it

recommended dismissal of claims against the Franklin County Jail and Franklin County Sheriff’s

Office, reasoning that such entities could not be sued. Third, it recommended dismissal of the

individual Doe Defendants, explaining that the Doe Defendants could not be sued in their official

capacities, and Brightwell had failed to allege how they had violated her rights in their individual

capacities.

Brightwell raised three objections to the Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 16 at 2–

4). The Court considers each objection in turn.

First, Brightwell objects to the dismissal of her Monell municipal liability claim. Brightwell

argues that her allegations regarding her Rule 4 release process merit discovery so she can further

investigate “whether an official policy, custom, failure to train, failure to supervise, or deficient

procedures contributed to the alleged constitutional injury.” (Id. at 3).

Here, the problem for Brightwell is that she “must allege the deprivation (1) of a right

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) that was directly caused by a municipal

policy or custom” in order to state a Monell claim. Nichols v. Wayne Cnty., 822 F. App’x 445, 448

(6th Cir. 2020) (citing Hardrick v. City of Detroit, 876 F.3d 238, 243 (6th Cir. 2017)). Nowhere

does Brightwell allege that her injury was caused by some Franklin County policy or custom. In

fact, she does not reference any policy or custom at all. Thus, Brightwell has failed to “allege facts

that if accepted as true, are sufficient to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” with

respect to her Monell claim. Nichols, 822 F. App’x at 448 (quoting Majestic Bldg. Maint., Inc. v.

Huntington Bancshares, Inc., 864 F.3d 455, 458 (6th Cir. 2017)). Her objection here is without

merit because she has not stated a Monell claim.

Brightwell also raises two other objections. She argues that her Complaint contains

allegations plausibly describing an unreasonable seizure and continued deprivation of her liberty,

supporting her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. She further contends that her Complaint

contains specific factual allegations and a detailed chronology. She asserts that her factual

allegations are not “bare legal conclusions.” (ECF No. 16 at 2). But precisely what Brightwell is

objecting to with each of these objections is unclear—she does not engage with or challenge specific

parts of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. She simply repeats these objections

multiple times.

The Court has no way to know how Brightwell believes the Magistrate Judge erred. At best,

the Court understands Brightwell to be making general objections to the dismissal of her Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment claims, as well as to the Magistrate Judge’s determination that some of her

allegations were conclusory. These objections are general, as they “merely dispute the magistrate

judge’s recommendation but do not set forth specific findings believed to have been made in error.”

Mobley v. Mohr, 2011 WL 4055234, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 12, 2011) (Marbley, J.). General

objections are insufficient. They do not focus a court’s attention “on any specific issues for review.”

Howard v. Sec’y of Health and Hum. Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 508–09 (6th Cir. 1991). Moreover, these

objections are poorly drafted—they consist of repeat paragraphs copied again and again. They fail

to advance any developed argument and do not point the Court to any error. “In light of the poor

draftsmanship of the paper, it is hard”—if not impossible—for the Court to “know what [Brightwell]

thought the magistrate [judge] had done wrong.” Id. at 508. Because Brightwell’s objections on

these points are unclear, the Court will uphold the Magistrate Judge’s determination. Kelly v.

Shoemaker, 2016 WL 2757547, at *2 (S.D. Ohio May 12, 2016) (Marbley, J.) (“Because Plaintiff

objects neither specifically nor understandably to the Magistrate Judge’s dismissal of the case, . . .

the Court upholds the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.”) (emphasis altered).

Finally, Brightwell raises other issues that are not objections. She argues that she needs

discovery, in part to identify the individual Doe Defendants, and requests leave to amend her

Complaint rather than have her Complaint dismissed. (ECF No. 16 at 4–9). As discussed, the

Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court dismiss Brightwell’s Complaint without prejudice

for failure to state a claim. The Court has determined that dismissal is proper, in part because

Brightwell’s objections fail to provide an error in the Magistrate Judge’s reasoning. But Brightwell

may still amend her pleading “once as a matter of course,” as it has not yet been served. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(a)(1).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff Brightwell’s objections,

ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, and DISMISSES the Complaint

without prejudice.

Should Brightwell wish to amend her pleadings as of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1),

she is ORDERED to submit an Amended Complaint within twenty-one days from the date she

receives this Order. The Court CAUTIONS Brightwell that it is her obligation to ensure that her

pleading consists of “short and plain” statements of her claims showing she is entitled to relief. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In drafting any revised pleading, Brightwell should carefully review the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation and this Order. Brightwell is also encouraged to

review the Court’s Pro Se Handbook.5

Moreover, any pleading must give each defendant “fair notice of what the claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (ellipsis

omitted). Thus, to the extent that any future Amended Complaint names multiple Defendants and

multiple causes of action, Brightwell SHALL specify which claims she seeks to assert against which

Defendants. Brightwell must do so to ensure that a reader of her pleading can track which

allegations of fact support each cause of action, and determine which causes of action are brought

5 U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Pro Se Handbook, available at

https://www.ohsd.uscourts.gov/pro-se-handbook (last visited Aug. 4, 2026).

against each Defendant. See Arnold v. CooperSurgical, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 3d 803, 823-25 (S.D.

Ohio 2023) (Sargus, J.) (observing that impermissible “shotgun pleading” makes it difficult or

impossible for defendants to understand allegations brought against them).

The Court CERTIFIES that an appeal of this Order would not be taken in good faith and

should not be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

“7 /

ALGENON L. MARB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED: August 12, 2026