Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 ROBERT NAUYOKS, No. 2:25-cv-0625-DC-CKD (PS)

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

14 COUNTY OF PLACER, et al.,

15 Defendants.

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17 Plaintiff Robert Nauyoks proceeds without counsel and seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. §

18 1983. This case is referred to the undersigned by operation of Local Rule 302(c)(21) pursuant to

19 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and the court’s minute order dated May 6, 2026. (ECF No. 47.) Defendants

20 County of Placer and Ross Byers move to dismiss plaintiff’s first amended complaint (“FAC”)

21 under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court previously found the

22 motion suitable for decision without oral argument under Local Rule 230(g). For the reasons set

23 forth below, the motion to dismiss should be denied.

24 I. Background

25 Plaintiff initiated this action while represented by counsel on February 21, 2025, and filed

26 the operative FAC on August 20, 2025. (ECF No. 25.) Under plaintiff’s allegations, defendant

27 Byers arrested plaintiff at 1:00 p.m. on February 16, 2024, in Lincoln, California, and applied

28 handcuffs. (Id., ¶¶ 8-9.) Plaintiff complained of pain and numbness and notified Byers of his

1 diabetic neuropathy. (Id., ¶ 9.) Byers adjusted the handcuffs and switched to using two pairs of

2 handcuffs placed in front of plaintiff’s body. (Id., ¶ 10.) Plaintiff alleges Byers knew or should

3 have known to cuff plaintiff in this manner based on a prior encounter and acted intentionally or

4 recklessly in failing to do so, ignoring a foreseeable risk of harm to plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 10, 19, 26.)

5 Plaintiff alleges he suffered physical injuries to his hands and shoulders as a result. (Id., ¶ 11.)

6 Plaintiff brings an excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims

7 asserting violation of California Civil Code § 52.1, Assault/Battery, Negligence, and Intentional

8 Infliction of Emotional Distress. (ECF No. 25, ¶¶ 12-26.)

9 Defendants filed the pending motion to dismiss on September 10, 2025. (ECF No. 27.)

10 Defendants argue that pursuant to Cal. Gov. Code sections 815 and 815.2, plaintiff’s state law

11 claims—the second, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action—fail to state a claim upon which

12 relief may be granted as to the County, which may only be liable as specified by statute. (Id. at 1-

13 2.) Defendants also assert all causes of action fail to state a claim as to either defendant. (Id. at 1-

14 2.)

15 Plaintiff, still represented by counsel at the time, filed an opposition to the motion. (ECF

16 No. 28.) Defendants filed a reply. (ECF No. 29.)

17 II. Legal Standards for Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6)

18 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be warranted

19 for “the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a

20 cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In

21 evaluating whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the court accepts as

22 true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most favorable to

23 the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d

24 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989).

25 III. Discussion

26 A. State Law Immunities

27 Defendants argue plaintiff’s second, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action against the

28 County are premised on common law theories not based in statute for which the County cannot be

1 directly liable. (ECF No. 27-1 at 4; ECF No. 29 at 2.) Plaintiff responds that the County is liable

2 under a theory of respondeat superior for his injuries caused by Byers’ acts and omissions. (ECF

3 No. 28 at 4.)

4 In California, all government tort liability must be based on statute. See Hoff v. Vacaville

5 Unified Sch. Dist., 19 Cal. 4th 925, 932 (1998); Cal. Gov. Code § 815(a) (except otherwise

6 provided by statute, “[a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of

7 an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person”). California

8 Government Code Section 815.2 provides for vicarious liability of a public entity, stating in

9 pertinent part:

10 A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or

omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his

11 employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section,

have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his

12 personal representative.

13 Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2(a).

14 It is well settled that “a governmental entity can be held vicariously liable when a police

15 officer acting in the course and scope of employment uses excessive force or engages in

16 assaultive conduct.” Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 3d 202, 215 (1991) (collecting

17 cases). California law does not immunize defendant employees’ unreasonable conduct. See Cal.

18 Gov. Code § 815.2(b).

19 The FAC alleges Byers was employed by defendant County and acting within the course

20 and scope of that employment at all relevant times. (ECF No. 25, ¶ 5.) Defendants challenge only

21 the County’s direct liability, but do not challenge plaintiff’s vicarious liability theory for the state-

22 law causes of action. The motion to dismiss the state law claims against the County should be

23 denied.

24 B. Sufficiency of the Allegations

25 1. Fourth Amendment and Bane Act

26 Defendants argue plaintiff’s excessive force and Bane Act claims fail because the force

27 used by Byers only involved handcuffing plaintiff, and Byers responded to plaintiff’s complaints

28 by adjusting the handcuffs. (ECF No. 27-1 at 5-6.)

1 Claims of excessive force are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s objective

2 reasonableness standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). When determining

3 whether the totality of the circumstances justifies the degree of force, the court considers “the

4 facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue,

5 whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether

6 he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396. “[T]he question is

7 whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances

8 confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 397 (citations

9 omitted). The reasonableness of force used is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. Avina v.

10 U.S., 681 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2012).

11 California’s Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (“Bane Act”) imposes liability on a person who

12 “interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat, intimidation, or

13 coercion, with the exercise” of an individual’s state or federal right. Cal. Civ. Code, § 52.1(b).) A

14 Bane Act claim requires the following: (1) intentional interference or attempted interference with

15 a state or federal constitutional or legal right, and (2) the interference or attempted interference

16 was by threats, intimidation or coercion. Allen v. City of Sacramento, 234 Cal. App. 4th 41, 67

17 (3rd Dist. 2015) (citing Jones v. Kmart Corp. 17 Cal.4th 329, 334 (1998)). To prevail on a Bane

18 Act claim, a plaintiff must establish the defendant had a “specific intent” to violate his rights.

19 Reese v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1043 (9th Cir. 2018).

20 Plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts alleging Byers used an unreasonable amount of force

21 when handcuffing plaintiff. It is well-established, for example, that “overly tight handcuffing can

22 constitute excessive force.” Wall v. Cnty. of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2004). Under

23 the FAC’s allegations, Byers applied handcuffs in a manner that caused plaintiff to suffer physical

24 injuries to his hands and shoulders even though Byers knew or should have known plaintiff

25 needed to be handcuffed differently based on a prior encounter, intentionally or recklessly

26 ignoring the risk of harm to plaintiff. Plaintiff allegedly suffered injuries. These allegations

27 suffice. See, e.g., White v. Gastelo, No. CV 21-02351-GW (DFM), 2025 WL 2087580, at *8

28 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 21-02351-GW (DFM),

1 2025 WL 2410766 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2025) (collecting cases and explaining that both Fourth

2 and Eighth Amendment excessive force claims can lie under a theory that the plaintiff

3 complained about the manner of handcuffing and was ignored and can also lie under a separate

4 theory that overly tight handcuffing results in a demonstrable injury); Smith v. Yarborough, No.

5 CV-044502-DSF-JTL, 2008 WL 4877464, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2008), aff’d, 578 F. App’x

6 721 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting excessive force may be found where “the plaintiff… had pre-existing

7 injuries known to the defendant”).

8 In addition, based on the FAC’s allegations, it is at least plausible that Byers intentionally

9 interfered with, or acted with reckless disregard for, plaintiff’s constitutional right to be free from

10 excessive force. Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient at the pleading stage as to the Bane Act

11 claim. See Smith v. City of Marina, 709 F. Supp. 3d 926, 939 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (“At the motion to

12 dismiss stage ... allegations of conduct that violates constitutional rights coupled with allegations

13 that conduct was done with reckless disregard for a party’s rights can be sufficient to establish

14 specific intent.”).

15 2. Assault and Battery

16 “The essential elements of a cause of action for battery are: (1) defendant touched

17 plaintiff, or caused plaintiff to be touched, with the intent to harm or offend plaintiff; (2) plaintiff

18 did not consent to the touching; (3) plaintiff was harmed or offended by defendant’s conduct; and

19 (4) a reasonable person in plaintiff’s position would have been offended by the touching.” So v.

20 Shin, 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 669 (2013), as modified on denial of reh’g (Jan. 28, 2013) (citing

21 Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instruction 1300). “A state law battery claim is a

22 counterpart to a federal claim of excessive use of force. In both, a plaintiff must prove that the

23 peace officer’s use of force was unreasonable.” Brown v. Ransweiler, 171 Cal. App. 4th 516, 527

24 (2009). Defendants’ argument for dismissal of the negligence claim is premised on the assertion

25 that Byers was entitled to use a reasonable amount of force to make an arrest and used a

26 reasonable amount of force. (ECF No. 27-1 at 6-7.) As plaintiff has plausibly alleged a Fourth

27 Amendment excessive force claim, this argument fails. Plaintiff has also plausibly alleged a

28 battery claim.

1 3. Negligence

2 In California, police officers have a duty to “use reasonable force under the totality of the

3 circumstances.” Brown, 171 Cal. App. 4th at 526, n.10. To prevail on a negligence theory,

4 plaintiff must show Byers “had a duty to use due care, that he breached that duty, and that the

5 breach was the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” Hayes v. County of San Diego,

6 57 Cal. 4th 622, 629 (2013). Defendants’ argument for dismissal of the negligence claim is

7 premised on the assertion that Byers used a reasonable amount of force. (ECF No. 27-1 at 7.) As

8 set forth above, plaintiff adequately alleged facts suggesting an unreasonable amount of force was

9 used. Plaintiff’s negligence claim is adequately pleaded.

10 4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

11 “The elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are (1)

12 the defendant engages in extreme and outrageous conduct with the intent to cause, or with

13 reckless disregard for the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff suffers

14 extreme or severe emotional distress; and (3) the defendant’s extreme and outrageous conduct

15 was the actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff’s extreme or severe emotional distress.” So,

16 212 Cal. App. 4th at 671 (citation omitted). “Outrageous conduct” is conduct that is intentional or

17 reckless and so extreme as to exceed all bounds of decency in a civilized community. Id. The

18 defendant’s conduct must be directed to the plaintiff, but malicious or evil purpose is not essential

19 to liability. Id. “There is no bright line standard for judging outrageous conduct.” Id.; see also

20 Cross v. Bonded Adjustment Bureau, 48 Cal.App.4th 266, 283 (1996) (where reasonable people

21 could differ in opinion, whether conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in

22 liability is a question for the jury).

23 Defendants argue plaintiff’s allegations do not plausibly allege extreme and outrageous

24 conduct. (ECF No. 27-1 at 8.) However, as set forth above, plaintiff alleges Byers knew or should

25 have known from a prior encounter that using only one set of handcuffs would cause plaintiff to

26 suffer pain and emotional distress. In initially applying handcuffs, plaintiff alleges, Byers

27 intentionally ignored or recklessly disregarded a foreseeable risk to plaintiff. Thus, plaintiff

28 alleges conduct more extreme than “mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty

1 || oppressions, or other trivialities.” Cross, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 283. Considering that the extreme

2 || and outrageous character of conduct may arise from an abuse by the actor of a position of

3 || authority, see id., plaintiff's allegations suffice to state a plausible claim.

4 IV. Recommendation

5 In accordance with the above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that defendants’ motion to

6 || dismiss (ECF No. 28) be denied.

7 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

8 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14)

9 || days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

10 || objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

11 || “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

12 || shall be served on all parties and filed with the court within seven (7) days after service of the

13 || objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

14 | District court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. YIst, 951

15 | F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

16 | Dated: July 13, 2026 / ae □□ / a Ly a

18 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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