Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

IBAN J. FRIAS AQUINO, CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff,

v.

LIFEGUARD HOME CARE AGENCY, NO. 25-cv-4693

INC.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Iban J. Frias-Aquino (“Frias-Aquino”) brings, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et. seq. (“Title VII”), the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42

U.S.C. §§ 12101 et. seq. (“ADA”), and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. § 951 et.

seq. (“PHRA”), this pregnancy discrimination action against her former employer, Defendant

Life Guard Home Care, Inc. (“Life Guard”), premised, she says, on a hostile work environment

that culminated in her wrongful termination. Life Guard now moves for summary judgment

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. It argues that: (1) Frias-

Aquino “cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on pregnancy nor perceived

disability and, even if she could, she cannot establish that the stated nondiscriminatory reason for

[Life Guard]’s actions” is pretextual; (2) Frias-Aquino “comes nowhere close to sufficient facts

to demonstrate a hostile work environment either based on pregnancy or perceived disability”;

and, (3) in any event, Frias-Aquino “failed to exhaust administrative remedies” for her ADA and

PHRA claims regarding perceived disability. For the reasons below, the motion shall be granted

in part and denied in part.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Frias-Aquino worked as a caregiver for a home care agency, Life Guard, which

specializes in “in-home personal care for adults.” When assigned to a patient, she took care of

the personal care needs of that patient with the precise nature of her care rendered differing with

each patient. Some required physical lifting on the part of their caregivers, while other, more

independent patients did not need such support.

Frias-Aquino was providing services to a client referred to herein as “Patient M” shortly

after she learned she was going to have a baby. One week after she notified Edwin Garcia

(“Garcia”), the co-owner and operations manager of Life Guard, of her pregnancy she was

rushed to the emergency room “due to bleeding and was told she was pregnant with twins.” She

informed Garcia. There is some dispute about what happened next. Life Guard asserts that

Frias-Aquino “requested accommodations due to her pregnancy,” while she maintains it was

Garcia who “immediately became falsely concerned with the news” and unilaterally labeled her

pregnancy as “high-risk.” All agree that she was reassigned from Patient M. “Patient N.S.,” her

new patient, “did not need any physical lifting and was more independent than Patient M.”

Frias-Aquino says that in the three or so weeks she worked with Patient N.S. her hours varied but

she estimates that the change of patient led to a reduction in the hours she worked per week: she

had worked for approximately thirty hours with Patient M which dropped to twenty-eight hours

when she took over Patient N.S.’s care.

The circumstances surrounding the conclusion of Frias-Aquino’s work with Patient

N.S.—which also marked the end of her employment with Life Guard—are also in dispute. She

maintains that her removal from Patient N.S. constituted termination because she was never

reassigned to another patient. Life Guard, however, asserts that she resigned when she indicated

that she did not want a replacement patient after being informed that Patient N.S. no longer

wanted her as her caregiver.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party shows “that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a). “By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence

of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly

supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue

of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).

“A disputed fact is ‘material’ if it would affect the outcome of the suit as determined by

the substantive law,” Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 585 F.3d 765, 771 (3d Cir.

2009) (citation omitted), and an issue of material fact is “genuine,” and thus warrants trial, “if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49, 252. Motions for summary judgment are evaluated with

the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and any reasonable

inferences must be made in that party’s favor. Hugh v. Butler Cnty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d

265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005).

The initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact lies

with the moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The non-moving

party must then present affirmative evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could return a

verdict in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257.

Importantly, the summary judgment “standard is applied with added rigor in employment

discrimination cases, where intent and credibility are crucial issues.” Stewart v. Rutgers, The

State Univ., 120 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 1997) (citation and internal quotations omitted). Indeed,

the Third Circuit has advised that “[s]ummary judgment is to be used sparingly in employment

discrimination cases.” Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 369 (3d Cir. 2008).

DISCUSSION

A. Administrative Exhaustion of Perceived Disability Claims

As a threshold matter, Life Guard argues that Frias-Aquino’s perceived disability claims

under the ADA and PHRA must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

“[B]oth the ADA and the PHRA require pursuit of administrative remedies before a

plaintiff may file a complaint in court.” Churchill v. Star Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir.

1999). This entails “fil[ing] a complaint with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful

employment practice.” Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2013)

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)). Merely filing an administrative claim, however, does not

give a plaintiff carte blanche to pursue any claim in federal court; rather, the ensuing suit must

remain within the scope of the prior administrative claim. See Anjelino v. N.Y. Times Co., 200

F.3d 73, 94 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he parameters of a civil action in the District Court are defined

by the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the

charge of discrimination . . . .” (citation and internal quotations omitted)). Nevertheless, “the

scope of the original charge should be liberally construed,” Hicks v. ABT Assocs. Inc., 572 F.2d

960, 965 (3d Cir. 1978), and the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies is therefore

satisfied so long as it “provide[s] the Commission with sufficient information so that it may

notify prospective defendants.” Rabzak v. Berks Cnty., 815 F.2d 17, 20 (3d Cir. 1987) (cleaned

up).

The EEOC charge filed by Frias-Aquino on February 17, 2025, reads in pertinent part as

follows:

In or about November of 2024, I learned that I was pregnant with twins and notified my

manager, Chery Brito (hereinafter “Brito”), of the same. Brito immediately became

concerned with the news that I was pregnant and told me that she would have to reassign

me to another patient that was “easier.” I did not request another patient, and I was

capable of performing my job with the same patient who I had already been assigned to.

However, Brito insisted that I needed a patient that was easier to handle because of my

pregnancy.

(emphasis added). Here, Frias-Aquino does not allege that she was reassigned merely because

she was pregnant, but instead because of the perception that she would need an “easier to

handle” patient by virtue of her being pregnant with twins. Although the phrase “perceived

disability” is not used explicitly in Frias-Aquino’s filing, the necessary implication of her alleged

discrimination is that Life Guard perceived her pregnancy as a disabling condition such that

accommodations—vis-à-vis an “easier” patient—were warranted.1 “[L]iberally constru[ing]”

Frias-Aquino’s EEOC charge, Hicks, 572 F.2d at 965, sufficient notice was therefore provided

regarding her alleged perceived disability discrimination so as to render her ADA and PHRA

claims administratively exhausted.

B. Wrongful Termination

Turning now to Frias-Aquino’s Title VII pregnancy and ADA perceived disability

discrimination claims, which are premised on wrongful termination. Both are governed by the

tripartite burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411

U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (providing the framework for Title VII cases); see also Shaner v. Synthes,

1 It bears mentioning that the instant facts are distinguishable from the out-of-district case relied on by Life Guard in

arguing that Frias-Aquino’s pregnancy is not an ADA-covered disability. See Matthews v. New Light, Inc., 2022

WL 11966542, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2022) (“Therefore, the Court finds that, because Plaintiff has alleged that

Defendant perceived her as being disabled because of her pregnancy—and since pregnancy is not a disability on its

own under the ADA—Plaintiff has not alleged a disability under the ADA.”). In Matthews, the plaintiff “allege[d]

that Defendant regarded her as pregnant (which is not a disability under the ADA), but she d[id] not specifically

allege that Defendant regarded her as having pregnancy-related complications (which may constitute a disability

under the ADA).” Id. at *3 (emphasis added). Here, Frias-Aquino’s allegation is precisely that Life Guard

“regarded her as having pregnancy-related complications,” id., such that she would require reassignment to an

“easier” and, impliedly, less strenuous patient. See Part III(B)(i)(b), infra. The principle espoused by Matthews is

therefore inapposite.

204 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 2000) (“We have indicated that the burden-shifting framework of

McDonnell Douglas . . . applies to ADA disparate treatment and retaliation claims.”).2 The

McDonnell Douglas framework operates as follows:

Briefly summarized, the McDonnell Douglas analysis proceeds in three stages. [1] First,

the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. [2] If the plaintiff

succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate

some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the [adverse employment decision] . . . .

[3] Finally, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff then must have an

opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons

offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination . .

. . While the burden of production may shift, the ultimate burden of persuading the trier

of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all

times with the plaintiff.

Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations and internal quotations

omitted).

i. Frias-Aquino’s Prima Facie Cases

The first question to be answered is, accordingly, whether Frias-Aquino has established a

prima facie case for her pregnancy discrimination and perceived disability claims.

a. Pregnancy Discrimination

Under Title VII, employers are prohibited from “discriminat[ing] against any individual

with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of

such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The

Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”), a 1978 amendment to Title VII, updated the statute’s

2 Frias-Aquino’s parallel claims under the PHRA are evaluated in the same manner as her Title VII and ADA

claims. See Dici v. Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542, 552 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Generally, the PHRA is applied in accordance

with Title VII.” (citation omitted)); Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dept., 380 F.2d 751, 761 n.6 (3d Cir.

2004), superseded on other grounds (“An analysis of an ADA claim applies equally to a PHRA claim.” (citation

and internal quotations omitted)); accord Gen. Elec. Corp. v. Pa. Hum. Rels. Comm’n, 469 Pa. 292, 304-06 (1976)

(adopting the holding of McDonnell Douglas).

prohibition of employment discrimination based on an employee’s sex, see id., to include

discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (PDA).

Therefore, “[t]here is employment discrimination whenever an employee’s pregnancy is a

motivating factor for the employer’s adverse employment decision.” In re Carnegie Ctr.

Assocs., 129 F.3d 290, 294 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m)).

Only if a plaintiff establishes that she: (1) “is a member of a protected class”; (2) “is

qualified for the position”; (3) she “suffered some form of ‘adverse employment action’

sufficient to evoke the protection of Title VII and the PHRA”; and, (4) that she suffered that

action “under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination,” has her

prima facie case of employment discrimination been met. Jones, 198 F.3d at 410 (citations and

internal quotations omitted). “[T]he prima facie requirement for making a Title VII claim ‘is not

onerous’ and poses ‘a burden easily met.’” C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d at 365 (quoting

Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).

Life Guard “does not dispute that [Frias-Aquino] was pregnant during her employment.”

Thus, Frias-Aquino is a member of a protected class. Life Guard concedes that, “generally,

[Frias-Aquino] was qualified to perform the job of caretaker,” but maintains that she “was not,

however, qualified to perform the job duties related to Patient [M] as she was unable to lift him

anymore” after becoming pregnant. While Frias-Aquino argues in her brief that she was at all

times “dutiful and competent in working for [Patient M], and could have continued working for

M, had it not been for Defendant’s actions,” that is not what she testified to at her deposition.

When asked whether she “believe[d] [she] could have continued to lift that client if necessary,”

Frias-Aquino responded: “Not that one.” This inconsistency is relevant as Frias-Aquino argues

she suffered two separate adverse employment actions: her ultimate termination, as well as her

reassignment from Patient M.

To show that she was qualified, Frias-Aquino “must point to evidence from which a

factfinder could reasonably infer that [she] satisfied the criterion identified by the employer or

that the employer did not actually rely upon the stated criterion.” Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div.

of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 647 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 767

(3d Cir. 1994)). Because Frias-Aquino does not produce any evidence to counter Life Guard’s

position that lifting Patient M was a required job duty—and in fact admitted that she could not

continue to lift Patient M—no reasonable jury could find she was qualified for her position with

Patient M. Thus, Frias-Aquino cannot succeed on the theory that her reassignment from Patient

M to Patient N.S. was an unlawful discriminatory action.

Her next theory is that her termination from Life Guard was an adverse employment

decision. See Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 288 (3d Cir. 2001)

(“We hold that [Plaintiff]’s termination clearly fulfills the [adverse employment action] prong of

the prima facie case . . . .”). But Life Guard’s position is that she was not terminated: she

resigned. Life Guard points out that shortly after Frias-Aquino was assigned to Patient N.S.,

Cheril Brito-Perez (“Brito”), one of Life Guard’s co-owners and the head of its human resources

department, called her to inform her that Patient N.S. “complained that she wasn’t properly being

taken care of”; Brito says she then told Frias-Aquino that she “would no longer be assigned to

work with Patient N.S. . . . [and] would be assigned to a new client because Patient N.S.

requested another aide.” Life Guard interpreted Frias-Aquino’s response, “that it was fine[,] that

we should leave things as they were[,] and that [she wasn’t] interested on [sic] working another

case,” to “constitute[] resignation.” But, Frias-Aquino says that she “was never told [Patient

N.S.] requested another aide,” and that she only “found out she was no longer working with N.S.

when attempting to clock in to Defendant’s timekeeping app while at N.S.’s house and was

unable to do so.” She then made repeated—nine phone calls, she says—unsuccessful efforts to

reach Brito in order to be assigned a new patient, in addition to an office visit where Brito

“ignored [her], despite being present in the office.” She only learned, she says, that Life Guard

no longer considered her an employee after she “request[ed] an employment letter she could

provide to welfare,” which Life Guard supplied using the following language: “Employee

resigned from her position on December 9th, 2024. Last day worked was December 7, 2025

[sic].” Accordingly, whether Frias-Aquino was terminated or resigned is a genuine dispute of

material fact which turns on a fact finder’s credibility determinations. See Horowitz v. Fed.

Kemper Life Assur. Co., 57 F.3d 300, 302 n.1 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at

255).

Finally, Life Guard argues that Frias-Aquino’s departure did not occur “under

circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” Jones, 198 F.3d at 410

(citations and internal quotations omitted). Unlawful discrimination can be inferred when a

plaintiff shows “the temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse action is

‘unusually suggestive.’” LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Center Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 232 (3d

Cir. 2007). While “[t]here is no bright-line rule to determine at what point temporal proximity,

in and of itself, can demonstrate an inference of discrimination . . . a span of days, and not

months, satisfies the requirement.” Ahern v. Eresearch Tech., Inc., 183 F. Supp.3d 663, 669-70

(E.D. Pa. 2016) (citing Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 279 n.5 (3d Cir. 2000)).

Importantly, in those cases “where the temporal proximity is not so close as to be ‘unduly

suggestive,’” then “timing plus other evidence may be an appropriate test.” Farrell, 206 F.3d at

280. That is the case here, as the two-month lapse Frias-Aquino points to between her pregnancy

notification and subsequent termination is not so short as to be “unduly suggestive,” therefore

necessitating some additional evidence in order to raise an inference of discrimination. See id.;

Williams, 380 F.2d at 760, superseded on other grounds (holding that evidence in addition to

temporal proximity was necessary because the two-month period between plaintiff’s protected

activity and termination was “not so close as to be unduly suggestive”).

And Frias-Aquino does indeed produce additional evidence that supports an inference of

discrimination. In her deposition, she testified that she was never told that N.S. requested

another aid, that no documentation exists in the record showing N.S. requested another aid, and

that she only found out she was no longer working with N.S. when she was unable to clock into

Life Guard’s timekeeping app while at N.S.’s house. Accordingly, she argues that Life Guard’s

proffered explanation for her removal from Patient N.S. is fallacious and pretextual.3

Viewing the dispute regarding her removal from Patient N.S. in the light most favorable

to Frias-Aquino, this evidence—in addition to the two-month temporal proximity—is sufficient

for a jury to infer that her termination was discriminatory. Considering her light burden at this

stage, C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d at 365, Frias-Aquino can therefore establish her prima

facie case of pregnancy discrimination.

b. Perceived Disability Discrimination

Turning now to Frias-Aquino’s perceived disability discrimination claims under the ADA

and PHRA. The prima facie case for perceived disability is a slightly modified version of the

test used in the Title VII pregnancy discrimination context examined supra. To establish a prima

3 Although Frias-Aquino cites this evidence as part of her argument that Life Guard’s proffered explanation for her

termination is pretextual, “nothing about the McDonnell Douglas formula requires us to ration the evidence between

one stage or the other.” Farrell, 206 F.3d at 286 (citing Jalil v. Advel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 709 n.6 (3d Cir. 1989)

(“As we have observed before, the McDonnell Douglas formula does not compartmentalize the evidence so as to

limit its use to only one phase of the case. The plaintiff’s evidence might serve both to establish a prima facie

case and discredit a defendant’s explanation.” (citation and internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added))).

facie case, Frias-Aquino must show that: (1) she “is a disabled person within the meaning of the

ADA,” Shaner, 204 F.3d at 500 (citation omitted)—a requirement she may satisfy by

demonstrating not that she was actually disabled, but that she was “regarded as having such

[physical or mental] impairment,” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); (2) she is “otherwise qualified to

perform the essential functions of the job”; and, (3) she “has suffered an otherwise adverse

employment decision as a result of discrimination.” Shaner, 204 F.3d at 500 (citation omitted);

see also Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 108 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Under the ADA and the EEOC

regulations, a claimant may be considered disabled even if his impairment does not substantially

limit a major life activity, if his impairment ‘is treated by a covered entity as constituting such

limitation.’” (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1))). Once again, the burden upon Frias-Aquino “is

not [an] onerous” one. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d at 365 (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty.

Affs., 450 U.S. at 253).

The sole argument advanced by Life Guard to contest Frias-Aquino’s prima facie case is

that pregnancy cannot be used as the basis of a perceived disability claim because pregnancy is

not an ADA-covered disability. 4 Life Guard is only partially correct. True, “[p]regnancy, alone,

does not constitute disability.” Ahern, 183 F. Supp.3d at 668-69 (collecting cases). However,

“certain impairments that a woman experiences as a result of pregnancy may qualify as a

disability for purposes of the [ADA].” Brown v. Aria Health, 2019 WL 1745653, at *4 (E.D. Pa.

Apr. 17, 2019) (emphasis added) (collecting cases). Life Guard misses its mark by arguing that

Frias-Aquino did not actually suffer from such complications—a claim she never makes. What

Frias-Aquino does assert is that Life Guard “regarded her as ‘disabled’ when it falsely labeled

her as a ‘high-risk’ pregnancy, despite the fact that she was never ‘high-risk,’” and that it was

4 Here, Life Guard again errantly relies on Matthews, 2022 WL 11966542. See supra note 1.

these concerns of a complicated pregnancy that motivated her termination. Life Guard contests

this position and cites deposition testimony that it “never told [Frias-Aquino] that her pregnancy

was considered high-risk.” These conflicting accounts constitute a genuine dispute which,

viewed most favorably to Frias-Aquino, would permit a reasonable trier of fact to find that Life

Guard perceived her as disabled and terminated her accordingly. Thus, Frias-Aquino has

surmounted the “low bar for establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination,”

Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 539 (3d Cir.

2006), and has set out a prima facie case for her perceived disability discrimination claims.

ii. Life Guard’s Proffered Nondiscriminatory Reason5

Once Frias-Aquino has established a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of

production passes to Life Guard to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating

her employment. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs., 450 U.S. at 254. This is a “relatively light burden”

that is satisfied “by introducing evidence which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that

there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the unfavorable employment decision.” Fuentes, 32

F.3d at 763 (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993)). Indeed, “[t]he

employer need not prove that the tendered reason actually motivated its behavior, as throughout

this burden-shifting paradigm the ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination always

rests with the plaintiff.” Id. (citing Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs., 450 U.S. at 253, 254, 256).

Here, Life Guard argues that Frias-Aquino was removed from her assignment with

Patient N.S. because of unsatisfactory job performance, citing Brito’s deposition testimony that

the patient complained about Frias-Aquino and “said to her service coordinator that [Frias-

5 From this juncture onward, the legal standards governing Frias-Aquino’s claims of pregnancy and perceived

disability discrimination become coterminous and are thus analyzed in tandem.

Aquino] was not doing her job” and had some “kind of a[n] attitude with [the patient].” This

explanation constitutes a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Frias-Aquino’s termination.

See Ross v. Gilhuly, 755 F.3d 185, 193 (3d Cir. 2014) (recognizing that “demonstrably poor job

performance” qualifies as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination).

iii. Pretext

Accordingly, under the McDonnell Douglas framework “the burden of production

rebounds to [Frias-Aquino], who must now show by a preponderance of the evidence that [Life

Guard]’s explanation is pretextual.” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763. To meet that burden, Frias-Aquino

must “point[] to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder would

reasonably either: (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that

an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause

of the employer’s action.” Shaner, 204 F.3d at 501 (citing Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764; Sheridan v.

E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1067 (3d Cir. 1996)) (internal quotations

omitted). “[T]his standard places a difficult burden on the plaintiff,” putting the onus on Frias-

Aquino to “demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or

contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable

factfinder could rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence.’” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 (quoting

Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr, & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 531 (3d Cir. 1992)).

Here, Life Guard argues that even if Frias-Aquino can make out her prima facie cases,

summary judgment is nevertheless appropriate because she cannot show that Life Guard’s

proffered reason for her termination is pretextual. However, the evidence Frias-Aquino presents

to cast doubt upon Life Guard’s explanation—which is essentially the same evidence she put

forth to establish her prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination—creates a genuine issue of

material fact that precludes summary judgment. See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764 (citations omitted)

(“[I]f the plaintiff has pointed to evidence sufficiently to discredit the defendant’s proffered

reasons, to survive summary judgment the plaintiff need not also come forward with additional

evidence of discrimination beyond his or her prima facie case.”). In particular, drawing all

reasonable inferences in Frias-Aquino’s favor and evaluating “the totality of the circumstances,”

Canada v. Samuel Grossi & Sons, Inc., 49 F.4th 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2022), the following disputes

would warrant a reasonable trier of fact reaching the conclusion that Life Guard’s claim of

unsatisfactory job performance should not be believed. See Jalil, 873 F.2d at 707 (“Summary

judgment is inappropriate, however, if the plaintiff . . . counters the defendant’s proffered

explanation with evidence raising a factual issue regarding the employer’s true motivation for

discharge.”). Namely: (1) whether Patient N.S. actually complained about Frias-Aquino’s

services; (2) whether Patient N.S. actually requested a new caregiver; (3) if Frias-Aquino, upon

being informed of Patient N.S.’s alleged complaint, was also informed that Patient N.S. had

requested a new caregiver; (4) whether Life Guard properly investigated a report by Frias-

Aquino that Patient N.S. had stolen goods while shopping, which complaint was lodged to Life

Guard just one day before Patient N.S.’s own alleged complaint about Frias-Aquino; and, (5) the

circumstances surrounding Frias-Aquino’s repeated inability to reach Life Guard’s managers

over the phone and in-person to discuss her next patient assignment in the days following her

removal from Patient N.S. Thus, Frias-Aquino’s wrongful termination claims cannot be decided

on summary judgment.

C. Hostile Work Environment

Like her wrongful termination claims, Frias-Aquino’s hostile work environment claims

are also brought under Title VII, the ADA, and the PHRA. Each of these statutes has the same

standard for hostile work environment claims. See Huston v. Procter & Gamble Paper Prods.

Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 104 n.2 (3d Cir. 2009) (regarding the PHRA and Title VII); Colwell v. Rite

Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 499 n.3 (3d Cir. 2010) (regarding the PHRA and ADA). To prevail,

Frias-Aquino must satisfy the following: (1) she suffered “intentional discrimination” because of

her pregnancy and the perception that she was disabled because her pregnancy was high-risk; (2)

“the discrimination was severe or pervasive”; (3) she was “detrimentally affected” by the

discrimination; (4) “the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like

circumstances”; and, (5) respondeat superior liability renders Life Guard responsible for the

discrimination. Mandel, 706 F.3d at 167 (citing Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 449 (3d Cir.

2006), overruled on other grounds by, Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53

(2006)). The gravamen of Life Guard’s opposition to these claims is that Frias-Aquino fails at

the second element, i.e., she “does not present sufficient evidence to demonstrate an environment

filled with either severe or pervasive harassment based on pregnancy or perceived disability.”

“‘[S]everity’ and ‘pervasiveness’ are alternative possibilities: some harassment may be

severe enough to contaminate an environment even if not pervasive; other, less objectionable,

conduct will contaminate the workplace only if it is pervasive.” Castleberry v. STI Group, 863

F.3d 259, 264 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Jensen, 435 F.3d at 449 n.3). The conduct is evaluated by

“looking at the totality of the circumstances, including: ‘the frequency of the discriminatory

conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive

utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.’” Id.

(quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 410 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)). The standard for hostile work

environment claims is “demanding.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 778 (1998).

Here, Frias-Aquino articulates four acts by Life Guard which she asserts created a hostile

work environment. Assuming arguendo that the factual disputes underlying these four incidents

are resolved in Frias-Aquino’s favor, they would, nevertheless, neither independently nor in the

aggregate rise to the “demanding” standard Frias-Aquino must satisfy here. See id. The first two

revolve around Life Guard’s negative assessment of Frias-Aquino’s work with Patient N.S.

Namely, she says that Life Guard: (1) assumed that she “treated [Patient] N.S. poorly, despite

[Frias-Aquino] having a perfect track record with Life Guard”; and, (2) wrongfully alleged that

Frias-Aquino “made gestures” while working with the patient to indicate she did not like the

work. These are both the types of “[s]nubs and unjust criticisms of one’s work [which] are not

poisonous enough to create an actionable hostile work environment.” Miller v. Aluminum Co. of

Am., 679 F. Supp. 495, 502 (W.D. Pa. 1988), aff’d, 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988) (emphasis

added).

Next, Frias-Aquino says Life Guard “assumed that, due to [her] ‘high-risk’ pregnancy,

she couldn’t perform the same job duties” as a non-pregnant woman or non-disabled employee.

She argues that this assumption manifested a hostile work environment in that it: (1) led to her

reassignment to Patient N.S., which act she labels a “functional[] demot[ion]”; and, (2) spurred

her termination. Regarding her reassignment, the record shows Life Guard’s assumption was in

fact valid insofar as Frias-Aquino was incapable of performing certain essential caretaker

responsibilities, i.e., lifting Patient M. And moreover, that this same assumption may well have

motivated Frias-Aquino’s removal from Patient N.S. speaks only to her termination being

discriminatory; without additional evidence, the only requisite, detrimental effect that it shows

Frias-Aquino experienced in the workplace was that she was wrongfully terminated from it—an

“adverse employment action that cannot itself create a hostile work environment.” Purnell v.

City of Phila., 2021 WL 3617161, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2021) (“Courts in this district have

repeatedly held that termination alone cannot support a claim of hostile work environment . . . .”

(citing Roberts v. Health Partners Plans, Inc., 2017 WL 3310691, at *5 n.4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3,

2017) (collecting cases))).

Finally, Frias-Aquino says that Life Guard “associated negative stigmas” with her need to

take time off from work due to her pregnancy—a claim that is unsupported by the record. The

only evidence Frias-Aquino cites in support of this argument is a portion of Garcia’s deposition

testimony where he was asked about Frias-Aquino’s performance with Patient M. He responded

that “she was doing her job” at the beginning of the patient relationship, but by the end “was

calling to request sign-off very often,” which he confirmed was “an issue . . . [f]or the client’s

family.” A reasonable factfinder would most aptly characterize this evidence as a manager’s

routine assessment of a workplace concern, not stigmatization of the severity required to support

hostile work environment claims. See generally Fields v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 696 F. Supp.3d 66,

114-15 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (collecting cases where objectively more egregious incidents were

deemed insufficiently severe to establish a hostile work environment under Third Circuit case

law).

Accordingly, because Frias-Aquino cannot show that Life Guard subjected her to severe

or pervasive harassment, “the Court need not address the remaining elements of [her] hostile

work environment claim[s].” Id. at 117. Therefore, Life Guard’s motion will be granted with

respect to Frias-Aquino’s hostile work environment claims.

An appropriate order follows.

BY THE COURT:

____/s/ Wendy Beetlestone_______________

WENDY BEETLESTONE, C.J.