The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DONTE PARRISH,
Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-cv-01805
v. (SAPORITO, J.)
FRANK KLUYBER, ,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
Donte Parrish brings Fourteenth Amendment claims against two
officers from the York County Prison (“YCP”), alleging that they placed
him in disciplinary segregation without affording him due process. The
defendants have moved for summary judgment (Doc. 45). Because any
claimed procedural error was harmless given the undisputed evidence of
Parrish’s guilt, the Court grants summary judgment to the defendants.
I. BACKGROUND
In the operative complaint (Doc. 12), Parrish alleges that on
October 5, 2022, as a pretrial detainee at the YCP, he was involved in an
“altercation” with C.O. Daryman and Sgt. Arnold, during which Arnold
allegedly “attacked” him. Parrish alleges that on the same day, a
disciplinary hearing was held before hearing examiner Frank Kluyber
and his “assistant,” Alexis Bartol. Parrish claims that he never received
written notice of the charges and was not permitted to present witness
testimony.1 He was ultimately found guilty of several disciplinary
charges and received a sanction of 120 days in segregated housing. After
his release from the YCP, he filed this complaint seeking compensatory
and punitive damages.
The Court permitted Parrish to proceed on Fourteenth Amendment
claims against Kluyber and Bartol based on Parrish’s alleged placement
in disciplinary segregation without appropriate due process protections.2
Prior to discovery, all parties moved for summary judgment, but these
motions were denied without prejudice. (Doc. 33). After the close of
discovery, defendants filed a renewed motion for summary judgment
(Doc. 45), which is now ripe for review.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary
1 The complaint identified the defendants as “Lt. Kruber” and
“Alexis.”
2 Upon screening of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,
several other defendants were dismissed. (Docs. 14, 15).
judgment should be granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might affect the outcome
of the case. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
dispute of material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence “is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”
, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all
inferences “should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, and where the non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the
movant’s, then the non-movant’s must be taken as true.”
, 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994). The party seeking
summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion,” and demonstrating the absence
of a genuine dispute of material fact. , 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes such a showing, the non-movant
must set forth specific facts, supported by the record, demonstrating that
“the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to
the jury.” , 477 U.S. at 251-52.
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must first
determine if the moving party has made a showing that it is
entitled to summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); , 477 U.S.
at 331. Only once that prima facie showing has been made does the
burden shift to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a
genuine dispute of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); , 477
U.S. at 331. Both parties may cite to “particular parts of materials in the
record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those
made for the purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory
answers or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
III. MATERIAL FACTS
Parrish’s response to the motion does not contain a
counterstatement of material facts that addresses defendants’ factual
contentions, as required by the Local Rules of this district. M.D. Pa.
L.R. 56.1. His response consists of a brief, his own declaration, and
attached exhibits. (Doc. 49). Noting that filings must be
“liberally construed,” , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and
to resolve this matter on the merits, we have considered all evidence and
argument the parties have submitted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Where
Parrish has not presented competent evidence to demonstrate a genuine
dispute of material fact, defendants’ properly supported fact statements
are deemed admitted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1.
A. October 5, 2022, Incident
The summary judgment record indicates as follows: On October 5,
2022, at 9:24 p.m., officers Colton Arnold and Allen Daryman were
searching Parrish’s cell for “hooch,”3 with Parrish present. The officers
discovered hooch “in Parrish’s possession,” and ordered him to relinquish
it, but he refused and tried to pour it into the toilet. They ordered Parrish
to vacate his cell for transfer to a “disciplinary prehearing confinement
cell.” While Parrish was packing, Daryman observed him drinking from
another bag of “hooch” that was stored under his bunk. Daryman ordered
Parrish to wait in the hallway. (Doc. 46 at 58-69).
In the hallway, Parrish and Arnold engaged in a verbal argument
that turned into a physical altercation. Defendants have submitted video
of the incident.4 (Doc. 48). The video shows Parrish sitting on a bench and
3 Hooch refers to a fermented alcoholic beverage that is prohibited
at the YCP. (Doc. 46 at 67).
4 We have also reviewed a second video, which shows officers
escorting Parrish away for medical attention after the incident.
arguing with an officer whom defendants identify as Arnold. Arnold
walks toward the bench to place handcuffs on Parrish, but Parrish
refuses and places his arms by his sides. Parrish then stands up abruptly.
Arnold places his hand on Parrish’s chest, and Parrish attempts to slap
Arnold’s hand away. Arnold then pushes Parrish against the wall as
Daryman arrives to assist. The officers combine to tackle Parrish and
bring him to the ground. The video does not clearly capture every aspect
of the scuffle, but it is apparent that officers are trying to restrain Parrish
while Parrish resists by kicking his legs and attempting to grab at the
officers. ( ., 2:00-2:41). It is undisputed that Parrish refused Arnold’s
orders to submit to handcuffs and violently resisted the officers as they
tried to restrain him. (Doc. 46 at 13-15, 58-67). The video then shows
other officers arriving to assist, one of whom shoots Parrish with a taser,
after which Parrish is immediately restrained. (Doc. 49, 2:42-3:08).
B. Disciplinary Hearing
After this incident, Parrish was placed in “prehearing
confinement.” Arnold prepared a disciplinary report charging Parrish
with “Assaulting a staff member” (Code 108), “Adulteration of food or
drink” (Code 210), “Any act that could endanger another person or
property” (Code 223), “Refusing orders given by staff” (Code 307), and
“Insolence or being disrespectful to staff” (Code 308). Another officer
prepared an “investigation report,” which included the disciplinary
report as an attachment. (Doc. 46 at 27-28, 86-87).
The following day, October 6, a hearing was held at 2:30 p.m.,
approximately 19 hours after the underlying incident. Officer Brandon
Koch attests that he delivered the investigation report to Parrish at 4:30
a.m., that Parrish refused to sign, and that Koch noted so on the form
and “push[ed] a copy . . . under the cell door.” ( . at 50-52, 55). Parrish
does not specifically address these facts, but through his declaration, he
denies “ever receiving an incident report.” He attests that he “stressed
this issue” to Kluyber, the hearing examiner, who “responded ‘we can do
what we want.’” (Doc. 49 at 3).
At the hearing, defendant Bartol read the charges orally to Parrish
and elicited a plea as to each charge. Parrish pleaded not guilty on all
charges. ( . at 36-39, 44). He did not request witness testimony but
testified on his own behalf, “claim[ing] that he was attacked” by the
officers. ( . at 23-24). Ultimately, he was found guilty of all charges. A
report signed by members of the disciplinary hearing board contained the
following explanation:
[Inmate] found guilty of all stated [charges]. [Inmate]
was observed [at] the bench arguing with staff. He stood
up, [illegible] . . . and appeared to hit C/O Arnold. Other
staff showed up and he was taken to the floor. He
continued to swing [at] staff until they were successful
in neutraliz[ing] him . . .
(Doc. 46 at 31). Parrish signed a form that documented the penalties and
included the following stipulation: “I hereby acknowledge that I have
been advised of my rights that were afforded at my hearing before the
Disciplinary Hearing Committee and have chose [sic] to [ ] TESTIFY.”
( . at 32, 45, 47).
Parrish appealed the sanction, arguing that “no one ever gave me a
copy of the charges against me or allowed me to call witnesses on my
behalf.” He did not argue the charges on the merits. Deputy Warden
Michael D. Cuti denied the appeal, on the basis that Parrish had provided
“no evidence” contradicting the disciplinary report:
[T]he only reasoning you provide is the process (not
receiving your paperwork) was not followed. I will make
sure that you receive the paperwork if you have not
already, but I have reviewed the video evidence of this
incident and I clearly see you resisting being handcuffed
and assaulting the officer in the process. I do not see how
you reviewing the paperwork in a timely fashion would
have any affect [sic] on what I was able to view on video
. . .
( . at 34-35).
IV. DISCUSSION
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects
pretrial detainees from conditions of confinement amounting to
“punishment.” , 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). “Generally,
prisons may sanction a pretrial detainee for misconduct that he commits
while awaiting trial, as long as it is not a punishment for the ‘underlying
crime of which he stands accused.’” , 739 F. App’x 111,
116 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting , 172 F.3d 999, 1003-06 (7th
Cir. 1999)). However, “the imposition of disciplinary segregation for
violation of prison rules and regulations cannot be imposed without
providing the due process protections set forth in , 418
U.S. 539 (1974).” , 739 F. App’x at 116. These protections “include
the right to receive written notice of the charges at least 24 hours before
the hearing, the opportunity to present witnesses and documentary
evidence, and a written statement of the reasons for the disciplinary
action taken and the supporting evidence.” . (citing , 418 U.S. at
563-66).
A federal court’s review of prison disciplinary proceedings includes
review for harmless error.5 For a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on
procedural errors in disciplinary proceedings, the prisoner must
introduce evidence that the result of the proceeding would have been
different but for the alleged violations. , 447 F. App’x
337, 340 (3d Cir. 2011); , 969 F.2d 48, 52-53 (3d Cir. 1992).
If we read the record in Parrish’s favor, the disciplinary hearing did
not comply with the requirements prescribed in . Parrish clearly did
not receive “written notice of the charges at least 24 hours before the
hearing,” because the hearing was held less than 24 hours after the
5 While the Third Circuit has not specifically confirmed that
harmless error review applies to pretrial detainees, numerous courts
addressing this issue have found that it does, and our review has revealed
no authority to the contrary. , , , 803 F. App’x 942,
944 (7th Cir. 2020) (nonprecedential); , No. 9:25-
CV-1566 (BKS/DJS), 2026 WL 868956, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2026);
, No. 25-CV-11090-AK, 2026 WL 540135, at *5 (D. Mass.
Feb. 26, 2026); , No. 3:24-CV-178-HAB-SLC, 2025 WL
1141046, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 16, 2025); , No. 3:19-
CV-1004 (JAM), 2019 WL 6879046, at *3 (D. Conn. Dec. 17, 2019);
No. 06-CV-1105-PHX-MHM-CRP, 2009 WL
10695543, at *9 (D. Ariz. July 21, 2009); ,
No. 06-C-1301, 2008 WL 515006, at *11 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 25, 2008);
, 720 F. App’x 94, 96 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[D]ue
process is not violated absent a showing of prejudice.”).
disputed incident.6 However, there is no evidence that Parrish was
denied the right to present witness testimony.7
With respect to the charges stemming from Parrish’s fight with
officers (Codes 108, 223, 307, and 308), the record shows that the
procedural error was harmless. The hearing board’s findings were
supported by video of the incident as well as the disciplinary report and
investigative report. This evidence established that Parrish was
6 Moreover, Parrish has established a genuine dispute as to whether
he received written notice at any point prior to the hearing. While we
acknowledge the evidence that the disciplinary report was served on
Parrish, we cannot say “with confidence that a rational trier of fact could
not credit” Parrish’s contrary declaration.
, 678 F.3d 254, 264 (3d Cir. 2012).
Defendant Kluyber attests that Parrish affirmatively waived the
right to 24 hours’ notice, and that the hearing would have been continued
if Parrish had asked, but Kluyber’s description of the alleged waiver is
vague. (Doc. 46 at 23, ¶¶ 15-16) (“In this case, Inmate Parrish had
his rights explained and he chose to proceed with the hearing.”). The
prison handbook does not indicate that prisoners can request to continue
disciplinary hearings, which could support an inference that this option
was not offered to Parrish. ( . at 86) (“If the case is referred [for a
hearing], the hearing will take place as soon as practical . . .”).
7 Although Parrish alleged in his complaint, a prior motion (Doc. 28
at 3), and his appeal to the Deputy Warden that he was not “allowed” or
“given an opportunity” to present witnesses, those unverified allegations
are not competent evidence at the summary judgment stage.
, No. 24-1763, 2025 WL 971669, at *2-3 (3d Cir. Apr.
1, 2025).
disrespectful to staff, refused legitimate orders, and assaulted officers
when they tried to restrain him. Although Parrish disputed the charge at
the time, he has not disputed defendants’ statement of material facts to
that effect.8 No prejudice resulted from the procedural error.
There were further procedural issues as to the final charge,
“Adulteration of food or drink” (Code 210), but the record compels the
same result. The disciplinary board’s findings do not address this charge
or explain the basis for the finding of guilt. (Doc. 46 at 45, 47).
Therefore, in addition to the absence of timely written notice, it is
questionable whether Parrish received a “written statement of the
reasons for the disciplinary action taken and the supporting evidence” as
to this charge.9 , 739 F. App’x at 116.
8 Even if he had presented evidence supporting his story that he
was attacked by Arnold and offered “no resistance,” , , (Doc. 28 at
3), that version of events is contradicted by the video. ,
550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“When opposing parties tell two different
stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no
reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of
the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”).
9 The “Sanction Report,” which Parrish did receive, stated that the
sanction was “a result of a disciplinary report dated 10/5/22” (Doc. 46 at
47), but whether Parrish received that report is disputed. Because
Parrish has not shown prejudice, we need not resolve whether this
reference was sufficient to comply with the requirements of due process.
However, it was undisputed that officers observed Parrish drinking
hooch and storing it in his cell. Arnold’s statement to that effect was
included in the disciplinary report, which was part of the record of the
disciplinary proceeding. Thus, there was at least “some evidence” in the
record supporting the decision, which is sufficient to impose a prison
disciplinary sanction. , 472 U.S. 445, 455-56
(1985). Parrish does not identify any evidence that he would have
presented on this issue or explain why the undisputed evidence did not
support the finding of guilt. Therefore, he has not shown prejudice from
the procedural errors, and defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted to the defendants,
and we need not address their arguments regarding qualified immunity.
An appropriate order follows.
Dated: August 11, 2026
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States District Judge