Cool

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS

MAURICE W. JOHNSON, : Case No. 2:25-cv-1504

:

Plaintiff, : District Judge Algenon L. Marbley

: Chief Magistrate Judge Stephanie K.

vs. :

Bowman

:

WILLIAM K. COOL, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This case is currently before the Court on Plaintiff’s “Text of Proposed Order” and

“Affidavit of Protective Custody” (Doc. 39), which the Court considers together to be a motion

for a temporary restraining order. For the reasons below, the motion, in which Plaintiff seeks to

enjoin conduct allegedly occurring at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF) (see Doc.

1-4, at PageID 97; see also Doc. 1-5, at PageID 100-02), should be denied.

In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order, this

Court must balance the following factors:

1. Whether the party seeking the injunction has shown a “strong” likelihood

of success on the merits;

2. Whether the party seeking the injunction will suffer irreparable harm

absent the injunction;

3. Whether an injunction will cause others to suffer substantial harm; and

4. Whether the public interest would be served by a preliminary injunction.

Liberty Coins, LLC v. Goodman, 748 F.3d 682, 689-90 (6th Cir. 2014); Overstreet v. Lexington-

Fayette Urban Cty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Leary v. Daeschner, 228

F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000)). The four factors are not prerequisites but must be balanced as

part of a decision to grant or deny injunctive relief. In re DeLorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223,

1229 (6th Cir. 1985). “[A] district court is not required to make specific findings concerning

each of the four factors used in determining a motion for preliminary injunction if fewer factors

are dispositive of the issue.” Jones v. City of Monroe, 341 F.3d 474, 476 (6th Cir. 2003),

abrogated on other gds. by Anderson v. City of Blue Ash, 798 F.3d 338, 357 (6th Cir. 2015). See

also Midwest Retailer Associated, Ltd. v. City of Toledo, 563 F. Supp. 2d 796, 802 (N.D. Ohio

2008) (“The same standard generally applies to the issuance of temporary restraining orders and

preliminary injunctions.”).

“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until a trial on the

merits.” S. Glazer’s Distributors of Ohio, LLC v. Great Lakes Brewing Co., 860 F.3d 844, 848-

49 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)); First Tech.

Safety Sys., Inc. v. Depinet, 11 F.3d 641, 650 (6th Cir. 1993) (noting that the purposed of a

temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo). When a prisoner requests an order

enjoining a state prison official, the Court must “proceed with caution and due deference to the

unique nature of the prison setting.” White v. Corr. Med. Servs., No. 1:08-cv-277, 2009 WL

529082, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2009) (citing Kendrick v. Bland, 740 F.2d 432, 438 n. 3 (6th

Cir. 1984); Ward v. Dyke, 58 F.3d 271, 273 (6th Cir. 1995)). In deciding if a preliminary

injunction is warranted, the Court must “weigh carefully the interests on both sides.” Lang v.

Thompson, No. 5:10-cv-379-HRW, 2010 WL 4962933, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 30, 2010) (citing

Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975)). A preliminary injunction is an

extraordinary remedy that should only be granted “upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is

entitled to such relief.” S. Glazer’s Distributors of Ohio, LLC, 860 F.3d at 849 (quoting Winter

v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)); see also Overstreet, 305 F.3d at 573.

Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order (Doc. 39) should be denied. First, the

allegations concern events at SOCF and are therefore beyond the scope of the Complaint in this

case (Doc. 1-1; Doc. 6, at PageID 131-32) which alleges events at the Ross Correctional

Institution. “[A] party moving for a preliminary injunction must necessarily establish a

relationship between the injury claimed in the party’s motion and the conduct asserted in the

complaint.” Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 300 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Devose v. Herrington,

42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir.1994)). Further, Plaintiff has made no attempt to apply the above

factors to his situation. (See Doc. 1-4; see also Doc. 1-5).

A temporary restraining order is also not warranted in this case because the docket

record establishes that Plaintiff is no longer housed at SOCF but is currently housed at the

Toledo Correctional Institution (ToCI).1 Courts have found that “injunctive relief is

appropriate only where [a] plaintiff can show a reasonable expectation or demonstrated

probability that he is in immediate danger of sustaining direct future injury as the result of the

challenged official conduct.” McMurry v. Brown, No. 2:20-CV-58, 2020 WL 3118567, at *3

(W.D. Mich. June 12, 2020) (citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)). Because

Plaintiff is currently at ToCI and not under the control of officials at SOCF he cannot show a

reasonable expectation that he is in immediate danger of sustaining direct future injury from

the challenged conduct. Id.; see also Roberson v. Jackson, No. 6:20CV188, 2022 WL

17546960, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 6:20-CV-

1See also Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction website,

https://appgateway.drc.ohio.gov/OffenderSearch/Search/Details/A694268 (viewed on July 27,

2026).

188, 2022 WL 17080741 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 2022) (finding the plaintiff’s requests for

injunctive relief concerning alleged use-of-force and medical claims moot upon his transfer to

new facility); Lowe v. Oppy, No. 2:14-CV-535, 2015 WL 1439345, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 10,

2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:14-CV-535, 2015 WL 1439325 (S.D. Ohio

Mar. 27, 2015) (“Accordingly, the Court’s entry of equitable relief on behalf of Plaintiff would

have no effect on Defendants’ actions towards him because Defendants perform their duties at

an institution where Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated.”).

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining

order (Doc. 39) be DENIED.

August 6, 2026 s/Stephanie K. Bowman

STEPHANIE K. BOWMAN

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy of

the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the

proposed findings and recommendations. This period may be extended further by the Court on

timely motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected

to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report

and Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring on the record at an oral

hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such

portions of it as all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the

assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections

WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in

accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Berkshire v. Dahl, 928 F.3d

520, 530 (6th Cir. 2019). See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v.

Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).