Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

CODY R. HENDERSON,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:26-cv-524

Chief Judge Sarah D. Morrison

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

PICKAWAY COUNTY SHERIFF’S

OFFICE, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Cody R. Henderson, an Ohio resident who is proceeding without the assistance

of counsel, sues the Pickaway County Sheriff’s Office, Pickaway County Jail, Circleville

Municipal Court, and several Pickaway County Sheriff’s Office employees under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for violation of his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff’s Complaint

is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma

pauperis. But because Plaintiff’s original Complaint misjoined several sets of unrelated claims,

the undersigned ordered Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint that complies with Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 20. (ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff was cautioned that failure to comply with that

Order would result in the Court performing an initial screen under § 1915 of Plaintiff’s claims

against Defendant Moore in connection with events occurring on May 1, 2024. (Id.) Plaintiff

filed an Amended Complaint on June 24, 2026 (ECF No. 7); however, the Amended Complaint

still misjoined the same claims as the original Complaint. Plaintiff’s arguments that the claims

are properly joined because the later events would not have occurred absent the earlier events

does not satisfy Rule 20’s requirements.

Accordingly, all claims in this action, except Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Moore

and the Pickaway County Sheriff’s Office arising from Plaintiff’s May 1, 2024 stalking charges,

are SEVERED and DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to pursuing them in separate

actions.

The Court now turns to the initial screen of Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation,

Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution, and Fourteenth Amendment fabrication of

evidence/denial of due process claims against Defendant Moore and the Pickaway County

Sheriff’s Office under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to identify cognizable claims and to recommend

dismissal of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious,

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff

MAY PROCEED on his individual-capacity First Amendment retaliation claim for damages

against Defendant Moore, but it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s remaining claims be

DISMISSED for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that he first encountered Defendant Moore, a Pickaway County Sheriff’s

Deputy, during a 2022 traffic stop. (Am. Compl. ¶ 21, ECF No. 7.) During that stop, Moore

“became aware that Plaintiff was actively asserting violations of his constitutional rights in

Pickaway County” and “Plaintiff expressly informed Moore that his civil rights were being

violated and that officers were conducting an unlawful seizure and search.” (Id. at ¶¶ 21–22.)

Plaintiff continued challenging alleged government misconduct over the next several years,

through such means as public records requests, formal complaints, filming, litigation, and public

criticism involving New Holland Police Chief Jason Lawless, the village of New Holland, and

related officials. (Id. at ¶ 25.) Plaintiff’s next allegation involving Moore is that on April 11,

2024, Moore interacted with Plaintiff regarding complaints involving Village officials and prior

false statements. (Id. at ¶ 48.) Moore thus “had actual notice that Plaintiff was actively exposing

misconduct by local officials, challenging false official narratives, and pursuing constitutional

claims.” (Id. at ¶ 52.)

On May 1, 2024, Plaintiff encountered Chief Lawless in a public setting. (Id. at ¶ 57.)

Although Plaintiff alleges that he did not threaten Lawless with imminent physical harm, engage

in violence, or commit any criminal act, Moore nevertheless caused a criminal complaint to be

filed in the Circleville Municipal Court charging Plaintiff with menacing by stalking under Ohio

Revised Code § 2903.211(A)(1) arising out of the May 1, 2024 encounter with Lawless. (Id. at

¶¶ 58–60.) Plaintiff contends that the charge “was based on a single encounter and subjective

interpretations of Plaintiff’s speech.” (Id. at ¶ 61.) Plaintiff further contends that Moore lacked

probable cause to file the criminal complaint because Moore failed to establish the required

pattern of conduct, a necessary element of the offense. (Id. at ¶ 62.) The criminal complaint also

failed to identify specific criminal acts threatening imminent or actual harm or facts that would

lead a reasonable officer to believe Chief Lawless would be harmed. (Id. at ¶ 63.)

Plaintiff commenced this action on April 30, 2026. (ECF No. 1.) His Amended

Complaint (ECF No. 7) advances claims for First Amendment retaliation, Fourth Amendment

malicious prosecution, and Fourteenth Amendment fabrication of evidence/denial of due process

against Defendants Moore and the Pickaway County Sheriff’s Office. Plaintiff seeks

compensatory and punitive damages and a declaratory judgment stating that Moore violated

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In

doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e), which

provides in pertinent part as follows:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

* * *

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or]

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See

also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (requiring a court to conduct a screening of “a complaint in a civil action

in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity . . . [to] identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion

of the complaint [that is] frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted”).

Further, to properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must

satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).

See also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under

Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual

demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,

727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading

that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”

is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not

“suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up).

Instead, in order to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up).

Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The

plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the

strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504

(citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612,

614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient

treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim

asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v.

Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

III. ANALYSIS

Having performed the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, the undersigned

concludes that Plaintiff may proceed on his individual-capacity First Amendment retaliation

claim for damages against Moore. However, Plaintiff’s claims against the Pickaway County

Sheriff’s Office and his remaining claims against Moore must be dismissed.

A. Municipal Liability and Official-Capacity Claims

First, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Pickaway County or any of its departments

(including the Pickaway County Sheriff’s Office). “[A] local government may not be sued under

§ 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a

government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is

responsible under § 1983.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Nichols v.

Wayne Cty. Mich., 822 F. App’x 445, 448 (6th Cir. 2020) (“To state a municipal-liability claim

under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege the deprivation (1) of a right secured by the Constitution

or laws of the United States, (2) that was directly caused by a municipal policy or custom.”)

(citing Hardrick v. City of Detroit, 876 F.3d 238, 243 (6th Cir. 2017)). A plaintiff may prove an

unconstitutional “policy” or “custom” by demonstrating “(1) the existence of an illegal official

policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision making authority ratified

illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the

existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.” Burgess v.

Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426,

429 (6th Cir. 2005)). Here, Plaintiff alleges in a conclusory manner that “[t]he unconstitutional

acts and omissions alleged herein were undertaken pursuant to, caused by, ratified by, or

permitted through the customs, policies, practices, deliberate indifference, and failure to properly

train, supervise, and discipline by the Pickaway County Sheriff’s Office and its final

policymakers.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 7.) In essence, Plaintiff asserts that every alleged act

of wrongdoing by a County employee was taken pursuant to a municipal policy or custom. (Id.)

But Plaintiff offers no facts on which this Court could rely to plausibly infer that Moore’s

allegedly unlawful conduct was the result of a County custom or policy (as opposed to the

misconduct of an individual). That is, “[h]e offers only . . . bare legal conclusions which the

Court properly disregards.” Freeman v. Spoljaric, 667 F. Supp. 3d 636, 651 (S.D. Ohio 2023)

(dismissing a claim for Monell liability due to conclusory allegations); see also Assi v. Hanshaw,

625 F. Supp. 3d 722, 750 (S.D. Ohio 2022) (dismissing a claim for Monell liability because it

was “simply too conclusory to survive”). Plaintiff’s claims against Pickaway County and its

Sheriff’s Office must therefore be dismissed.

Similarly, any claims against Moore in his official capacity must be dismissed. A suit

against a government official in his or her official capacity is “not a suit against the official but

rather is a suit against the official’s office.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71

(1989). Thus, “an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit

against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). But, as just discussed,

Plaintiff has not stated a claim against the relevant entity (Pickaway County). Plaintiff’s claims

against Moore in his official capacity must therefore be dismissed.

B. Declaratory Relief

Additionally, Plaintiff is not entitled to declaratory relief. “When seeking declaratory and

injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show actual present harm or a significant possibility of future

harm in order to demonstrate the need for preenforcement review.” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v.

Magaw, 132 F.3d 272, 279 (6th Cir. 1997). In other words, “[p]ast harm allows a plaintiff to seek

damages, but it does not entitle a plaintiff to seek injunctive or declaratory relief.” Kanuszewski

v. Michigan Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 927 F.3d 396, 406 (6th Cir. 2019). Plaintiff does not

allege any ongoing or likely future violations of his constitutional rights with regard to Moore.

His claims for declaratory relief must therefore be dismissed.

C. Individual-Capacity Claims for Damages

All that remains are Plaintiff’s individual-capacity claims against Moore for damages. As

noted above, Plaintiff may proceed on his individual-capacity First Amendment retaliation claim

for damages against Moore. But Plaintiff’s remaining individual-capacity claims must be

dismissed.

As to Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim, Plaintiff contends that

“Defendant Moore initiated the May 1 menacing by stalking charge despite the absence of a

legally sufficient pattern of conduct and in reliance on protected or noncriminal activity.” (Am.

Compl. ¶ 183, ECF No. 7.) To succeed on a malicious-prosecution claim under § 1983 when the

claim is premised on a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff must prove (1) “that a

criminal prosecution was initiated against the plaintiff and that the defendant made, influenced,

or participated in the decision to prosecute”; (2) “that there was a lack of probable cause for the

criminal prosecution”; (3) “that, as a consequence of a legal proceeding, the plaintiff suffered a

deprivation of liberty, as understood in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, apart from the

initial seizure”; and (4) “the criminal proceeding must have been resolved in the plaintiff's

favor.” Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308–09 (6th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up).

Plaintiff cannot satisfy the third element because he has not alleged a deprivation of

liberty arising from the stalking charges initiated by Moore. Plaintiff’s allegations reflect that he

was not arrested on the stalking charge and appeared for his arraignment at the Circleville

Municipal Court on May 21, 2024, of his own volition. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 67.) Nor does the

docket of his stalking case reflect that Plaintiff was ever arrested or detained. The charges were

voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution on September 5, 2024. See Circleville Municipal Court

Case No. CRB 2400414.1 Because Plaintiff has not alleged a deprivation of liberty in connection

with his stalking charges, Plaintiff has not stated a claim for malicious prosecution.

Nor can Plaintiff make out a claim for fabrication of evidence/denial of due process

against Moore. As an initial matter, because Plaintiff was never convicted of a crime as a result

of Moore’s criminal complaint, but rather only charged with stalking, “his § 1983 fabrication

claim arises under the Fourth Amendment, not the [Fourteenth Amendment] Due Process

Clause.” See Codrington v. Dolak, 142 F.4th 884, 893 (6th Cir. 2025). And “to prevail on this

claim,” a plaintiff “must show that defendants fabricated evidence presented to a grand jury or to

a judge determining probable cause.” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Clark v. Abdallah, 131 F.4th 432,

447 (6th Cir. 2025)). But Plaintiff has not alleged that Moore presented any false evidence to

support probable cause. Plaintiff alleges that Moore presented insufficient evidence—that

Moore’s reliance on the single May 1, 2024 encounter with Chief Lawless did not establish the

necessary pattern, and that Moore relied on “subjective interpretations of Plaintiff’s speech”

(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 61–62, ECF No. 7)—but Plaintiff does not allege that Moore relied on any false

evidence. Plaintiff therefore has not stated a claim for fabrication of evidence.

IV. DISPOSITION

For these reasons, all claims in this action, except Plaintiff’s claims against Moore and

the Pickaway County Sheriff’s Office arising from Plaintiff’s May 1, 2024 stalking charges, are

SEVERED and DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to pursuing them in separate actions.

Plaintiff MAY PROCEED on his individual-capacity First Amendment retaliation claim for

damages against Defendant Moore, but it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s remaining

1 This Court properly takes judicial notice of the state-court dockets relating to Plaintiff’s

criminal proceedings pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b). Cf. Buck v. Thomas M.

Cooley Law Sch., 597 F.3d 812, 816 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[A] court may take judicial notice of other

court proceedings . . . .”).

claims be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

Plaintiff has submitted service copies of his Amended Complaint and a summons form

(Form AO-440) and a U.S. Marshal form (Form USM-285) for Defendant Moore (ECF No. 1-3,

PAGEID #61; ECF No. 4, PAGEID #91). The Clerk is DIRECTED to issue the summons and

the United States Marshal is DIRECTED to serve by certified mail upon Defendant Moore the

issued summons, a copy of the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 7), and a copy of this Order and

Report and Recommendation.

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those

specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with

supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations

to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive

further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura

CHELSEY M. VASCURA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE