Paris

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAMAR PARIS, Civil No. 3:26-cv-1434

Petitioner (Judge Mariani)

v. .

WARDEN, FCI-LEWISBURG, :

Respondent

MEMORANDUM

On or about May 19, 2026, Petitioner Lamar Paris (“Paris”) initiated the above-

captioned action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2241. (Doc. 1). Paris alleges that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) incorrectly

calculated his First Step Act (“FSA”) and Second Chance Act (“SCA”) time credits. (/d.).

For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny the habeas petition.

I. Background

A. Paris’ Criminal History

Paris is serving an 87-month term of imprisonment, and a four-year term of

supervision, imposed by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

Tennessee for conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. (Doc. 8-2,

Declaration of BOP Case Manager Jacoby Foresman (“Foresman Decl.”), at 2 | 3; Doc. 8-

3, Public Information Inmate Data). According to BOP documentation submitted by

Respondent, Paris’ projected release date is September 29, 2027, via FSA and conditional

Residential Drug Abuse Program (“RDAP”) release. (/d.). However, a review of the BOP’s

inmate locator indicates that Paris’ projected release date is now August 30, 2027.

B. Administrative Remedy History

The Administrative Remedy Generalized Retrieval reveals that, while in BOP

custody, Paris filed six administrative remedies. (Doc. 8-2, Foresman Decl. at 3 J 5; Doc. 8-

4, Administrative Remedy Generalized Retrieval; Doc. 10-3, Administrative Remedy

Generalized Retrieval). Those administrative remedies are as follows.

On October 10, 2025, Paris filed administrative remedy 1257151-F1 with the

institution, requesting to be awarded FSA credits. (Doc. 8-4, at 3). On that same date, the

institution rejected the remedy as illegible and advised Paris to resubmit his remedy within

five days of the rejection notice. (/d.; Doc. 10-2, Declaration of BOP Executive Assistant

James Moroney (“Moroney Deci.”), at 3 6). (/d.). Paris never resubmitted his filing, and

he did not appeal to the Regional or Central Offices. (See id.).

On November 5, 2025, Paris filed administrative remedy 1259389-F1 with the

institution, requesting that “credits be calculated accordingly.” (Doc. 8-4, at 3). The

institution rejected the remedy as illegible and advised Paris to resubmit his remedy within

five days of the rejection notice. (/d.; Doc. 10-2, Moroney Decl. at 3 J 7). On November 12,

2025, Paris resubmitted administrative remedy 1259389-F2 with the institution, again

1 See FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS’ INMATE LOCATOR, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (searching

Inmate Number 39553-510) (last visited Aug. 3, 2026).

requesting that “credits be calculated accordingly.” (Doc. 8-4, at 4). The remedy was

closed on November 19, 2025, and a response was provided for information/explanation

purposes only. (/d.; Doc. 10-2, Moroney Decl. at 3 { 8).

On December 1, 2025, Paris filed an appeal to the Regional Office, designated as

administrative remedy 1259389-R1. (Doc. 8-4, at 4). The remedy was closed on February

20, 2026, and a response was provided for information/explanation purposes only. (/d.;

Doc. 10-2, Moroney Decl. at 3 { 9).

On February 18, 2026, Paris filed an appeal to the Central Office, designated as

administrative remedy 1259389-A1. (Doc. 8-4, at 5). On March 17, 2026, the Central Office

rejected the remedy for failing to provide a copy of the BP-9 and BP-10 and advised Paris to

resubmit his filing within 15 days. (/d.; Doc. 10-2, Moroney Decl. at 3 J 10).

On May 13, 2026, Paris resubmitted his appeal to the Central Office, designated as

administrative remedy 1259389-A2. (Doc. 8-4, at 5). On July 16, 2026, the Central Office’s

denied the appeal. (Doc. 10-3, at 5; Doc. 10-2, Moroney Decl. at 3 J] 11).

C. Claims Raised in the Habeas Petition

In his Section 2241 petition, Paris argues that he should be entitled to the application

of “prospective”, unearned credits, and that he should have been referred for prerelease

placement to occur on August 9, 2026. (Doc. 1, at 4, 9). Respondent contends that the

Section 2241 petition must be dismissed because Paris failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies by filing his habeas petition before the Central Office issued its decision on July

16, 2026. (Doc. 8, at 3-6; Doc. 10). Alternatively, Respondent argues that the petition must

be denied because Paris has no right to prerelease custody, FSA credits are “earn as you

go” and Paris has no right to prospective credits, his credits have been correctly calculated

and applied, his request for transfer to prerelease custody is premature, and the BOP is

responsible for designating the place for a prisoner's imprisonment. (Doc. 8, at 6-16).

Paris was put on notice of Respondent's arguments, and he had an opportunity to

present arguments on his behalf in his reply. Paris chose not to file a traverse. Accordingly,

the petition is ripe for disposition.

Il. Discussion

A. — Exhaustion

While there is no statutory exhaustion requirement for habeas corpus petitions

brought pursuant to Section 2241, the Third Circuit has recognized that “[flederal prisoners

are ordinarily required to exhaust their administrative remedies before petitioning for a writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to [Section] 2241.” Moscato v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 98

F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d

Cir. 2000). Exhaustion is required because: “(1) allowing the appropriate agency to develop

a factual record and apply its expertise facilitates judicial review; (2) permitting agencies to

grant the relief requested conserves judicial resources; and (3) providing agencies the

opportunity to correct their own errors fosters administrative autonomy.” Moscato, 98 F.3d

at 761-62 (citations omitted); Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682 F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981).

However, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where these

underlying reasons for exhaustion would not be served. See Coleman v. U.S. Parole

Comm'n, 644 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2016) (unpublished). For example, exhaustion is

unnecessary if the issue presented is one that involves only statutory construction. See

Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 433-34 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Bradshaw, 682 F.2d at

1052). Exhaustion is also excused when it would be futile. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.

509, 516 n.7 (1982); see also Brown v. Warden Canaan USP, 763 F. App’x 296, 297 (3d

Cir. 2019). “In order to invoke the futility exception to exhaustion, a party must ‘provide a

clear and positive showing’ of futility before the District Court.” Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475

F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting D'Amico v. CBS Corp., 297 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir.

2002)).

To exhaust administrative remedies, a federal inmate must comply with the

procedural requirements of the BOP’s administrative remedy process, which are set forth in

the Code of Federal Regulations. See generally 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-542.19. Under these

regulations, an inmate shall first attempt informal resolution of his complaint with staff and, if

the inmate is unable to resolve his complaint informally, he shall submit a formal, written

request on the proper form to the designated staff member. See id. §§ 542.13-542.14. If

the inmate is not satisfied with the Warden's response, the inmate shall then submit an

appeal to the Regional Director, using the appropriate form. See id. § 542.15(a). And,

finally, if the inmate is not satisfied with the Regional Director's response, then the inmate

shall submit an appeal to the Office of the General Counsel, located in the BOP Central

Office, using the appropriate form. See id. An inmate is not deemed to have exhausted his

administrative remedies until his complaint has been pursued at all levels. See id.

(explaining that an “[a]ppeal to the General Counsel is the final administrative appeal’).

As set forth above, the record reflects that Paris filed the following administrative

remedies.

On October 10, 2025, Paris filed administrative remedy 1257151-F1 with the

institution, requesting to be awarded FSA credits. (Doc. 8-4, at 3), On that same date, the

institution rejected the remedy as illegible and advised Paris to resubmit his remedy. (/d.;

Doc. 10-2, Declaration of BOP Executive Assistant James Moroney (“Moroney Deci.”), at 3

16). (/d.). Paris did not resubmit his filing. (See id.).

On November 5, 2025, Paris filed administrative remedy 1259389-F1 with the

institution, requesting that “credits be calculated accordingly.” (Doc. 8-4, at 3). The

institution rejected the remedy as illegible and advised Paris to resubmit his remedy within

five days of the rejection notice. (/d.; Doc. 10-2, Moroney Decl. at 3 J 7). On November 12,

2025, Paris resubmitted administrative remedy 1259389-F2 with the institution, again

requesting that “credits be calculated accordingly.” (Doc. 8-4, at 4). The remedy was

closed on November 19, 2025, and a response was provided for information/explanation

purposes only. (/d.; Doc. 10-2, Moroney Decl. at 3 7 8).

On December 1, 2025, Paris filed an appeal to the Regional Office (administrative

remedy 1259389-R1). (Doc. 8-4, at 4). On February 20, 2026, the Regional Office closed

the remedy, and a response was provided for information/explanation purposes only. (Id.;

Doc. 10-2, Moroney Decl. at 3 9).

On February 18, 2026, Paris filed an appeal to the Central Office (administrative

remedy 1259389-A1). (Doc. 8-4, at 5). On March 17, 2026, the Central Office rejected the

remedy for failing to provide proper copies and advised Paris to resubmit his filing. (/d.;

Doc. 10-2, Moroney Decl. at 3 J 10). On May 13, 2026, Paris resubmitted his appeal to the

Central Office (administrative remedy 1259389-A2). (Doc. 8-4, at 5). On July 16, 2026, the

Central Office’s denied the appeal. (Doc. 10-3, at 5; Doc. 10-2, Moroney Decl. at 3 J] 11).

Respondent acknowledges that Paris has now completed the BOP’s administrative

remedy process through all stages of review, but argues that his petition should be

dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies because he did not wait for a final

denial from the BOP’s Central Office before filing this case. (Doc. 10).

Although Paris filed his habeas petition before the Central Office’s deadline to issue

a decision expired, the Court will excuse this failure to comply with the procedure because

the remedy for such a failure would be dismissal of this petition without prejudice for failure

to exhaust administrative remedies. Given that Paris would be able to immediately refile the

petition, the Court finds that allowing the instant case to proceed advances the interest of

judicial economy and conserves the parties’ resources.

B. — Jurisdiction

Paris is challenging the BOP’s alleged failure to refer him for prerelease placement

and argues that he should have already been referred for prerelease placement to occur on

August 9, 2026. (Doc. 1, at 4, 9). However, this Section 2241 challenge, which implicates

the execution of his sentence (i.e., where the remainder of his sentence is served), is not

cognizable on habeas review.

The core of habeas corpus usually involyes a challenge to the fact or duration of

confinement. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88, 500 (1973). In Woodall v.

Federal Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2005), the United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit held that—in addition to the fact or duration of confinement—prisoners

may also challenge the “execution” of their sentences in a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

See Woodall, 432 F.3d at 241-44. The Woodall Court acknowledged that “the precise

meaning of ‘execution of the sentence’ is hazy.” Id. at 242.

In Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533 (3d Cir. 2012), the Court of Appeals clarified

the jurisdictional boundaries for execution-of-sentence habeas challenges. In Cardona, the

Third Circuit considered whether a claim challenging the BOP’s decision to transfer the

petitioner to the Special Management Unit—a highly restrictive form of confinement—was

cognizable iin a Section 2241 habeas petition as a claim challeriging tie execution of the

petitioner's sentence. Cardona, 681 F.3d at 535-37. The court summarized two earlier

Third Circuit cases that analyzed what claims could be brought to challenge the execution of

a sentence under Section 2241—Woodall and McGee v. Martinez, 627 F.3d 933 (3d Cir.

2010). The court reasoned that the claims at issue in Woodall and McGee were cognizable

because they “both challenged BOP conduct that conflicted with express statements in the

applicable sentencing judgment.” Cardona, 681 F.3d at 536. “That is, both petitions

claimed that the BOP was not properly ‘putting] into effect or carry[ing] out’ the directives of

the sentencing judgment.” /d. (quoting Woodall, 432 F.3d at 243). The court in Cardona

thus held, “[iJn order to challenge the execution of [a] sentence under § 2241, [a petitioner]

would need to allege that BOP’s conduct was somehow inconsistent with a command or

recommendation in the sentencing judgment.” /d. at 537. Because the petitioner's claim did

not argue that such an inconsistency was present, the court found that he was not properly

challenging the “execution” of his sentence and held that it was not a cognizable Section

2241 habeas claim. /d. at 537, 538.

Similarly, Paris has not alleged that the BOP’s conduct regarding prerelease custody

is inconsistent with an express command or recommendation in his judgment of sentence.

Paris’ sentencing judgment does not address or discuss prerelease custody. See United

States v. Paris, No. 2:24-cr-4, Doc. 91 (E.D. Tenn.). Accordingly, Paris’ habeas petition

does not properly challenge the “execution” of his sentence, and this Court lacks jurisdiction

over his claim. See Cardona, 681 F.3d at 537, 538. As such, the Section 2241 petition

must be dismissed.

C. Merits—Paris Has No Right to Prerelease Custody

Assuming that this Court has jurisdiction over Paris’ claim, the petition fails on the

merits.

Transfer of BOP prisoners to prerelease custody is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3624

and 18 U.S.C. § 3621. Section 3624 states, in relevant part:

The Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall, to the extent practicable, ensure

that a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment spends a portion of the final

months of that term (not to exceed 12 months), under conditions that will

afford that prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare for the

reentry of that prisoner into the community. Such conditions may include a

community correctional facility.

18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1). The decision whether to transfer an inmate to prerelease custody,

however, is left to the discretion of the BOP. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(4). When exercising this

discretion, the BOP must conduct an individualized assessment of whether an inmate

should be transferred to prerelease custody based on five factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b);

Woodall, 432 F.3d at 247.

According to the FSA time credit assessment provided to the Court, Paris’ FSA

conditional placement date is December 18, 2027. (Doc. 8-5). And, according to

Respondent, inmates are generally reviewed for such placement 17-19 months prior to their

FSA conditional placement date. (Doc. 8-2, Foresman Decl. at 3 J 7). Paris’ Unit Team has

not yet given him individualized consideration consistent with the five factors of § 3621(b),

as he currently falls within the timeframe to conduct a review. (Doc. 8-5; Doc. 8-2,

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Foresman Decl. at 3 { 7). Because Paris has not yet been reviewed or referred for

placement in prerelease custody, his claim for an earlier placement is not ripe for review.

However, any purported disagreement with the BOP’s forthcoming recommendation does

not establish a cognizable claim under Section 2241, as nothing in Section 3624 or Section

3621(b) entitles an inmate to any guaranteed placement in prerelease custody. See

Woodall, 432 F.3d at 244-51 (holding, in exercising its discretion to make halfway house

placement decisions, the Bureau must consider the factors set forth in § 3621(b);

“[hlowever, that the [Bureau] may assign a prisoner to a halfway house does not mean that

it must.”); see also Beckley v. Miner, 125 F. App’x 385, 389 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding, “fit is

well settled, and the parties agree, that the Bureau has nearly exclusive jurisdiction to

classify and transfer prisoners.”).

Ill. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss the petition for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1).

A separate Order shall issue.

2h Ovahaty

obert D. Mariani

a United States District Judge

Dated: August S$ 2026

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