Michaels

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KENNETH R. MICHAELS, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-1511

Petitioner,

v. (Magistrate Judge Latella)

BRAD A. SHOEMAKER, et al.,

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM

I. Introduction

The Petitioner, Kenneth R. Michaels, was charged with criminal

homicide and Possessing Instruments of a Crime in Lycoming County

on August 21, 2023. (See Doc 1.1, p. 1). The charges stem from a fatal

single-shot shooting of Petitioner’s brother-in-law and former business

partner on August 17, 2023. (Id.). Petitioner has steadfastly

maintained that the shooting was in self-defense. (Id. at p. 11). The

Petitioner was originally arrested in New Jersey, waived Extradition,

and appeared for a preliminary arraignment in Lycoming County on

September 14, 2023, at which time he was denied bail. (Doc.1.1, p. 1).

A preliminary hearing was held on September 22, 2023, the charges

were bound over, and Petitioner was again denied bail. (Id.). On

October 23, 2023, the Petitioner filed a Motion to Set Reasonable Bail in

the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County, arguing that

reasonable bail was appropriate in his case and challenging the

constitutionality of Article 1, Section 14 of the Pennsylvania

Constitution addressing bail in Pennsylvania. (See Doc. 1, pp. 2-3). A

bail hearing was held on November 8, 2023, and November 14, 2023.

After the matter was fully briefed, the Lycoming County Court denied

Petitioner’s bail motion. (See Doc. 1.1). Petitioner then filed a Petition

for Specialized Review in the Superior Court of Pennsylvania

challenging the trial court’s bail decision and arguing that the trial

court did not address Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to Article 1,

Section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. (Doc. 16-1, Petition for

Specialized Review). On August 27, 2024, the Superior Court affirmed

the trial court’s denial of bail. Commonwealth v. Michaels, 326 A.3d

464 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2024) (Table). Micheals filed the instant

Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on

August 15, 2025. (Doc. 1). The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss,

arguing that the Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 15).

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The matter has been fully briefed. For the reasons that follow, the

Motion will be granted.

II. Procedural History

This matter was initiated by the filing of a counseled Habeas

Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on August 15, 2026. (Doc. 1). A

brief in support was filed along with the Petition. (Doc. 2). The parties

consented to the jurisdiction of a united states magistrate judge on

October 10, 2025.1 (Doc. 10). On October 10, 2025, the Respondents

filed a Response to the Petition and a Motion to Dismiss. (Docs. 11 and

15). The Petitioner filed a Brief in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss

on November 7, 2025. (Doc. 16).

III. Discussion

Petitioner argues that Article 1, Section 14 of the Pennsylvania

Constitution, which states “All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient

sureties, unless for capital offenses or for offenses for which the

maximum sentence is life imprisonment or unless no condition or

1 The matter was reassigned to the undersigned on January 14, 2026.

3

combination of conditions other than imprisonment will reasonably

assure the safety of any person and the community when the proof is

evident or presumption great…,”2 violates the Fourteenth and Eighth

Amendments to the United States Constitution. Petitioner asserts that:

1) he was denied his substantive and procedural rights under the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by having been deprived

of pre-trial liberty; 2) that provision creates a class of individuals, viz.,

those charged with life-eligible felonies in violation of the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that he was

denied equal treatment with those defendants in a non-life eligible

felony case; and 3) that the denial of bail based on the classification of

the offense charged alone violated the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive

Bail Clause. (Doc. 1, pp. 4-5).

2 “To satisfy one of these exceptions, the Commonwealth must offer

‘evident’ proof or establish a ‘great’ presumption that the accused: (1)

committed a capital offense, (2) committed an offense that carries a

maximum sentence of life imprisonment, or (3) presents a danger to any

person and the community, which cannot be abated using any available

bail conditions. If the Commonwealth fails to satisfy its burden of proof,

the trial court cannot deny bail.” Commonwealth v. Talley, 670 Pa. 671,

719, 265 A.3d 485, 513 (2021).

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In response to the Petition, Respondents assert that Petitioner’s

claims were not fully developed in the state courts and are now

procedurally defaulted. Accordingly, Respondents request that the

Petition be dismissed. Prior to addressing the issues of exhaustion and

procedural default, an examination of the state court proceedings is

necessary.

A. History of State Cout Proceedings

As referenced above, Petitioner filed a Motion to Set Reasonable

Bail in the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County on October 23,

2023. That Court held hearings on November 8, 2023, and November

14, 2023. After the matter was briefed by the parties, the Lycoming

County Court denied Petitioner’s motion in a detailed Opinion dated

February 13, 2024. (Doc. 1-1). The vast majority of the 18-page

Opinion summarized the testimony at the two bail hearings and

addresses whether the Commonwealth convinced the Court that it is

more likely than not that the Petitioner will be convicted at trial of

first-degree murder. Having found that the burden was met, the Court

ordered the Petitioner to remain detained. (Doc. 1-1, p. 16). The Court

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then referenced, but did not fully analyze, Petitioner’s argument that

Article 1, Section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution violated the

United States Constitution. (Id. at pp. 16-18).

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Specialized Review in the

Superior Court of Pennsylvania pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of

Appellate Procedure 1610, which allows for the review of an order

denying release “by filing a petition for specialized review in the

appellate court that would have jurisdiction over the appeal from the

judgment of sentence.”3 Pa. R. App. P. 1610. As with the trial court’s

Order denying release, the vast majority of the Petition for Specialized

Review focused on whether the Commonwealth met its burden. (Doc.

16-1).

The final four paragraphs of the forty-three-paragraph Petition

addresd the federal constitutional issues presented in this habeas case

and read as follows:

40. Finally, the trial court failed to give any meaningful

consideration to Mr. Michaels’ federal constitutional

3 The requirements relating to the form and content of a Petition for

Specialized Review will be discussed below.

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challenges to Pennsylvania's 1998 Amendment to Article

I, Section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

41. Mr. Michaels alleged that the life imprisonment

trigger for denying bail under the 1998 Amendment

violates the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth

Amendment and the Due Process and Equal Protection

Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United

States Constitution since it categorially denies bail to an

entire class of defendants without any consideration of

the dangerousness of the individual and/or any

individualized facts of the particular case. See Pet'r 's Ex.

1 (Motion to Set Reasonable Bail, ¶¶ 28 - 37) .

42. However, the trial court did not specifically address

those federal constitutional claims. Instead, it merely

cited the history of the amendment to Article I, Section

14 and its legislative justification. Pet'r' s Ex . 3 at 16-18.

43. Notably, it did not address the legal arguments and

the case law cited by Mr. Michaels. Mr. Michaels is left

to guess the application of the law to the facts in this case

due to the absence of any analysis at all.

(Doc. 16-1, pp. 9-10). On August 27, 2024, the Superior Court issued a

three-page Order affirming the trial court’s denial of bail. The Superior

Court did not address the merits of Michael’s constitutional claim

outlined above, but in a footnote held that they were “waived as

underdeveloped.” Commonwealth v. Michaels, 326 A.3d 464, p.3, n.3

(Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2024) (Table) (attached as Doc. 15-3). The

Superior Court stated:

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Michaels attempts to raise a challenge that Article I,

Section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution violates the

8th and 14th Amendments to the United States

Constitution; we find the argument is waived as

underdeveloped. See Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d

291 (Pa. 2011) (finding that incorporation by reference is

an unacceptable manner of appellate advocacy and that

thus, those claims are waived). We decline to opine on the

constitutionality of Michaels’ claim.

Id.

B. The Exhaustion Requirement

The Respondents argue that Petitioner did not exhaust the

constitutional claims raised here by presenting them first to the

Pennsylvania courts and that those claims are now procedurally

defaulted based on independent and adequate state law grounds.

Petitioner asserts that Respondents argue the wrong standards relating

to the exhaustion requirement, that even if exhaustion were required

here it would be futile, that assuming exhaustion were required it

should be excused, and, alternatively, that he did indeed exhaust is

state court remedies. The issue of whether Petitioner, a pretrial

detainee proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, is subject to the exhaustion

requirement, and the parameters of the requirement will be discussed

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first. Whether the Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted will be

addressed in the following section.

i. Petitioner was Required to Exhaust

Five decades ago, the Third Circuit’s decision Moore v. DeYoung,

515 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1975), affirmatively addressed whether a

petitioner proceeding pursuant to Section 2241 is subject to the

exhaustion requirement. The Court held:

For state prisoners, federal habeas corpus is

substantially a post-conviction remedy, Peyton v. Rowe,

391 U.S. 54, 60, 88 S.Ct. 1549, 20 L.Ed.2d 426 (1967); see

28 U.S.C. § 2254.4. Nevertheless, jurisdiction to issue the

writ exists in the federal courts before a judgment is

rendered in a state criminal proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. §

2241.

In discussing exhaustion in the habeas corpus context,

few cases discern between pre-trial and post-trial

situations. With respect to state prisoners, it is only in

the post-trial setting that exhaustion has been mandated

by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3),

which empowers district courts to issue the writ before a

judgment is rendered in a criminal proceeding, makes no

reference to exhaustion. In this area, an exhaustion

requirement has developed through decisional law,

applying principles of federalism. The distinction

between § 2241, pre-trial exhaustion, and § 2254, post-

trial exhaustion, is recognized and discussed in Justice

Rehnquist's dissent in Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit

Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 503, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 35

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L.Ed.2d 443 (1973). For our purposes, it is sufficient to

recognize that, although there is a distinction in the

statutory language of §§ 2254 and 2241, there is no

distinction insofar as the exhaustion requirement is

concerned.

Id at. 441–42. Cases following Moore have reiterated that the

exhaustion requirement enshrined in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), applies

equally to Section 2241 petitions in the pre-trail context – even those

involving pre-trail detention. As recognized in Moore, this requirement

“plainly stemmed from considerations of comity rather than power, and

envisaged only the postponement, not the relinquishment, of federal

habeas corpus jurisdiction, which had attached by reason of the

allegedly unconstitutional detention and could not be ousted by what

the state court might decide.” Id. at 442. Thus, “ordinarily the federal

court should stay its hand on habeas pending completion of the state

court proceedings.” Id. See also Duran v. Thomas, 393 F. App'x 3, 4 (3d

Cir. 2010) (affirming the dismissal of a section 2241 Petition that

claimed, inter alia, excessive bail for failure to exhausted state

remedies); Green v. Piazza, No. 1:11-CV-1456, 2011 WL 3739356 (M.D.

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Pa. Aug. 23, 2011) (dismissing Section 2241 Petition raising, inter alia,

an excessive bail claim for failure to exhaust state court remedies).

As Judge Kane of this Court recently concisely explained:

“Regarding exhaustion, although Section 2241 does not contain a

statutory exhaustion requirement like Section 2254…an exhaustion

requirement has developed through decisional law, applying principles

of federalism. Moreover, although there is a distinction in the statutory

language of Sections 2254 and 2241, there is no distinction insofar as

the exhaustion requirement is concerned. Accordingly, the petitioner

must have exhausted their state-court remedies regarding their claims

before the federal court can consider their merits.” Barr v. Shenk, No.

1:26-CV-01043-YK, 2026 WL 1383767, at *3 (M.D. Pa. May 18, 2026)

(cleaned up).

C. Procedural Default

“To properly exhaust state remedies, a Section 2241 habeas

petitioner must invoke ‘one complete round of the state's established

appellate review process.’” Barr v. Shenk, at *4 (quoting O'Sullivan v.

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999)). “The petitioner bears the burden of

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showing that all claims alleged have been ‘fairly presented’ to the state

courts, and ‘it is not enough that the petitioner presents to the state

court the facts upon which a federal claim is based.’” Id. (quoting

Brown v. Cuyler, 669 F.2d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 1982).

Respondents argue that the claims raised in the instant Petition,

viz., that Article 1, Section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution

addressing bail in Pennsylvania violated the Excessive Bail Clause of

the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process and Equal Protection

Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, have not been fully presented in

the state court and therefore are unexhausted. Further, because the

Superior Court found that those claims were waived, Respondents

assert that the claims are now procedurally defaulted. Petitioner

argues that he properly presented his claims to the state courts, which

refused to address them. Petitioner asserts “the issue was properly

raised to the superior court but it elected to punt on the issue.” (Doc.

16, p. 6).

“Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality of a state

prisoner's conviction and sentence are guided by rules designed to

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ensure that state-court judgments are accorded the finality and respect

necessary to preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our

system of federalism. These rules include the doctrine of procedural

default, under which a federal court will not review the merits of

claims, including constitutional claims, that a state court declined to

hear because the prisoner failed to abide by a state procedural rule.”

Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9 (2012). “A state court's invocation of a

procedural rule to deny a prisoner's claims precludes federal review of

the claims if, among other requisites, the state procedural rule is a

nonfederal ground adequate to support the judgment and the rule is

firmly established and consistently followed.” Id.

As fully set forth above, Petitioner raised the constitutional issues

presented in the instant habeas Petition in four paragraphs of his forty-

three-paragraph Petition for Specialized Review filed in the Superior

Court of Pennsylvania. While Petitioner referenced the constitutional

issues and asserted that they were not addressed by the trial court, no

legal argument in support of the contention that the Pennsylvania

Constitution’s treatment of bail violates the United States Constitution

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was presented to the Superior Court. The Superior Court found the

argument to be waived as underdeveloped.

Respondents argue that Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate

Procedure 2119, which provides that each argument raised shall be

“followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed

pertinent,” provided an adequate and independent state procedural rule

for purposes of procedural default. (Doc. 15, p. 8). While Respondents

are correct in asserting that Pa. R. App. P. 2119 requires that appellate

briefs must meaningfully develop legal arguments and cite to

appropriate authorities, Petitioner is equally correct in asserting that

Appellate Rule 2119 is completely inapposite in this case. Rule 2119

applies to appellate briefs. That Rule is contained in Chapter 21 of

Pennsylvania’s Appellate Rules. The relevant appellate document here,

however, was a Petition for Specialized Review addressed in Chapter 16

of Pennsylvania’s Appellate Rules which has its own separate and

distinct set of rules for appellate advocacy. The rules providing for the

form and content for a Petition for Specialized Review pursuant to Rule

1610 are set forth in Rule 1603 which specifically provides that “No

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supporting brief is permitted or required; the petition for specialized

review shall present all contentions and arguments relied on with

accuracy, brevity, and clarity.” Pa. R. App. P. 1603(d).

Although Petitioner was not subject to Rule 2119, he was subject

to the long-standing requirement in Pennsylvania that appellate

arguments be developed and—although that requirement is “embodied”

in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure—it is established by

Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent independently of those rules.

See Leake v. Dillman, 594 F. App’x 756, 758 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing

Commonwealth v. Bracey, 568 Pa. 264, 273 n.4 (1999)); see also

Commonwealth v. Clayton, 572 Pa. 395, 402 (2002) ( “[I]t is a well

settled principle of appellate jurisprudence that undeveloped claims are

waived and unreviewable on appeal.”).

Indeed, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has recognized a

petitioner pursing a Petition for Specialized Relief under Rule 1610 is

not permitted to file a brief in support of the petition and “[i]nstead, the

petition itself must contain ‘a concise statement of the reasons why the

trial court ... erred,’ and ‘shall present all contentions and arguments

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relied on with accuracy, brevity, and clarity’” and therefore the petition

must present relevant legal argument. Commonwealth v. Langley, 344

A.3d 1091, 1091, n. 3 (Pa. Super. 2025), appeal denied, 352 A.3d 459

(Pa. 2026). Accordingly, legal argument is required. Here, as in

Langley, the Petition for Specialized Relief did not contain any legal

argument on the specific issue at hand. See also Commonwealth v.

Bryant, 352 A.3d 954, n. 6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2025) (deeming an argument

waived in a Petition for Specialized Review where petitioner failed to

address the issue).

“A state procedural rule is ‘independent’ if it is separate from the

federal issue.” Leake v. Dillman, 594 F. App'x at 758. “Here, it is

beyond dispute that the Superior Court's determination that Petitioner

had waived his claims was pursuant to state law, and was separate

from the federal issues before it.” Id. The Third Circuit has recognized

that the requirement by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that

appellate arguments be “developed” is firmly established and “regularly

followed.” Id. at 758–59.

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Because the Pennsylvania Superior Court deemed Petitioner’s

federal constitutional challenge to the Pennsylvania Constitution’s

provision regarding bail waived as underdeveloped, the issue has been

procedurally defaulted.4

i. Petitioner’s Procedural Default Cannot be Excused

Petitioner argues that even if he procedurally defaulted his

claims, any default should be excused. “If a claim is found defaulted,

the federal court may address it only if the petitioner establishes cause

for the default and prejudice resulting therefrom, or that a failure to

consider the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.”

Angelillo v. Warden SCI-Coal Township, 3:25CV1929, 2026 WL

1896215, at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 1, 2026) (citing Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d

178, 192 (3d Cir. 2000)). “To demonstrate cause’ for a procedural

4 This is not to say that the Court is not sympathetic to Petitioner’s

argument that he raised his constitutional argument in his Petition for

Specialized Relief in the final four paragraphs of his Petition. However,

it is not for this Court to interpret Pennsylvania’s principles of appellate

jurisprudence or to second guess the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s

application of those rules. The Pennsylvania Superior Court found that

the Petition for Specialized Relief did not contain sufficient legal

argument, and the constitutional claims were waived. That decision

must be respected by this Court.

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default, a petitioner must point to some objective external factor which

impeded their efforts to comply with the state's procedural rule.” Culley

v. Adams, 1:23-CV-01513, 2026 WL 2137345, at *8 (M.D. Pa. July 24,

2026) (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). Petitioner

here has not crossed this first hurdle. While a petitioner seeking to

review a bail decision through a Petition for Specialized Relief is limited

by Pa. R. App. P. 1603, the Rule does not prevent legal argument and,

as the Superior Court indicated in Commonwealth v. Langley, supra,

such argument is necessary to avoid a claim being deemed waived.

Therefore, it cannot be said that some objective external factor impeded

Petitioner’s efforts to comply with the state's procedural rules.

Accordingly, “cause” has not been established to excuse the procedural

default.5

D. Futility

5 Nor can it be said that the fundamental miscarriage of justice

exception to the rule of procedural default applied here. “[T]he

Supreme Court requires that the petitioner show that a ‘constitutional

violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually

innocent.’” Angelillo, 2026 WL 1896215, at *3 (citing Schlup v. Delo,

513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)).

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Petitioner asserts that because he challenges the validity of

Article 1, section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, he would not be

required to exhaust his state remedies because exhaustion would be

futile and cites Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235 (3d Cir.

2005) in support of that proposition. Woodall, which addressed the

validity of the Federal Bureau of Prison’s (BOP) regulations limiting

placement in community confinement, is inapposite here. Exhaustion

was not an issue in Woodall. In a footnote, the Court of Appeals noted:

“The District Court excused Woodall's failure to exhaust his

administrative remedies. It determined that exhaustion would be futile,

given that Woodall is not challenging the application of the BOP

regulations, but their validity. The government does not contest this

issue on appeal. We agree with the District Court that the purposes of

exhaustion would not be served here by requiring Woodall to exhaust

his administrative remedies, and we affirm on this matter.” Id. at 239,

n. 2. The Court cited Pimentel v. Gonzales, 367 F. Supp. 2d 365

(E.D.N.Y. 2005), which also addressed a challenge to the BOP’s

regulations regarding placement in community confinement. Pimentel

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v. Gonzales recognized that “courts have frequently waived exhaustion

requirements in Section 2241 challenges to the December 2002 Policy

on the grounds that exhaustion would be futile.” 367 F. Supp. 2d 371.

However, as stated in Pinto v. Menifee, No. 04 CIV 5839, 2004 WL

3019760, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2004), the reason exhaustion was

waived as futile was that “to do so would be useless, since the BOP

policy is the result of a directive from the Department of Justice that

the BOP is powerless to change.” That is not the case here, there was

no prohibition or reason why the Pennsylvania Superior Court could not

address Petitioner’s federal constitutional claim had it been properly

presented. See Smith v. Pennsylvania, No. 1:11-CV-0264, 2011 WL

1375015, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 2011) (“Before a state prisoner brings

an action in federal court, the state court should retain the first

opportunity to address purported violations of a state prisoner's

constitutional rights.”). Accordingly, it cannot be said that it would

have been futile for Petitioner to present his constitutional claim to the

Superior Court, which goes to the heart of the exhaustion requirement.

O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (“[T]he exhaustion

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doctrine is designed to give the state courts a full and fair opportunity

to resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are

presented to the federal courts.”).

E. Unavailability of State Remedies

Petitioner argues that his claims are “technically exhausted

because no state remedies remain available to him.” (Doc. 16, p. 4).

Petitioner asserts that he could not file a Petition for Specialized

Review because under Pa. R. App. P. 1602(a), such petitions must be

filed within thirty days of the date of the order denying bail. (Id.). This

argument, however, ignores the fact that the claims were already

presented to the Superior Court on a Petition for Specialized Review,

which deemed them waived and that these claims are now procedurally

defaulted.

Even assuming that Petitioner’s claims are considered exhausted

because “there are no state remedies available to him… it does not

necessarily follow, however, that [Petitioner] is entitled to an

adjudication of the merits of his unexhausted federal habeas claims

merely because it is now futile to attempt to raise them in state court.”

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Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d 153, 166 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation

omitted). “A finding of futility merely eliminates the procedural

pretense of requiring a federal habeas petitioner to return to an

unavailable state forum for nonexistent relief. Futility, without more,

does not mean that the federal courts may proceed to the merits of the

petitioner's claims.” Id. “When exhaustion is futile because state relief

is procedurally barred, federal courts may only reach the merits if the

petitioner makes the standard showing of ‘cause and prejudice’ or

establishes a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Id. (citing Caswell v.

Ryan, 953 F.2d 853, 861 (3d Cir. 1992). As discussed above, Petitioner

has not made such a showing.

F. Extraordinary Circumstances

Finally, Petitioner asserts that exhaustion should be excused

based on extraordinary circumstances. Beyond a general assertion that

pretrial custody constitutes a deprivation of a liberty interest—common

to every pretrial detainee—there is no support for the assertion that

this case presents extraordinary circumstances. In explaining excusing

exhaustion based on extraordinary circumstances in the context of a

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challenge under Section 22441 to pretrial detention, the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently wrote:

If the petitioner has not exhausted his remedies, this

Court may still adjudicate the petition if there are

“extraordinary circumstances.” Moore[v.DeYoung], 515

F.2d, [437] 443 [3d Cir. 1975]. While what constitutes

“extraordinary circumstances” is not well-defined, it is

established that it must include some “quality of delay,

harassment, bad faith or other intentional activity,”

which, under the circumstances of that particular case,

would justify setting aside the exhaustion requirement.

Id. at 447 n.12. “Absent a showing of bad faith or an

intent to harass, federal courts should decline requests to

enjoin state criminal prosecutions, ‘particularly when the

moving party has an adequate remedy’ in state court.”

Gonzalez v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 755

F.3d 176, 180 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401

U.S. 37, 43 (1971)). The Court of Appeals has rejected

“run-of-the-mill challenges to indictment, arrest,

interrogation, and denial of pre-trial release” as being

insufficient to qualify as “extraordinary circumstances.”

Reese v. Warden Phila. FDC, 904 F.3d 244, 246 n.2 (3d

Cir. 2018).

Reese v. Warden of Allegheny Cnty. Jail, No. CV 25-1237, 2026 WL

906719, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2026), report and recommendation

adopted, No. 2:25-CV-01237, 2026 WL 906312 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 2026).

See also Duran v. Thomas, 393 F. App'x 3, 5 (3d Cir. 2010) (unlawful

bail decision was not an extraordinary circumstance that would

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warrant dispensing with the exhaustion requirement); Garrick v. City of

Philadelphia, No. CIV.A. 13-4899, 2014 WL 1466855, at *3 (E.D. Pa.

Apr. 10, 2014) (extraordinary circumstances not present to excuse

exhaustion, despite the nearly nineteen month delay in ruling on bail

motion).

Because Petitioner has not demonstrated exceptional

circumstances, the exhaustion requirement cannot be excused.

IV. Conclusion

Writing for the Court in Lines v. Larkins, Judge McKee described

the “path to federal habeas review” as “serpentine” and observed that

“unexploded mines await[] even seasoned practitioners.” 208 F.3d at

155. A Petitioner challenging a bail issue in Pennsylvania faces an

even narrower path because of the restrictions contained in Pa. R. App.

P. 1603. Nevertheless, a narrow and windy road does indeed exist to

federal habeas review. Here, a procedural default which is inexcusable

exists, leaving the Court with no other option than to dismiss this

petition with prejudice.

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An appropriate Order is attached.

Dated: August 5, 2026 /s/ Leo A. Latella

Leo A. Latella

United States Magistrate Judge

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