REYNOSO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PEDRO REYNOSO, :

Petitioner, :

v. : Civ. No. 16-01721

:

CYNTHIA LINK, et al., :

Respondents. :

O R D E R

Having been convicted in 1996 of two 1991 murders, state inmate Pedro Reynoso seeks

habeas relief. (Doc. No. 71); 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He has filed counseled Objections to Magistrate

Judge Sitarski’s Recommendation that I deny relief without issuing a certificate of appealability.

(Doc. Nos. 93, 120.) It appears that Reynoso is seeking to retry his murder prosecution, urging

that the evidence he presents is more credible than that the Commonwealth presented at trial.

Federal habeas review of state proceedings is necessarily limited and does not provide the means

for such a “retrial,” especially when, as Judge Sitarski correctly found, the “new” evidence (almost

all created decades after the murders) is unreliable. I will thus overrule Reynoso’s Objections,

adopt Judge Sitarski’s Report and Recommendation, and deny the Petition without conducting a

hearing or issuing a certificate of appealability.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Trial and Sentencing

On July 3, 1996, a Philadelphia jury convicted Reynoso (tried under the name “Pedro

Reymoseo”) of two counts of first-degree murder and a weapons offense for the July 23, 1991

drive-by shootings of Carlos Torres and Charles Rivera. Commonwealth v. Reymoseo, No. CP-

51-CR-0500301-1994 (Phila. Cnty. Com. Pl.) (“Crim. Dkt.”); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 2502, 907; see

also Commonwealth v. Reymoseo, No. 2657 EDA 2014, 2015 WL 7185493, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct.

Nov. 16, 2015). Reynoso was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murders followed by 11.5 to

60 months’ incarceration for the gun crime. Crim. Dkt. at 3.

Reynoso was represented at trial by Louis T. Savino—an enormously skilled,

accomplished defense lawyer. (See Doc. No. 71 at 58.) The Commonwealth’s trial evidence

included eyewitness testimony from Samuel Wilkerson and Sarah Robinson, who identified

Reynoso—whom they referred to as “Poppo Dito” or “Papadito”—as the shooter. (See N.T.

6/25/96 at 54:23–25, 91:3–10; N.T. 6/26/96 at 163:23–64:12, 166–67, 169.) Robinson testified

that she saw two guns fire from the driver’s side window. (N.T. 6/26/96 at 164:2–12.) Wilkerson

testified that right before the shooting, he heard one of the victims threaten to kill “the Dominicans”

who had stolen his guns. (N.T. 6/25/96 at 54:17–25.) A firearms expert testified that the shooting

involved “a minimum of two firearms.” (N.T. 6/27/96 at 105:1–9.) Reynoso, who is Dominican,

called two alibi witnesses, who testified that they saw Reynoso in the Dominican Republic town

of Pimentel around the day the Philadelphia murders were committed. (See N.T. 6/28/96 at 14–

79.) The Commonwealth called forensic document expert Elaine Wooten, who testified without

contradiction that the July 27, 1991 Dominican exit stamp on Reynoso’s passport had been forged.

(See N.T. 6/26/96 at 80–137; N.T. 6/27/96 at 111–140, 149–173.) The Commonwealth also called

an INS inspector, who testified that although Reynoso’s passport had a “Dominican entry stamp

from the 13th of July, 1991, and [a Dominican] exit [stamp] on July 27th, 1991”—which was four

days after the Torres-Rivera murders—“at about that time [the INS] had been intercepting other

people from the Dominican Republic who had stamps placed in their passports to make it look like

they were not in the United States at the time—at times that they actually were.” (N.T. 6/27/96 at

166:19–23, 167:1–3.)

Felo Garcia (who sat next to the driver of the car from which the shots were fired) was tried

separately and convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of criminal

conspiracy. (See Doc. No. 93 at 3–4); Commonwealth v. Garcia, No. CP-51-CR-0746321-1991

(Phila. Cnty. Com. Pl.). At both Reynoso’s and Garcia’s trials, Wilkerson testified that a third

man, “Chuito,” had been sitting in the car’s backseat. (Doc. No. 93 at 3; N.T. 6/26/96 at 51:20–

24, 62:8–63:8.)

B. Direct Appeal and Collateral State Court Litigation

After the Superior Court rejected Reynoso’s appeal, the Supreme Court denied allocatur.

Commonwealth v. Reynoso, 726 A.2d 1082 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (table); Commonwealth v.

Reynoso, 738 A.2d 456 (Pa. 1999) (table).

On July 9, 2001, the PCRA Court dismissed Reynoso’s first, pro se petition after appointed

counsel submitted a Finley no-merit letter. (Doc. No. 93 at 5); Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d

213 (1988); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9541 et seq. The Superior Court affirmed, and Reynoso did not

seek allocatur. (Doc. No. 93 at 5.)

On November 22, 2010, now represented by counsel, Reynoso filed a second PCRA

petition, in which he alleged that Robinson had recanted her trial testimony, and that this

recantation constituted new exculpatory evidence that would have changed the outcome of his

trial. (Id.) The PCRA Court dismissed this petition as untimely, and Reynoso did not appeal. (Id.)

On November 22, 2011, Reynoso filed a third, counseled PCRA petition, alleging that

Wilkerson had also recanted his trial testimony. (Id.) After holding three evidentiary hearings,

the PCRA Court found Wilkerson’s recantation testimony incredible and dismissed the petition.

(Id. at 5–6.) The Superior Court affirmed, and the Supreme Court denied allocatur. (Id. at 6.)

C. Federal Habeas Proceedings

It is undisputed that Reynoso had until May 4, 2003 to seek habeas relief under AEDPA.

(See Doc. No. 40 at 51); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Reynoso filed his initial, counseled § 2254

petition in this Court on April 8, 2016, and amended it on January 27, 2017. (Doc. Nos. 1, 16.)

He concedes that his Petition is untimely, but argues that his “actual innocence” overcomes this

bar. (Doc. No. 16 at 90 (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569

U.S. 383, 386 (2013)).) The Commonwealth does not agree. (Doc. No. 21.)

On April 18, 2018, Magistrate Judge Sitarski recommended dismissal of the Petition as

time-barred, finding that Reynoso failed to show his actual innocence. (Doc. No. 23); Reynoso v.

Link, No. 16-1721, 2018 WL 3097349 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 2018). Judge Sitarski found that much

of the evidence presented by Reynoso in his petition was not “new” because it was known to

Reynoso at the time of his trial. Id. at *5–6. On June 22, 2018, Judge Robert F. Kelly adopted

and approved the Report over Reynoso’s objections. Reynoso v. Link, No. 16-1721, 2018 WL

3092376 (E.D. Pa. June 22, 2018).

The Third Circuit granted Reynoso’s request for a certificate of appealability on whether

Reynoso’s Petition was timely in light of the Third Circuit’s intervening Reeves decision. Reynoso

v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, No. 18-2523 (3d Cir. Jan. 8, 2019) (citing Reeves v. Fayette

SCI, 897 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2018) (“when a petitioner asserts ineffective assistance of counsel

based on counsel’s failure to discover or present to the fact-finder the very exculpatory evidence

that demonstrates his actual innocence, such evidence constitutes new evidence for purposes of

the Schlup actual innocence gateway”)). The Circuit also ruled that the Petition “states a valid

ineffective assistance of counsel claim that is debatable among jurists of reason based on

[Reynoso’s] attorney’s alleged failure to present additional alibi and identification evidence.” Id.

Upon remand, this case was reassigned to me, and I referred it to Judge Sitarski for a second

Report and Recommendation. (Doc. Nos. 33, 35.) Judge Sitarski ordered supplemental briefing

addressing Reeves. (Doc. No. 36.)

After engaging in “voluntary discovery” with the Commonwealth, Reynoso filed a

“Supplemental Amended 2254 Petition,” which the Commonwealth opposes. (Doc. Nos. 71, 77,

93 at 8.) Reynoso again argues that he has sufficient new evidence to make out his actual

innocence:

- Eight alibi affidavits from his friends and family—signed some nine years after

the murders—who purportedly saw Reynoso in or around Pimentel, on or

around July 23, 1991;

- Unsworn Zoom interviews conducted 29 years after the murders between

counsel and four additional alibi witnesses;

- Additional documentary and photographic alibi evidence;

- A report by immigration attorney Thomas Griffin concluding that Reynoso

continuously resided in the Dominican Republic from July 13, 1991 through

March 23, 1994, and explaining that Reynoso’s Dominican July 27, 1991 exit

and March 10, 1994 entry passport stamps were fabricated to permit Reynoso

to reenter the United States;

- Purportedly suppressed H-File documents that identified Chuito and

“Poppodito” as the shooters, and that identified Felo Garcia (not Reynoso) as

“Popidito.”

- Recantations from Robinson and Wilkerson, who both now identify Chuito as

the shooter;

- An affidavit from Marisol Colon-Torres—the sister of one of the victims—in

which she avers 20 years after the murders that Chuito acknowledged

responsibility for the crimes;

- An affidavit from Jose Colon—Marisol’s husband—in which he avers 20 years

after the murders that Chuito had a motive to kill Torres.

(Doc. No. 71 at 95–98; see also Doc. No. 71-1.) Reynoso argues this evidence is sufficient to

serve as a gateway to his two underlying untimely habeas claims: (1) his trial counsel ineffectively

failed to develop the additional alibi evidence; and (2) the Commonwealth suppressed the

purportedly exculpatory H-File documents. (Doc. No. 71 at 93–138, 152.)

In her second Report, Judge Sitarski recommends that I dismiss the Petition as untimely

without reaching Reynoso’s underlying claims, holding an evidentiary hearing, or issuing a

certificate of appealability. (Doc. No. 93 at 90–93.) Judge Sitarski found that even though much

of Reynoso’s evidence may be “new” under Reeves, it is not reliable. (Id. at 12–74); 897 F.3d

154. Judge Sitarski also found that Reynoso “failed to show that it is more likely than not that no

reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” (Doc. No. 93 at 90.)

Reynoso has filed lengthy, counseled Objections to the Report, to which the Commonwealth has

responded. (Doc. Nos. 120, 131.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

I must review de novo those portions of the Report to which Reynoso filed timely, specific

objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). I may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part” Judge

Sitarski’s findings or recommendations. Id.; Brophy v. Halter, 153 F. Supp. 2d 667, 669 (E.D. Pa.

2001). As to those portions to which no objections have been made, I must “satisfy [myself] that

there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(b) Advisory Committee Note to the 1983 Amendment; see Henderson v. Carlson, 812

F.2d 874, 878 (3d Cir. 1987) (explaining the Court’s responsibility “to afford some level of review”

when no objections have been made).

I may consider a § 2254 petition that is untimely or otherwise procedurally defaulted if the

petitioner makes a “gateway” showing of “actual innocence.” McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 386;

Schlup, 513 U.S. 298. To qualify, the petitioner must: (1) “present new, reliable evidence that was

not presented at trial”; and (2) “show by a preponderance of the evidence, ‘that it is more likely

than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.’”

Houck v. Stickman, 625 F.3d 88, 93 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). “The

gateway actual innocence standard is ‘demanding’ and satisfied only in the ‘rare’ and

‘extraordinary’ case where ‘a petition presents evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot

have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free

of nonharmless constitutional error.’” Reeves, 897 F.3d at 161 (quoting McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at

386, 392, 401). “It is not enough that in light of the new evidence a reasonable doubt may exist as

to the Petitioner’s guilt, the test is even more onerous than that.” Cox v. Beard, No. 12-285, 2014

WL 556236, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2014) (citing Schlup, 512 U.S. at 329)).

III. OBJECTIONS

A. Reliability

“As part of the reliability assessment” of new evidence of innocence, “the court ‘may

consider how the timing of [the petitioner’s] submission and the likely credibility of the [witnesses]

bear on the probable reliability of that evidence,’ as well as the circumstances surrounding the

evidence and any supporting corroboration.” Reeves, 897 F.3d at 161 (quoting House v. Bell, 547

U.S. 518, 537, 551)).

Alibi Affidavits

Reynoso presents eight new alibi affidavits that apparently were prepared in 2000 by his

friends and relatives. (Doc. No. 71 at 63–67.) Reynoso objects to Judge Sitarski’s finding that

these affidavits—signed nine years after the murders—were unreliable. (Doc. Nos. 93 at 28–29,

120 at 9–18.) I agree with Judge Sitarski.

Reynoso first argues that Judge Sitarski erred in discounting the affidavits’ reliability based

on their timing without considering the reason for the delay in production: Reynoso’s counsel had

ineffectively failed to develop the evidence sooner. (Doc. No. 120 at 9–11.) Yet, “[t]he timing of

a statement is relevant to assessing its credibility and . . . an ‘11th hour’ affidavit does not carry

great weight,” even in the circumstances urged here. Bennett v. Irwin, No. 22-5015, 2024 WL

3174479, at *9 (E.D. Pa. May 24, 2024) (affidavit signed by a witness four years after the

petitioner’s trial and ten years after the murder was unreliable, even though the petitioner alleged

his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview that witness previously), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 22-5015, 2024 WL 3165277 (E.D. Pa. June 25, 2024); (see also

Doc. No. 93 at 28–29 (collecting authorities).)

Reynoso next argues that it was unreasonable for Judge Sitarski to find the affidavits raised

“questions of bias” because of the affiants’ close relationships with Reynoso. (Doc. No. 120 at

11–12.) The Third Circuit has admonished, however, that “‘alibi testimony by a defendant’s

family members is of significantly less exculpatory value than the testimony of an objective

witness.’” Hess v. Mazurkiewicz, 135 F.3d 905, 909 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Romero v. Tansy, 46

F.3d 1024, 1030 (10th Cir.1995)); see also Pirela v. Vaughn, No. 01-4017, 2014 WL 1199345, at

*14, *46 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2014) (discounting affidavits where the affiants were the petitioner’s

family or friends).

Reynoso next argues that Judge Sitarski mistakenly found that “the ‘affiants failed to

factually support their averments’ that [he] ‘was in the Dominican Republic’ on July 23, 1991.”

(Doc. No. 120 at 13 (quoting Doc. No. 93 at 29).) Reynoso here notes that six of the eight affiants

said that they saw him on July 23, 1991. (Id. at 13–15.) This misses the point: even when an

affiant purported to identify the precise date in question, he or she failed to explain adequately

how, nine years later, he was certain that he saw Reynoso on that particular day. See Reeves, 897

F.3d at 161. Given this lack of detail (as well as the bias and timing concerns I have discussed),

an affiant purporting to place Reynoso in the Dominican Republic on the day of the murders

without more does not make out innocence. Cf. Lopez v. Miller, 915 F. Supp. 2d 373, 401

(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“detailed and consistent” belated alibi affidavits were reliable new evidence of

actual innocence).

Finally, Reynoso argues that even if “nothing remarkable . . . happened in Pimentel” on

July 23, 1991, the affiants would have remembered Reynoso’s absence, given the consistency with

which they saw him during the surrounding weeks. (Id. at 13–18.) Once again, however, nothing

in the affidavits provides any reason why the affiants would, nine years after the fact, have recalled

Reynoso’s absence for just a few days.

Passport Stamps

As I have discussed, Reynoso’s passport stated that he entered the Dominican Republic on

July 13, 1991 and did not leave unit July 27, 1991. As I have also discussed, the Commonwealth

presented expert testimony that the July 27 passport stamp was forged. Indeed, as I discuss below,

Reynoso now acknowledges the forgery (and, incredibly, argues that this, too, proves his

innocence). (See Doc. No. 71 at 80.) Judge Sitarski found, however, that several witnesses

credibly remembered that Reynoso “was in the Dominican Republic on July 13, 1991 because that

was the date they either accompanied him on the flight to Santo Domingo or met up with him at

the airport there.” (Doc. No. 93 at 29.) Reynoso argues that this credibility finding is inconsistent

with her rejection of his passport stamp showing that he entered the Dominican Republic on July

13, 1991. (Doc. No. 120 at 19–20.) Yet, Judge Sitarski never found the July 13, 1991 stamp,

specifically, to be unreliable. Rather, as the Commonwealth notes, she “declined to credit the

passport stamps as a whole as an ‘accurate [] reflect[ion of] his travel history.’” (Doc. No. 131 at

8–9 (quoting Doc. No. 93 at 38) (emphasis added).) Judge Sitarski thus simply found that the

absence of any passport stamps indicating that Reynoso travelled back to the United States after

July 13, 1991 but before the July 23, 1991 murders does not reliably show that he did not to do so.

Because this finding was entirely proper, I will overrule Reynoso’s objection.

2020 Zoom Interviews

Reynoso objects to Judge Sitarski’s finding that an unsworn statement given by his

neighbor, Anna Roman Deleno, to his present counsel, was not reliable alibi evidence. (Doc. No.

120 at 21–22 (citing Doc. No. 93 at 33).) Like the alibi affiants, Deleno did not explain how she

knew, almost thirty years later, that she saw Reynoso on July 23, 1991. (Doc. No. 93 at 33.) As I

have discussed, the absence of specific, corroborative details impugns a statement’s reliability.

See Reeves, 897 F.3d at 161. Accordingly, I will overrule this objection.

Reynoso next objects to Judge Sitarski’s finding that a portion of an unsworn statement

given by his wife’s Dominican obstetrician, Dr. Ana Luisa Milagros Rosario, supports the

“Commonwealth’s assertion that [Reynoso] had some way of traveling between the United States

and the Dominican Republic undetected.” (Doc. Nos. 93 at 26, 120 at 22–27.) Dr. Rosario told

counsel that Reynoso “lived in the United States,” but repeatedly “accompanied” his wife to her

prenatal appointments when he “visit[ed]” her in the Dominican Republic. (Doc. No. 93 at 33–34

(citing Doc. No. 77 at 21–22).) As Judge Sitarski explained, Reynoso’s wife gave birth in the

Dominican Republic in April 1992, but Reynoso’s passport had no stamps between July 27, 1991

(when he purportedly left the Republic) and March 10, 1994 (the only time he purportedly

reentered). (Doc. No. 93 at 35, 37.) If Reynoso was living in the United States but visiting the

Dominican Republic repeatedly when his wife was pregnant, then, as Judge Sitarski found, he

necessarily did so without his passport so indicating.

Reynoso also argues that Judge Sitarski unfairly credited this one statement by Dr. Rosario

over the several other alibi affidavits and Zoom interviews. (Doc. No. 120 at 23–27.) Reynoso

thus ignores that it is “his burden is to come forward with actual ‘new reliable evidence . . . not

presented at trial’”—not the Commonwealth’s. Ruoss v. Pennsylvania, No. 08-172, 2008 WL

2622906, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 2008) (emphasis added) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324).

Judge Sitarski thus properly noted that the inconsistency between Dr. Rosario’s statement and

Reynoso’s other new alibi evidence further impugns the reliability of that evidence.

Alibi Testimony at Reynoso’s Trial

Reynoso objects to Judge Sitarski’s finding that the proposed and trial testimony of alibi

witnesses was not sufficiently corroborated. (Doc. No. 120 at 26–28.) Once again, Reynoso takes

issue with Judge Sitarski’s finding that neither the old nor new alibi evidence was corroborated:

for instance, by indicating that anything particularly memorable happened in Pimentel on July 23,

1991. As I have discussed, this finding is well-supported. Accordingly, I will overrule this

objection.

Reynoso’s Belated Admission Regarding the Fabricated Passport Stamps

Having vigorously urged through trial and earlier in these proceedings the genuineness of

his passport stamps, Reynoso now urges the opposite: he “admits” that his July 27, 1991

Dominican exit and March 10, 1994 Dominican entry passport stamps were fabricated—

something he first told his counsel in December 2019. (Doc. Nos. 16 at 100–01, 40 at 29–31, 71

at 80, 120 at 31; N.T. 06/26/96 at 107–09, 110–11, 130–33.) Yet, Reynoso objects to Judge

Sitarski’s finding that his failure to admit the fabrication for nearly three decades “‘casts

considerable doubt on the credibility of his alibi theory.’” (Doc. No. 120 at 31 (quoting Doc. No.

93 at 38).) I will overrule this objection.

Reynoso now urges that he fabricated the passport stamps not to create an alibi for the

murders, but to to retain his immigration status. (Doc. No. 120 at 32–33.) He alleges that he was

in the Dominican Republic for nearly three years—from July 13, 1991 to March 23, 1994—but

that he would have relinquished his immigration status upon reentry to the United States unless he

could make it seem as if he had been gone for no more than two weeks at a time. (Id.) Reynoso

urges that this is the “simplest explanation” for why he fabricated the July 27, 1991 and March 10,

1994 passport stamps. (Id. at 31–33.) Reynoso has contradicted himself.

If the fabrication of these passport stamps substantiated Reynoso’s alibi, then he would not

have argued—as he did for nearly thirty years—that the stamps were authentic. (See N.T.

6/26/1996 at 133:15–134:12; Doc. No. 16 at 101.) Plainly, if any stamps was fabricated, this

would cast grave doubt on whether Reynoso’s passport could be relied upon to establish his

whereabouts on any particular day (especially decades after the fact). Accordingly, I overrule

Reynoso’s objection: Judge Sitarski reasonably found that his belated forgery admission casts

considerable doubt on the credibility of his alibi defense.

Attorney Thomas Griffin’s Report

Griffin reported, after examining Reynoso’s immigration documents and passport stamps

and interviewing Reynoso, that Reynoso forged the stamps to maintain his immigration status in

the United States. (Doc. No. 71-1 at 349–59.) As I have discussed, Judge Sitarski discredited

Reynoso’s belated explanation. She found instead that the falsehood Reynoso had maintained for

some 30 years—that the stamps were not forged and confirm that he was not in the United States

on the day of the double murders—rendered that belated explanation unreliable. In rejecting

Griffin’s report, she thus properly found “much of the evidence undergirding” the report “is itself

unreliable or problematic.” (Doc. No. 93 at 41–42.) I will overrule Reynoso’s objections to these

findings. (See Doc. No. 120 at 28–30.)

Reynoso also argues that the Commonwealth failed to present any “corroborating or

substantiating evidence to validate” the finding of Elaine Wooten (the prosecution’s document

expert) that the March 10, 1994 Dominican entry stamp was authentic. (Doc. No. 120 at 30 (citing

N.T. 6/26/97 at 112).) This “argument reverses the order of the two-pronged analysis under Schlup

and Howell.” Tillery v. Clark, No. 20-2675, 2024 WL 6971165, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 3,

2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 20-2675, 2026 WL 27822 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2026).

“Without reliable evidence of [Reynoso’s] actual innocence, [I do] not reach the question of

whether any reasonable juror, in light of that evidence, would vote to convict him.” Id.

Accordingly, it was appropriate for Judge Sitarski to scrutinize the reliability of Reynoso’s new

evidence without first evaluating “what [Reynoso] believes to be [the] deficiencies in the

Commonwealth’s case.” Id.

Finally, Reynoso argues that the authenticity of the INS documents Griffin reviewed in

reaching his conclusions is undisputed. (Doc. No. 120 at 29.) Yet, as Judge Sitarski noted, Griffin

also based his report on his interview with Reynoso. (Doc. No. 71-1 at 349–350, 93 at 42.) Once

again, Judge Sitarski did not err when she determined that Griffin’s report was unreliable based on

the unreliability of that underlying evidence.

H-File Documents

Reynoso objects to Judge Sitarski’s finding that the “suppressed” documents are not

reliable evidence of his innocence. (Doc. No. 120 at 47–52.) These objections are overruled.

The “Homicide Summary” document listed “Chuito” and “Popoditto” as the “persons

responsible for the murders,” that Garcia had been arrested, and that “Popoditto” remained a

fugitive. (Doc. No. 71-1 at 3.) Even if the Homicide Summary implicates Chuito, it is still not

reliable evidence of Reynoso’s innocence because it also lists “Popoditto” as a person responsible.

(See id.) Wilkerson and Robinson each testified at trial that they knew Reynoso by some variant

of the “Popoditto” nickname, as did Reynoso’s own character witnesses. (N.T. 6/25/96 at 91:3–

10; N.T. 6/26/96 at 168:24–69:19; N.T. 6/28/96 at 10:15–17, 11:12–14, 18:7–13.)

Reynoso’s argument that the additional H-File documents are reliable, exculpatory

evidence because they identify Felo Garcia (as opposed to Reynoso) as “Popodito” or “Popidito”

fails for similar reasons. (Doc. No. 120 at 50–52.) That some unknown person may have at some

point identified Garcia to the police as “Popodito” is hardly reliable evidence of innocence, given

the extensive trial testimony identifying Reynoso by some variant of that nickname. (See N.T.

6/25/96 at 91:3–10; N.T. 6/26/96 at 168:24–69:19; N.T. 6/28/96 at 10:15–17, 11:12–14, 18:7–13.)

Moreover, the Homicide Summary clearly identifies “Popoditto” and Garcia as two different

people. (See Doc. No. 71-1 at 3.)

Reynoso argues at length that it was Robinson who identified Garcia to the police as

“Popodito” shortly after Garcia was arrested on July 27, 1991, and that Robinson’s statement to

the police two days later—in which she stated that she had previously “mixed up” the names of

the two men seated in the front of the car—is not credible. (Doc. Nos. 71-1 at 61, 120 at 34–47,

51–52.) Reynoso’s purported credibility determination provides no basis to disregard the wealth

of previously discussed evidence identifying Reynoso by some variant of the “Popodito”

nickname.

Wilkerson and Robinson’s Recantations

“As a general matter, a recantation in the absence of corroborating evidence or

circumstances will probably fall short of the standard of reliability contemplated by Schlup.”

Howell v. Superintendent Albion SCI, 978 F.3d 54, 60 (3d Cir. 2020). Recantation evidence

should not, however, be “categorically rejected.” Id. Rather, “recantations should be analyzed on

an individual and fact-specific basis, taking into account the non-exclusive factors outlined in

Reeves.” Id. Where, as here, “the recantation involves an admission of perjury, it is the least

reliable form of proof.” Teagle v. Diguglielmo, 336 F. App’x 209, 213 (3d Cir. 2009).

Reynoso objects to Judge Sitarski’s finding that Robinson and Wilkerson’s recantations

were not reliable, exculpatory evidence. (Doc. No. 120 at 52–68.) I will overrule these objections.

With respect to Wilkerson, the PCRA Court found his 2013 recantation testimony

incredible because, inter alia, his identification of Chuito as the shooter was inconsistent with his

initial March 1, 2012 recantation affidavit, in which he averred that he did not recognize anyone

in the car. (Doc. No. 93 at 70 (citing Commonwealth v. Reynoso, CP-51-CR-0500301-1994, slip

op. at 7 (Phila. Cnty. Com. Pl Dec. 31, 2014).) As Judge Sitarski explained, “[t]his Court must . .

. defer to the PCRA Court’s findings of fact, including its assessment of Wilkerson’s credibility,”

unless Reynoso rebuts those “findings with clear and convincing evidence.” (Doc. No. 93 at 72

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Harris v. Mahally, No. 17-1688, 2017 WL 6949815, at *7 (E.D.

Pa. Nov. 30, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 451638 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 17,

2018)).)

Despite this deferential standard, Reynoso argues that Judge Sitarski erred by failing to

consider Wilkerson’s explanation for the inconsistency between his initial recantation affidavit

and his subsequent PCRA hearing testimony: i.e., Wilkerson had feared Chuito, but was moved

by his newfound religious conviction to tell the full truth. (Doc. No. 120 at 62; N.T. 8/13/13 at

32–33, 71.) Yet, Judge Sitarski explicitly found this explanation was suspect because, “as the

PCRA Court observed, at [Reynoso’s] trial [Wilkerson] had previously implicated Chuito in the

double murder.” (Doc. No. 93 at 72.) Indeed, Wilkerson testified repeatedly at Reynoso’s trial

that Chuito was also in the car from which Reynoso shot his victims. (N.T. 6/26/96 at 51:20–24,

62:8–63:8.) Accordingly, I agree with both the PCRA Court and Judge Sitarski that Wilkerson’s

“explanation” is belied by that trial testimony.

With respect to Robinson, Reynoso objects to Judge Sitarski’s finding that Robinson’s

“new account”—that “she identified [Reynoso] as the shooter at his preliminary hearing and trial

because police instructed her to implicate (or ‘finger’) everyone apprehended during the raid”—

“does not line up with the record.” (Doc. Nos. 93 at 63–64, 120 at 53–54.) I agree with Judge

Sitarski that the new account “makes little sense.” (Doc. No. 93 at 63.)

In a 2021 interview with the DAO, Robinson stated that she was “certain” that Reynoso

“was there when the police raided the house” in July 1991, “that the detectives had asked her to

identify anyone they pulled out of the house as involved in the murders,” and that Reynoso “was

among them.” (Doc. No. 71-1 at 186; see also Doc. No. 71-1 at 163–70 (Robinson’s initial 2010

recantation statement averring substantially the same).) Yet, the record shows that Reynoso was

not apprehended until he reentered the United States on March 23, 1994. (Doc. Nos. 21-8 at 1–4,

71-1 at 357–58.) Robinson’s new account is thus necessarily incorrect. Reynoso’s arguments

regarding: (1) the purported consistency between Robinson’s new account, the H-File documents,

and Robinson’s initial nonidentification of Reynoso to the police; and (2) the prosecution’s “power

and resources” to encourage false testimony from Robinson both fail to address this fundamental

flaw in the reliability of her recantation. (Doc. No. 120 at 53–60.)

Reynoso also objects to Judge Sitarski’s finding that Wilkerson and Robinson’s

recantations were inconsistent with and not corroborative of each other. (Id. at 59, 63–68; Doc.

No. 93 at 64, 72–73.) The bulk of Reynoso’s objection addresses Wilkerson’s PCRA hearing

testimony that Robinson was “lying” when she spoke with police after the shooting. (Doc. No.

120 at 66–68 (citing N.T. 8/13/2013 at 38–39).) When asked by the PCRA Court to specify what

exactly Robinson had been lying about, Wilkerson replied, “I don’t know—the point was the fact

that we wasn’t supposed to be talking to no police at all.” (Id.) Reynoso argues that given this

context, it was wrong for Judge Sitarski to “latch[] on to” the “she ‘was lying’” portion of

Wilkerson’s testimony to find that his “account of the shooting differed from Robinson’s.” (Id. at

67.)

Regardless of whether Wilkerson actually disputed the truth of anything Robinson had told

the police after the shootings, their recantations are not sufficiently corroborative as to be reliable.

When testifying before the PCRA Court, Wilkerson denied that Robinson had witnessed the

shooting at all. (N.T. 8/13/2013 at 45.) Even though both Wilkerson and Robinson now identify

Chuito as the shooter, this inconsistency underscores their recantations’ unreliability.

Marisol Colon-Torres’s 2011 Affidavit

Reynoso objects to Judge Sitarski’s finding that Colon-Torres’s 2011 affidavit was not

reliable exculpatory evidence. (Doc. No. 120 at 68–70.) I will overrule this objection.

Reynoso first argues that Judge Sitarski’s “credibility assessment gave no weight” to the

fact that Colon-Torres is the sister of one of the victims. (Id. at 69–70.) Her affidavit remains

unreliable, however. She averred that on the day of the murders, she “heard gunshots and saw

Chuito in a car pulling away.” (Doc. No. 71-1 at 180.) She further averred that “[a] short time

thereafter,” Chuito replied, “Don’t worry about it. I did you a favor,” when she “asked him why

he had killed [her] brother.” (Id.) These averments are consistent with Wilkerson’s repeated trial

testimony that Chuito—who, the Commonwealth argues, was Reynoso’s “boss”—was also in the

car during the shooting. (See Doc. No. 131 at 6, N.T. 6/26/96 at 51:20–24, 62:8–63:8).

Accordingly, Judge Sitarski permissibly found that Colon-Torres’s affidavit is not reliable

evidence of Reynoso’s innocence.

Reynoso next argues that Judge Sitarski’s refusal to credit Colon-Torres’s narrative is

inconsistent with her treatment of evidence favorable to the Commonwealth. (See Doc. Nos. 93

at 56 (“It is doubtful that ‘[a] short time’ after her brother’s murder, Colon-Torres would choose

to go, apparently alone, to Chuito’s ‘drug house’ and confront the man who she believed had just

shot and killed her brother.” (quoting Doc. No. 71-1 at 179)), 120 at 70–71.) Once again, it is

Reynoso’s burden to present new, reliable evidence at the first step of the Schlup inquiry; Judge

Sitarski is not required at that step to assess the purported “deficiencies in the Commonwealth’s

case.” Tillery, 2024 WL 6971165, at *16.

B. Likelihood of Conviction

Reynoso objects to Judge Sitarski’s likelihood of conviction analysis on the same grounds

that he objects to each of the reliability findings that I have discussed. (Doc. No. 120 at 72

(“[B]ecause the likelihood of conviction analysis is based entirely on Magistrate Sitarski’s

credibility and reliability findings—if Magistrate Sitarski’s credibility and reliability findings are

wrong, her likelihood of conviction of analysis is worthless/invalid.”). Accordingly, for the same

reasons that I overruled Reynoso’s objections to Judge Sitarski’s reliability findings, I will overrule

this objection as well.

C. Request for an Evidentiary Hearing

Reynoso objects to Judge Sitarski’s recommendation to deny him an evidentiary hearing,

arguing without elaboration that he is entitled to such a hearing. (Doc. No. 120 at 72.) I agree

with Judge Sitarski that additional fact-finding is unnecessary, as any further factual development

would not assist Reynoso in satisfying his demanding burden under Schlup. (Doc. No. 93 at 90–

92.)

D. Certificate of Appealability

Reynoso objects to Judge Sitarski’s recommendation that I deny his Petition without

granting a certificate of appealability. (Doc. No. 120 at 72–74.) He argues that even if I otherwise

adopt the Report, he is entitled to a COA on the following issue:

Whether the District Court erred in adopting the Magistrate Judge’s

credibility and reliability findings – where the Magistrate Judge used

different credibility and reliability standards when evaluating [Reynoso’s]

new evidence of innocence and the DAO’s old (trial) evidence – where

[Reynoso’s] new evidence of innocence required him to meet a heightened

standard of credibility and reliability – which the DAO’s old (trial) evidence

didn’t have to meet.

(Id. at 73.) I disagree that jurists of reason could debate Judge Sitarski’s application of “credibility

and reliability standards” to the new and old evidence. As I have discussed, Reynoso must first

put forth reliable evidence of his innocence before Judge Sitarski can assess the likelihood of

conviction by weighing that new evidence against the old. See Tillery, 2024 WL 6971165, at *16

(citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324); supra Part III § A. It is thus not debatable that Judge Sitarski was

not required to reassess the reliability of the Commonwealth’s old evidence at step one of the

Schlup inquiry.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Third Circuit has admonished that the innocence gateway can be met only in the “rare”

and “extraordinary” § 2254 case: one where the Petitioner presents exculpatory evidence “so

strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Reeves, 897 F.3d at 161

(quoting McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 386, 392, 401). Having conducted a painstaking analysis of

Reynoso’s “new” evidence—all of it devised some 10 to 35 years after the Torres and Rivera

murders—Judge Sitarski found it unreliable, vague, and contradictory. My review of Reynoso’s

objections compels me to agree. Because he has not made the gateway actual innocence showing,

Reynoso’s Petition remains time barred. Accordingly, I will dismiss the Petition without

addressing Reynoso’s underlying habeas claims and without conducting a hearing.

* * *

AND NOW, this 27th day of July, 2026, upon consideration of the pleadings and record

herein, and after careful review of the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate

Judge Lynne A. Sitarski (Doc. No. 93), Petitioner’s Objections (Doc. No. 120), and Respondents

Response (Doc. No. 131), it is hereby ORDERED that:

1. The Supplemental Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 71) is

DENIED;

2. Petitioner’s Objections to the Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 120) are

OVERRULED;

3. The Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 93) is APPROVED and ADOPTED;

4. There are no grounds to issue a certificate of appealability; and

5. The Clerk of the Court shall CLOSE this case.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

_/s_/_ P_a_u_l_ S_._ D__ia_m__o_n_d________

Paul S. Diamond, J.