Green

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JEROME GREEN, # M17555, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:26-cv-00421-GCS

)

C/O HOUSE, )

MENARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER, )

(Second Shift C/Os), )

and NURSE MORGAN, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

SISON, Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff Jerome Green is an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(“IDOC”) who is currently incarcerated at Western Illinois Correctional Center. He brings

this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his constitutional

rights while he was confined at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”). He claims

Defendants denied and delayed necessary medical and mental health care, housed him

in an unsanitary cell, and retaliated against him. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.

Plaintiff’s Complaint is now before the Court for preliminary review under

28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the Court to screen prisoner complaints to filter out

non-meritorious claims.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of the Complaint that is

1 The Court has jurisdiction to screen the Complaint due to Plaintiff’s consent to the

full jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge (Doc. 5), and the limited consent to the exercise of

Magistrate Judge jurisdiction as set forth in the Memoranda of Understanding between

this Court, Wexford Health Sources, and the IDOC.

legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages

from an immune defendant must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture,

the factual allegations of the pro se Complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez

v. Plymouth Ambulance Service, 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges in early 2023 at Menard, he asked Defendant C/O House to

summon a mental health crisis team for him. (Doc. 1, p. 3).2 Plaintiff, who is seriously

mentally ill, was confined in a cell with a steel door and no air circulation, causing him

to suffer from depression and anxiety. House refused because Plaintiff had previously

filed grievances against him. After House’s denial, Plaintiff injured himself by punching

the wall. (Doc. 1, p. 8-9).

Plaintiff also complained to House that his cell was contaminated with mold and

feces on the wall, and he lacked cleaning supplies, which created a risk of infection to

Plaintiff’s neck wound. (Doc. 1, p. 3). House responded that he didn’t give a damn and

walked away. Between August 25, 2023, and November 3, 2023, Plaintiff was in an

unsanitary cell and was not given proper medical treatment, making his neck condition

(involving a keloid) worse. (Doc. 1, p. 5).

Plaintiff asked House in early 2023 to summon medical attention because the open

wound on his neck was infected and was draining pus, causing severe pain to Plaintiff’s

neck, face, and head. (Doc. 1, p. 3). Plaintiff also asked several nurses for help with this

2 Plaintiff attaches a grievance noting House denied him a crisis team on August 25,

2023. (Doc. 1-1, p. 4).

condition. On several occasions, House directed the nurses not to give Plaintiff any

medical attention – again, in retaliation for Plaintiff’s prior grievances. House told

Plaintiff that as long as he had a say-so, Plaintiff would be almost dead before he received

treatment. (Doc. 1, p. 4). After many days without medical attention, Plaintiff’s infection

became worse and began bleeding. He was not seen by medical staff until weeks later,

when his pain and drainage had increased.

On or about November 3, 2023, a nurse gave Plaintiff an antibiotic but did not

provide him supplies for dressing changes. (Doc. 1, p. 4). On November 17, 2023, while

Plaintiff was in restricted housing, Defendant Nurse Morgan on the 3:00-11:00 shift told

Plaintiff he cried too much and gave him “Island” sterile 6x6 dressing for his neck wound.

Plaintiff told Morgan he could not use the dressing because when it was removed, it

would take off his skin and create further damage to his neck wound. He told Morgan

the doctor issued a permit for transparent film sterile dressing for that reason. (Doc. 1, p.

4-5). Morgan still gave Plaintiff the Island dressing and said she was not the doctor and

did not care if he turned pink by pulling the dressing off. House escorted Morgan to

Plaintiff’s housing area and influenced Morgan to deny proper medical treatment.

Plaintiff’s wound became worse because of Morgan’s deliberate indifference.

The doctor ordered twice-daily dressing changes for Plaintiff’s neck wound. (Doc.

1, p. 6). However, only the first shift officers took Plaintiff to the nurse’s station for

dressing changes; the second shift officers refused to follow the doctor’s order. Plaintiff

asked various second shift officers for their names, but they removed their name tags and

refused to identify themselves. As a result, Plaintiff was forced to wear a bloody dressing

for an entire day until the first shift officers returned. This condition attracted bugs and

caused altercations with his cellmate.

On June 24, 2024, Plaintiff finally had surgery for removal of the keloid on his neck.

(Doc. 1, p. 5).

PRELIMINARY DISMISSALS

Plaintiff cannot maintain his suit for damages against Defendant Menard

Correctional Center. A state governmental agency such as the Illinois Department of

Corrections and the prisons it manages are not “persons” that can be sued for civil rights

violations under § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). See

also Billman v. Indiana Dept. of Corrections, 56 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that state

Department of Corrections is immune from suit by virtue of Eleventh Amendment);

Hughes v. Joliet Correctional Center, 931 F.2d 425, 427 (7th Cir. 1991) (same).

Plaintiff states he included Menard as a defendant because he wants to hold the

various unknown second shift officers liable for refusing to follow orders to provide

wound dressing changes. (Doc. 1, p. 6). A plaintiff may proceed against an unknown

individual by designating them as John or Jane Doe and providing identifying

information that could lead to discovering the individual’s name. He cannot bring a claim

against a vague, undefined group of people, but must make plausible allegations against

individuals. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). For these reasons, Menard

Correctional Center will be dismissed from the action.

DISCUSSION

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designates the following

claims in this pro se action:

Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to mental health

needs claim against House for failing to summon a mental

health team for Plaintiff in early 2023.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment claim against House for confining

Plaintiff in a cell contaminated with mold and human waste

between August 25, 2023, and November 3, 2023.

Count 3: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs claims against House for preventing Plaintiff from

obtaining medical care, and against Morgan for ignoring the

doctor’s order and giving Plaintiff the wrong wound dressing

in November 2023.

Count 4: First Amendment retaliation claim against House for denying

Plaintiff mental health and medical care because Plaintiff filed

grievances against House, and against Morgan for furthering

the retaliation by denying Plaintiff proper medical care.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders,

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is

mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered

dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading

standard.3

Official Capacity Claims

Plaintiff raises claims against each defendant in his or her individual and official

capacities. (Doc. 1, p. 1). However, Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages may only be

pursued against state officials in their individual capacities. See Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d

3 See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (noting that an action

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts

to state a claim that is plausible on its face.”).

904, 918 (7th Cir. 2005); Shockley v. Jones, 823 F.2d 1068, 1070 (7th Cir. 1987). Accordingly,

the official capacity claims against the individual defendants are dismissed without

prejudice.

Count 1

Prison officials and medical staff violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition

against cruel and unusual punishment when they act with deliberate indifference to a

prisoner’s serious medical or mental health needs. See Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 475

(7th Cir. 2017). To state such a claim, a prisoner must plead facts and allegations

suggesting that (1) he suffered from an objectively serious medical or mental health

condition, and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs.

Id. Deliberate indifference is demonstrated where a prison official acted or failed to act

despite his/her knowledge of a serious risk of harm. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

842 (1994).4

Plaintiff alleges he was on the mental health case log, designated as seriously

mentally ill, and suffered from depression and anxiety. It appears he had an objectively

serious mental health condition. He claims House denied him a crisis team on more than

one occasion, and Plaintiff harmed himself after House refused to summon a crisis team.

The deliberate indifference claim in Count 1 may proceed against House.

4 Plaintiff also invokes the Fourteenth Amendment in connection with his claims.

His Fourteenth Amendment claims are dismissed as duplicative of the Eighth

Amendment claims. See, e.g., Conyers v. Abitz, 416 F.3d 580, 586 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that

claims are to be analyzed under the most explicit sources of constitutional protections)

(citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989)).

Count 2

Prison conditions that deprive inmates of basic human needs – food, medical care,

sanitation, or physical safety – may violate the Eighth Amendment. See Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346-347 (1981). To state an Eighth Amendment claim for

unconstitutional conditions of confinement, Plaintiff must plead facts suggesting he was

denied “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” creating an excessive risk to

his health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). He must also sufficiently

plead that the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious

harm to the inmate, despite the defendant’s knowledge of the conditions. See Farmer, 511

U.S. at 837, 842. For a defendant to be personally liable under § 1983, the individual “must

have caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.” Pepper v. Village of Oak Park,

430 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff’s description of being confined in a cell contaminated with feces and mold

for over two months, while he had an open wound and had no access to cleaning

supplies, amounts to an objectively serious deprivation. He alleges House was aware of

the conditions and refused to correct the problems. Count 2 may also proceed against

House.

Count 3

Under the standards discussed in Count 1, Plaintiff sufficiently states a claim

against House for deliberate indifference to his need for medical care for his infected neck

wound. While Morgan did not deny Plaintiff all medical care, he alleges Morgan

knowingly ignored the doctor’s specific order to provide him with wound dressing

material that would not cause his skin to peel off. The deliberate indifference claims in

Count 3 may proceed against House and Morgan.

Plaintiff states he seeks to hold Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”) liable

because Morgan was under a contract with Wexford. (Doc. 1, p. 7). However, Plaintiff

failed to include Wexford among the defendants. Even if he had done so, Plaintiff cannot

maintain a claim against Wexford merely because it employed an individual medical

provider. A corporation can be held liable for deliberate indifference only if it had a policy

or practice that caused the alleged violation of a constitutional right. See Woodward v.

Correctional Medical Services of Illinois, Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927 (7th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff

includes no such allegation, thus any claim against Wexford is dismissed without

prejudice.

Count 4

Prison officials may not retaliate against inmates for exercising their First

Amendment rights to file grievances, lawsuits, or otherwise complain about their

conditions of confinement. See Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012); Walker v.

Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2002). To state a retaliation claim, a prisoner must allege

that he engaged in some protected First Amendment activity (for example, filing a

grievance or otherwise complaining about conditions of confinement) and that prison

officials took adverse action against him because he engaged in the protected activity. See

Hawkins v. Mitchell, 756 F.3d 983, 996 (7th Cir. 2014); Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 552

(7th Cir. 2009). “A complaint states a claim for retaliation when it sets forth ‘a chronology

of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred.’” Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226

F.3d 568, 573 (7th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiff alleges he filed grievances against House, which prompted House

to retaliate by denying Plaintiff’s requests for a mental health crisis team and for medical

care. Plaintiff further claims that Morgan denied him proper medical care under the

influence of House, thus participating in the retaliation. Count 4 sufficiently states a

retaliation claim against House and Morgan.

DISPOSITION

The Complaint states colorable claims in Counts 1 and 2 against House, and in

Counts 3 and 4 against House and Morgan. Defendant Menard Correctional Center is

DISMISSED from the action with prejudice.

The Clerk shall prepare for C/O House and Nurse Morgan: (1) Form 5 (Notice of

a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service

of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and

this Memorandum and Order to Defendants’ place of employment as identified by

Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form

6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take

appropriate steps to effect formal service on the Defendant, and the Court will require

the Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the

employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not

known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for

sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation

of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the court

file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to

the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).

Pursuant to Local Rule 8.2, Defendants need only respond to the issues stated in this

Merit Review Order.

Plaintiff is ADVISED that if judgment is rendered against him and the judgment

includes the payment of costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, he will be required to pay the full

amount of the costs, even though his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).

Plaintiff is further ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the

Clerk of Court and the opposing parties informed of any change in his address; the Court

will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not

later than 14 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply

with this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result

in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 41(b).

Finally, based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Clerk of Court is

DIRECTED to ENTER the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health

Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: A 14, 2026 Digitally signed by

>: August 14, . . Judge Sison

Aklnt D5 ate: 2026.08.14

12:23:18 -05'00'

GILBERT C. SISON

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of

your lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your Complaint. After service has been

achieved, the defendants will enter an appearance and file an Answer to your Complaint.

It will likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’

Answer, but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all the

defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing

important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to

wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the

defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before

defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature.

Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time, unless specifically

directed to do so.

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