Watson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

SHERREE WATSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:25-cv-01162

) Judge Aleta A. Trauger

MONTGOMERY COUNTY, TENNESSEE, )

CORPORAL RYAN WRIGHT, in his )

Official and Individual Capacity )

CORPORAL IGNACIO ALEX RIVERA, )

in his Official and Individual Capacity )

MATTHEW WAYNE CRYSEL, )

and KATHERINE CRYSEL, in her )

Individual Capacity, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Sherree Watson brings this lawsuit against Montgomery County, Tennessee

(“Montgomery County” or the “County”), two officers employed by the Montgomery County

Sheriff’s Department (“MCSD”), and two individuals who allegedly orchestrated the wrongful

arrest of the plaintiff, Matthew Crysel and his wife Katherine Crysel. The Complaint asserts claims

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of Watson’s constitutional rights and related state

law claims. (Doc. No. 1, Compl.) Now before the court are two Motions to Dismiss under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), filed by Montgomery County (Doc. No. 29) and MCSD officers

Ryan Wright and Ignacio Alex Rivera (the “Officer defendants”) (Doc. No. 36).

For the reasons set forth herein, the court will grant the motions in part and dismiss with

prejudice all claims under § 1983. However, the court will decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. The defendants’ motions will be denied as moot,

insofar as they seek dismissal of the state law claims under Rule 12(b)(6), and the remainder of

the case will be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3), without prejudice to the plaintiff’s ability

to reassert those claims in state court.

I. LEGAL STANDARD – RULE 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. RMI

Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996). Such a motion is

properly granted if the plaintiff has “fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Marvaso v. Sanchez, 971 F.3d 599, 605 (6th Cir. 2020). To survive a

motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege facts that, if accepted as true, are sufficient to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57

(2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint has “facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly,

550 U.S. at 556). The complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but it must contain

more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007). A complaint that “tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further

factual enhancement’” will not suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “construe the

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in

the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Courtright v.

City of Battle Creek, 839 F.3d 513, 518 (6th Cir. 2016).

II. JURISDICTION

Plaintiff Sherree Watson is a citizen and resident of Tennessee, and all of the defendants

are likewise alleged to be citizens of Tennessee. (Compl. ¶¶ 5–10.) The court has original

jurisdiction over the case the plaintiff’s federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

The court has supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s state law claims. Id. § 1367(a).

III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Factual Allegations

The plaintiff alleges that she was in an intimate relationship with her co-worker, defendant

Matthew Crysel (“M. Crysel”), from approximately late February 2023 through late April 2023,

when M. Crysel’s wife, defendant Katherine Crysel (“K. Crysel”) discovered the relationship.1

(Compl. ¶¶ 23–27.) Over the course of the year following the termination of their relationship,

Watson and M. Crysel engaged in a contentious pattern of lodging and pursuing workplace

complaints against each other, with both accusing the other of stalking, harassment, and other

inappropriate conduct.2 The plaintiff obtained an ex parte Temporary Order of Protection against

K. Crysel in March 2024. According to Watson, all of the Crysels’ complaints against her were

based on false allegations and were eventually dismissed as unsubstantiated. (Id. at 27–67, 76.)

On May 15, 2024, however, M. Crysel filed an affidavit of complaint for aggravated assault

and aggravated stalking against Watson with the MCSO. (Id. ¶ 69.) On May 16, 2024, the Crysels

jointly filed a report with the MCSO against Watson, which “result[ed] in arrest warrants for

1 The plaintiff alleges that K. Crysel was at all relevant times employed as a State Trooper

with the Tennessee Highway Patrol. (Compl. ¶ 7.)

2 Watson was employed by the “Clarksville VA Clinic.” (Compl. ¶ 18.) She alleges that

internal workplace investigations into these complaints were conducted by a Department of

Veterans Affairs (“VA”) criminal investigator, other agents of the VA police, and various agents

of the Tennessee Department of Safety & Homeland Security.

aggravated assault, aggravated stalking, and harassment.” (Id. ¶ 70.) The plaintiff asserts that

defendant Rivera “received the false report from the Crysels” and that Rivera and defendant Wright

“failed to fully investigate[] the false report.” (Id. ¶ 112.) Elsewhere in the Complaint, Watson

asserts that Rivera and Wright “had a duty to fully investigate the Crysel[s’] allegations against

her, and they breached that duty by failing to do so, due to their relationship with the Crysels.” (Id.

¶ 16; see also id. ¶¶ 131, 149, 151.)

The Complaint contains no facts to substantiate the existence of this purported

“relationship,” except insofar as it asserts that “Defendant Mrs. Crysel was personally involved

with former Cpl. Wright with whom she was texting Plaintiff’s location, her typical parking space,

what time she would ordinarily arrive to work, and details of her vehicle.” (Id. ¶ 71.) Although the

Complaint does not make this clear, the court and the Officer defendants understand the plaintiff

to be alleging that K. Crysel provided information to Wright to help facilitate Watson’s arrest. (See

Doc. No. 37 at 4 (“The Complaint also alleges that, in order to find Plaintiff (so he could arrest

her), Corporal Wright received certain pertinent, necessary, and customary information from Mrs.

Crysel (a fellow law enforcement officer) pertaining to Plaintiff, to include her whereabouts at the

time, her typical parking space and usual arrival time at the VA Clinic, and a description of her

vehicle.” (citing Compl. ¶¶ 7 & 71)).) On October 11, 2024, Watson was arrested on those warrants

by defendant Wright, “based on the false statements of Mr. Crysel.” (Id. ¶¶ 78, 113.) At a

preliminary hearing on February 4, 2025 in the Montgomery County General Sessions Criminal

Court, the state announced that it would not prosecute Watson “due to potential misconduct by the

alleged victim and his wife,” and the charges were dismissed upon the state’s motion. (Id. ¶ 84.)

In March 2025, after dismissal of the charges, Watson met with Montgomery County

District Attorney Robert Nash to request a TBI investigation into the actions of K. Crysel, Rivera,

and Wright. (Id. ¶ 86.) In May 2025, the MCSO instigated an internal investigation into the

plaintiff’s “concerns about her arrest and alleged misconduct by MCSO personnel.” (Id. ¶¶ 92,

96.) On May 14, 2025, Rivera was placed on administrative leave during the pendency of the

investigation. (Id. ¶ 97.) On May 16, 2025, the investigation into Rivera’s conduct concluded with

the finding of “no violation of policy regarding collusion, but finding violations of other policies.”

(Id. ¶ 98.) On May 29, 2025, he was issued a “written reprimand . . . for violations of the Code of

Conduct while on duty.” (Id. ¶ 100.) The Complaint does not elaborate on which policies Rivera

may have violated. On May 28, 2025, Wright was placed on administrative leave pending the

outcome of the administrative process. (Id. ¶ 99.) The Complaint does not indicate that he was

disciplined as a result of the investigation.

B. Claims for Relief

Based on these factual allegations,3 the plaintiff asserts claims for (1) false arrest, (2) false

imprisonment, (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress, (4) intentional infliction of emotional

distress, (5) negligent hiring, supervision, or retention, (6) false light invasion of privacy, (7)

defamation, and (8) civil conspiracy. (Compl. at 15–23.)

Although the Complaint does not specify the defendants against whom each claim is

asserted and uses the term “Defendants” without distinguishing among them, the statements

supporting each claim make it fairly clear which defendants are implicated in which counts. For

instance, under Counts One and Two, for false arrest and false imprisonment, the plaintiff alleges

that defendants Rivera and Wright “received the false report from the Crysels,” “failed to fully

investigate[] the false report,” “arrested Plaintiff, based on the false statements of Mr. Crysel,” and

“[a]ccordingly, . . . lacked the legal authority or justification in arresting Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶¶ 112–

3 The court has omitted reference to the factual allegations that only concern the Crysels.

14.) The Complaint further asserts that Montgomery County is liable “by virtue of the ultimate

decision-maker, as the Sheriff or County Mayor’s ratification of their conduct and their failure to

stop or remedy the conduct of Cpts. River [sic] or Wright or sufficiently discipline them for the

same against the Plaintiff, or that Montgomery County showed deliberate indifference to Cpl.

Wright and Cpl. Rivera, based on prior instances of unconstitutional conduct.” (Id. ¶ 115.) The

plaintiff does not allege any facts suggesting that the Crysels were “state actors” for purposes of

§ 1983 when they filed an affidavit of complaint against Watson. Thus, although the Complaint

then states that “Defendants” violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from

unlawful search and seizure when they “falsely arrest[ed] her and caus[ed] her false arrest” (id.

¶¶ 116, 126), the court construes the § 1983 claims in Counts One and Two as asserted only against

the Officer defendants and MCSO, not the Crysels.

Counts Three and Four, for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress,

appear to be asserted against all defendants (except perhaps K. Crysel, as the Complaint references

only the “false statement” to MCSO officers by “Defendant Mr. Crysel” (id. ¶ 140; see also id.

¶ 132)). Montgomery County, as the only hiring entity named in the Complaint, appears to be the

sole defendant targeted by the “negligent hiring, supervision, or retention” claim in Count Five.

Count Six, for false light invasion of privacy, asserts that the “Crysels[’] false statement to MCSO

officers” “placed [Watson] before the public . . . in a false light” and that the Crysels’ “false

statements and report to law enforcement . . . accus[ing] Plaintiff of criminal activity which she

did not commit” resulted in “her being falsely arrested and falsely detained.” (Id. ¶ 157.) The court

construes this claim as asserted against the Crysels only. Likewise, Count Seven, for defamation,

is based on the Crysel defendants’ knowingly making false statements to the VA and law

enforcement. The Complaint does not actually allege that the Officer defendants published

statements about the plaintiff; it alleges that Rivera “received the false report from the Crysels”

and that Wright “arrested Plaintiff, based on the false statements of Mr. Crysel.” (Id. ¶ 112.)

Accordingly, the court construes this claim, too, as asserted only against the Crysels. Count Eight,

for “civil conspiracy,” claims that “the Crysels, along with Cpls. Rivera and Wright, had a common

design, to wit: to falsely accuse Plaintiff both at work and to have her criminally charged, arrested

and attempted to have her prosecuted.” The court construes this claim as asserted against all

defendants.

C. Motions to Dismiss

The Crysel defendants have sought and been granted a stay of these proceedings as to them,

pending the final disposition of criminal charges against M. Crysel in the Montgomery County

Circuit Court. (See Doc. Nos. 17, 25.) Accordingly, they have not answered or otherwise

responded to the Complaint.

The matter is not stayed as to the other defendants, however, and Montgomery County and

the Officer defendants now seek dismissal of the Complaint as to them (including the claims that,

as set forth above, are not actually asserted against them).4 (Doc. No. 29; see also Doc. No. 30,

Mem. of Law; Doc. No. 36; see also Doc. No. 37, Mem. of Law). The plaintiff opposes both

motions (Doc. Nos. 32, 39), and the defendants filed Reply briefs in further support of their

motions (Doc. Nos. 39, 40-1).

4 The plaintiff’s Responses to the Motions to Dismiss make no effort to clarify what claims

are asserted against whom, and she appears to assume, as do the defendants, that all counts are

asserted against the moving defendants (except apparently Count Five, for negligent hiring,

supervision, or retention, which the parties agree is asserted only against Montgomery County).

Watson concedes only that Montgomery County is immune under the Tennessee Governmental

Tort Liability Act from liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress, false light invasion

of privacy, and defamation. (See Doc. No. 32 at 10–11.)

IV. ANALYSIS

A. The False Arrest Claims Under § 1983 Against the Officer Defendants

1. False Arrest and False Imprisonment Are a Single Claim.

As a preliminary matter, the Officer defendants assert that, under federal law, false arrest

and false imprisonment are the same claim, so the court should dismiss Count Two (for false

imprisonment) as redundant of Count One. (Doc. No. 30 at 13–14.) In response, the plaintiff

concedes that “[c]laims of false arrest and false imprisonment under federal law are typically

analyzed in identical fashion, with false arrest being considered a species of false imprisonment.”

(Doc. No. 39 at 8.) She argues, however, that, while false arrest and false imprisonment claims

“may overlap in some circumstances,” her claims are distinct because they may have different

accrual dates, different elements, different injuries, and different potential remedies. (Id. at 9.)

Alternatively, she argues that the court should simply construe the two counts together rather than

dismissing one.

The law in this arena is clear. “When a false-imprisonment claim arises out of an alleged

false arrest—as it does in this case—those claims are identical, so we will simply refer to those

two claims together as a false-arrest claim.” Weser v. Goodson, 965 F.3d 507, 513 (6th Cir. 2020)

(citation omitted). This maxim remains true whether the claims are deemed to arise under federal

law or state law. See id. at 517 (“As under federal law, the claims of false arrest and false

imprisonment are the same under Tennessee law when the alleged false imprisonment arises out

of an alleged false arrest by a law-enforcement officer.” (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted)). Moreover, despite the plaintiff’s assertions that her claims may have different accrual

dates, elements, injuries, and remedies, nothing in the Complaint supports that assertion. She does

not allege any continuing detention apart from her initial arrest. The court finds, therefore, that, as

in Weser, the two claims are “the same.” Rather than dismiss one or the other as redundant,

however, the court simply construes the Complaint as asserting a single claim under § 1983 for

false arrest in violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

2. The Official Capacity Claims Are Redundant.

The Officer defendants are sued in both their individual and their official capacities.

(Compl. at 1 (case caption).) It is well established that a suit against a government official in his

official capacity is effectively a suit against the government entity he represents. Kentucky v.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); Petty v. Cnty. of Franklin, 478 F.3d 341, 349 (6th Cir. 2007),

abrogated on other grounds by Bailey v. City of Ann Arbor, 860 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2017);

Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). The Officer defendants seek dismissal of

the official capacity claims against them on this basis.5

Although the court has the discretion to construe the official capacity claims as asserted

against Montgomery County, in this case, the plaintiff has also sued Montgomery County.

Consequently, the court has no reason to construe the official capacity claims against the Officer

defendants as asserted against Montgomery County. Instead, the official capacity claims are

redundant and unnecessary and will be dismissed on that basis. Accord, e.g., Foster v. Michigan,

573 F. App’x 377, 390 (6th Cir. 2014); Faith Baptist Church v. Waterford Twp., 522 F. App’x

322, 327 (6th Cir. 2013) (affirming the dismissal of official capacity claims as “superfluous” where

the government entity was also named as a defendant).

3. The Parties’ Arguments for Dismissal of the False Arrest Claim

The Officer defendants argue that the Complaint does not plausibly plead facts that give

rise to an inference that they arrested the plaintiff without probable cause. In particular, they

5 The County notes that the official capacity claims are simply claims against the County

and elects to treats them as such. (Doc. No. 30 at 3 n.3.)

contend that the bare allegation that the defendants failed to “fully investigate” does not support a

claim against them under § 1983. They also characterize the Complaint as impermissibly engaging

in “group pleading” without specifying which defendant undertook what action. (See Doc. No. 37

at 7–13.)

The plaintiff responds that the Complaint clearly alleges that Rivera “received the false

report from the Crysels” and “prepared the arrest warrant,” while Wright “served the warrant and

took Plaintiff into custody.” (Doc. No. 39 at 4.) She also argues that the Complaint “alleges the

accusations lacked evidentiary support (including video not substantiating the vehicular assault

claim) and that charges were later dismissed, supporting an inference that probable cause was

lacking and that reliance on the accusations was unreasonable under the circumstances.” (Id.) She

also asserts that the claim is based on more than “mere negligence or failure to conduct a perfect

investigation,” insofar as the Complaint “alleges that the Officers deliberately avoided

investigating exculpatory evidence due to their relationship with the Crysels, which constitutes

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” (Id. at 5.) While the plaintiff effectively

concedes that “the Crysels engaged in falsifying facts to establish probable cause to arrest

Plaint[]iff,” she argues that the Officer defendants are nonetheless liable because they either “failed

to investigate exculpatory evidence that could invalidate the warrant” or “acted with knowledge

or at the very least reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the information provided by the

Crysels.” (Id. at 6, 7.) She also points to the fact that the Officer defendants’ actions were later

investigated, that they were both placed on administrative leave, and that Rivera was issued a

reprimand. (Id.)

In their Reply, the Officer defendants argue that the plaintiff cannot avoid dismissal by

relying on factual allegations that are not actually found in the Complaint itself. (Doc. No. 40-1 at

1.) They also point out that the fact that the charges were later dismissed does not mean that the

underlying arrest was unlawful. (Id. at 3 (citing Gordon v. Clinton Police Dep’t, No. 3:19-cv-496,

2021 WL 1431544, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 15, 2021)).) And they argue that the plaintiff’s

concessions that the Crysels’ allegations establish probable cause and that “officers generally have

no duty to investigate further once probable cause is established” doom her claim. (Id. (quoting

Doc. No. 39 at 5).)

4. The Complaint Fails to State a Colorable False Arrest Claim.

To avoid dismissal of a false arrest claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff “must plausibly

allege that [the arrest] was unsupported by probable cause.” Wesley v. Campbell, 779 F.3d 421,

429 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 255 (6th Cir. 2003)). In

making a probable cause determination, the officer must consider the “totality of the

circumstances,” taking into account “both the inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.” Id.

(emphasis in original) (quoting Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 318 (6th Cir. 2000)).

Generally, however, “a law enforcement officer is entitled to rely on an eyewitness

identification to establish adequate probable cause with which to sustain an arrest . . . unless, at

the time of the arrest, there is an apparent reason for the officer to believe that the eyewitness was

lying, did not accurately describe what he had seen, or was in some fashion mistaken regarding his

recollection of the confrontation.” Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir. 1999) (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted); Brown v. City of Wyoming, No. 23-1285, 2024 WL

5040781, at *4 (6th Cir. Dec. 9, 2024). Moreover, “[o]nce probable cause is established, an officer

is under no duty to investigate further or to look for additional evidence which may exculpate the

accused.” Ahlers, 188 F.3d at 371. Instead, this “duty” is intertwined with the determination of

probable cause and the decision to pursue an arrest. See Gardenhire, 205 F.3d at 318.

Further, as set forth above, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A

claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678. Thus, a complaint must contain “more than labels and conclusions [or] a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

In this case, the allegations in Watson’s Complaint specifically directed to Rivera and

Wright are sparse, to say the least. As indicated above, the plaintiff alleges that M. Crysel filed an

affidavit of complaint for aggravated assault and aggravated stalking against Watson on May 15,

2024 and that the Crysels jointly filed a report with the MCSO against Watson on May 16, 2024,

which “result[ed] in arrest warrants for aggravated assault, aggravated stalking, and harassment.”

(Compl. ¶¶ 69, 70.) Under the “Counts” for false arrest and false imprisonment, the plaintiff alleges

that Rivera “received the false report from the Crysels” and that Rivera and Wright “failed to fully

investigate[] the false report.” (Id. ¶ 112.) On October 11, 2024, Watson was arrested on those

warrants by defendant Wright, “based on the false statements of Mr. Crysel.” (Id. ¶¶ 78, 113.)

This is the totality of the factual allegations against Rivera and Wright, not counting the

plaintiff’s somewhat incoherent allegations regarding her initiation of an administrative

investigation into their actions after the charges against her were dismissed. The Complaint does

not allege that the arrest warrant failed to establish probable cause, does not allege that the Officer

defendants were in possession of information that called the Crysels’ veracity into question, and

does not allege facts from which it might be inferred that the Officer defendants had any reason to

suspect that the Crysels were lying.

Instead, as noted above, the plaintiff concedes in response to the Officer defendants’

Motion to Dismiss that the information provided by the Crysels was sufficient to establish probable

cause (Doc. No. 39 at 7) and that officers “generally have no duty to investigate further once

probable cause is established” (id. at 5). To avoid the obvious conclusion to be drawn from these

concessions, Watson asserts new facts—specifically that the Officer defendants “ha[d] both

inculpatory and exculpatory evidence” but “deliberately ignore[ed] the exculpatory evidence, such

as the video footage, due to personal relationships with complainants.” (Id. at 8.) But these facts—

including facts that would establish that the Officer defendants knew about the video tape to which

the plaintiff refers or that they had a “personal relationship” with the Crysels—are simply not

alleged in the Complaint.6 The Complaint makes only conclusory assertions as to liability that are

not sufficient to state a claim. Accord Carver v. City of Kalamazoo, No. 23-1369, 2024 WL

3595965, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 14, 2024) (affirming dismissal of Fourth Amendment claims

“because [the plaintiff] supported them with only conclusory factual allegations and legal

conclusions that the defendants utilized false information or omitted material information, that the

warrant application failed to establish probable cause, and that the defendants knew of his

innocence”), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 321 (2024); see also Willman v. Att’y Gen., 972 F.3d 819,

823 (6th Cir. 2020) (explaining that conclusory allegations and legal conclusions masquerading as

factual allegations are insufficient to state a claim).

Even accepting as true the plaintiff’s (unsupported) assertion that the Officer defendants

“failed to fully investigate[] the false report,” an inadequate investigation does not, standing alone,

6 The Complaint refers to a “video and workplace investigation” in the VA’s possession

(Compl. ¶ 37), but it does not allege that the Officer defendants knew about that video or had

access to it at the time of the arrest. The Complaint asserts several times that the Officer defendants

“breached” their duty to investigate “due to their relationship with the Crysels” (see, e.g., Compl.

¶¶ 16, 131), but it does not contain facts to substantiate the existence of any type of relationship.

give rise to a claim under § 1983. See, e.g., Baker-Schneider v. Napoleon, 769 F. App’x 189, 192

(6th Cir. 2019) (“Mere negligence does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.”); Seigel

v. City of Germantown, 25 F. App’x 249, 250 (6th Cir. 2001)(“[A] finding of incompetent or

negligent investigation . . . is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.”); Ahlers, 188 F.3d

at 373–74 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that an investigation’s “lack of thoroughness might support an

inference of negligence, but it does not demonstrate knowing or intentional behavior designed to

violate [the plaintiff’s] constitutional rights”).

The allegations in the Complaint relating to the Officer defendants’ actions are too bare-

bones to give rise to an inference that their conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Counts One and Two against them, construed as a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful

arrest in violation of the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights, will be dismissed for failure to state

a claim for which relief may be granted.

B. Conspiracy Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

The Complaint also asserts a “Civil Conspiracy” claim based on allegations that the

Crysels, Wright, and Rivera “had a common design, to wit: to falsely accuse Plaintiff both at work

and to have her criminally charged, arrested, and attempted to have her prosecuted,” that they

“accomplished this common design by concerted action,” that they committed overt acts in

furtherance of this conspiracy, and that the plaintiff was injured thereby. (Compl. ¶¶ 166–69.)

The defendants construe the claim as brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and argue that the

plaintiff does not allege that she suffered discrimination because of her membership in a protected

class. (Doc. No. 30 at 22–23; Doc. No. 37 at 20–21.) They also argue that the Complaint does not

allege facts to support the elements of a conspiracy claim. The plaintiff responds that she has

adequately alleged a conspiracy under § 1985(3) because, as a woman, she belongs to a protected

class and that, in any event, her allegations “satisfy the elements of civil conspiracy under state

law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides an independent basis for the claim regardless of whether

the federal conspiracy claim under § 1985(3) can proceed.” (Doc. No. 39 at 15.)

It is unclear to the court why the defendants construe the conspiracy claim under § 1985(3)

or why, indeed, the plaintiff acquiesces to that construction. The Complaint does not mention

§ 1985(3), and, to state a claim under § 1985(3), the plaintiff must plausibly allege “both

membership in a protected class and discrimination on account of it.” Ohio ex rel. Moore v.

Brahma Inv. Grp., Inc., 723 F. App’x 284, 288 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Est. of Smithers ex rel.

Norris v. City of Flint, 602 F.3d 758, 765 (6th Cir. 2010)). The Complaint does not remotely allege

that the plaintiff was targeted by the defendants because of her membership in a protected class.

However, it is reasonable to construe the conspiracy claim under § 1983, as the plaintiff

argues in the alternative. “A civil conspiracy under § 1983 is ‘an agreement between two or more

persons to injure another by unlawful action.’” Marvaso, 971 F.3d at 606 (quoting Revis v.

Meldrum, 489 F.3d 273, 290 (6th Cir. 2007)). To survive a motion to dismiss this claim, the

Complaint needs to “allege facts that, when accepted as true, would allow a juror to find that ‘(1)

a single plan existed, (2) the conspirators shared a conspiratorial objective to deprive the plaintiffs

of their constitutional rights, and (3) an overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy

that caused the injury.’” Id. (quoting Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 622 (6th Cir. 2014)). While

a conspiracy may be proved with circumstantial evidence, “conspiracy claims must be pled with

some degree of specificity and . . . vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts

will not be sufficient to state such a claim under § 1983.” Id. (quoting Heyne v. Metro. Nashville

Pub. Sch., 655 F.3d 556, 563 (6th Cir. 2011)).

The Complaint in this case alleges no facts to support the existence of a single plan or a

conspiratorial objective. Moreover, a conspiracy claim under § 1983 “needs an underlying

constitutional violation.” Price v. Montgomery Cnty., 72 F.4th 711, 726 (6th Cir. 2023) (citing

Stricker v. Twp. of Cambridge, 710 F.3d 350, 365 (6th Cir. 2013)). Having failed to plausibly

allege that the Officer defendants violated her constitutional rights, the plaintiff also cannot

maintain a conspiracy claim against them. The construed § 1983 civil conspiracy claim against the

Officer defendants will be dismissed for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted.

C. The § 1983 Claims Against the County

Because the Complaint fails to state colorable claims under § 1983 against the Officer

defendants in their individual capacities for a violation of Watson’s constitutional rights, her

municipal liability claims against the County are likewise subject to dismissal. See Carver, 2024

WL 3595965, at *3 (“[A] plaintiff cannot establish a claim of supervisory or municipal liability

without establishing an underlying constitutional violation.” (citing Price, 72 F.4th at 726)).

Moreover, even if the Complaint did state a colorable claim against the individual officers,

the claims against Montgomery County are still subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. It

is well established that a municipality may be liable under § 1983, but such liability “attaches only

under a narrow set of circumstances: ‘A municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 on a

respondeat superior theory—in other words, solely because it employs a tortfeasor.’” Jackson v.

City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 828 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d

378, 388–89 (6th Cir. 2014)). “Instead, a plaintiff must show that ‘through its deliberate conduct,

the municipality was the “moving force” behind the injury alleged.’” Id. (quoting Alman v. Reed,

703 F.3d 887, 903 (6th Cir. 2013)). To make this showing, the plaintiff must plausibly allege that

the municipality’s “policy or custom” caused the violation of her rights. Id. (quoting Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).

To establish that the municipal defendant had such a policy or custom, the plaintiff may

show (or plausibly allege) “(1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment;

(2) that an official with final decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of

a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance or

acquiescence of federal rights violations.” Id. (quoting Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th

Cir. 2013)).

In this case, there are no factual allegations in the fact section of the Complaint concerning

Montgomery County. The sole basis for the § 1983 municipal liability claims against it is the

following assertion, which is repeated several times in the Complaint:

Defendant Montgomery County is liable to Plaintiff by virtue of the ultimate

decision-maker, as the Sheriff or County Mayor’s ratification of their conduct and

their failure to stop or remedy the conduct of Cpts. River [sic] and Wright or

sufficiently discipline them for the same against the Plaintiff, or that Montgomery

County showed deliberate indifference to Cpl. Wright and Cpl. Rivera, based on

prior instances of unconstitutional conduct, pursuant to Miller v. Sanilac County,

606 F.3d 240 (2010).

(Compl. ¶¶ 115, 125, 136, 144, 153.)7 In other words, the plaintiff asserts (without alleging facts)

that some decisionmaker for Montgomery County “ratified” the Officer defendants’ actions, failed

to stop their conduct, failed to remedy the conduct, did not sufficiently discipline the officers after

the conduct, and exhibited deliberate indifference “based on prior instances of unconstitutional

conduct.” (See id.)

As set forth above, however, the municipality’s policy or custom must be the “moving

force” behind the alleged injury, that is, it must cause the rights violation. Jackson, 925 F.3d at

828. The plaintiff here does not actually allege that there were any prior instances of

unconstitutional conduct of which the County should have been aware. Moreover, the County

7 The Complaint contains two additional paragraphs concerning Montgomery County in

support of the “negligent hiring, supervision, and retention” claim, specifically that Montgomery

County “knew or should have known” that the Officer defendants were not fit for their jobs based

on the actions they took in this case and the County’s investigation of the plaintiff’s administrative

complaint against them. (Compl. ¶¶ 151–52.)

cannot be charged with failing to stop or remedy conduct of which it was not aware, and, as a

matter of logic, any ratification or failure to discipline that took place after the alleged

constitutional violations occurred cannot be deemed the cause or moving force behind the

constitutional violations. Accord Crabbs v. Pitts, No. 2:16-cv-387, 2018 WL 3328404, at *13 (S.D.

Ohio July 6, 2018) (“Sheriff Martin’s ‘purported ratification . . . cannot logically be the moving

force behind the alleged constitutional violation because it occurred after the shooting, and a thing

that happens after an event cannot logically be said to have caused the event that preceded it.’”

(quoting Thornton v. City of Columbus, No. 2:15-CV-1337, 2017 WL 2573252, at *8 (S.D. Ohio

June 14, 2017), aff’d, 727 F. App’x 829 (6th Cir. 2018)); Drake v. Montgomery Cnty., No. 3:19-

cv-01037, 2022 WL 2960762, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. July 26, 2022) (“The mere fact that [the event]

may have been subsequently approved by a[n] (alleged) final policymaker does not mean that the

final policymaker’s ratification was the ‘moving force’ for the alleged constitutional violation.”

(collecting cases)).

In sum, the Complaint fails to allege a constitutional violation for which the County could

be liable, and, even if it did, it fails to allege facts that support a municipal liability claim under

Monell against the County.

V. THE PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST TO AMEND

The plaintiff asks, at the conclusion of her Response to both Motions to Dismiss, that she

be given leave to amend her Complaint if the court finds the factual allegations insufficient. She

does not suggest what additional facts she might add; she has not actually moved to amend, and

she has not filed a proposed amended pleading. Rule 15(a) provided her the option of filing an

amended pleading in response to the Motions to Dismiss. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B). She did not

take that course. The court declines to consider such an unsupported request in a vacuum.

VI. SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

The court has concluded that the federal claims against Montgomery County and the

Officer defendants must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. What remains are the claims

against them for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent hiring,

supervision and retention (against the County), as well as false arrest/imprisonment and civil

conspiracy claims under Tennessee law. As already discussed above, the Complaint does not assert

federal claims against the Crysels. In other words, only state law claims over which the court may

exercise supplemental jurisdiction remain.

Where a district court dismisses all of the claims over which it has original jurisdiction, the

court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3). The decision whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim is purely

discretionary. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009). “Both federal

statutory provisions and [Sixth Circuit] precedent not only permit but encourage district courts to

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that are left without an anchor

when their associated federal claims are dismissed.” Lyndon’s LLC v. City of Detroit, No. 23-1895,

2024 WL 3427176, at *3 (6th Cir. July 16, 2024) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367; Packard v. Farmers

Ins. Co. of Columbus Inc., 423 F. App’x 580, 584 (6th Cir. 2011); Blakely v. United States, 276

F.3d 853, 863 (6th Cir. 2002)). While the exercise of the court’s discretion is guided by such factors

as “judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity,” when all federal claims are dismissed

early in the proceedings, as here, “the balance of considerations usually will point to dismissing

the state law claims.” Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254–55 (6th Cir.

1996), amended on denial of reh’g, No. 95-5120, 1998 WL 117980 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1998); see

also Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[A] federal court that

has dismissed a plaintiff’s federal-law claims should not ordinarily reach the plaintiff’s state-law

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claims. .. . Residual jurisdiction should be exercised only in cases where the interests of judicial

economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation outweigh our concern over needlessly

deciding state law issues.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Having dismissed all of plaintiffs’ federal claims at this early stage of the litigation, the

court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Watson’s remaining state law claims. As

a result, the defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, insofar as they seek dismissal of the state law claims

under Rule 12(b)(6), will be denied as moot.

VIL. CONCLUSION

As set forth herein, the Motions to Dismiss (Doc. Nos. 29, and 36) will be granted in part

and denied in part as moot. The plaintiffs claims under 42 US.C. § 1983 (false

arrest/imprisonment in violation of the Fourth Amendment and conspiracy to violate constitutional

rights) will be dismissed with prejudice. The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over the remaining state law claims, and the Motions to Dismiss will be denied as moot as to those

claims. An appropriate Order is filed herewith.

United States District Judge