Rose

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

TINA ROSE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:25-CV-1207-NJR

STATE OF ILLINOIS, by and through

its Judicial Branch, including the Second

Judicial Circuit and the Franklin County

Circuit Court,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:

This matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 17). Pro se plaintiff Tina Rose sues

Defendant State of Illinois under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.

§ 12101 et seq., alleging that she has experienced discrimination and retaliation during the

course of over two dozen proceedings in state court. (Docs. 2; 10). Illinois argues that the

Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this case under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, that

Ms. Rose’s claims are barred by absolute judicial immunity, that the Court should abstain

under the Younger doctrine or similar principles of federal-state comity, and that

Ms. Rose’s allegations are legally insufficient. (Doc. 17). Ms. Rose has filed a response

arguing that her complaint should not be dismissed or, if it is dismissed, that she should

be given an opportunity to amend her complaint. (Doc. 19). For the following reasons,

the motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

The following facts from the complaint are taken as true for the purposes of

Illinois’s motion to dismiss.

Since August 2024, Ms. Rose has either filed or been a party to 29 cases in Illinois’s

Second Judicial Circuit, primarily in Franklin County, where she lives. (Doc. 2, at 3).

Some of these cases are civil; some are “quasi-criminal.” Id. As far as this Court can tell,

most or all of the 29 state court cases arise out of disputes between Rose, her landlord,

and city officials. See id. at 5.

Ms. Rose has been dissatisfied with the way the state court proceedings have

progressed. She has multiple disabilities, including Post Traumatic Stress Disorder,

Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, and chronic

pain disorders. Id. at 3. Due to these disabilities, she requested accommodations to enable

her to access court services and proceedings. Id. 3–6. For instance, she requested

permission to use something called “ADA notes.” Id. at 4. (While Ms. Rose does not list

all of the accommodations she requested, she does note that the Franklin County

Courthouse lacks an “ADA Advocate” and has no “handicap accessible functions” for its

front door.) Id. at 6.

But Ms. Rose did not receive her requested accommodations. Instead, she alleges

that her requests were denied and she was retaliated against for having made those

requests—both in violation of the ADA. Id. at 3–7, 10–21. Ms. Rose’s complaint is a little

disorganized and sometimes provides legal conclusions rather than allegations of fact;

however, as far as the Court can discern, the discriminatory and retaliatory acts Ms. Rose

endured include the following:!

e Refusal by state court judges to hear motions for ADA accommodations

until after delays of up to ten months, id. at 3-4;

e Refusal by state court judges to hear motions for ADA accommodations at

all, id. at 4;

e Insistence by state court judge that Ms. Rose provide live medical testimony

to establish her need for accommodations, id. at 4, 14-15, 20;

e Anti-disability ridicule from a state court judge, id.;

e Refusal by state court judge to permit Ms. Rose to use ADA notes in the

courtroom during a preliminary protective order hearing, id. at 4, 21;

e Refusal by state court judge to assign professional mediator to assist

Ms. Rose in negotiations, id. at 4, 12-13, 16;

e Order by state court judge consolidating three different hearings despite

Ms. Rose’s request for three hearings, causing her to endure physical

reactions and to eventually faint, id. at 5;

e Denial by state court judge of request to record hearings, id. at 12;

e Refusal by state court judge to allow unspecified ADA accommodations,

id. at 18; and

e Exhibition of hostility toward Ms. Rose by state court judges after she

requested ADA accommodations. Id., passim.

After screening Ms. Rose’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and permitting

it to proceed on her ADA claims, this Court directed service on Illinois. (Doc. 10).? Illinois

has now filed its motion to dismiss, arguing that it is immune from suit, that this Court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine (or, if it has

jurisdiction, it should abstain from exercising it), and that Ms. Rose has failed to state a

claim on which relief can be granted.

1 Ms. Rose’s complaint originally sought relief on two additional claims that have since been dismissed:

one under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Constitution, and one under the Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (Doc. 2; see Doc. 10). Some of the misconduct she

alleges in her complaint appears to be related to those two claims rather than disability discrimination or

retaliation. To the extent that Ms. Rose feels some of her factual allegations were incorrectly considered

unrelated to her ADA claims, she is welcome to re-allege them in an amended pleading.

2 See also Rose v. Illinois, No. 25-CV-1207, 2025 WL 3153411 (S.D. IIL Nov. 12, 2025).

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LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests whether the complaint states a

claim on which relief may be granted.” Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637

(7th Cir. 2012). The Court accepts as true the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations

and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Burke v. 401 N. Wabash Venture,

LLC, 714 F.3d 501, 504 (7th Cir. 2013). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff only

needs to allege enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A plaintiff need not plead detailed

factual allegations, but must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements.” Id.

Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), which “provides that a case will be

dismissed if the court lacks the authority to hear and decide the dispute,” are

“analyze[d] . . . as any other motion to dismiss.”3 Gonzalez v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 13

CV 3463, 2014 WL 26283, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2014) (first citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1);

and then citing United Phosphorous, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 946

(7th Cir. 2003) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683

F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc)). Thus, when analyzing a motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court “must accept as true all well-

3 With the exception (not relevant here) that, if a complaint formally and facially satisfies jurisdictional

requirements but the underlying facts do not, motions under Rule 12(b)(1) can be decided with reference

to materials outside the complaint itself. E.g., Gonzalez v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 13 CV 3463, 2014 WL

26283, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2014) (first citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); and then citing United Phosphorous,

Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Minn-Chem,

Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc)).

pleaded factual allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.”

St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir. 2007)

(quoting Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999)).

DISCUSSION

I. Subject matter jurisdiction

The Court first addresses Illinois’s objection under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,

which “precludes federal district-court jurisdiction ‘over cases brought by state court

losers challenging state court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings

commenced.’” Bauer v. Koester, 951 F.3d 863, 866 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Sykes v. Cook Cty.

Circuit Court Prob. Div., 837 F.3d 736, 741 (7th Cir. 2016)) (citing Harold v. Steel, 773 F.3d

884, 885 (7th Cir. 2014)); see also Continental Indemnity Co. v. BII, Inc., 104 F.4th 630, 636

(7th Cir. 2024) (“Subject matter jurisdiction is the first issue in any case . . . .” (quoting

Miller v. Southwest Airlines Co., 926 F3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 2019))). The doctrine therefore

“requires a party seeking review of a state court judgment or presenting a claim that a

state judicial proceeding has violated their constitutional rights to pursue relief through

the state court systema and ultimately to the Supreme Court.” Long, 182 F.3d at 554; see

also, e.g., Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining that Rooker-Feldman

is based on “the principle that only the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over the

civil judgments of state courts” (citations omitted)).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine

blocks federal jurisdiction when four elements are present. First, the federal

plaintiff must have been a state-court loser. Second, the state-court judgment

must have become final before the federal proceedings began. Third, the

state-court judgment must have caused the alleged injury underlying the

federal claim. Fourth, the claim must invite the federal district court to

review and reject the state-court judgment.

Gilbank v. Wood Cnty Dep’t of Human Servs., 111 F.4th 754, 766 (7th Cir. 2024) (en banc).

Illinois argues that the doctrine precludes jurisdiction over at least some portion

of Ms. Rose’s claims. (Doc. 17, at 7–8). First, Illinois correctly points out that much of

Ms. Rose’s complaint arises out of the alleged decisions of judges in 29 state court cases.

Three of those cases have proceeded to final judgment. Accordingly, by challenging the

adverse decisions in those cases (e.g., to deny Ms. Rose ADA accommodations), she is

effectively attempting to appeal those decisions in this Court, thus implicating the

doctrine.

But Illinois is incorrect, even as to the three cases that have proceeded to final

judgment. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not preclude this Court’s jurisdiction

because the doctrine does not apply to interlocutory orders. Kowalski v. Boliker, 893 F.3d

987, 995 (7th Cir. 2018); see also T.M. v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 146 S. Ct. 1739, 1765

(2026) (Barrett, J., dissenting) (“As the Court concedes, the doctrine applies only to ‘state-

court judgments’; it does not bar district courts from reviewing state-court interlocutory

orders.” (quoting T.M., 146 S. Ct. at 1744 (majority opinion))). Ms. Rose does not ask this

Court to review or reject any state court judgment as violating the ADA. Rather, her

complaint arises out of the interlocutory orders and conduct of Illinois judges during the

course of state court proceedings. Accordingly, the doctrine’s elements are unsatisfied,

and Rooker-Feldman does not bar this Court’s jurisdiction.

II. Abstention under Younger or other doctrines

Disposing of Illinois’s Rooker-Feldman objection does not end the jurisdictional

inquiry. Illinois also argues that, even if jurisdiction technically exists, this Court ought

to abstain from exercising it. In support of this argument, it first invokes the doctrine of

Younger abstention. Then, perhaps sensing that Younger is (like Rooker-Feldman) an

imperfect fit, Illinois relies on a sort of composite abstention doctrine recently espoused

by the Seventh Circuit in J.B. v. Woodard, 997 F.3d 714, 720–25 (7th Cir. 2021) (holding

abstention was proper “under the foundational principles of our federal system,” even

though “none of the abstention doctrines” in isolation were “a literal or perfect fit”). The

Court concludes that this latter abstention doctrine, which the Court refers to as “Woodard

abstention,” applies to this case.

Illinois first argues that this Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction

under Younger, which “directs federal courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over

federal claims that seek to interfere with pending state court proceedings.” Woodard, 997

F.3d at 722 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971)). The doctrine applies

“where federal court intervention would intrude” into (1) “ongoing state criminal

proceedings,” (2) “state-initiated civil enforcement proceedings akin to criminal

prosecutions,” or (3) “civil proceedings implicating a state’s interest in enforcing orders

and judgments of its courts.” Id. (citing Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72–73

(2013)). Underlying Younger abstention is the principle “that, absent extraordinary

circumstances, a federal court should not interfere with pending state judicial

proceedings.” Brunken v. Lance, 807 F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).

Illinois argues that Younger applies to the extent that Ms. Rose seeks relief which

would interfere with 13 of the 29 cases she mentions in her complaint. (Doc. 17, at 8–9).

Those 13 cases, it points out, are identified by Ms. Rose as involving “orders of

protection,” which Illinois argues fall under the third category of Younger abstention. Id.

Ms. Rose counters that she “does not seek to enjoin any specific pending state

case” or “request an order directing how a state judge must rule.” (Doc. 19, at 11). In her

complaint, she asks for three primary forms of relief: a declaratory judgment that Illinois’s

courts violated federal law, compensatory damages of three million dollars, and

“appropriate injunctive and structural relief to prevent future . . . ADA violations.”

(Doc. 2, at 6–7, 9). While she does not specify what she means by “appropriate” injunctive

relief, id. at 9, Ms. Rose now avers that she is seeking “prospective compliance with

federal disability law rather than intervention in the merits of an ongoing state

proceeding.” (Doc. 19, at 12). She further argues that, rather than dismissing her ADA

claims in their entirety at the pleadings stage, this Court could “tailor” the forms of relief

she requests “to avoid interference with any particular proceeding.” Id.

Illinois argues, in the alternative, that Woodard abstention is appropriate in this

case. (Doc. 17, at 9–11). In Woodard, the Seventh Circuit identified a line of cases in which

none of the canonical abstention doctrines had applied but abstention was nonetheless

merited. Woodard, 997 F.3d at 723–24. The through-line was respect for comity between

federal and state courts: where a plaintiff requests federal intrusion into the

administration of state courts, comity dictates that the federal court abstain. Id.

At first blush, this case seems like the poster child for Woodard abstention. Ms. Rose

takes issue with the decisions of judges in more than two dozen state court cases. Some

of the decisions she objects to involve the minutia of docket management (such as the

consolidation of hearings), a responsibility familiar to all courts, federal and state. To

remedy her injuries from the myriad objected-to state court decisions, she asks this Court

to (1) declare that Illinois has violated federal law, (2) award her three million dollars,

and (3) issue “appropriate injunctive and structural relief” to prevent future ADA

violations. Because the ADA violations were allegedly constituted by a wide array of state

judicial decisions involving matters as anodyne as docket management, it is not unfair to

imagine that “appropriate injunctive relief” would require this Court to effectively

superintend the daily functioning of Illinois’s state courts. Thus, Ms. Rose’s request for

relief would “directly affect[] the administration of” state courts and “run[s] contrary to

the basic principles of equity, comity, and federalism.” Woodard, 997 F.3d at 724 (quoting

Courthouse News Serv. v. Brown, 908 F.3d 1063, 1070 (7th Cir. 2018)).

There is no doubt that Woodard abstention applies to at least some portion of

Ms. Rose’s claims; the tricky question is determining how much. For instance, Ms. Rose

complains that the entrance to the courthouse does not comply with the ADA. Certainly

neither an injunction requiring Illinois to modify that entrance nor an award of

compensatory damages would interfere with any pending state court proceedings. But

on the other hand, much the rest of Ms. Rose’s complaint focuses on the orders of state

court judges (e.g., denying her requests for accommodations). Nearly any relief

predicated on individual state court decisions—compensatory, declaratory, or

injunctive—would enable Ms. Rose to “shape—or perhaps change—the direction and

course” of those state court proceedings which remain pending. Woodard, 997 F.3d at 723;

see also Lopez v. Kubalanza, No. 24 C 13340, 2025 WL 2306815, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11,

2025) (applying Woodard to a plaintiff’s requests for declaratory and monetary relief as

well as to injunctive relief).

Another wrinkle: at least three of the state court proceedings giving rise to this suit

are no longer pending. (Doc. 17, at 7–8; Doc. 2, at 11, 13). While Ms. Rose cannot secure

prospective relief with respect to state judicial proceedings, the Court need not abstain

from suits for compensatory damages arising out of completed state court proceedings

under the Woodard or Younger doctrines. See Woodard, 997 F.3d at 724–25 (when

compensatory damages are sought in an action subject to Younger abstention, courts

should generally stay the case until the state court proceedings have finished). To the

extent that Ms. Rose is seeking compensatory damages for those three proceedings,

Woodard abstention does not apply; however, because Ms. Rose’s complaint is not

sufficiently specific in describing the relief she seeks, the Court cannot determine with

any precision what portion of her claims arise out of state cases that are no longer

pending.

Despite the lack of specificity in Ms. Rose’s complaint, the Court finds that

application of the Woodard abstention doctrine requires the following results:

1. To the extent that Ms. Rose seeks injunctive or declaratory relief with

respect to any state court judge’s decisions, conduct, or orders in a pending

state court proceeding, the Court will abstain from exercising jurisdiction.

Ms. Rose’s claims to that effect are DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. To the extent that Ms. Rose seeks compensatory relief with respect to any

state court judge’s decisions, conduct, or orders in a pending state court

proceeding, the Court will abstain from exercising jurisdiction and STAY

these proceedings in their entirety4 until each such state court proceeding

is no longer pending.

Neither Younger nor Woodard abstention would apply if, alternatively, Ms. Rose only

sought (1) relief from injuries caused by something other than the decisions, conduct, or

orders of state court judges, or (2) compensatory relief alone with respect to any state

court judge’s decisions, conduct, or orders in non-pending state court proceedings. If that

were so, this case could proceed.5

As it stands, the Court reads Ms. Rose’s complaint to seek compensatory relief

with respect to the decisions, conduct, and orders of state court judges arising out of

pending state court proceedings. As such, the proper disposition is to stay this case until

all 29 state court cases have been resolved. However, in light of Ms. Rose’s status as a

pro se litigant, the Court will first give Ms. Rose an opportunity to amend her

complaint.

Therefore, the Court HOLDS IN ABEYANCE its decision to stay this action.

If Ms. Rose so chooses, she may amend her complaint to remove her requests for

compensatory relief based on the decisions, conduct, or orders of state court judges in

4 If Ms. Rose seeks compensatory relief based on any state court judge’s judicial acts in any ongoing state

court proceeding, this entire action will be stayed. This is because any partial stay would be impracticable

to the point of being unmanageable. There are 29 cases addressed in Ms. Rose’s complaint; these

proceedings will never end if a new set of factual allegations suddenly springs to life each time one of the

26 pending state court cases is finalized. Judicial economy will best be preserved by litigating all of

Ms. Rose’s claims based on as-yet pending state court cases at the same time, which can only be

accomplished by staying this action until each state court case has been resolved.

5 Here, the Court does not reach Illinois’s arguments on the merits or on judicial immunity precisely

because it finds that, as Ms. Rose’s complaint stands, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over an

indeterminable portion of Ms. Rose’s claims until there are no longer any pending state court proceedings

at issue.

ongoing state court proceedings. If she successfully does so, no stay will be required.

Therefore, the Court ORDERS Ms. Rose to either file an amended complaint or a notice

stating her intention not to so amend on or before August 28, 2026.

If Ms. Rose does not choose to amend her complaint, or if her amended complaint

continues to require Woodard abstention, the Court will stay this action until such time as

the underlying state court proceedings for which Ms. Rose seeks compensatory relief

have each become final. If such a stay is entered, this Court will order Ms. Rose to keep

the Court informed of the status of the state-court proceedings.

Illinois’s motion to dismiss is therefore GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Ms. Rose’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to any state court

judge’s decisions, conduct, or orders in a pending state court proceeding are

DISMISSED without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 14, 2026

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL

United States District Judge

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