Hackethal

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

TYLER HACKETHAL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:25-cv-00414-GCS

)

TIFFANY PHILLIPS, SUSAN )

SCHNIERS, BOBBY PLUM, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

SISON, Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff Tyler Hackethal, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

("IDOC"),1 brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations

of his constitutional rights at Pinckneyville Correctional Center (“Pinckneyville”). (Doc.

1). Pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies by Defendant Tiffany Phillips and joined by

Defendants Susan Schniers and Bob Blum.2 (Doc. 55, Doc. 61, Doc. 62). For the reasons

explained below, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.

1 Hackethal is currently incarcerated at Graham Correctional Center. (Doc. 63)

2 While Defendant Blum is listed as “Bobby Plum” on the docket, his filings indicate

that his name is Bob Blum. (Doc. 38, Doc. 41). The Court will refer to him as Bob Blum in

this Memorandum & Order.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his Complaint on March 27, 2025. (Doc. 1). He alleged that between

January 9 and January 13, 2025, Plaintiff submitted a medication refill sticker for his blood

pressure medication. (Doc. 1, p. 3). Nearly a week later, Plaintiff had only one dose left

and had not received a refill, so he asked the nurse to whom he had submitted the sticker

about its status. Id. The nurse confirmed that Plaintiff had not received a refill and placed

him on the medical call list for the next day. Id. Nonetheless, Plaintiff did not receive a

refill the next day or in the days that followed. Id. Within a few days of running out of

medication, Plaintiff experienced chest pain, blurry vision, fatigue, and lightheadedness.

Id. Soon after, Plaintiff explained his symptoms to Defendant Phillips and asked her

about his prescription. Id. at p. 3-4. Defendant Phillips promised that she would come

back, but she did not do so. Id. at p. 4. On the same day, Plaintiff told Defendant Schniers

the same thing that he had told Defendant Phillips, i.e., he was out of medication and

suffering from symptoms. Id. Defendant Phillips told him to lie down. Id.

Plaintiff’s symptoms worsened over the next week. (Doc. 1, p. 4). He continued to

ask Defendants Phillips and Schniers for help, but they did nothing. Id. Ultimately,

Plaintiff alleges he went fifty-two days without medication. Id. at p. 5. The lapses in

medication caused him immediate harm and increased his risk of medical harm in the

future. Id. at p. 6.

Based on the above allegations, the Court allowed Plaintiff to proceed on the

following claim:

Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Jane Does 1-2 and Jane Doe Nurse Practitioner for failing to

address Plaintiff’s lack of medication, leaving him without

his Lisinopril medication for approximately 52 days from

January to March of 2025.

(Doc. 10, p. 3, 5).

On February 16, 2026, Defendant Phillips filed a Motion for Summary Judgment

on the Issue of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. (Doc. 55). Plaintiff filed a

response on March 12, 2026. (Doc. 59). Defendants Schniers and Blum sought to join

Defendant Phillips’ Motion. (Doc. 56). The Court denied this motion because Defendants

Schniers and Blum had previously withdrawn the affirmative defense of exhaustion of

administrative remedies and could not reassert it without moving for leave to file an

amended answer. (Doc. 49, Doc. 60). Defendants Schniers and Blum subsequently moved

for leave to file an amended answer and to join Defendant Phillips’s Motion for Summary

Judgment. (Doc. 61). The Court granted both motions. (Doc. 62). Accordingly, the issue

of exhaustion is now ripe for the Court’s review.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The parties have limited their discussion of Plaintiff’s grievance record to one

grievance and its subsequent appeal to the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”). (Doc.

55, p. 7; Doc. 59, p. 1-2). The Court's discussion is therefore limited to this grievance.

A. Grievance No. K59-0225-888

Plaintiff submitted Grievance No. K59-0225-888 to the Counselor at Pinckneyville

on February 24, 2025, marking it as an emergency. (Doc. 55-1, p. 4). Plaintiff complained

that he turned in a refill sticker for his blood pressure medication in early January 2025

but had not received a refill more than a month later. Id.

On February 28, 2025, the Chief Administrative Officer (“CAO”) determined that

the grievance was an emergency and expedited the grievance process. (Doc. 55-1, p. 4).

On March 17, 2025, a Grievance Officer reviewed the grievance and recommended that

the grievance be denied. Id. at p. 3. The next day, the CAO concurred with the

recommendation. Id. Plaintiff then appealed the grievance to the ARB. Id. The ARB

received Plaintiff’s appeal on March 24, 2025, and denied the appeal three weeks later, on

April 15, 2025. (Doc. 55-1, p. 2; Doc. 59, p. 1, 4).

LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is proper when a moving party cannot establish the presence

of a genuine dispute of material fact. See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56(a). To survive a motion for

summary judgment, the non-moving party must provide admissible evidence which

would allow a reasonable jury to find in his or her favor. See Maclin v. SBC Ameritech, 520

F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 2008). Generally, the Court’s role is to determine whether a genuine

issue of material fact exists rather than evaluate the weight of the evidence, judge witness

credibility, or determine the truth of the matter when determining the outcome of such a

motion. See National Athletic Sportswear, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 528 F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir.

2008).

However, in Pavey v. Conley, the Seventh Circuit held that, “debatable factual

issues relating to the defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies” are not

required to be decided by a jury but are to be determined by the judge. 544 F.3d 739, 740-

741 (7th Cir. 2008). Therefore, the Court must determine whether an inmate has

exhausted his or her remedies when the affirmative defense of non-exhaustion is raised.

If the court finds that the inmate failed to exhaust administrative remedies, then the

inmate is given the opportunity to exhaust should time still permit or if the failure to

exhaust was innocent. Id. at 742. If the court determines that the failure to exhaust was

the inmate’s fault, then the case is over. Id.

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), which governs lawsuits filed

by inmates, “no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under § 1983 of

this title, or any other Federal Law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This coincides with the PLRA’s statutory purpose of “afford[ing]

correction officials [the] time and opportunity to address complaints internally before

allowing the initiation of a federal case.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006); see also

Begolli v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 701 F.3d 1158, 1161 (7th Cir. 2012). It affords prison

administrators an opportunity to fix the problem, reduce damages, and shed light on the

factual disputes that may arise in litigation. See Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1023-

24 (7th Cir. 2002).

Inmates must follow their prison’s administrative rules when attempting to

exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA. See Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1023. Hackethal

is an inmate in the IDOC and is required to follow the regulations contained in the IDOC’s

Grievance Procedures to exhaust his claims. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.800, et seq. The

Seventh Circuit requires strict adherence to a prison’s grievance procedures to satisfy the

requirements for exhaustion under the PLRA. See Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th

Cir. 2006). The exhaustion requirement cannot be satisfied if an inmate files untimely or

procedurally defective grievances. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 83. Additionally, an inmate

must correctly complete all the steps outlined in the grievance procedures and is barred

from filing suit prior to any step being completed. See Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398

(7th Cir. 2004); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). If an inmate fails to complete all the steps correctly

to exhaust his claim, then “the prison administrative authority can refuse to hear the case,

and the prisoner’s claim can be indefinitely unexhausted.” Dole, 438 F.3d at 809. However,

inmates are not required to exhaust administrative remedies that are unavailable to them

which can occur if, “prison employees do not respond to a properly filed grievance or

otherwise use affirmative misconduct to prevent a prisoner from exhausting.” Dole, 438

F.3d at 809.

The IDOC Grievance Procedures require that an inmate first file a grievance with

a counselor at their correctional institution within 60 days of the discovery of an incident.

See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(a). The Grievance must include, “factual details

regarding each aspect of the offender’s complaint, including what happened, when,

where and the name of each person who is the subject of or who is otherwise involved in

the complaint.” See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(c). If the inmate is unsatisfied with the

counselor’s response, then the inmate can submit a formal grievance to the prison’s

grievance officer. Id. at (a)-(b). The grievance officer must then review the grievance and

provide a written response to the inmate. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.830(a). Within 60

days of the receipt of the grievance, the grievance officer must report their findings and

recommendations in writing to the CAO. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.830(e). The CAO

will then review the findings and recommendations and offer a written decision to the

inmate. Id. The inmate can appeal the CAO’s decision to the ARB within 30 days. See 20

ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(a). To do this correctly, the inmate is required to attach copies

of the grievance officer’s report and the CAO’s decision to his appeal. Id. The ARB then

submits its findings and recommendations to the Director who will issue the IDOC’s final

decision within six months. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(d)-(e).

DISCUSSION

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff filed this suit

before fully exhausting his administrative remedies. Exhaustion of administrative is a

precondition to filing a suit under the PLRA. See Perez v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections,

182 F.3d 532, 534 (7th Cir. 1999). “A prisoner must exhaust administrative remedies

before filing suit: a ‘sue first, exhaust later’ approach is not acceptable.” Chambers v. Sood,

956 F.3d 979, 984 (7th Cir. 2020). See also Perez, 182 F.3d at 535 (stating that “a suit filed by

a prisoner before administrative remedies have been exhausted must be dismissed; the

district court lacks discretion to resolve the claim on the merits, even if the prisoner

exhausts intra-prison remedies before judgment.”).

Where a prisoner files suit before he has exhausted administrative remedies, the

case must be dismissed without prejudice. See Chambers, 956 F.3d at 984. The prisoner can

file a new suit once he has fully exhausted administrative remedies, provided that it is

possible for him to do so. Id. Here, the record indisputably shows that Plaintiff filed suit

after appealing his grievance to the ARB, but before the ARB decided the appeal.

Plaintiff's complaint is dated March 27, 2025. (Doc. 1, p. 1). The ARB decision that is

attached to both the Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's response is dated

April 15, 2025. (Doc. 55-1, p. 2; Doc. 59, p. 4). Plaintiff himself says that he filed this suit

only three days after the ARB received his appeal. (Doc. 59, p. 1). Because Plaintiff filed

suit before he had fully exhausted his administrative remedies, Defendants are entitled

to summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED. (Doc. 55). The Court DISMISSES the case without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 14, 2026. Digitally signed by

i . Judge Sison

Alek ©. iate: 2026.08.14

13:09:12 -05'00

GILBERT C. SISON

United States Magistrate Judge

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