Chambers

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

BRYAN CHAMBERS,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 1:26-cv-611

Judge Douglas R. Cole

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

CORRECTION OFFICER LARSON,

et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Bryan Chambers, sues several corrections officers and the Warden of Warren

Correctional Institution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his Eighth Amendment rights.

(Compl., ECF No. 1-1.) This matter is before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s

Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A to identify cognizable claims and to

recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious,

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b)(1)–(2); see also McGore v.

Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997). Having performed the initial screen, Plaintiff

it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a

claim on which relief may be granted.

This matter is also before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2), which is GRANTED. (ECF

No. 1.) Plaintiff must pay the full amount of the Court’s $350 filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

Plaintiff’s certified trust fund statement reveals that he has $139.94 in his prison account, which

is insufficient to pay the filing fee.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust accounts

(Inmate ID Number A809897) at the Warren Correctional Institution is DIRECTED to submit

to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio as an initial

partial payment, 20% of the greater of either the average monthly deposits to the inmate trust

account or the average monthly balance in the inmate trust account, for the six months

immediately preceding the filing of the Complaint.

After full payment of the initial, partial filing fee, the custodian shall submit 20% of the

inmate’s preceding monthly income credited to the account, but only when the amount in the

account exceeds $10.00, until the full fee of $350.00 has been paid to the Clerk of this Court. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).

Checks should be made payable to: Clerk, United States District Court. The checks

should be sent to:

Prisoner Accounts Receivable

260 U.S. Courthouse

85 Marconi Boulevard

Columbus, Ohio 43215

The prisoner’s name and this case number must be included on each check.

It is ORDERED that Plaintiff be allowed to prosecute this action without prepayment of

fees or costs and that judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs

had been prepaid. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and

the prison cashier’s office.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In

doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e):

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

* * *

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or]

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See

also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (requiring a court to conduct a screening of “a complaint in a civil action

in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity . . . [to] identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion

of the complaint [that is] frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted”).

Further, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule

8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual

demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,

727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading

that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”

is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not

“suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up).

Instead, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up). Facial

plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The

plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the

strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504

(citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612,

614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient

treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim

asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v.

Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleges that on at least 17 enumerated occasions between September 2, 2025, and

June 11, 2026, Defendants Corrections Officers Larson, Shear, Mills, Harris, and an unknown

third shift officer “have continuously opened [Plaintiff’s] cell door while [he] is sleeping to allow

inmates to come in and assault [Plaintiff].” (Compl., ECF No. 1-1, PAGEID #15.) Plaintiff

asserts that all incidents would have been captured on the prison’s security cameras. (Id.)

Plaintiff further alleges that he suffers continuous pain from multiple hits to the left side of his

head, but that his request for an MRI has been denied. (Id. at PAGEID #16.) Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants’ actions constitute cruel and unusual punishment and inadequate medical care in

violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks damages and for the Ohio Department

of Rehabilitation and Correction to “review their policy on handling inmates being subjected to

cruel and unusual punishment by correction officers opening cell doors to assault sleeping

inmates.” (Id. at PAGEID #18.)

The undersigned construes Plaintiff to allege Eighth Amendment claims for failure to

protect and for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Both claims lack merit.

“The [Eighth] Amendment . . . imposes duties on [prison] officials, who must provide

humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate

food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must take reasonable measures to guarantee the

safety of the inmates . . . .” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 932–33 (1994) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (quoting

DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)) (holding that the

Eighth Amendment “requires that inmates be furnished with the basic human needs, one of

which is ‘reasonable safety’”).

Such claims under the Eighth Amendment require a plaintiff “to prove both the

subjective and objective elements necessary to prove an Eighth Amendment violation.” Helling,

509 U.S. at 35. To satisfy the objective component for a claim based upon a failure to prevent

harm, “the inmate must show he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of

serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court

has offered the following guidance with respect to the objective factor:

[The objective factor] requires a court to assess whether society considers the risk

that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards

of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk. In other words, the prisoner

must show that the risk of which he complains is not one that today’s society

chooses to tolerate.

Helling, 509 U.S. at 36.

“To satisfy the subjective component, an inmate must show that prison officials had a

sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Berksire v. Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520, 535 (6th Cir. 2019)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The United States Court of Appeals for the

Sixth Circuit has explained:

“[T]hat state of mind is one of deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.

Although the deliberate indifference standard describes a state of mind more

blameworthy than negligence, this standard is satisfied if the official knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of

serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”

Id. (quoting Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted)). However, “a prison official who was unaware of a substantial risk of harm to

an inmate may not be held liable under the Eighth Amendment even if the risk was obvious and a

reasonable prison official would have noticed it.” Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 767 (6th Cir.

2011) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).

Plaintiff’s failure-to-protect claim does not satisfy the objective component. Although

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants allow other inmates to “assault” Plaintiff, he has provided no

facts describing the assaults or any resulting injuries. His allegations that he has suffered

multiple hits to the left side of his head causing lasting pain are not attributed to these inmate

assaults. Without further information concerning the nature or severity of the alleged assaults,

the undersigned cannot conclude that Defendants have exposed Plaintiff to a risk “so grave that it

violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.”

Helling, 509 U.S. at 36. Plaintiff therefore has not stated an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect

claim.

As to Plaintiff’s claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, Plaintiff does

not satisfy the subjective component. The Sixth Circuit has also noted that in the context of

deliberate indifference claims:

“[W]e distinguish between cases where the complaint alleges a complete denial of

medical care and those cases where the claim is that a prisoner received inadequate

medical treatment.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976).

Where a prisoner alleges only that the medical care he received was inadequate,

“federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments.” Id.

However, it is possible for medical treatment to be “so woefully inadequate as to

amount to no treatment at all.” Id.

Alspaugh, 643 F.3d at 169. See also Santiago v. Ringle, 734 F.3d 585, 590 (6th Cir. 2013) (“If

the plaintiff’s claim, however, is based on the prison’s failure to treat a condition adequately . . .

the plaintiff must place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental

effect of the delay in medical treatment.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Moreover, “when a prison doctor provides treatment, albeit carelessly or inefficaciously, to a

prisoner, he has not displayed a deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s needs, but merely a

degree of incompetence which does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Id. at 591.

(cleaned up). Here, Plaintiff expressly alleges that his medical treatment was merely

“inadequate” (Compl., ECF No. 1-1, PAGEID #16), not non-existent, and his only complaint is

that Defendants have not provided him with an MRI. He does not allege that the prison has

completely denied medical care for the pain in the left side of his head. Plaintiff therefore has not

stated a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

III. DISPOSITION

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED.

In addition, for the reasons above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s

Complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those

specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with

supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations

to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive

further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura

CHELSEY M. VASCURA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE