Judd

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

ALBERT LEE ST. CLAIR, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:21-cv-2581-MSS-AEP

GRADY JUDD,

Defendant.

ORDER

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendant Sheriff Grady Judd’s

Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. 53), and pro se Plaintiff Albert Lee St. Clair,

Jr.’s response in opposition thereto.1 (Dkt. 57) Upon consideration of all relevant

filings, case law, and being otherwise fully advised, the Court GRANTS in part and

DENIES in part Sheriff Judd’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background and Procedural History

This case arises from St. Clair’s confinement as a pretrial detainee at the Polk

County Jail from April 2019 to October 2022. (Dkt. 52-2 at 2) He initiated this action

by filing a civil-rights Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging as

unconstitutional a wide variety of jail conditions. (Dkt. 1) St. Clair verified the

Complaint by declaring “under penalty of perjury” that its allegations were “true and

1 Although afforded the opportunity, Sheriff Judd did not file a reply.

correct.” (Id. at 24) Therefore, the Complaint must be “treated as testimony” for

purposes of summary judgment. Sears v. Roberts, 922 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir.

2019); see also Walker v. Poveda, 735 F. App’x 690 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[Plaintiff]

verified his complaint . . . in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 by attesting to the truth

of his factual assertions under penalty of perjury, and we have held that pleadings

verified under § 1746 are admissible (and may substitute for sworn affidavits) on

summary judgment.”).2

According to the Complaint, the cells at the Polk County Jail were

“overcrowded” and uncomfortable. (Dkt. 1 at 19) For “30 months,” St. Clair was

housed in an “approximately” 343-square-foot cell with eight other inmates. (Id. at 16,

19) These cells were “originally designed for [six] inmates.” (Id. at 19) They lacked

“tables or chairs,” and the bottom bunks did “not have enough headroom to be able

to sit up.” (Id. at 16) During St. Clair’s time at the Polk County Jail, Sheriff Judd

followed a “policy” of locking down “all non-open bay dorms for 23 hours per day.”

(Id. at 12) As a result, St. Clair was forced to “lie on his bunk close to 23 hours per

day.” (Id. at 16) Moreover, he had “only one hour per day” to make phone calls and

access the “kiosk,” which contained “inmates’ legal work, legal research, personal

mail,” and “e-mail.” (Id. at 12) According to St. Clair, the lockdown policy applied

only to male inmates. (Id. at 14) Female inmates, by contrast, were allowed to spend

six hours outside their cells every day. (Id.)

2 The Court notes that “[a]lthough an unpublished opinion is not binding on this court, it is persuasive

authority. See 11th Cir. R. 36-2.” United States v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2000).

The Complaint also states that Sheriff Judd instituted a policy of placing all

occupants of a cell “on 24-hour lockdown for the actions of one inmate.” (Id. at 21)

The lockdowns were imposed “without any due process procedures for the [non-

offending] inmates.” (Id.) St. Clair elaborated on this policy in his deposition. He

testified that if an inmate “holler[ed] out their door or sa[id] a cuss word or something

like that to one of the deputies,” the deputy would lock down the entire nine-man cell

and falsely claim that it was “for sanitation purposes.” (Dkt. 52-1 at 22) Instead of

instituting disciplinary proceedings against the offending inmate, the deputy would

“punish[ ] eight people . . . for the actions of one” without providing any “due process”

to the inmates. (Id.) St. Clair further testified that “all of [the deputies were] allowed

to” mete out collective punishment in this fashion, and that the practice had “always

been happening” at the jail. (Id. at 68-69)

Next, the Complaint states that Sheriff Judd enacted policies restricting the

reading material available to inmates. From April 2019 to November 2021, St. Clair

was forbidden from ordering “books of his choice,” “legal books,” newspapers, or

magazines; instead, only “religious material” could be “sent in.” (Dkt. 1 at 13-14, 20;

Dkt. 52-1 at 108-09) During his deposition, St. Clair explained that “[w]e [were] not

allowed to order nothing in. We could get a Bible in. That’s pretty much about it.”

(Dkt. 52-1 at 91) St. Clair further testified that in November 2021, he received a notice

on the “kiosk” that the jail would “start allowing inmates to receive reading material.”3

3 St. Clair took advantage of the change in policy, sending the following message to his mother in July

(Id.) St. Clair acknowledged that the jail had a “book cart,” but he stated that “the

book cart had ripped up books in it and it didn’t have hardly [any] good reading

material. Some of them were just half books and all, a lot of pages missing. And you

only [got] that thing once a month if you were lucky.” (Id. at 92)

In addition, according to the Complaint, Sheriff Judd followed a policy of

isolating “inmates [who] test[ed] positive for COVID-19 for 14 days.” (Dkt. 1 at 15)

While in isolation, inmates had no “means to communicate with family,” could not

use the “kiosk,” and were “denied access to the phone” and “e-mail.” (Id. at 15, 22)

Finally, the Complaint states that Sheriff Judd initially permitted free hour-long

sessions of “video visitation” if the visitor “drove to the jail,” but the policy was later

changed to allow “only [two] 20 min[ute] [video] visitations costing the visitor [$]10

per session.” (Id. at 21) St. Clair testified at his deposition that his mother is not

“technically inclined” and could not figure out how to “schedule a [video] visit” with

him. (Dkt. 52-1 at 87)

St. Clair asserts that the conditions at the Polk County Jail damaged his physical

and mental health. (Dkt. 1 at 17) He allegedly gained 50 pounds, experienced

“elevated” cholesterol levels, and became “pre-diabetic.” (Id.) St. Clair was also placed

on “sinus” and “heartburn” medication. (Id.) In addition, he became “severely

depressed,” causing him to be placed on unspecified “medication.” (Id.) As relief, St.

2022: “hey can you call a book store and find out how much it would cost . . . for them to ship me

two books get the price per each please they now let us receive book[s] if they are sent from the

supplier.” (Dkt. 52-6 at 320) Before the new policy was implemented, St. Clair had filed a grievance

about the ban on receiving reading material. (Dkt. 52-1 at 95-96)

Clair seeks $500,000 in compensatory damages, $250,000 in punitive damages, and

the reversal of the allegedly unlawful policies described above. (Id. at 5, 24)

The Court screened the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, allowing the

following claims to proceed against Sheriff Judd in his official capacity:

• A Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim based on the

allegation that St. Clair’s cell was too small, “overcrowded,” and lacked “tables

or chairs.”

• A Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim based on the allegation

that entire cells were “locked down for twenty-four hours without due process

[because of] the actions of only one inmate.”

• First Amendment claims based on the restrictions on St. Clair’s reading

material, the fees charged for “video visitation sessions,” the limitation “to one

hour per day . . . for making phone calls and reviewing letters and personal

email,” and the inability to communicate with family and friends during

COVID-related quarantines.

• A Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim based on the allegation that

“female inmates [were] afforded more time out of their cells than male

inmates.”

(Dkt. 14 at 4-9)

Following service of process, Sheriff Judd moved to dismiss the Complaint.

(Dkt. 25) The Court denied the motion, and the case proceeded to discovery. (Dkts.

37, 38, 42)

B. Sheriff Judd’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Sheriff Judd moves for summary judgment, arguing that St. Clair “failed to

show that his constitutional rights were violated while he was incarcerated,” and that

even if a constitutional violation occurred, no evidence established that “an official

policy or practice was the moving force that caused the alleged violation of [his]

constitutional rights.” (Dkt. 53 at 1) In support, Sheriff Judd submits an affidavit by

Michael Allen, the Chief of Detention for the Polk County Sheriff’s Office. (Dkt. 52-

2) As discussed below, Allen disputes St. Clair’s assertions about jail policies and

conditions. For example, Allen states that jail officials do not “place an entire housing

area on lockdown as punishment for the conduct of one inmate.” (Id. at 6) In addition

to Allen’s affidavit, Sheriff Judd submits several written jail policies, records of St.

Clair’s telephone calls and electronic messages, and St. Clair’s deposition transcript.

(Dkt. 52)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant can show that there is no

genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. Fennell v. Gilstrap, 559 F.3d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Welding

Servs., Inc. v. Forman, 509 F.3d 1351, 1356 (11th Cir. 2007)). Whether a fact is

material depends on the substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The movant bears the burden of showing that

no genuine issue of material facts exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604,

608 (11th Cir. 1991).

Evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Fennell,

559 F.3d at 1216 (citing Welding Servs., Inc., 509 F.3d at 1356). A moving party

satisfies its burden for a motion for summary judgment by showing that there is no

evidence to support the non-moving party’s case. Denney v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d

1171, 1181 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).

When a moving party has satisfied its burden, the non-moving party must then

designate specific facts, by its own affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

or admissions on file, that show there is a genuine dispute of material fact. Porter v.

Ray, 461 F.3d 1315, 1320-21 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). At this stage, the non-

moving party must rely on more than conclusory statements or allegations

unsupported by facts. Evers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985)

(“[C]onclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative

value.”). “If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly

address another party’s assertion of fact . . . the court may grant summary judgment if

the motion and supporting materials . . . show that the movant is entitled to it.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e).

III. DISCUSSION

The Court considers each of St. Clair’s claims in turn. For the reasons explained

below, Sheriff Judd is not entitled to summary judgment on the conditions-of-

confinement claim, the procedural due process claim, or the claim based on the

restriction of reading material. Summary judgment is warranted, however, on the

claims concerning video visitation, limitations on communication with family and

friends, and the disparate treatment of male and female inmates. Finally, Sheriff Judd

is entitled to summary judgment on St. Clair’s request for injunctive relief.

A. Conditions of Confinement

A reasonable jury could find that the conditions in St. Clair’s cell violated the

Fourteenth Amendment. As noted above, St. Clair sues Sheriff Judd in his official

capacity. Thus, the claim against Sheriff Judd is effectively a claim against Polk

County. See Ireland v. Prummell, 53 F.4th 1274, 1288 (11th Cir. 2022) (“[Plaintiff’s]

Estate brought suit against Sheriff Prummell in his official capacity. Thus, the Estate’s

suit against Prummell is, in essence, a suit against Charlotte County.”). “The

touchstone of [a] § 1983 action against a government body is an allegation that official

policy is responsible for a deprivation of civil rights protected by the Constitution.”

Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir. 2016). “A plaintiff can

establish that an official policy caused the deprivation of his constitutional rights by

identifying a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written or express

municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage

with the force of law.” Christmas, 76 F.4th at 1329.

A plaintiff seeking to show unconstitutional conditions of confinement must

clear a “high bar” by demonstrating “extreme deprivations.” Chandler v. Crosby, 379

F.3d 1278, 1298 (11th Cir. 2004). A deprivation is “extreme” if it “objectively exposes

the [inmate] to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Christmas v. Nabors, 76 F.4th 1320,

1331 (11th Cir. 2023). This standard guarantees that inmates will not be “deprive[d] .

. . of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1289.

Once an extreme deprivation is shown, a plaintiff must then establish that the risk of

harm was “so obvious” that “the municipality can reasonably be said to have been

deliberately indifferent to” the risk. Daniels v. City of Hartford, 645 F. Supp. 2d 1036,

1057 (M.D. Ala. 2009).

In his verified Complaint, St. Clair asserts that for “30 months,” he was housed

in an “approximately” 343-square-foot cell with eight other inmates. (Dkt. 1 at 16, 19)

These cells were “originally designed for [six] inmates,” they lacked “tables or chairs,”

and the bottom bunks did “not have enough headroom to be able to sit up.” (Id. at 16,

19) Additionally, because Sheriff Judd followed a “policy” of locking down “all non-

open bay dorms for 23 hours per day,” St. Clair was forced to “lie on his bunk close to

23 hours per day.” (Id. at 12, 16) According to St. Clair, the conditions in his cell

harmed his physical and mental health, causing him to gain 50 pounds, become “pre-

diabetic,” and develop severe depression. (Id. at 17)

Viewed in the light most favorable to St. Clair, these assertions would allow a

reasonable jury to infer that the conditions in the cell “objectively expose[d] [him] to

a substantial risk of serious harm.” Christmas, 76 F.4th at 1331; see also Williams v.

Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1215 n.8 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[G]enerally accepted correctional

standards require a minimum of 50 square feet of living area for every prison

inmate.”);4 Turley v. Bedinger, 542 F. App’x 531, 533 (7th Cir. 2013) (inmate stated

conditions-of-confinement claim based on allegation “that his tiny, cramped, poorly

ventilated cell, exacerbated by his inability to leave it for exercise, caused his joint pain,

respiratory difficulty, gastrointestinal problems, and anxiety”). Likewise, St. Clair’s

assertions permit a reasonable inference that the risk of harm was “so obvious” that

4 See Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (adopting as binding

precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit issued on or before September 30, 1981).

“the municipality [could] reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to”

the risk. Daniels, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1057.

A rational jury could also find that “an official policy caused the deprivation of

[St. Clair’s] constitutional rights.” Christmas, 76 F.4th at 1329. As noted above, a

plaintiff may satisfy this standard “by identifying a widespread practice that, although

not authorized by written or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled

as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” Id. According to the verified

Complaint, the overcrowding at Polk County Jail was pervasive, with all inmates

occupying cramped nine-man cells designed for six inmates. (Dkt. 1 at 16, 19)

Moreover, the challenged conditions were present for “30 months.” (Id. at 16) Taken

as true, these assertions are sufficient to show that the conditions in St. Clair’s cell

resulted from an unofficial custom. See Anela v. City of Wildwood, 790 F.2d 1063,

1069 (3d Cir. 1986) (municipality “may be held liable” for “jail conditions” where

“[t]he description of the cells revealed a long-standing condition that had become an

acceptable standard and practice for the” municipality).

Sheriff Judd argues that summary judgment is warranted because St. Clair “has

no competent evidence from which to substantiate his allegations—nothing beyond

his opinion that the conditions constituted an extreme deprivation.” (Dkt. 53 at 8) But

St. Clair’s Complaint is “verified under 28 U.S.C. § 1746,” which means that his

allegations “may be viewed as evidence” for purposes of summary judgment. Howard

v. Memnon, 572 F. App’x 692, 694 (11th Cir. 2014). Moreover, St. Clair plainly has

“personal knowledge” of conditions in the Polk County Jail, having resided there for

over three years. Id. A “litigant’s self-serving statements based on personal knowledge

or observation can defeat summary judgment.” United States v. Stein, 881 F.3d 853,

857 (11th Cir. 2018).

Sheriff Judd also disputes St. Clair’s description of the cells. In support, Sheriff

Judd relies on the affidavit by Chief of Detention Allen, who states that “inmates

assigned to [St. Clair’s dorm] were provided access to seating and table surfaces,

including chairs and tables, within the housing area for meals, writing, and other

routine activities.”5 (Dkt. 52-2 at 3) Allen also claims that St. Clair gained 50 pounds

not because of “housing conditions and limited movement,” but rather because he

routinely consumed “canteen or commissary food items” in addition to regular meals.

(Id. at 4-5) Finally, Allen asserts that the cells measured “approximately . . . 380.4”

square feet rather than 343 square feet. (Id. at 3) Again, however, St. Clair’s sworn

statements are admissible as evidence, and they contradict Allen’s account of jail

conditions. Summary judgment is not the appropriate procedure to resolve a

“swearing contest between interested witnesses.”6 Joassin v. Murphy, 661 F. App’x

558, 560 (11th Cir. 2016).

5 In his affidavit, Allen uses the term “housing area” to refer to a cell holding “nine inmates.” (Dkt.

52-2 at 3)

6 Relatedly, Sheriff Judd contends that St. Clair presents no evidence connecting his “fifty-pound

weight gain,” “severe depression,” and “pre-diabetic state” to the conditions of his confinement. (Dkt.

53 at 22) A rational jury could find, however, that St. Clair’s physical and mental-health issues were

“a reasonably foreseeable consequence of” spending a lengthy period in the conditions described by

St. Clair, and that his health issues “would not have occurred” had he not been exposed to those

conditions. Buckman v. Halsey, No. 20-13596, 2021 WL 4127067, at *3 (11th Cir. Sept. 10, 2021).

B. Procedural Due Process

A reasonable jury could find that St. Clair’s right to procedural due process was

violated by the lockdowns imposed on entire cells for the actions of one inmate. “[A]

pretrial detainee is entitled to a due process hearing before being subjected to

conditions that amount to punishment.” Jacoby v. Baldwin Cnty., 835 F.3d 1338,

1348 (11th Cir. 2016). “[W]hether a condition of pretrial detention amounts to

punishment turns on whether the condition is imposed for the purpose of punishment

or whether it is incident to some legitimate government purpose.” Id. at 1348 n.5.

“[L]egitimate governmental objectives and alternative purposes justifying a particular

condition or restriction include insuring the detainees[’] presence at trial, effectively

managing the detention facility, maintaining order and security, excluding weapons

and drugs, and others.” Hughes v. Judd, 108 F. Supp. 3d 1167, 1218 (M.D. Fla. 2015).

According to St. Clair, Sheriff Judd instituted a policy of placing all occupants

of a cell “on 24-hour lockdown for the actions of one inmate.” (Dkt. 1 at 21) The

lockdowns were imposed “without any due process procedures for the [non-offending]

inmates.” (Id.) For example, if an inmate “holler[ed] out their door or sa[id] a cuss

word or something like that to one of the deputies,” the deputy would lock down the

entire nine-man cell and falsely claim that it was “for sanitation purposes.” (Dkt. 52-1

at 22) Instead of instituting disciplinary proceedings against the offending inmate, the

deputy would “punish[ ] eight people . . . for the actions of one” without providing

any “due process” to the inmates. (Id.) St. Clair testified at his deposition that the

lockdowns happened “all the time” during his incarceration at the jail. (Dkt. 52-1 at

68) He also explained that deputies used this “tactic” because if “one person” caused

a “lockdown” for “everyone in the cell,” the inmates “would take care of it themselves

and . . . beat that person or hurt that person in [the cell].” (Id. at 22-23)

Viewed in the light most favorable to St. Clair, these assertions support a

reasonable inference that the lockdowns were “imposed for the purpose of punishment

. . . [rather than a] legitimate government purpose.” Jacoby, 835 F.3d at 1348 n.5. A

reasonable jury could conclude that deputies acted “arbitrar[ily]”—and thus with the

“intent to punish”—when they locked down a nine-man cell based solely on alleged

misconduct by one inmate. Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2004).

Notably, Sheriff Judd does not contend that lockdowns conducted in this manner

would serve a legitimate government purpose. Instead, he relies on Chief of Detention

Allen’s assertion that “[t]he Polk County Sheriff’s Office does not maintain any policy

or practice of imposing twenty four-hour punitive lockdowns, nor does it place an

entire housing area on lockdown as punishment for the conduct of one inmate.” (Dkt.

52-2 at 6) But St. Clair offers competent testimony to rebut these assertions, and

“[w]hen factual conflicts arise [on summary judgment], [courts] must credit the

nonmoving party’s version.”7 Blanco v. Samuel, 91 F.4th 1061, 1070 (11th Cir. 2024).

7 A reasonable jury could also find that “an official policy caused the deprivation of [St. Clair’s]

constitutional rights.” Christmas, 76 F.4th at 1329. St. Clair testified that “all of [the deputies were]

allowed to” collectively punish inmates in the manner described above, and that the practice had

“always been happening” at the jail. (Dkt. 52-1 at 68-69) This testimony points to the existence of a

“widespread practice that, although not authorized by written or express municipal policy, is so

permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” Christmas, 76

F.4th at 1329.

In short, a triable issue exists as to whether the lockdowns were “imposed for

the purpose of punishment.” Jacoby, 835 F.3d at 1345. Thus, a jury could reasonably

conclude that St. Clair’s right to due process was violated when deputies imposed the

lockdowns without providing any procedural protections to the affected inmates. The

required protections would include, at a minimum, “(1) advance written notice of the

charges; (2) a written statement of the reasons for the disciplinary action taken; and (3)

the opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence when permitting [the inmate]

to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.” Id.

at 1350.

C. Restrictions on Reading Material

Summary judgment is not warranted on St. Clair’s claim that Sheriff Judd

violated the First Amendment by restricting the reading material available to inmates.

“The First Amendment protects ‘the right to receive information and ideas,’ which, as

applicable in the prison context, extends to the right to receive mail and to access

reading material.” Bethel v. Jenkins, 988 F.3d 931, 938 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting

Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972)). “At the same time, the Supreme

Court has acknowledged that running a prison ‘is an inordinately difficult undertaking

that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are

peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of

government.’” Pesci v. Budz, 935 F.3d 1159, 1165 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Turner v.

Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987)).

“In an effort to vindicate both ‘the need to protect constitutional rights’ and the

need for ‘judicial restraint regarding prisoner complaints,’ [the Supreme Court] set out

the ground rules for evaluating prisoners’ constitutional claims: When a prison

regulation or policy ‘impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid

if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’” Id. (quoting Turner, 482

U.S. at 85, 89)). To make this determination, courts ask “(1) whether there is a valid,

rational connection between the regulation and a legitimate governmental interest put

forward to justify it; (2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the asserted

constitutional right that remain open to the inmates; (3) whether and the extent to

which accommodation of the asserted right will have an impact on prison staff,

inmates, and the allocation of prison resources generally; and (4) whether the

regulation represents an exaggerated response to prison concerns.” Hakim v. Hicks,

223 F.3d 1244, 1247-48 (11th Cir. 2000). Although St. Clair “bear[s] the ultimate

burden of showing that the [challenged] policy is unconstitutional, it is [Sheriff Judd’s]

burden to demonstrate that a rational connection exists between the policy and a

legitimate penological interest.” Fontroy v. Beard, 559 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2009).

Sheriff Judd fails to meet his burden. According to St. Clair, from April 2019 to

November 2021, inmates were forbidden from ordering “books of [their] choice,”

“legal books,” newspapers, or magazines; instead, only “religious material” could be

“sent in.” (Dkt. 1 at 13-14, 20; Dkt. 52-1 at 108-09) St. Clair clarified at his deposition

that “[w]e [were] not allowed to order nothing in. We could get a Bible in. That’s

pretty much about it.” (Dkt. 52-1 at 91) Sheriff Judd does not put forward any

“legitimate governmental interest” to justify such a policy. Hakim, 223 F.3d at 1247.

Instead, he appears to dispute its existence, citing Allen’s statement that the jail did

not “maintain a blanket ban on newspapers or approved publications.” (Dkt. 52-2 at

9) According to Allen, inmates could receive “approved reading materials, including

religious or educational publications, through incoming mail from family members or

other approved senders, subject to inspection and institutional safety requirements.”

(Id. at 9-10) Again, however, St. Clair presents competent testimony to rebut this

assertion, and “[w]hen factual conflicts arise [on summary judgment], [courts] must

credit the nonmoving party’s version.” Blanco, 91 F.4th at 1070.

Because Sheriff Judd identifies no “legitimate penological interest[ ]” that could

justify the policy described by St. Clair, summary judgment is unwarranted on this

claim. Pesci, 935 F.3d at 1165. Notably, some courts have held that a “de facto total

ban on all publications sent by mail” violates the First Amendment because it is “not

reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Hum. Rts. Def. Ctr. v. Baxter

Cnty., 667 F. Supp. 3d 959, 974 (W.D. Ark. 2023), aff’d, 129 F.4th 498 (8th Cir. 2025);

see also Prison Legal News v. Nw. Reg’l Jail Auth., No. 5:15-cv-61, 2017 WL

4415659, at *5 (W.D. Va. Sept. 29, 2017) (“Where a regulation is, or is akin to, a

‘blanket’ prohibition [on inmates receiving certain categories of publications,] courts

seem more likely to rule it unconstitutional.” (collecting cases)); Marcum v. Jones, No.

06-cv-822, 2009 WL 3172048, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2009) (“[D]efendants have

not produced sufficient evidence in support of their motion for summary judgment to

show that the total ban on publications, magazines, tabloids and newspapers received

through the mail at the Hanover and Resolutions facilities is reasonably related to

legitimate penological objectives.”). To be clear, the Court makes no finding on the

constitutionality of the alleged policy. Instead, the Court holds only that Sheriff Judd

is not entitled to summary judgment because, to this point, he has not discharged his

“burden to demonstrate that a rational connection exists between the policy and a

legitimate penological interest.” Fontroy, 559 F.3d at 177.

D. Video Visitation

No reasonable jury could find that the change in the video visitation policy

violated St. Clair’s First Amendment rights. According to St. Clair, Sheriff Judd

initially permitted free hour-long sessions of “video visitation” if the visitor “drove to

the jail,” but the policy was later changed to allow “only [two] 20 min[ute] [video]

visitations costing the visitor [$]10 per session.” (Dkt. 1 at 21) St. Clair testified at his

deposition that he believed each inmate was entitled to two such sessions “per week,”

but he was not sure because he “never got to get one.” (Dkt. 52-1 at 90) He explained

that his mother is not “technically inclined” and could not figure out how to “schedule

a [video] visit” with him. (Id. at 87)

Viewed in the light most favorable to St. Clair, these assertions do not establish

a constitutional violation. To the extent that St. Clair challenges the $10 fee charged

for video visitation, the First Amendment “does not prohibit charging prisoners for

essential prison services, at least in the absence of a showing that the result is a severe

deprivation of a fundamental right.” Holloway v. Magness, 666 F.3d 1076, 1080 (8th

Cir. 2012) (rejecting prisoner’s First Amendment challenge to allegedly excessive

telephone charges); see also Nelson v. Hjorth, No. 8:18-cv-88, 2018 WL 2050571, at

*8 (D. Neb. May 2, 2018) (“[F]ederal courts . . . have consistently rejected First

Amendment claims challenging high telephone rates on grounds that prisoners are not

entitled to a specific rate for telephone calls and that prisoners failed to allege that the

rates were so exorbitant as to deprive them of telephone access altogether.” (collecting

cases)). St. Clair does not present any evidence that the $10 fee was “so exorbitant as

to deprive prisoners of . . . access altogether.” Johnson v. State of California, 207 F.3d

650, 656 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, he fails to show that the fee violated his constitutional

rights.

As noted above, St. Clair claims that he was unable to have video visits with his

mother because she lacked the technical know-how to “schedule a visit.” (Dkt. 52-1 at

87) According to St. Clair, his mother went to “Best Buy or one of these technical

places . . . to try to get it set up,” but she could not afford to pay the “150, 160 bucks”

it would cost to receive such assistance. (Id. at 87-88) St. Clair also stated that “[e]ven

if they tried to set it up on the phone, [his] mom still did not know how to . . . do all

that stuff.” (Id. at 88) St. Clair does not cite—and this Court cannot locate—any

authority suggesting that the video visitation policy is unconstitutional because

individuals may face technical difficulties in using the program. Moreover, although

St. Clair did not have any video calls with his mother, he acknowledged that he was

able to call her on the telephone throughout his incarceration, and he routinely

exchanged emails with her. (Id. at 89; Dkt. 52-6; Dkt. 52-11) Inmates “retain a right

under the First Amendment to send and receive information while incarcerated,” but

“they do not have a constitutional right to a particular form of communication.”

Kersaint v. Daniel, No. 7:25-cv-38-WLS-ALS, 2025 WL 2648234, at *6 (M.D. Ga.

Sept. 15, 2025) (collecting cases).

E. Limitations on Outside Communication

Sheriff Judd is also entitled to summary judgment on St. Clair’s claims that (1)

he had only “one hour per day” for making phone calls and reviewing letters and

personal email on the kiosk, and (2) he was unable to communicate with family and

friends during COVID-related quarantines. (Dkt. 1 at 12, 15, 22)

As to the first claim, St. Clair fails to present “facts showing a significant

infringement of his right to communicate with the outside world.” Holloway, 666 F.3d

at 1081. As Chief of Detention Allen notes, St. Clair “made substantial use of the

inmate telephone system during his incarceration.” (Dkt. 52-2 at 8) The records show

that “[b]etween February 2021 and September 2022 alone, [St. Clair] initiated

approximately 570 telephone call attempts, including over 200 completed calls,

totaling more than 2,400 minutes of call time.” (Id.; see also Dkt. 52-11) Moreover, as

Allen points out, St. Clair “exchanged numerous electronic messages with outside

contacts during the period of his confinement, including during the time when

COVID-19 operational protocols were in effect.” (Dkt. 52-2 at 7-8) Indeed, the record

includes 357 pages of electronic messages between St. Clair and outside contacts from

April 2019 to September 2022. (Dkt. 52-6) Given St. Clair’s extensive contacts with

friends and family via phone calls and electronic messaging, no reasonable jury could

find that any outside communication restrictions were enforced in violation of the First

Amendment. See Lopez v. Morrison, No. 22-cv-6607-KMW-AMD, 2022 WL

17417120, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 5, 2022) (“While detained individuals have a First

Amendment right to communicate, including to communicate with family and

friends, that right is not inviolable and does not include unfettered access to any and

all forms of communication at all times.”).

St. Clair separately challenges the policy of isolating “inmates [who] test[ed]

positive for COVID-19 for 14 days.” (Dkt. 1 at 15) While in isolation, inmates had no

“means to communicate with family,” could not use the “kiosk,” and were “denied

access to the phone” and “e-mail.” (Id. at 15, 22) These assertions are insufficient to

establish a constitutional violation.

Inmates’ right to communicate with outside parties is “subject to rational

limitations in the face of legitimate interests of the penal institution.” Jackson v. Ward,

No. 6:19-cv-91, 2022 WL 866340, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 1, 2022), adopted by 2022 WL

854819 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 22, 2022). In response to St. Clair’s allegations, Chief of

Detention Allen states that “[t]emporary limitations on . . . communication during

COVID-related quarantines were implemented as part of . . . infection-control

measures and were based on medical and operational considerations consistent with

the agency’s epidemic response procedures.” (Dkt. 52-2 at 9) Thus, any limitations on

communication during the two-week quarantine periods “appear[ ] to be rationally

related to the need to prevent possible spread of COVID-19.” McGlory v. Michigan

Dep’t of Corr., No. 2:20-cv-81, 2020 WL 4362307, at *3 (W.D. Mich. July 30, 2020)

(no constitutional violation where plaintiffs “were held in a cell for a period of eight

days without access to a phone or mail because of a need to quarantine them after their

potential exposure to COVID-19”). St. Clair offers no evidence that the temporary

restrictions on communication were unreasonable or failed to advance the legitimate

goal of combating the spread of COVID-19. Therefore, no triable issue exists as to the

constitutionality of these restrictions.

F. Equal Protection

Sheriff Judd is entitled to summary judgment on St. Clair’s equal protection

claim. The Equal Protection Clause is “essentially a direction that all persons similarly

situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.

432, 439 (1985). “To establish an equal protection claim, a prisoner must demonstrate

that (1) he is similarly situated to other prisoners who received more favorable

treatment; and (2) the state engaged in invidious discrimination against him based on

race, religion, national origin, or some other constitutionally protected basis.” Sweet

v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 467 F.3d 1311, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2006). “A similarly situated

prisoner must be prima facie identical in all relevant respects.” Sumrall v. Georgia

Dep’t of Corr., 154 F.4th 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2025). In determining whether male

and female inmates are similarly situated, “[c]ourts should consider the number of

inmates housed in each facility, their average length of stay, their security levels, and

the incidence of violence and victimhood.” Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 746 (5th Cir.

2002).

St. Clair’s equal protection claim fails because he presents no evidence that he

was “similarly situated” to the female inmates who allegedly “received more favorable

treatment.” Sweet, 467 F.3d at 1318. As explained above, St. Clair alleges that Sheriff

Judd followed a “policy” of locking down “all non-open bay dorms for 23 hours per

day.” (Dkt. 1 at 12) According to St. Clair, the lockdown policy applied only to male

inmates. (Id. at 14) Female inmates, by contrast, were allowed to spend six hours

outside their cells every day. (Id.) At his deposition, St. Clair explained that he learned

of this disparity by talking to “girls in the medical” unit and unidentified “officers”

who told him that female inmates were “out six hours a day.” (Dkt. 52-1 at 78) St.

Clair could not “identify any female inmate” he spoke to, nor did he know their

“custody level[s]” or in which dorms they resided. (Id. at 79-81)

As this summary makes clear, St. Clair presents no “details”—such as the

female inmates’ security levels or the incidence of violence in their dorms—“that

would allow [the Court] to assess whether they were similarly situated” to St. Clair.

Sumrall, 154 F.4th at 1313. Without such information, no reasonable jury could

conclude that the female inmates were “prima facie identical [to St. Clair] in all

relevant respects.”8 Id. at 1312. Additionally, St. Clair offers no evidence to rebut

Chief of Detention Allen’s assertion that “[i]nmate gender alone does not determine

out-of-cell time, recreation opportunities, or daily movement schedules; rather, such

decisions are based on objective classification factors and legitimate operational needs,

including temporary public-health measures such as COVID-19 mitigation protocols

when in effect.” (Dkt. 52-2 at 13) Therefore, St. Clair fails to establish a genuine

8 At his deposition, St. Clair stated that his security level was “medium and sometimes high.” (Dkt.

52-1 at 28)

dispute of material fact as to his equal protection claim. See Simmonds v. Cockrell, 81

F. App’x 488, 489 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Because [plaintiff] has not shown that male and

female prisoners in the Texas prisons are similarly situated, the district court did not

err in dismissing his equal protection claim.”).

G. Injunctive Relief

In his Complaint, St. Clair appears to seek the reversal of the challenged jail

policies. (Dkt. 1 at 5) But St. Clair no longer resides at the Polk County Jail. After he

filed this lawsuit, he was sent to the Florida Department of Corrections to serve his

prison sentence. (Dkt. 8) Later, he completed his sentence and moved to Illinois. (Dkt.

34) “The general rule is that a prisoner’s transfer or release from a jail moots his

individual claim for declaratory and injunctive relief.” McKinnon v. Talladega Cnty.,

Ala., 745 F.2d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 1984); see also Smith v. Allen, 502 F. 3d 1255,

1267 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[A] transfer or a release of a prisoner from prison will moot

that prisoner’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief.”), abrogated on other

grounds by Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011). Because St. Clair is no longer

incarcerated at the Polk County Jail, his request for injunctive relief must be dismissed

as moot. See Brown v. Riley, No. 2:08-cv-804-JES-DNF 2010 WL 3069490, at *10

(M.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2010) (granting summary judgment as to former prisoner’s “request

for injunctive relief” because the request was “moot in light of his release from the

Department of Corrections”).

IV. CONCLUSION

Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

1. Sheriff Judd’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. 53), is GRANTED in part

and DENIED in part.

a. Summary judgment is GRANTED as to the request for injunctive relief

as well as the claims concerning video visitation, limitations on

communication with family and friends, and the disparate treatment of

male and female inmates.

b. Summary judgment is DENIED as to the conditions-of-confinement

claim, the procedural due process claim, and the claim based on the

restriction of reading material.

2. The Parties must confer in good faith to discuss the possibility of settling the

remaining claims in this action. Within FORTY-FIVE DAYS of this Order, the

Parties must notify the Court whether they are able to reach a settlement. If the

Parties are unable to settle the case privately among themselves, they must

notify the Court if they wish to have the case referred to a United States

Magistrate Judge for a settlement conference.

3. To allow the Parties sufficient time to confer regarding settlement, the Court

STAYS all upcoming case deadlines and removes this case from the August

2026 trial term. If the Parties are unable to reach a settlement, the Court will

enter an Amended Case Management and Scheduling Order and set new pre-

trial management deadlines and a new trial term.

DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, this 2Ist day of July 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRI CT JUDGE

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