Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ANTHONY DIXON, JR.,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 25-14610 (GC) (JBD)

v.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

STACEY KERR, ESQUIRE,

Defendant.

CASTNER, District Judge

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon pro se Plaintiff Anthony Dixon, Jr.’s revised

Application to Proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) and Complaint against Stacey Kerr, Esq. (ECF

Nos. 1, 5); and

WHEREAS Plaintiff alleges that, during a mediation on September 29, 2016, Defendant

coerced and threatened Plaintiff into signing an unlawful agreement regarding child support and

parenting time. (ECF No. 1 at 3-4.)1 Plaintiff alleges that, because of this agreement, he lost

money and access to his child.2 (Id.) Accordingly, Plaintiff brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

and he seeks approximately $3,000,000.00 in monetary relief. (Id. at 2, 4)3; and

1 Page numbers for record cites (i.e., “ECF Nos.”) refer to the page numbers stamped by the

Court's e-filing system and not the internal pagination of the parties.

2 Plaintiff’s Complaint initially refers to “property” and later clarifies that the property is his

“lone offspring.” (ECF No. 1 at 4.)

3 The Court notes that Plaintiff alleges the events underlying his constitutional claims

occurred on September 29, 2016. (Id. at 3.) Claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the New

Jersey Civil Rights Act are subject to New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations on personal

WHEREAS in considering an application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court engages

in a two-step analysis. Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990). First, the Court

determines whether the plaintiff is eligible to proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Brown v. Sage,

941 F.3d 655, 660 (3d Cir. 2019). Second, the Court determines whether the Complaint should be

dismissed as frivolous or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, as required

by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Ball v. Familia, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013). A court need not

complete each step, nor must it do so in a specific order. See Brown, 941 F.3d at 660; and

WHEREAS the Court exercises its discretion to review the merits of Plaintiff’s Complaint

before it decides whether to grant the IFP Application. See id. “The legal standard for dismissing

a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that

for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure [(‘Rule’)] 12(b)(6).”

Schreiner v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012). Although courts construe pro se

pleadings less stringently than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys, pro se litigants are still

required to “allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay

Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels

and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007)); and

WHEREAS Plaintiff fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under

§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person

injury actions and thus may be time-barred. See Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d

Cir. 2010).

acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Schneyder v. Smith, 653

F.3d 313, 319 (3d Cir. 2011). Liberally construing Plaintiff’s Complaint as the Court must, the

Court cannot discern a plausible constitutional claim from the minimal facts alleged. First,

Plaintiff alleges no facts from which the Court can reasonably infer that Defendant acted under the

color of state law. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (“[The] under-

color-of-state-law element of Section 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no

matter how discriminatory or wrongful.”). Second, while Plaintiff alleges that Defendant deprived

him of his “rights and property” generally, (ECF No. 1 at 3), Plaintiff does not clarify which of his

constitutional rights were violated by Defendant’s conduct4; and

WHEREAS even if the Court infers that Plaintiff asserts a procedural due process claim

under the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiff still fails to state this claim. To prevail on a procedural

due process claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived of an individual interest included

within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of “life, liberty, or property,” and (2) the procedures

available to him did not provide “due process of law.” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225,

233-34 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000)). In evaluating

whether procedures satisfy due process, courts consider whether a plaintiff received, at a minimum,

“the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).

4 Of course, due process protections do not apply to private contractual or settlement

agreements. See SMI Indus., Inc. v. Lanard & Axilbund, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 459, 462 (E.D. Pa.

1979) (“[A] remedy devised by private parties and executed without the help of public officials

does not constitute state action to which the due process clause would be applicable.”).

Plaintiff’s allegations do not articulate how the procedures available to him did not provide due

process of law or the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time or in a meaningful manner; and

WHEREAS because Plaintiff fails to state any federal claim over which this Court has

original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any potential

state law claims.’ See Obuskovic v. Wood, 761 F. App’x 144, 148-49 (3d Cir. 2019).

al

IT IS on this 3) day of July, 2026 ORDERED as follows:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall REOPEN this matter.

2. Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice.

3, The Clerk’s Office is directed to mail Plaintiff a copy of this Memorandum Order

by regular U.S. mail and CLOSE this case.

4. Plaintiff may have this case reopened if, within thirty (30) days of the date of the

entry of this Memorandum Order, Plaintiff files an amended complaint that cures □

the deficiencies set forth herein, Failure to file an amended complaint within that

time will render the dismissal with prejudice or final. See Hoffinan v. Nordic Nats.,

Inc., 837 F.3d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 2016) (‘When that 30-day period expired, the

District Court’s decision became final.”).

GEORGETTE/CASTNER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Although Plaintiff does not expressly assert any state law causes of action, his allegations

that Defendant used “trickery, deception, and coercion” appear to potentially allege common law

fraud or other common law claims. To the extent Plaintiff intends to assert such claims, the Court

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).