GREEN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

WILLIAM G.,1

Case No. 25–cv–03594–ESK

Plaintiff,

v.

OPINION

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

KIEL, U.S.D.J.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on plaintiff William G.’s appeal (ECF

No. 1 (Compl.)) from the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration denying his application for Social Security disability insurance

benefits (ECF No. 4–2 (R. Part 2) pp. 17–37).2 For the following reasons, the

decision will be VACATED and REMANDED for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff applied for benefits on August 8, 2022, alleging an inability to

work as of February 28, 2021. (Id. p. 98.) The application was denied on

December 6, 2022 (id. pp. 128–132) and again on reconsideration (id. pp. 134–

38). The administrative law judge held a telephone hearing on April 30, 2024,

1 Plaintiff is referred to by his first name and last initial consistent with D.N.J.

Standing Order 2021–10.

2 It is the Court’s general practice to label documents that appear multiple times

within an opinion: the deposition of a particular party, a letter sent on a particular

date, and so on. The record here is separated into parts, with each part containing

multiple documents. To avoid confusion, the Court will adopt this convention without

further specifying the cited document.

during which plaintiff and a vocational expert testified. (Id. pp. 44–87.) On

June 26, 2024, the administrative law judge issued a decision unfavorable to

plaintiff. (Id. pp. 17–37.) The Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request to

review on March 7, 2025, rendering the June 26, 2024 ruling the

Commissioner’s final decision. (Id. pp. 1–3.)

Plaintiff filed the instant complaint on April 30, 2025 (Compl.) and filed

the administrative record and supporting brief (ECF No. 4; ECF No. 5; ECF No.

6 (Pl.’s Br.)). The Commissioner filed an opposition (ECF No. 8 (Comm’r Opp’n

Br.)) to which plaintiff has replied (ECF No. 9 (Pl.’s Reply Br.)).

B. Standard Governing Benefits

Disability insurance benefits are available under the Social Security Act

to program contributors who have a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1); Pearson

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 839 F. App’x 684, 687 (3d Cir. 2020). The term

“disability” includes the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity

by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which

can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last

for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

An individual is disabled only if their disability is of such severity that not only

can they not engage in their prior line of work, but—considering their age,

education, and work experience—they cannot “engage in any other kind of

substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy ….” Id.

§ 423(d)(2)(A).

Administrative law judges follow a five-step sequential process to

determine whether an individual is disabled. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v). The administrative law judge first determines whether

the individual is engaged in substantial gainful activity and—if not—moves to

the second step, analysis of the severity of the individual’s impairment.

Thomas v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 856 F. App’x 400, 403 (3d Cir. 2021). Third, the

administrative law judge compares the individual’s impairment “to a list of

impairments ‘presumed severe enough to preclude any gainful work.’” Id.

(quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 1999)). If the

individual’s impairment is not listed, the administrative law judge determines

at step four whether they have retained sufficient residual functional capacity

to perform past relevant work. Id. If the individual can perform past

relevant work, they are not disabled. Id. Finally, if the individual cannot

return to past relevant work, the administrative law judge determines at the

fifth step whether the impairment precludes adjustment to other work. Id.

The burden is on the claimant through the first four steps but shifts to the

Commissioner for the fifth step. Sisco v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 840 F. App’x 685,

686 (3d Cir. 2020). The Commissioner must prove that the claimant can adjust

to other work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v); Orr v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 805

F. App’x 85, 90 (3d Cir. 2020). Determination of what type of work an

individual is capable of performing may come from a variety of sources,

including the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and vocational expert

testimony. Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 616 (3d Cir. 2014).

C. The Administrative Law Judge Decision

The administrative law judge found that plaintiff had not engaged in

substantial gainful activity since February 28, 2021. (R. Part 2 p. 20.)

Plaintiff was found to have several severe impairments including degenerative

disc disease, osteoarthritis of the left shoulder, depressive disorder, and anxiety

disorder. (Id.) These impairments did not individually or in combination

equal an impairment identified in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

(Id. pp. 20–22.) Plaintiff was determined to have the residual functional

capacity to perform light work with additional limits including lifting and

carrying up to ten pounds frequently; the need to change positions while

remaining on task; only occasionally pushing, pulling, or reaching overhead

with the left upper extremity; never lifting overhead or firmly grasping;

occasional, if any, exposure to vibrations, irritants, and hazards; tasks with

simple or detailed—but not complex—directions; no fast-paced work; and only

occasional interaction with the public. (Id. pp. 22–35.)

Plaintiff was found unable to perform past relevant work as a truck driver

or hospital cleaner. (Id. p. 35.) But given his age, education, work experience,

and residual functional capacity, plaintiff was found able to perform several

jobs that exist in significant number within the national economy. (Id. pp. 35,

36.) These jobs consisted of mail sorter, price marker, and electronic

assembler. (Id. p. 36.) 3

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A reviewing court may enter “a judgment affirming, modifying, or

reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without

remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Factual findings,

“if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” Id.; see also Appau

v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 847 F. App’x 149, 151 (3d Cir. 2021) (“Like the District

Court, we must uphold a final agency determination unless we find that it is

not supported by substantial evidence in the record.” (quoting Rutherford v.

Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005))). Review of an administrative law

judge’s decision “is highly deferential” and “[t]he substantial-evidence threshold

‘is not high.’” Sisco, 840 F. App’x at 687 (quoting Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S.

97, 103 (2019)). “Substantial evidence ‘means—and means only—“such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

3 Plaintiff’s original brief argued that the administrative law judge failed to carry

her burden at the fifth step of the sequential process. (Pl.’s Br. pp. 18–23.) The

Commissioner rebutted this argument. (Comm’r Opp’n Br. pp. 6–10.) Plaintiff’s

reply is silent on this point. His argument is therefore abandoned. See Prearyer v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Case No. 19–21385, 2020 WL 7778077, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 31, 2020)

(interpreting the plaintiff’s failure to address the Commissioner’s opposition in his

reply as an abandonment of the position).

conclusion.”’” Id. (quoting Biestek, 587 U.S. at 103). Courts are bound by an

administrative law judge’s findings when they are supported by substantial

evidence, even if the court would have decided the matter differently. See

Taylor v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 826 F. App’x 224, 226 (3d Cir. 2020).

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Administrative Law Judge

Appropriately Considered Plaintiff’s

Subjective Complaints

Plaintiff argues that the administrative law judge concluded that he is

able to attend to personal-care tasks, do laundry, drive, shop, and perform other

activities all while he testified to his difficulty doing so. (Pl.’s Br. p. 29.)

Though the administrative law judge cited to the record, many of the tasks

identified are ones that plaintiff testified that he could not perform. (Id.)

Instead, activities were cherry-picked from the record, creating an impression

that he is more capable than he actually is. (Id. pp. 29, 30.)

The Commissioner maintains that the administrative law judge

appropriately found that plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could

reasonably be expected to cause the symptoms alleged, but his statements of

intensity and persistence were not entirely consistent with the record.

(Comm’r Opp’n Br. p. 14.) Plaintiff’s ability to perform activities such as

laundry and driving were found to be inconsistent with his complaints. (Id.

p. 15.) Plaintiff nitpicks the administrative law judge’s discussion of daily

activities and in any case plaintiff admitted to being able to perform these

activities. (Id. pp. 15, 16.) The Commissioner posits that plaintiff’s aim is for

the Court to reweigh the evidence. (Id. pp. 16, 17.)

A plaintiff’s own statements concerning pain or symptoms are alone

insufficient to establish disability. Cosme v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 845 F. App’x

128, 133 (3d Cir. 2021). Rather, administrative law judges must determine

whether the complained-of symptoms are consistent with objective medical and

other evidence and—if not—the administrative law judge may discount them.

Id.; see also Mercado v. Kijakazi, 629 F. Supp. 3d 260, 279 (M.D. Pa. 2022)

(recognizing the two-step process in evaluating a plaintiff’s symptoms where

the administrative law judge first determines whether a medically

determinable impairment could be the cause of the alleged symptoms and next

evaluates the alleged symptoms against the record as a whole).

Here, the administrative law judge determined that plaintiff’s allegations

were not consistent with the objective record. (R. Part 2 p. 32.) With respect

to mental impairments, the administrative law judge noted that there was no

evidence of hospitalization, formal treatment, or decompensation. (Id. pp. 32,

33.) Even without treatment, symptoms were mild-to-moderate. (Id. p. 33.)

Treatment for physical impairments were more extensive, but also

demonstrated partial success, with the administrative law judge citing

improvement following a cervical spine fusion, no persistent complaints related

to cardiac-related symptoms such as chest pain or fatigue, and the relief

provided by medication and steroid injections. (Id. pp. 33–35.) Plaintiff’s

regimen was stable and the record did not contain evidence of persistent

complaints related to side effects or the need to change medication. (Id. p. 34.)

The administrative law judge further concluded that plaintiff’s range of

daily activities—including laundry, shopping, and driving—were inconsistent

with his allegations. (Id.) Plaintiff focuses on this conclusion in his brief.

But plaintiff stated in his function report that he did not have trouble with

personal care. (ECF No. 4–3 (R. Part 3) pp. 44, 45.) He did not prepare meals

and generally ordered take-out, but was capable of doing laundry, cleaning, and

mowing. (Id. p. 45.) Plaintiff indicated that he drove; shopped in stores and

online; handled personal finances; watched television; and socialized in-person,

over the phone, and through text messaging. (Id. pp. 46, 47.) The function

report completed by his mother detailed a substantially similar list of activities.

(Id. pp. 55–66.) These reports are also consistent with a November 23, 2022

assessment from Brick Psychiatric Services, Inc., which states that plaintiff

shared housekeeping duties such as cooking and laundry with his mother, was

able to drive, managed his own finances, and played with his grandson. (ECF

No. 5–15 p. 214.) These sources were cited in the administrative law judge’s

decision. (R. Part 2 pp. 21, 28.)

Plaintiff’s hearing testimony did not depart from these representations.

He testified that personal care was “[a] little hard, but [he] ma[de] it work.”

(Id. p. 61.) When asked about helping around the house, he stated that his

mother did the grocery shopping and wash and he would help cook by cutting

up vegetables. (Id. pp. 61, 62.)4 He stated that he spent his days driving to

the bay and watching boats or driving to the cemetery to visit the grave of his

daughter. (Id. p. 62.) He later repeated that he spent his days visiting the

cemetery and helping his mother around the house. (Id. pp. 69, 70.)

On review, I find that the administrative law judge followed the two-step

process in considering plaintiff’s subjective complaints and her decision was

supported by substantial evidence. See Seney v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 585 F.

App’x 805, 808–09 (3d Cir. 2014) (affirming the administrative law judge’s

decision to not credit the plaintiff’s allegations upon the administrative law

judge’s evaluation of her treatment, the results of that treatment, her daily

activities, and medical opinions); Morris v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Case No. 20–

4 Plaintiff argues that he testified that he could not shop or do laundry. (Pl.’s

Br. p. 29.) Plaintiff’s actual testimony is slightly more nuanced. Plaintiff was asked

whether he was “able to help out at all around the house …. Cooking, cleaning, grocery

shopping, doing the wash?” (R. Part 2 p. 61.) Plaintiff replied only that his mother

did the grocery shopping and the wash and that he would help cook by cutting

vegetables. (Id. pp. 61, 62.) Plaintiff did not testify that he was incapable of

shopping or doing laundry and his function report indicates that he performed such

tasks. (R. Part 3 pp. 45, 46.)

10273, 2022 WL 577963, at *6 (D.N.J. Feb. 24, 2022) (finding that the

administrative law judge’s analysis was supported by substantial evidence

when he considered the plaintiff’s normal cardiac examinations, positive

responses to treatment, and range of daily activities). Though plaintiff

criticizes the administrative law judge for failing to analyze his testimony and

“regurgitat[ing] a portion of the medical evidence of record,” (Pl.’s Br. pp. 29,

30), I do not agree with that characterization. Rather, the administrative law

judge expressly referred to plaintiff testifying to greater limitations than she

found to be supported and followed with a discussion of the objective evidence.

(R. Part 2 pp. 32–35.) Insofar as plaintiff’s testimony was not detailed in the

decision, reversal or remand is not warranted. See Anthony S. v. Bisignano,

Case No. 23–23070, 2025 WL 3204774, at *10 (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 2025) (“Even

assuming—without definitively deciding—that the ALJ erred in failing to

expressly articulate the details of Plaintiff’s subjective statements, the Court is

not persuaded that any such alleged error requires remand.”).

B. Remand is Warranted with Respect to the

Consideration of Medical Evidence

Plaintiff notes that the administrative law judge was persuaded by the

opinions of the state-agency consultants Dr. James Brown and Dr. Julie Bruno

and correctly adopted their opinions of moderate limitations in interacting,

concentrating, persisting, and maintaining pace. (Pl.’s Br. p. 25.) Despite

being persuaded, the residual functional capacity does not reflect limitations in

the ability to maintain concentration for extended periods, complete a normal

workday or workweek without interruption, accept instructions and respond to

criticism, and get along with coworkers. (Id. pp. 25, 26.) This inconsistency

is not explained, according to plaintiff. (Id. pp. 26, 27.)

The Commissioner responds that plaintiff refers to the worksheet portions

of the disability determination explanation forms that do not themselves

constitute a residual functional capacity assessment. (Comm’r Opp’n Br.

pp. 12, 13.) The Third Circuit has confirmed that this fill-in portion—unlike

the narrative portion—is not an assessment. (Id.) Dr. Brown only provided

a conclusory narrative, according to plaintiff, necessitating evaluation of the

fill-in portions. (Pl.’s Reply Br. pp. 5, 6.)

I agree with the Commissioner that plaintiff refers to the fill-in portion of

the disability determination explanation form and administrative law judges

“are not required to give any weight to these fill-in-the-blank and checklist

portions of [residual functional capacity] assessments ….” See Wise v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., 626 F. App’x 357, 360 (3d Cir. 2015). Specifically, the pages cited

in plaintiff’s brief are part of the Mental Residual Functional Capacity or

MRFC1 portion of the form. (Pl.’s Br. p. 26; see also R. Part 2 pp. 94, 104.) A

court in this District recently concluded that an administrative law judge may

assign little or no weight to the MFRC1 and that there was no error in not

explicitly considering it in formulating a residual functional capacity. See

Patrick C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Case No. 24–09154, 2025 WL 2778472, at *8

(D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2025).

More persuasive is plaintiff’s position that the narrative portions of the

forms note a moderate impairment in the ability to maintain attention and

perform detailed tasks not reflected in the residual functional capacity. (Pl’s

Reply Br. p. 6.) Indeed, both Dr. Brown and Dr. Bruno wrote that plaintiff had

“moderate impairment in the ability to maintain attention and concentration

on detailed tasks for periods of at least two hours duration over the course of a

normal workday and workweek.” (R. Part 2 pp. 94, 104.) The administrative

law judge found that the opinions were persuasive “because the mild-to-

moderate degree of mental limitation set forth in these opinions is consistent

with the evidence of record viewed as a whole.” (Id. p. 32.) Yet the residual

functional capacity provides that plaintiff “could only perform tasks involving

simple or detailed, but not complex directions, which include no more than

occasional interaction with the general public and no fast pace (assembly line

work or work with hourly quotas).” (Id. p. 22.) This apparent departure from

Dr. Brown and Dr. Bruno’s otherwise persuasive opinions is not explained and

remand is therefore warranted. See Carr v. Bisignano, Case No. 24–00945,

2025 WL 2844488, at *9–11 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2025) (finding that remand was

warranted because the residual functional capacity provided that the plaintiff

could perform “routine two to three step tasks or instructions,” inconsistent

with medical opinions found otherwise persuasive).

To be clear, remand is not intended to express judgment on the ultimate

merits of plaintiff’s claim, only that the departure from otherwise persuasive

opinions is not entirely clear. Because this question must be addressed by the

administrative law judge, plaintiff’s request for reversal (Pl.’s Br. pp. 30, 31) is

denied. See Rebecca P. v. O’Malley, Case No. 22–01869, 2024 WL 165368, at

*8 (D.N.J. Apr. 17, 2024) (finding that remand was appropriate even if the

administrative law judge might again deny benefits).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Commissioner’s decision will be

VACATED and REMANDED for further proceedings. An appropriate order

accompanies this opinion.

/s/ Edward S. Kiel

EDWARD S. KIEL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: July 30, 2026